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

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


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



NAPOLEON BONAPARTE:

HIS SAYINGS AND HIS DEEDS.

BY A. VIEUSSEUX.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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NAPOLEON BONAPARTE.

CHAPTER I.

Bonaparte's Parentage and Early Education.—His First Commission in the Artillery.—His First Campaign in Corsica.—Employed at the Siege of Toulon.—Removed to the Army of Italy.—Commands the Artillery at Paris against the Citizens.—Is appointed General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE was born at Ajaccio, in the island of Corsica, the 15th August, 1769. He was the second son of Carlo Bonaparte and of his wife Letizia Ramolino. The Bonaparte family was of the class styled "famiglie di cittadini," or notables of Corsica, a sort of native gentry; for the Genoese, who were then the sovereigns of Corsica, did not recognise any patricians, except those who were inscribed in the golden book at Genoa. The ancestors of the Bonaparte family appear to have emigrated from Genoa to Ajaccio, with a number of other colonists, about the end of the 15th century. Another family, or distant branch of the same family, of the name of Bonaparte, or rather Buonaparte, was settled already at that period in the town of San Miniato, in Tuscany, and it has since produced several men

of learning. A Niccolo Buonaparte, in the 16th century, published a comedy, entitled "La Vedova." There was also a Jacopo Buonaparte, the reputed author of a narrative of the storming and pillage of Rome, by the Imperial troops, in 1527; but his title to the authorship of the work has been disputed. Ranieri Buonaparte was professor in the University of Pisa, in the 18th century.

Carlo Bonaparte, the father of Napoleon, studied the law at Pisa, after which he returned to Corsica, where he became intimate with Pasquale de Paoli, who had undertaken to deliver his country from the arbitrary rule of Genoa; and when the Genoese, finding themselves unable to reduce the Corsicans, sold that island to France, Carlo followed Paoli through his last campaign, acting as his aide-de-camp and secretary, and his young wife, who was then pregnant with Napoleon, accompanied her husband, sharing in the hardships and dangers of a partisan warfare, over the rugged mountains of Corsica, until the defeat of the Corsicans at Pontenovo obliged Paoli to give up the unequal contest and to emigrate, leaving Corsica in possession of the French. Some physiologists might be found to ascribe to these circumstances the restless disposition of Napoleon for war; he has said himself that he never felt so happy and so well as during a campaign, when riding sixty miles in a day, and that his health generally declined in peace and repose. The final submission of Corsica to France took place in June, 1769, when Carlo Buonaparte retired to his native town, and about two months after, Napoleon was born. In his baptismal register at *Ajaccio, his* family name is spelt both Buonaparte *and Bonaparte*; the former being more in accord-

ance with the correct, or Tuscan orthography; but the second mode agrees with the common pronunciation of most Italians, who, in speaking, say bono, instead of buono. His father, and other members of his family, signed Buonaparte; but Napoleon himself, from his first Italian campaigns, adopted the signature of Bonaparte, probably because it was shorter and better adapted to French pronunciation: he became known to the world as Bonaparte, and we have adopted his own mode of spelling, as it is registered in his despatches, proclamations, and other documents, until he became Emperor, when he signed himself Napoleon solely.

Carlo Bonaparte had two uncles: Napolione, who was a magistrate, and died at Corte, in Corsica, in De Paoli's time; and Luciano, who was Archdeacon of Ajaccio. When Count Marbœuf, the French Governor of Corsica under Louis XV., convoked the three estates of that island in 1770, the family of Bonaparte was registered in the order of the nobility, and Carlo Bonaparte, as its representative, attended the assembly. He was afterwards appointed Counsellor and King's Assessor to the Judicial Court for the town and province of Ajaccio. After Louis XVI. had ascended the throne, Carlo was sent to Paris with other deputies of the nobility of Corsica, in 1777; and there he obtained, chiefly through the recommendation of Count Marbœuf, a bourse, or gratuitous admission to the College of Autun for his eldest son, Joseph; and another in the Military School of Brienne for Napoleon. He afterwards obtained likewise a pensioner's place for his eldest daughter, Marianne, in the Royal Institution of *St. Louis de St. Cyr.* Carlo found himself at that

time in straitened circumstances, owing to some law-suits he had to sustain about a disputed inheritance, and also about a marshy tract of land, called "Le Saline," which he undertook to drain and bring into cultivation, being encouraged and supported in it by the local administration, but in which task he was disappointed through the fault of an engineer, whom the Government had appointed to superintend the works.

Young Napoleon left Corsica for Brienne in 1778. There was nothing remarkable in his boyhood; he has said of himself that he was only a stubborn and inquisitive child. At Brienne, where he spent about six years, he learnt to speak French, became a great proficient in mathematical studies, but made little progress in Latin and general literature. Pichegru was for a time his monitor in the class of mathematics. Bourrienne, who was his school companion and his only friend at the time, says, that Bonaparte was noticeable chiefly for his Italian complexion, the keenness of his eye, and a certain abrupt and bitter tone in his conversation. He was poor but proud; he was looked upon as a needy foreigner by his more mercurial and more affluent school-fellows, and he felt keenly their jibes and sneers. He told Bourrienne one day, in a pet, "I don't like your French countrymen—I shall do them all the mischief I can; as for you, it is another thing, you never sneer at me—you are my friend." Bourrienne states that Bonaparte studied history assiduously, especially classical history, from which he probably *derived* those mistaken notions of glory and conquest which urged him on afterwards in his headlong career. There is a report made to the King

by M. de Keralio, Inspector-General of the Military Schools of France, in 1783, in which Bonaparte is mentioned as follows:—"Very forward in the mathematical studies—tolerably acquainted with history and geography—has made but little progress in Latin, belles lettres, and other accomplishments—bears a good character for regular conduct—would make a good sea-officer—deserves to be transferred to the Military School at Paris!" Accordingly he was transferred to Paris in October, 1784, to continue his studies, until he attained the age for entering the army. The establishment of the Paris School, and the manner of living of the pupils, were upon a footing of expensive indulgence, which shocked young Bonaparte's notions of regularity and economy. He accordingly indited a long letter to Father Berton, his late Superior at Brienne, in which he exposed the error of such a system of education, which, he said, was a bad preparation for the hardships attendant upon the military profession. Bourrienne has given a copy of this remarkable letter. In the regulations which he afterwards, when in power, drew up for his own Military School of Fontainebleau, Napoleon enforced the principles which he had thus early expressed. Meantime his spirit of observation and censure, and his active, restless disposition, appear to have attracted the attention of his superiors at the Paris School, who hastened the period of his examination, as if anxious to get rid of a troublesome guest. Having passed his examination, by the celebrated Laplace, which proved satisfactory, he was appointed second lieutenant in the artillery regiment de la Fère, and joined his regiment at Valence, on the Rhone. His father,

Carlo Bonaparte, had just died at Montpélier, an ulcer in the stomach, in the 39th year of h age, leaving a family of five boys, Joseph, Nap leon, Lucien, Louis, and Jerome; and three gir Marianne (afterwards Elise Baciocchi), Anno ciade (afterwards Pauline Borghese), and Carlet (afterwards Caroline Murat).

At Valence, Bonaparte appears to have mix in society and shared in the amusements of h brother officers, without neglecting, however, improve himself in his professional studies. H had a yearly supplementary allowance from hon probably from the old great uncle, Archdeac Lucien, who, since the death of Carlo, acted as father to his widowed niece and her childre Bonaparte remained at Valence for two or thr years. In 1788 his regiment was removed Lyon, and afterwards to Auxonne, in Burgund During these changes of quarters he obtain leave to visit the capital, Paris, which then beg to be a focus of political agitation, owing to t meeting of the States General. Our young offi of artillery caught the prevailing fever of politi excitement, and he thought of trying his pen writing for the press, like many others. He h begun writing a history of his native count Corsica, and he mentioned his attempt to the w known Raynal, to whom he had become int duced, and who encouraged him in it. About end of that year, 1789, Bonaparte went to Cors on a visit to his family, and it was from Cors that he sent the MS. of the first volume of *history to* Raynal, with a letter, the autograph *which has been* preserved, and is remarkable fo *faults of French* orthography, a slovenly hab

which Bonaparte never entirely got rid throughout life. The work was never finished, and the first volume was not printed, which Bonaparte said long after that he was glad of, as the style of the book was crude and undigested, and full of the turgid republican phraseology of those times.

Bonaparte was still in Corsica in 1790, when De Paoli, the emigrant patriot, having been recalled by a decree of the National Assembly from his place of refuge in England, was invested by Louis XVI. with the governorship of his native island. A deputation of Corsicans repaired to Paris to grace the return of their veteran leader, and escort him home, and Joseph Bonaparte was one of the deputies. Young Napoleon was introduced to De Paoli, who well remembered his father, and who now treated the son as a family acquaintance. Towards the end of 1790 Bonaparte rejoined his regiment at Auxonne, and whilst there he wrote a violent invective, in the shape of a letter, against one of his countrymen, Matteo Buttafuoco, then a deputy to the National Assembly, whom he charged with political dishonesty, and want of patriotism. He had the pamphlet printed at his own expense in the neighbouring town of Dôle, whither he used to walk from Auxonne to correct the proofs. He was living at that time in the barracks at Auxonne with his younger brother, Louis, whom he was instructing in mathematics, in the expectation of his entering the army also. When the pamphlet was printed, he sent the copies to the President of the Political Club of Ajaccio to be distributed. The style of the work is turgid and declamatory. In April, 1791, Bonaparte was transferred to the 4th Regiment of Artillery, sta-

tioned at Valence. Party spirit began to r
high at that epoch in the various regimen
Most of the officers were Royalists;—Bonapar
who professed the new ideas, had frequent alter
tions with them; but shortly after the Royal
officers followed the tide of emigration to t
banks of the Rhine, and, by so doing, they l
the field open to their democratic brethren, w
gained thereby promotion to their vacant pos
In February, 1792, Bonaparte was made a capta
and two months after he went to Paris, it appea
without leave, in order to solicit active emplo
ment. It was an epoch of general disorganizatio
when military discipline became relaxed. H
disappearance from his corps, however, was notice
and he was superseded. At Paris, where he r
mained unemployed for several months, he met h
former school-fellow, Bourrienne, who has given
graphic account of their manner of living togethe
Bonaparte witnessed the insurrection of the 20th
June, when the mob forced their way into the Tuil
ries, and he expressed to Bourrienne in strong tern
his indignation, both at the conduct of the popula
and the pusillanimity of the Court; saying, th
with a few pieces of cannon he could have swe
away all that rabble; and when he beheld th
King standing near an open window with th
red cap on his head, he cried out, "That is a lo
man!" clearly perceiving that there was an en
of the monarchy in France. He retained ev
after a strong dislike to armed mobs and arme
people in general, who were not regular soldier
On the 10th of August he was a spectator of th
attack of the Parisian populace against the Tuil
ries, and he made his remarks upon the manner

the attack and defence of the palace were
cted. He has said since, that during that
ntous crisis, had he been a general officer,
uld have fought for the King; but, being
y a poor regimental officer, he took part with
epublic, though he did not approve of its
es. Meantime he was soliciting to be ac-
employed, and he obtained at last, about the
August, a commission to serve in the expe-
under Admiral Truguet, which was to scour
editerranean, and act against the dominions of
ia, and Naples. Bonaparte was to go to Cor-
d join the expedition there. He lost no time,
to St. Cyr, near Versailles, where his sister
nne was being educated, but which institution
now suppressed by a decree of the Legislative
ably, the pupils were preparing to return to
homes; and he wrote to the Administrators
district of Versailles to ask for his sister the
ling allowance of one livre per league to
to Corsica under his care. This document,
l from the original text in the 'Supplement
e Biographie Universelle,' art. Napoleon,
ed the 1st of September, 1792, and has a
ription by his sister, stating that she should
able to leave St. Cyr, unless she availed her-
f her brother's escort to return to Corsica, as
s her only protector. The orthography,
f Napoleon and of his sister, is faulty. The
nistrators of Versailles referred the matter to
laire and Municipal Council of St. Cyr, who
ed to the petition, and made out an order for
vres, as the *travel-money* of Demoiselle Ma-
Buonaparte, to return to Corsica. The
ay Napoleon removed his sister to Paris,

and the following day both set off for the south. It was the 2nd of September, memorable for the massacre of the political prisoners at Paris. Bonaparte and his sister must have contrived to pass the barriers before they were closed, preparatory to the butchery.

Immediately upon his arrival in Corsica, Bonaparte reported himself to De Paoli and the military authorities, and was appointed to the local rank of chief of a battalion. He occupied himself in surveying the coast, especially towards the south, from whence an invasion of Sardinia was projected. In January, 1793, Truguet appeared with his fleet and some land troops before Cagliari, at the south end of Sardinia, and about the same time Bonaparte was employed with a body of soldiers and sailors in making a diversion from Bonifacio, by attacking the intermediate islands which lay between Corsica and Sardinia. He anchored off the island of La Maddalena—took possession of the little island of Santo Stefano, but failed in the attack of the larger island, with the loss of men and artillery, owing, perhaps, as much to the indiscipline of his own men, who, on one occasion, threatened to murder him as an aristocrat, as to the resistance he experienced from the natives. This was the first engagement of Napoleon Bonaparte. Truguet likewise failed in his attack upon Cagliari, and the scheme of invasion was given up. Soon after, Corsica itself revolted against France. De Paoli, indignant at the deposition and execution of King Louis, who had given him his commission, refused to acknowledge the Republic; and most of his *countrymen* followed his part, and drove the *French and* their partisans away from Ajaccio.

Corte, and other towns. The family of Bonaparte remained attached to the union with France, in which the young members of the family had placed all their expectations; and they were obliged to fly from Ajaccio and retire to Bastia, which was held by a French garrison. Their house at Ajaccio was plundered, and their little property confiscated. Napoleon was at Bastia when the Commissioners of the Convention, Saliceti and La Combe St. Michel, arrived from Toulon with reinforcements and with an order of outlawry against Paoli. Two frigates were sent to retake Ajaccio, and Bonaparte embarked in one of them. He landed at Ajaccio, and had some skirmishing with De Paoli's men, but the peasantry rushed down from the mountains in such numbers that he was glad to return on board the frigate. Soon after the English landed in Corsica, and the French were expelled from the island. Napoleon and the rest of his family emigrated to Nice, and afterwards to Marseille, where his mother with her three daughters and the two youngest boys lived for a time in great penury. Lucien obtained a situation in the Commissariat at St. Maximin, near Marseille, and Joseph found also some sort of employment until he married, a year or two after, the daughter of a wealthy merchant of the name of Clari. As for Napoleon, after seeing his family safely located at Marseille, he went to Paris to seek for active employment. By dint of solicitations he obtained the confirmation of his local rank of Chef de Bataillon, and in September, 1793, was appointed to serve in the artillery at the siege of Toulon, which town had been given up by the Royalists to the English and Spanish combined forces. About this time he

wrote and published another political pamphlet, entitled 'Le Souper de Beaucaire,' being a supposed conversation between men of different parties in the South of France, which was then distracted by civil war. One of the interlocutors, a military man, speaks the sentiments of the author—recommends union and patriotism, and obedience to the decrees of the Convention. The spirit of this composition is sternly Republican; but its logic and style are superior to those of his former declamatory pamphlet against Buttafuoco. This pamphlet, which he took care to distribute among those in official stations, may have done him some service with the rulers of the day.

When Bonaparte arrived before Toulon, the besieging army had made little or no progress in its operations against the place. Its commander, Cartaux, who had been a private of dragoons before the revolution, was extremely ignorant of military matters; for in those times, although many men risen from the ranks, who had natural abilities and habits of observation and application, became good officers, others got themselves promoted through sheer impudence and an affected display of Republican fanaticism, and of the coarse revolutionary jargon then so much in fashion. Bonaparte has given in 'Las Cases' Memorial' an amusing account of his reception at Cartaux's head-quarters—of the gross ignorance and absurd vanity of the man, and of the difficulty Bonaparte found in trying to make him understand the simplest notions concerning a battery. On a trial *of one* of the guns, the shot was found not to reach *one-third of the* distance. Fortunately, Gasparin, *a representative* of the people, or Commissioner

e Convention, arrived at the camp; he had
a little service, and understood Bonaparte. A
il of war being assembled, Bonaparte told
that the shortest way to oblige the English
acuate Toulon, was to take possession of a
ontory which commands the ingress of the
ur, and on which the English had raised a
alled the Little Gibraltar. Cartaux, mean-
was recalled; his successor, Doppet, a Sa-
d physician, now transformed into a general,
the command but for a few days, and was
seded by the veteran Dugommier, who placed
confidence in Bonaparte, and gave him the
and of the whole artillery for the siege. The
h were now reinforced to more than 30,000
whilst the Allies within did not exceed
0, consisting of four or five different nations,
of which, the Spaniards, proved lukewarm in
ause. Bonaparte placed his batteries both
st the promontory and against Fort Malbous-
which commands the docks; he found him-
ngaged in a sortie made by the English, and
ed a bayonet-wound in the thigh. Having
ed his batteries, he opened a brisk fire on
Gibraltar, and being favoured by the defec-
of a body of Spaniards, who abandoned a
bt placed across the neck of the promontory,
rench stormed the fort and took it, after a
loss, on the 17th of December. Bonaparte
told Dugommier that Toulon would be his
o days at the latest. Meanwhile, Admiral
having assembled a council of war, it was de-
to evacuate *the place.* The Allies, Spaniards
Neapolitans, could no longer be depended
and the French Royalists, who had been

fighting gallantly till then, became suspicious of the English, who, it was reported, were going to abandon them to the fury of the Republicans. In such a state of affairs, the troops were ordered to embark, as well as all the inhabitants who were afraid of remaining; and the French men-of-war were ordered to be carried away or destroyed. Sir Sidney Smith was charged with the latter part of the operation. Nine ships of the line were destroyed, four more were carried away, besides frigates and smaller vessels; but, through the hurry of the moment and the want of proper co-operation on the part of the Spaniards, fourteen sail of the line and five frigates escaped destruction, as well as the arsenal, timber-yard, &c. It is here worth noticing that, while the destruction of the French fleet has been magnified and commented upon by most French writers as an act of vandalism, though it is perfectly in accordance with the laws of war and the practice of all nations, there are Royalist writers who accuse the English of having connived with the Revolutionists, and purposely sparing the best part of the fleet and the arsenal; and this they account for by the supposition of secret negotiations, which they say were going on between Austria and England on one side, and Robespierre's Committee of Public Safety on the other! Things, however, are better known in England. It is well known that Sir Sidney Smith's instructions were to destroy the whole French fleet, and that he and his brave sailors did all that mortal men could do to that effect; amidst the fire of the *enemy's* batteries, the explosion of fire-ships and *of powder-magazines*, the resistance of the Jacobins *and galley-slaves*, and all the other fearful circum-

stances of that night of horrors. The best account we have seen of that memorable transaction is in Macfarlane's excellent history of the 'French Revolution;' an account derived not from party surmises or garbled statements, but from authentic documents from 'W. S. Rose's Naval History,' 'Lord Hood's Despatches,' 'Schomberg's Naval Chronology,' &c.

The Allied fleet sailed away at last, having taken on board 14,000 of the unfortunate inhabitants. The Republican troops had by that time entered the town, butchering all whom they met. Afterwards they proceeded in their revolutionary vengeance in a more systematic manner. Several hundreds of poor workmen and labourers who had been employed by the Allies in repairing the fortifications, were assembled in a square and exterminated by musket-shot. A number of others were guillotined. Barras, Fréron, Fouché, and the younger Robespierre presided over these massacres as Commissioners of the Convention. Bonaparte and the regular troops had nothing to do with them; they were executed by what was called the Revolutionary Army, a set of wretches from Paris and other towns who followed the march of the armies as volunteers.

Dugommier recommended Bonaparte to the Executive Committee at Paris for promotion, and, meantime, employed him to inspect and fortify the coast of Provence, in the course of which he ran some risk at Marseille from some fanatical Jacobins who took it into their heads that he was erecting new Bastilles to *enslave the* people. In February, *1794, he received his* commission of Brigadier-*General, and joined the* army of Italy, at Nice.

under General Dumorbion, who had with him General Masséna, who was already rising to military fame. It is said that Bonaparte's plans and suggestions were of great use to the French in the following campaign, in which they conquered Saorgio, Oneglia, and all the summits of the Alps, from which they could infest the fair valleys of Piedmont which lay at their feet. Masséna pushed on as far as Ormea, in the valley of the Tanaro. In order to surprise and circumvent the Piedmontese positions, the French had openly violated the neutral territory of Genoa, and they intended to carry on their schemes much further at the expense of that weak Republic. The envoy of the French Republic at Genoa, a former noble of the name of Tilly, but now professing the most headlong republicanism, had undertaken to effect a revolution in that city, to subvert the aristocratic government which had received and acknowledged him as the agent of a friendly power, and to make Genoa the focus of a great conspiracy against the other powers of Italy. Such practices were then common to the diplomatic agents of the French Republic wherever they were allowed to instal themselves: they scrupled not to abuse the respect paid to their public character, the confidence reposed in them, by betraying and conspiring against those who trusted them, because, they said, there was no faith to be kept with aristocrats. This they did at Genoa, at Florence, at Naples, at Venice; this they attempted to do at Rome, but the Roman *populace* killed the agent, Basville. In the case of Tilly, however, the Revolutionary Committee at Paris seem to have been overreached. There is

markable report made by St. Just to the Com-
ee of Public Safety, in 1794, not long before the
of Robespierre, in which he states that revolu-
ary intrigues at Genoa had been carried on since
ch, 1793 ; and millions of livres had been sup-
by the French Revolutionary treasury to Tilly
other agents for organizing a grand conspiracy
Genoa, and all over Italy, by which all the
ing sovereigns, nobles, and priests of that
try were to be destroyed by steel, or shots,
oison, in order to enforce the principles of
French Revolution, and by which, in the first
, the treasures of Genoa were to have come
the possession of France, and one of the gates
taly be opened to the French armies. But,
continues the report, our Chief Emissary,
, the ex-noble, has contrived to deceive and
the Committee of Public Safety, and nothing
esulted of all his boastings and promises ; not a
ch given, nor a single person poisoned, &c.
lst these intrigues were being carried on, the
missioners of the Convention, who attended the
ch army in Italy, and one of whom was a younger
ier of Robespierre, addressed to the Senate of
a a kind of manifesto, at the end of March,
, stating that they had been informed that
King of Sardinia, the old enemy of the
ese, had been promised by Austria and the
Allied powers the ultimate possession of
a, as an inducement for him to invade the
h of France, and that, therefore, the French
of Italy found itself obliged, in its own
ce, to *anticipate him*, by attacking him in
wn territories, and in its progress to pass
h the intervening tracts of the territory of

mittee of Public Safety." After this, Bonaparte does not seem to have had any further annoyance on the subject, but he was not restored to his employment in the artillery of the army of Italy, and soon after he left head-quarters and rejoined his family at Marseille, where he courted one of the daughters of the merchant, Clari, who afterwards married Bernadotte and became Queen of Sweden, and whose sister had lately married Joseph Bonaparte. Whilst pressing her to accept his hand, Napoleon told her one day, "Perhaps I am doomed to shine like a meteor; but I will ensure you a brilliant existence." His addresses, however, were declined, and he shortly after went to Paris, and applied to Aubry, an old artillery officer, who was President of the Military Committee, who received him coldly, and made some remarks about his being too young to command as a General officer. He, however, offered him the command of a brigade of infantry, in the army of La Vendée, which Bonaparte refused. He was then struck off the list of General Officers, and he remained unemployed at Paris for the greater part of the year 1795, and this was the most distressed period in his fortunes. He received no pay—his family was exiled from Corsica—and it was Bourrienne and Saliceti who supplied his most pressing wants. Bourrienne states, that Bonaparte had at one time an idea of going to Turkey, as a volunteer, to instruct the troops of the Sultan in the service of the artillery; and he gives a copy of a paper which Bonaparte presented to the War Office, showing the advantages that would result to France from a closer connection with the Porte. This paper, however, remained unanswered. He at last obtained

emporary employment in the Bureau Topogra-hique, being a department of the War Office in hich the plans of field operations and fortifica-ions were drawn. Meantime another crisis in the nternal affairs of France was approaching. The Vational Convention, which had ruled France for hree years, having now thrown off the yoke of Robespierre and the Terrorists, and adopting more umane and practicable views of government, had ramed a new constitution, under the inspiration of he Abbé Sieyès, with two legislative councils, a pro-erty qualification for voters on elections, and an Ex-cutive, consisting of five Directors, possessed of ery ample faculties. This Constitution, known by he name of the Constitution of the year III., was the hird Constitution proclaimed in France since the be-inning of the revolution. But the Convention, pre-ious to its own dissolution, passed a resolution to he effect that two-thirds of the members of the two ew Legislative Councils should be taken from mong its own actual members, so that the electors hould only have to fill up the other third. The new Constitution, with this supplementary clause, was aid before the primary assemblies of the people all ver France, in September, 1795, to receive their anction, and every kind of influence, legal and llegal, was employed to ensure success. In many of he departments, the Constitution and its rider were ubmitted to, as people were tired of terrorism nd anarchy, and wished and hoped for a more egular form of government, caring little about letails. But in Paris, the proposal met with a trong opposition *from various* parties, Jacobins, *Royalists, Constitutional* Monarchists, and their *arious shades and fractions*, who exclaimed

"That the Convention, after having d
France with blood, wished to perpetuate
rannical power under a new name." The e
of the sections, or districts of Paris, asse
protested against the Supplementary Claus
formed a central committee to organize resis
and called upon the national guard of Pa
support the rights of the people. From
to 50,000 national guards answered to th
On the 12th Vendemiaire (or 4th of Oct
the Convention, which sat in the Palace
Tuileries, ordered Menou, the Commanda
Paris, who had under him about 5000 r
troops, to march and disperse the insurgents.
in advancing through the narrow streets of
Menou saw muskets protruding at every do
window of the massive lofty houses, an
national guard drawn up at the entrance
Rue Vivienne, ready to give him a warm
tion; he hesitated, and fell back upon the
ries without striking a blow. The dange
appalling; the Convention was sitting in
alarm; a committee of members was del
with closed doors about the means of de
Bonaparte, who had witnessed the failu
Menou, applied at the door of the comm
room to be introduced, and after some diffi
being shown in, he explained the plan he ha
ceived for the defence of the Tuileries, i
expectation that the Sections would attac
place, and he referred to Barras, one of the
ing members of the Convention, who had n
contributed to the fall of Robespierre, as h
known him at the siege of Toulon. Barra
been a military man in his youth, and he ha

nded the guard of the Convention the year efore, when Robespierre was overthrown. He as now appointed Commandant of Paris in the lace of Menou, and he took Bonaparte for his econd in command, but in reality to do all the ctive part of the business for him. Bonaparte st no time, but sent Murat, then a cavalry fficer, to Sablons, outside of Paris, where the ark of artillery was, to bring the cannon to the 'uileries. Murat arrived at the park, with some undreds of horsemen, in the middle of the night, nd moved the guns away. On his return, it is id that he passed, in the dark, a detachment of e national guards, who were going upon the me errand; but the horsemen kept them in awe, nd the cannon was brought safely to Bonaparte, ho immediately set about placing the pieces the various avenues leading to the Tuileries, nd loaded them with grape-shot. Next morn-g, 5th of October, the drums of the Sections eat to arms, but it was not till noon that the ational guard could be formed in their respective attalions. They had no cannon. Bonaparte, as e had proposed from the first, instead of attack-g them in the narrow and intricate streets, aited quietly for their attack. Some more hours apsed in hesitation and cautious movements in dvance on the part of the men of the Sections, ho attempted to parley with the troops of the onvention, and sent flags of truce to the Assembly self, which refused to listen to them. A little fter four o'clock, their columns put themselves in otion along the *quays and the* street St. Honoré. *Vhen they arrived within* musket-shot of Bona-*rte's posts they were* summoned to disperse in

separate the Austrians from their Piedmonte allies. Dumorbion, following the advice, attacke the Austrians at Dego, in the valley of the Bormid in the autumn of 1794; but, after obtaining son partial success, he did not think himself stron enough to venture into the open country, an withdrew again to the coasts of Genoa. He how ever sent Bonaparte's plan to the war-office. Du morbion was afterwards replaced by Kellerman and Kellermann by Scherer, who, in the autumn 1795, gained, by means of his subordinates, Augu reau and Masséna, a victory over the Austria General, Argenteau, at Loano, in the Riviera Genoa, after which he placed his army in winte quarters. Bonaparte, while at Paris, recurred t his favourite scheme of invading Italy, and ha conferences on the subject with the engineer, Car not, one of the Directors, and who acted as Minis ter at War. The French Republic, having mad peace with Prussia and with Spain, was able t send considerable reinforcements to the army o Italy. The Executive Directory wished to strik a blow in that quarter, to detach the King of Sar dinia from the Coalition, oblige Austria to sue fo peace, and to obtain at the same time for Franc a permanent footing in Italy; the old traditiona scheme of French policy for centuries past. Car not approved Bonaparte's plans, and he cause them to be approved by Barras, and on the 23 of February they appointed him General in Chie of the army of Italy, in lieu of Scherer, thu placing him over the heads of officers older tha *himself,* Augereau, Masséna, Laharpe, Serrurier *and who had* already acquired fame by their success *on the same* field. An artillery officer, unacc

as Marmont has remarked, to manœuvre
of infantry and cavalry, Bonaparte made
is skill in strategy for what may have been
iency in field-tactics, which he had excel-
sion-generals to execute.

CHAPTER II.

Invasion of Italy.—Submission of the King of Sardinia.—Retreat of the Austrians and French occupation of Lombardy.—Bonaparte's Violation of the Neutrality of Venice.

GENERAL BONAPARTE arrived at the head-quarters at Nice on the 20th of March, and on the 27th he assumed the chief command.

The French army, about 50,000 strong, was stationed in cantonments along that long and narrow slip of land called the Western Riviera of Genoa, between the ridge of the Apennines and the sea-coast of the Mediterranean. The allied Austrian and Piedmontese armies, under Generals Beaulieu and Colli, were stationed on the reverse, or northern side of the Apennines, from which the numerous valleys and rivers of Piedmont slope to the northward towards the Po. The Austrian head-quarters were at Acqui, on the river Bormida, and the Piedmontese were at Ceva, on the Tanaro, more than thirty miles apart. The two armies, if united, would have been about one-third superior to the French in number, but they were scattered over a very long line, intersected by rivers and mountainous tracts, and Bonaparte determined upon forcing his way between the two armies, and fighting them separately one after the other. *Leaving* General Serrurier on his left to attack the *Piedmontese*, by the road leading from Oneglia

er the mountains, into the valley of the Tanaro, pushed on his right along the coast as far as ltri, ten miles from Genoa, as if to threaten that y, as well as the high road leading towards the ins of Lombardy, whilst he, with the main dy, took a position at the foot of the mountains, ve Savona, on the bye-roads leading over the ennines, by Montenotte, into the valley of the ro, and by the Col, or pass, of Altare, into the ley of the Bormida. This latter pass is the est of the whole Apennine ridge, being only 0 feet above the sea. Bonaparte fortified the s of Montenotte with redoubts. All this was e about the beginning of April. On the 9th that month the Austrian General, Beaulieu, rched with his left upon Voltri, from whence dislodged the French. He had ordered, several s previously, his subordinate, General Argen- u, who was stationed at Sassello, to attack on same day the central position of Montenotte. genteau however did not make his attack until 10th, when the Austrians carried two of the loubts, but the French Colonel, Rampon, who s posted with 1500 men in the third redoubt, on Montelegino, determined to defend himself the last, and repulsed all the attacks of the emy. During the night, Bonaparte moved a umn to attack the left of Argenteau, and sent other column under Masséna by the pass of tare, to turn the right of the Austrians. These vements succeeded. Argenteau having resumed, the 11th, the attack of Rampon's redoubt, nd himself *attacked in his* turn by superior *es, in flank and rear,* and made a precipitate *at to Dego, having* lost above 4000 men in

killed or prisoners. The French entered Carca and Cairo, and advanced down the valley of t Eastern Bormida, close to Dego, which t Austrians had fortified. Argenteau was great blamed for his conduct in the affair of Montenot and was dismissed the service.

On the 13th Bonaparte sent Augereau with strong division to the left, to attack the post Millesimo, in the valley of the Western Bormic which was the point of contact between the Sa dinian and Austrian armies. General Prove who was posted there with 1500 Piedmonte grenadiers and a few Austrian irregular troo finding himself cut off from the main body of t Austrians, as well as from the Piedmontese arm which, being attacked by Serrurier's division, the side of the Tanaro, had gathered togeth near Ceva, withdrew to the old castle of Cossar on the top of a mountain, determined to defe himself as long as hunger and thirst would all him, as he had neither provisions nor water. I held out the whole of that day and night: thr times the French assaulted the castle, and thr times they were repulsed with great loss; two their general officers were killed, and anoth Joubert, was wounded. The next day, 14th Apr Bonaparte attacked the Austrian position of M gliani, near Dego, and after much resistance c ried it, and drove the Austrians lower down t Bormida, towards Acqui. The gallant Prov who, from his hill castle, could see the result the fight, having lost all hope of succour, and *men being* tormented by hunger and thirst, w *obliged to* capitulate, which he did upon hono *able conditions*. The combat of the 14th has

called the Battle of Millesimo, though the decisive contest was at Magliani. The following night the rain fell in torrents, and the French, harassed by five days' fighting, and having driven the enemy, as they thought, far away, were resting themselves at Magliani and the hamlets around it, in fancied security. All at once, at break of day, an Austrian division, 5000 strong, under General Wukassowich, came across the mountains from Sassello, expecting to find their countrymen at Magliani. Perceiving their mistake, they charged resolutely into the village, and carried it as well as the redoubt, driving the French before them. At last, Masséna succeeded in rallying the fugitives, and leading them again to the charge to recover the village. Laharpe with another division hastened to his assistance, but the Austrians maintained their ground in the village and redoubt, occasioning great loss to the assailants. Bonaparte hearing of this strange occurrence, hurried to the spot with fresh troops, and, by a desperate effort, drove the Austrians out of Magliani. Wukassowich lost about 1600 men and his cannon; the French loss was about 800, including two Generals. This battle of the 15th has been called in the French narratives the Battle of Dego, because it was fought near the town of that name. The Austrians after this withdrew by Acqui and Alexandria towards the Po, and the French were thus left at liberty to turn all their strength against the Piedmontese army, stationed near Ceva, which had taken as yet very little part in the great struggle. General Colli, who commanded it, was a well-instructed but cautious officer; and he seems to have thought it his chief duty to guard the ap-

proaches to his royal master's capital, Turin, w
out depending too much upon Austrian co-op
tion. There was, besides, an old hereditary jeal
of the Piedmontese towards the Austrians, ar
latent hope of sharing with France the spoil
Austria, and adding part of Lombardy to
Sardinian dominions; there was also a knot
partisans of democracy and of France, who, tho
not numerous, were active and intriguing.
forms of the court of Turin were stiff and a
quated; its system of administration was rigid
absolute, as may seem by reading the Memoir
Count Alfieri; and several of the younger mem
of the nobility, and many of the middle class
brooked the constraint, ecclesiastical and polit
under which they lived. This may be asserte
have been the condition of all the Italian Sta
the discontented, the revolutionary, were fo
among the higher and the educated classes;
lower orders, the mass of the people, were decid
royalists, and the revolution cannot be said, sp
ing correctly, to have been *popular* in that cour
as it was in France. But the people had no v
in the government, they had not the least shar
the administration, and therefore their good will
of little service to the sovereigns, who were
trayed or ill advised by some of the very nob
and courtiers who shared the power with them

Bonaparte marched by his left to Ceva in
valley of the Tanaro, where he was joined by
rurier, who had advanced along the left ban
that river. Colli, afraid of being surroun
abandoned his camp of Ceva in the night of
16th of April, and, after some sharp fighting,
dually fell back to Fossano, on the river S

ween Coni and Cherasco. The town of Mon-
i was taken by the French and plundered, after
hort fight, which was magnified into a battle.
aparte then sent forward a division, which took
a, on the Tanaro, below Cherasco, thus
atening the left flank of the Piedmontese,
lst he attacked Colli in his front. Colli then
ught proper to retire farther back to Carma-
la, about twenty miles from Turin. On the 25th
April the commandant of Cherasco, a fortified
e with a garrison of 2000 men, and immense
es of ammunition and provisions, surrendered it
he first appearance of Bonaparte's aide-de-camp,
rmont, who had been sent to reconnoitre. A panic
ed the court of Turin, and the party who were
peace with France at all price circumvented
old king, and persuaded him to treat with the
nch government and separate himself from his
es. Bonaparte himself, many years after, ac-
wledged how injudicious was this resolve; for
king had an army yet unbroken, a loyal and
like population, a strong country studded with
resses, and the example of his ancestor and
nesake, who, in worse circumstances, never de-
ired of his cause, and at last defeated the French
ler the walls of Turin. Bonaparte said that if
King of Sardinia had held out a fortnight
ger the French would probably have been
iged to retrace their steps across the mountains
m whence they had come.

The king sent ambassadors to Paris to negotiate
peace, and commissioners to Bonaparte's head-
arters at Cherasco to demand an armistice.
naparte, as a first condition, required to be put
ossession of the fortresses of Cuneo, Ceva, and

Tortona—three of the keys of Piedmont. This being consented to, the armistice was concluded the 28th of April. On the 15th of the following May peace was concluded at Paris between the King of Sardinia and the French Directory, and such a peace as had seldom been seen, as the French general Pommereul acknowledges in his narrative of that campaign. The king gave up to France, until the general continental peace, his frontier fortresses of Susa, Exilles, Assiette, Château Dauphin, and Alessandria, besides the three already occupied by Bonaparte, with all their artillery and stores of every kind. He gave also free passage to the French troops throughout his dominions, and made a formal cession to France of Savoy and Nice. The provinces south of the Tanaro and the Stura were to continue in the military occupation of the French, and to furnish all necessary supplies to their army. Bonaparte had written to the Directors, after the conclusion of the armistice, that they might dictate to the King of Sardinia the conditions they pleased; that if they did not consent to grant him peace, they must give him fair words for a while until after the conquest of Lombardy, when it would be safer to march upon Turin and depose the king; for otherwise, whilst he, Bonaparte, was marching upon Milan, the Piedmontese army in his rear might play him a bad trick.

Before moving his head-quarters from Cherasco, Bonaparte issued an order of the day to his soldiers, in which, after praising them for what they had done, and telling them that there remained much *more* for them to do, he warned them against *indulging in* plunder and other excesses, which he was

etermined to punish severely. Several of his fficers, especially Laharpe and Serrurier, had bitrly complained of the violence committed by their ien on the first irruption into Piedmont.

Beaulieu, who had collected about 15,000 men ear Alessandria, made some demonstrations to sist Colli; but when he heard of the defection of he court of Turin, he gave up Piedmont as lost, nd thought only of defending the frontiers of the Austrian dominions in Lombardy. He therefore rossed the Po, and took a defensive line along the eft bank of that river. In the convention with the King of Sardinia, Bonaparte had especially stipuated that the fortified town of Valenza on the Po hould be garrisoned by French troops. Other roops were directed upon the same point, and Beaulieu expected that the passage of the river vould be attempted there. Bonaparte, however, tarting from Tortona with a division of grenadiers nd his cavalry, marched rapidly along the right r southern bank of the Po, entered the territory f Piacenza, and crossed the river on the 9th of May, in the rear of the Austrian army, which, hanging its front, hastened to oppose the advance f the French upon Milan. An engagement took place at Fombio, in which the Austrians were outed. Beaulieu retired behind the Adda, a rapid stream: Bonaparte followed him without delay, nd forced the passage of the bridge of Lodi amidst tremendous fire from the Austrian artillery—not ithout a considerable loss. It has been said that he Austrian commander had not placed his infantry near enough to support his guns; but the eal fact seems to be, that Beaulieu only made a *tand at Lodi with his* rear-guard in order to have

time to effect his retreat with his stores and artillery. Having effected this he fell back upon the strong fortress of Mantua; and Bonaparte took possession of Milan, the capital of Lombardy, on the 14th of May. The Milanese, in general, saw the French conquerors with feelings rather of wonder and awe than of either satisfaction or hostility. The country, naturally fertile, was rich and thriving: it had enjoyed half a century of peace under the administration of Austria, which, in the reigns of Maria Theresa and Joseph II., had effected many useful reforms, with an enlightened, liberal spirit. Republican ideas existed among a few, but there were many who sided with the French, in order to share the advantages of their ascendancy; besides which Milan soon became the rallying-point of discontented emigrants from all the other Italian States, who had, or thought that they had, more reason than the Milanese to complain of their respective rulers. They formed patriotic clubs, made speeches, published papers, in which they lauded the French and Bonaparte to the skies. Bonaparte himself assumed a rather distant and supercilious demeanor towards them, but many of the French officers and soldiers fraternized with the Italian republicans. But the French army must be supported, equipped, and paid by the conquered countries; and money must, besides, be drawn from Italy, and in no small quantities, to recruit the finances of the government. Such was the system of the Executive Directory. "The Milanese territory," thus wrote Carnot to Bonaparte, in the *name of the* Directory, "must be treated most *rigorously*. Impose upon it contributions in cash *to be paid* immediately during the first ter

caused by the arrival of our troops. The canals and other great public works ought not to be altogether exempt from the contingencies of war; but a certain prudence is required in this. Let the troops of the Republic stationed in that fertile country live upon its resources: the harvest is near at hand. The army of Italy must not draw anything from France. . . . . With regard to the Duke of Parma, he must be punished for his obstinacy in not detaching himself from the coalition: his territories must supply us with everything we want, in kind as well as in cash; but his connexion with Spain obliges us to keep measures with him, and not to commit any useless devastation in his dominions; in short, to treat him better than our other enemies."

These injunctions were punctually obeyed, except the odious suggestion about the canals and other public works, of which Bonaparte afterwards testified his abhorrence. He put upon the duchy of Milan a contribution of twenty millions of livres, and he authorised the commissaries to seize horses, carts, and provisions of every sort, giving cheques in return upon the local administration. This was done with a certain regularity in the towns, but in country places the commissaries and the military often seized what they liked without any return for it. The horses and carriages of the nobility were confiscated as belonging to aristocrats. All property belonging or supposed to belong to the Austrian government was sequestrated. The furniture, books, and other moveables found in the palaces of the Archduke Ferdinand, ex-governor of Lombardy, were sold by auction. But an act which exasperated the Milanese was the spoliation

of the Monte di Pietà, a sort of institution which existed in all Italian cities, being a place of deposit for plate, jewels, and other valuables, belonging to people of every class, but mostly to the trading and working classes, which were left there under the guarantee of the laws as pledges for money lent upon them. The Monte was broken into by order of the commander-in-chief and of the commissioners of the Directory who accompanied the army; the more valuable deposits were seized and sent to Genoa to be at the disposal of the French government. Bonaparte gave orders that the smaller deposits should be untouched or restored; but in the disorder of the seizure many of them had disappeared, and a report was spread through Milan that all had been taken away. This spoliation of the Monte di Pietà became afterwards a customary occurrence in most of the Italian cities occupied by the French army. In these and other similar discreditable transactions, which became of common occurrence in every part of Italy occupied by the French for the next three years, the military commanders, commissaries, and other agents were assisted by many Italians who had embraced their part in order to glean in such a harvest. They pointed out where valuable objects were to be found, and they went to find them out, and deliver them into the hands of the French. It is remarked by a French writer in the Supplement to the 'Biographie Universelle' that the acknowledgments given for the valuables taken away from churches and other public establishments are signed by Italians, and that not a French *name appears* on them. Many of these however *belong to a* later period, after Bonaparte had left

taly. A collection of these original documents, r *procès-verbaux*, as the French style them, has een made by a French gentleman, M. Villenave : hey are all dated the year VI. (1797-8), and entitled 'In the name of the French Republic," bearing the egend of "Liberty and Equality." Some of them re remarkable for the miscellaneous nature of the lunder. One *procès-verbal* states the delivery f a golden chalice weighing six and a half pounds, ine other chalices, seven silver lamps, sixteen ilver candlesticks, eight flower vases, censers, tatues, basins, saucers, coffee-spoons, trays, hand-ells, &c., all of silver. Another mentions a sack ontaining several packets of silver utensils of the ountry churches of the province of Perugia, with-ut specifying either the objects or the weight. hese acknowledgments are signed by men calling hemselves agents of finance, and are countersigned y the superiors of the churches thus plundered. Under General Bonaparte things were done with nore regularity ; but still many irregularities and violences were committed which he did not know r could not prevent, as he himself acknowledged. The spoliation of the Monte di Pietà, and the violences perpetrated in the country, gave rise to opular insurrections in various parts of Lombardy. The inhabitants of Beinasco, a large village be-tween Milan and Pavia, rose in arms and killed everal French, and partisans of the French whom he people stigmatized as Jacobins. The insurrec-ion spread rapidly in that quarter, the bells rang o alarm, and a multitude of country people ran o Pavia, *where they were* joined by the lower *rders in that city,—for* it must be observed that in *ly it was the peasantry* and the working classes

in general that were most inimical to the French
On the 23rd of May, Pavia, a large city wit
about 30,000 inhabitants, was in open revol
The French soldiers that were in the town shu
themselves up in the castle; those who were foun
about the streets were seized and ill used; som
were killed; the rest had their lives saved by th
interference of the municipal magistrates, wh
protected them at the risk of their own. Gener
Haquin, who happened to pass at the time on h
way to head-quarters, was assailed by a franti
mob and wounded, but was saved by the magi
trates and concealed in the town-house. In a
this tumult the country people were the chi
actors. Bonaparte was at Lodi, on the point
following up Beaulieu, when the news of the ir
surrection in his rear reached him. He hastene
back to Milan, and induced the Archbishop Vi
conti to proceed to Pavia in order to persuade th
people to lay down their arms. Meantime he ser
Lannes with a strong column against Beinasc
which was stormed and set on fire. All peopl
taken with arms in their hands were put to deatl
Bonaparte himself advanced against Pavia. Th
archbishop, who preceded him, harangued th
multitude from the balcony of the town-hous
explaining to them their danger, their inabilit
to resist the French regular troops, and exhorte
them to lay down their arms and disperse quietl
But the ignorant and deluded people would n
listen to his advice, and some even cried out th
the archbishop was become a Jacobin. Meantim
the French arrived, and broke open one of th
gates by means of cannon. The cavalry rushe
into the streets and sabred all they met. Mos

the country people ran out of the other gates, and the citizens retired to their houses. An order of Bonaparte required the inhabitants to give up their arms of every description immediately, which was obeyed. Then came a second order by which the city of Pavia was given up to pillage for twenty-four hours. During the rest of that day, the 25th of May, and the whole of the following night, the soldiers rioted in plunder, violence, and debauch in the houses of the unfortunate Pavese. Murder however was not added to pillage and rapes, and it is recorded that several of the French officers and soldiers spared the honour and property of those who were at their mercy, and screened them at the risk of their lives from their more brutal companions. Next day, the 26th, at 12 o'clock, the pillage ceased; but Pavia felt for a long time after the effects of this cruel treatment. It is not true, as some have stated, that the municipal councillors were shot; General Haquin interceded for them, stating how kindly they had behaved to him, and they were only sent for a time as hostages to France. Three or four of the leaders of the insurrection were publicly executed, and about one hundred more had been killed in the first irruption of the French. The university, and the houses of the professors, among whom was the celebrated Spallanzani, were spared from pillage by an express order of Bonaparte.

Such scenes are of common occurrence in a town taken by storm, and the excuse is that it is impossible to prevent soldiers rushing in with arms in their hands from doing what they please. But *Pavia was not so situated*; the defence was *contemptible; and the people* had given up their

arms. The pillage therefore was not tolera
authorized; it was meant as a punishmen
know that an insurrection in the rear of
is a most dangerous contingency, and tha
laws of war, which are founded upon self-p
tion, it must be severely punished. But
degree and measure of the punishment ar
the discretion of the commanding officer, a
a heavy responsibility indeed. In the pres
Bonaparte wanted to prevent a repetition
tempt which might have proved most disas
his army. He wished to terrify the people
bardy, but he knew that it was the country
and not the respectable quiet citizens of Pa
had risen. And yet it was upon those very
that the punishment chiefly fell. And what
ment! To have the domestic privacy
houses violated by an infuriated and lust
diery; their wives and daughters literally
under their own eyes, and their property
away or wantonly destroyed! There was
tality of the deed. Had Bonaparte ordered
real insurgents taken with arms in their han
tried by military law and executed; had
levied a severe contribution on the town
having resisted the insurgents; no one, cert
military man, could have blamed him: but t
blooded pillage and rape were totally inex
Much of the property of the inhabitants
stroyed; it ruined them, and did no good to
diers. It was no fit of passion, or revenge,
fluenced Bonaparte on this occasion, for
himself cool and temperate; it was a matter
blooded calculation in order to strike terro
future. The means, however, were ill-cho

disgraceful usage of the women of Pavia could not have had any great effect on the minds of the country people, for the town and country populations were quite distinct, if not alien, from each other in feelings, in those times. It was also a dangerous precedent for a soldiery already but too inclined to lawless acts, and it could not but demoralize the army still more. The burning of Beinasco, a country village which had begun the revolt, was not half so horrible as the coolly calculated enormities of Pavia.

Agreeably to the injunctions of the Directory, Bonaparte granted an armistice to the Duke of Parma, on condition of his paying two millions of livres, furnishing 1700 horses with harness, besides corn and bullocks for the army, and twenty of his choice paintings to be sent to Paris. This last condition was the beginning of the systematic spoliation of the national museums and galleries in the countries occupied by the French. Bonaparte requested of the Directory a supply of artists and scholars to assist him in choosing the best paintings, sculptures, and MSS. in the galleries, churches, museums, and libraries of Italy, in order to enrich the museum of the Louvre. A number of paintings were seized at Milan for the same purpose. The Duke of Modena, Ercole d' Este, alarmed for his own safety, had fled to Venice, carrying with him his treasures, which were said to be considerable. He left a regency at Modena, which, as Bonaparte drew near, sent to sue for peace. It was absurd to consider such petty states as Parma and Modena as being at war with France, *against* which they had com*mitted no actual hostilities*; but the Duke of Mo*dena was allied to the* House of Austria by the mar-

riage of his daughter Beatrice with the Archduke Ferdinand, and he was, moreover, considered as a feudatory of the Emperor of Germany; and the ministers of the Directory, among whom was Talleyrand, were well acquainted with diplomatic history. Bonaparte granted the duke an armistice to give him time to send envoys to Paris to negotiate a peace, for which respite the duke was obliged to pay seven millions and a half of French livres, and two millions and a half more in provisions and ammunition, and to give up twenty of his best paintings. After all this, however, the peace was not granted, and the duke was dispossessed of his dominions. Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that he had placed at Genoa seven or eight millions in cash, bills, bullion, and jewels at its disposal.

On the first news of the rapid successes of Bonaparte, the Directory wrote a long letter dated the 7th of May, in which, after many praises and congratulations, they desired him after having conquered the Duchy of Milan to divide his army into two, one to remain in Lombardy under General Kellermann, who was already in command of the army called of the Alps, and the other, under Bonaparte himself, to march into central Italy, and pay a visit to the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Pope. The grand duke, though a brother of the emperor, was an independent prince; he had been the first among all the sovereigns of Italy to enter into terms of friendly relations with the French republic, and he kept an envoy at Paris. The Directors, however, instructed Bonaparte to march into his territories, seize Leghorn, and sequestrate all the property belonging to English, Austrian, Neapolitan, and Portuguese subjects; and to make the grand duke

comprehend that this "vigorous measure was one of necessity, in order to destroy the overbearing influence of the English in the port of Leghorn!" This alluded to the English having made that port the principal deposit for their goods, and also for provisioning their garrisons in Corsica, and their fleet; which was no more than availing themselves of the facilities of a neutral port, not blockaded. In another part of the letter it is said that one of the objects of the march upon Leghorn was to facilitate the reconquest of the island of Corsica from the English, and to drive them out of the Mediterranean.

The contents of this letter gave Bonaparte considerable uneasiness; he saw that the Directors feared that he might become too powerful at the head of his victorious army, and therefore wished the command to be divided. They had not relished the peremptory manner in which he had granted an armistice to the King of Sardinia; they particularly dwelt in their letter upon "their satisfaction that he had, previous to concluding the armistice, consulted with Saliceti, their commissioner to the army of Italy, as the commissioners of the government were the proper authorities for all diplomatic negotiations on the spot." In fact, ever since the beginning of the campaign, Bonaparte had shown very little deference towards Saliceti and his brother commissioner Garreau, and on one occasion had even told them that they were no longer, as formerly, the representatives of the people, but were agents of the government, subject to the authority of the commander-in-chief.

Bonaparte lost *no time* in replying to the *Directory. He told them* plainly that they might *choose either Kellermann* or himself for the supreme

command in Italy, but that a divided command he should not retain. "Kellermann," said he, in a confidential letter to the Director Carnot, "may do as well as I, especially as I am convinced that our victories are mainly due to the courage of the army; but to place Kellermann with me in Italy would be to spoil every thing. I cannot serve willingly with a man who thinks himself the first general in Europe; besides, I am of opinion that it is better to have one bad general than two good ones." In his official letter to the Directory, he told them that the complicated operations in Italy required a single general, unfettered in his movements. "I have hitherto carried on the campaign without taking anybody's advice, and I should not have done any good had I been obliged to conciliate the opinions of others. My actions have been as quick as my thoughts. If I were to be hampered in my operations by the commissioners of the government,—if the commissioners should have the power of altering my plans, and changing the disposition of the divisions of the army, you must expect no good result. Divide your forces in Italy, take away the unity of military direction, and you will lose the finest opportunity of dictating the law to your enemies. The present position of our affairs in Italy requires one general possessed of your entire confidence; if I am not to be that general I shall not complain, and I will endeavour to win your esteem in any other capacity. Every commander has his own method for making war. General Kellermann has more experience than I have, and may do better than I can, but he and I *together we* shall spoil the business." After the *receipt of this* letter the Directory insisted no

r about the partition of the forces, nor about
ppointment of Kellermann to the army of
ardy, but allowed Bonaparte to go on in his
ay.
er the battle of Lodi, Beaulieu was no longer
ndition to keep the field; he therefore fell back
the Mincio to reinforce Mantua, and to retire
the remainder of his forces into the Tyrol,
ere wait for reinforcements. He had resolved
this ever since the French had crossed the
is army being reduced to about 24,000 men,
ject in making a stand at Fombio and at Lodi
retard the advance of the French so as to have
o evacuate Milan, and to remove in safety
ge stores and baggage which accompanied his
The French, living at discretion upon the
y, were not subject to the same encumbrance.
accounts for much of the difference in the
rative rapidity of the two armies throughout
r Another circumstance unfavourable to
ustrians is, that Bonaparte spared no money
cure information through his emissaries all
Italy, and especially at Venice and other
in the rear of the Austrian army, as may be
y his correspondence with Lallement, who
inister of the French republic to the Venetian
ment. It is said also that several of the
h royalist emigrants, who had taken refuge
Venetian territories, were in active corre-
nce with Bonaparte's head-quarters. The
h minister at Genoa was likewise very useful
ocuring information, and money was not
, for it *flowed plentifully* into the military
from the contributions paid by the Italian
The Austrians had not the same resources:

theirs was a defensive war; their means limited, and the treasury of Vienna was o and economical; and they were therefore supplied with emissaries, and at times betra them. Corruption spread even among thei In retiring through the neutral Venetian pro of Brescia and Bergamo, in order to rea Austrian territory of Mantua, they found the of the walled towns, such as Brescia, close them, and the troops were not allowed to enter for, by an old agreement between Venice a Emperor, the Austrian troops to and from were allowed to pass by the shortest road, t the intervening territories of the Republic, t to enter the fortified towns. Beaulieu qu his troops outside of the town, and pursu way. Bonaparte, who, in his despatches Directory, acknowledged the neutral conduct Venetian governor, when following himself track of Beaulieu, arrived before Brescia, once entered the town, and quartered his in it, the Venetian governor protesting hi trality, but unable to oppose him by force. Senate having resolved from the first on main what they called an "unarmed neutrality," c to the advice of some of the ablest members body, had left the garrison on the main land same weak state as in time of peace, throug of giving umbrage to either one or the other belligerent powers. In order to palliate h trary conduct Bonaparte issued from the ver of Brescia a proclamation, dated 29th May, *that the* French army "which was come to *the fairest* country in Europe from the iron *the House* of Austria, was now traversing

suit of the enemy the territory of the Republic of Venice, without however forgetting the old friendships which existed between the two Republics. Religion, the government, the usages, the properties shall be respected. Whatever supplies might be wanted for the army, shall be paid in cash. Beaulieu, who had taken position on the river Mincio, upon hearing of the occupation of Brescia by the French, gave orders to his troops to occupy Peschiera, a fortified town at the issue of the Mincio from the Lake of Garda, and therefore covering the right of his position, and protecting his communications with the Tyrol. Peschiera was in a defenceless state, owing to the ill-advised system of unarmed neutrality adopted by the Venetian government; its garrison consisted of sixty invalids, the guns were without carriages or ammunition, even the drawbridges through rust and decay could not be raised. The Venetian commandant had exposed these facts to the superior authorities at Verona, but received no reply. He stated that he had not even a flag to hoist on the ramparts to show to whom the fortress belonged. He could therefore do no more than vainly expostulate with the Austrian officer who went to take possession of the place, on the 26th of May. Soon after the commander-in-chief, Beaulieu, wrote to say that having learnt that an enemy's column had taken possession of the city of Brescia, and as there was reason to fear that it might surprise Peschiera also, he had thought it necessary for the safety of the Imperial army and of the confines of the Tyrol, to occupy *temporarily the* said fortress, giving his *word that it should be restored* to the Republic of *Venice as soon as the enemy* should have withdrawn


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from Lombardy. This occupation of P
however, was used by Bonaparte as t
pretext for the overthrow of the Venet
public, and therefore it deserves particular

On the 30th of May Bonaparte's colu
tacked the Austrian line on the Minci
principal attack took place at the bridge
ghetto. Beaulieu had placed 4000 infant
some cavalry, to defend the pass. After
resistance, on the right bank, the Austria
drew across the bridge, one arch of whi
broke down. The French Colonel, Gard
the head of a body of grenadiers, waded th
the Austrians gave way—the bridge was
and the whole French column passed th
Beaulieu, afraid of having his retreat
hastened to throw a strong reinforcem
Mantua, and withdrew with the rest ac
Adige into the Tyrol. Thus ended Bonapa
campaign in Italy. Beaulieu was an a
brave old officer, but he was ill secor
some of his subalterns. The unaccounta
duct of Argenteau at Montenotte was th
ning of his reverses, and the unexpected
of the King of Sardinia which followed,
to his own resources, numerically and
inferior to those of Bonaparte. He, h
disputed the ground with spirit, and susta
great losses; he provided for the safety of
which is the main stronghold of Lombar
withdrew with the rest of his forces into t
lands of the Tyrol, ready to begin a fresh c
as soon as reinforced. But the Aulic Co
Vienna thought advisable to substitute
another commander as old, if not older

and equally brave, who, however, was doomed
ncounter still greater reverses than the much-
ured Beaulieu. We are not acquainted with
really good political as well as military history
iose Italian campaigns of 1796-97, which in-
ced so materially the fate of Europe for a
ter of a century after. Pommereul's 'Cam-
es du Général Bonaparte en Italie,' published
ymously at Paris in 1797, is merely a tran-
t of Bonaparte's and Berthier's dispatches to
Directory; orders of the day to the army; and
lamations to the Italians; papers calculated
oduce an effect for the moment, exalting the
ess of the French arms, but utterly inexact as
tails. There is another work, entitled 'Récit
rique de la Campagne d'Italie,' published in
lon, in 1808, by an Italian officer, who was
ng in the Austrian army, and was present
ost of the engagements, which corrects many
'ommereul's statements. Lastly, Bonaparte's
spondence, published by Panckoucke, and the
etian state-papers, entitled 'Raccolta di do-
nti inediti che formano la Storia diplomatica
Rivoluzione e Caduta della Repubblica di
ezia,' published in 2 vols., 4to., at Florence,
800, afford the best materials for a critical
ry of that eventful period. All subsequent
ries have been compiled, more or less critically,
these materials. Bonaparte said in his dis-
hes, that "Beaulieu was possessed of the
gy of passion, but not of that of genius; and
he generally fell into the snares which were
for him." *This may be* a plausible though
censure of his veteran antagonist; Bonaparte
have known that Beaulieu, after his separa-

tion from the Piedmontese, which was the r
of Argenteau's mismanagement, without whic
would have cut through the centre of the Fr
army, was much inferior in force to himself,
withstanding he made a bold stand twice at
and at Borghetto, and effected a very credi
retreat.

Bonaparte, in order to secure the blockad
Mantua, not only occupied and fortified Pesch
now abandoned by the Austrians, but detern
upon taking possession of the important ci
Verona, which commands the entrance of I
bardy from the Tyrol. Verona was the prin
town of the Venetians on the mainland of Ita
was respectably fortified, and had a regular th
insufficient garrison. The Senate had lately
thither as Governor-General of the mainland, th
trician Foscarini, who had been Ambassador at
stantinople, and who was a well-meaning man, f
peaceful times, but totally unqualified for the
sent emergency. They sent him, too, without
additional assistance of either troops or artil
Foscarini, immediately after the battle of
ghetto, sent a Venetian colonel to give and re
explanations concerning Peschiera. Bona
stormed and threatened against Venice, said "
he had a mind to burn Verona," and lastly,
the colonel "that he could not listen to
explanation unless from the Governor-General
self, whom he must see at Peschiera that very
ing." Upon the colonel's return, Foscarini be
greatly alarmed: he wrote to the Senate
same day, 31st May, enclosing the colonel's r
of his fruitless mission, and expressed his tre
tion at the prospect of the impending inte

d that "he was going to offer himself as ocaust for the good of his country." A Governor-General this, descended from the inded Patrician family of Foscarini! On ne afternoon Foscarini went to Peschiera, Bonaparte, who appeared to be in great received him very ill, reproaching him with allowed the Austrians to enter Peschiera, in ience of which he had been obliged to fight tle of Borghetto, with the loss of 1500 men, blood must be avenged; that he should now eschiera himself till the end of the war. He mplained that the Venetian Senate had al- the Pretender (Louis XVIII.) to reside for ars at Verona, where he had kept his court, m whence he had issued his manifestos against nch Republic, as if Verona had been the pital of the French Monarchy; in punish- r which presumption he had received orders Verona on fire, and that General Masséna rching that very evening with artillery and s for that purpose. Foscarini, who believed reat, and who had neither orders nor the o oppose force to force, tried to appease neral by showing that his government had meant to maintain a strict neutrality, and had not given orders to reinforce its garri- cc. At length Bonaparte said, "that he countermand Masséna's attack for that ut that the next day he would appear before es of Verona, which, if not opened with a race, should be forced open by cannon, and e Governor-General, would be answerable *consequences; that* if the French troops *mitted in a friendly* manner, they should

ing in the southern valleys of Piedmont. ference to dates is most essential in the na of these so often controverted and misrepr transactions.

When news of the first threatening intimat Bonaparte of the 31st of May reached Veni College of the Savj communicated the infor to the Council of Pregadi, or Senate. By the tution of that republic, the Savj formed a nent council of government, and to the addressed all the correspondence of the dipl agents abroad, of the governors of towns ar vinces, of the inquisitors of state, and other of the government.

The Savj, having examined these communi laid before the Senate, presided by the Dog papers only as they thought of importance Senate, which had the executive power, af bating the matter with closed doors, gav orders as it judged fit. It was afterwar covered at the fall of the republic, that number of dispatches and other communi amounting to more than one hundred, rece the Savj, from the beginning of the French lutionary Wars to the final overthrow of had never been laid by them before the Sen great body of which was thereby left in ign of the dangers which threatened the State. of these papers was found in the secret ar with the label, "Filza di communicate *n* in Senato," many of which are given from t in the 'Raccolta di documenti' mentioned What could be the reason of the Savj f *deceiving the* Senate? Barzoni, a Venetian *of democratic* principles, but honestly att

ountry, and who felt indignant at its treatment onaparte, in his work 'Rivoluzioni della Re- lica Veneta,' thus accounts for the conduct of Savj: These men, who were patricians and ors, could not wish the ruin of the govern- , which must involve their own; but they pusillanimous: born during the long season ace which the republic had enjoyed for more seventy years, they feared every military de- tration; faithful to the old State traditions, were afraid above all of appointing a native r to be General-in-Chief, for fear he should against the government, and they did not like point a foreigner, for fear of giving offence to elligerent powers. At one time the adventu- and brave Prince of Nassau, who happened to Venice, was thought of; but the Austrian ie Minister, Baron Thugut, who had some te feuds against him, hinted to the Venetian y at Vienna that the choice would be unac- ble to his court, and Nassau was thought of ore. The Savj had also an hereditary dread e House of Austria, so long the only formida- neighbour of Venice; they were besides un- ng to bring extraordinary charges upon the ury, which would require additional taxation; they were afraid of the Venetian maritime being cut off by the French privateers which med in the Adriatic and the Archipel. They efore clung to the fatal system of unarmed rality, flattering themselves that it would be ected by others. But after they had thus ed themselves *at the* mercy as it were of the *ch armies, Lallement*, the French Minister at *e, who had been* all along intriguing against

that very government to which he was ac
told them plainly that "they ought not t
the old maxims of international law, wh
fallen into oblivion; that all traces of
balance had disappeared from the face of
and that weak States had henceforth no
but that of a federative alliance!" And s
in reality the principles of revolutionary
from the time of Brissot to that of Bonapa

On the 1st of June the Senate was infor
Foscarini's despatch of the day before, of
tical state of affairs, and of Bonaparte'
against Venice. On that and the followi
orders were sent to the governors of Is
Dalmatia to send to Venice their respect
tingents of troops, and likewise to the com
officer at Corfu, to assemble the fleet on th
of Istria. Meantime arrived the second
of Foscarini of the 1st of June, giving an
of his interview with General Bonaparte an
impending occupation of Verona by the
troops, which added to the general alarm
Senate appointed an extraordinary Provved
Inspector-General of the Lagoons and coasts
Venice, with ample powers for the prote
the capital. These resolutions were made
tence by Bonaparte and the French Direc
accusing the Senate of hostile intentions aga
French. This puts us in mind of a certa
veller who, in describing some wild ani
Africa, said it was of a very ferocious and
nary disposition, for it turned against and a
the hunters who wanted to kill it. The
historian Daru lays a great stress upon
sumption that the Venetian government w

ided upon arming previous to Bonaparte's threat-
ng language of the 31st of May. This is denied
Botta and others; but even supposing it to have
n as Daru assumes, mere common prudence and
instinct of self-preservation would have sug-
ed those measures, as soon as the storm ga-
ed on the borders of the Venetian states, espe-
y after Bonaparte had entered the Venetian
of Brescia. The example of Genoa, Parma,
Modena, showed how little Bonaparte was in-
ed to respect a defenceless neutrality.
he Senate had decided by a large majority, ever
e April 1794, on recruiting the army, strength-
ng the fortresses, and other similar measures,
ch the Board of the Savj, to whom their execu-
was intrusted, contrived to render nugatory, for
reasons already stated. The present resolutions
une, 1797, were therefore only a confirmation
ie former decision. Daru further assumes that
present armaments were for the purpose of
ing the Austrians, at the first reverse which the
ich might experience. But the Senate had al-
y refused to join the coalition when urged to do
efore the French irruption, under circumstances
h more favourable than at the present moment,
n the Austrians had evacuated Lombardy, and
e in full retreat into the Tyrol. The whole of
u's argument is mere pleading in defence of a
cause, and his chief authority is the insidious
espondence of the French legation at Venice,
se object, as well as that of all the diplomatic
nts of the Directory in Italy, was to seek out
grievances against the existing governments.
he Senate, at the suggestion of the Inspector-
ral of the Lagoons, appointed to the com-

mand of the flotilla which was to protect the
tal, the patrician Condulmer, of whose since
idea may be formed from the fact that in
phlet which he published after the fall of the
cian government, he acknowledged that h
been long disaffected towards it, and was
those who wished for a democratic revolution.
he was not the only patrician so disposed.

CHAPTER III.

Bonaparte's Conduct towards the Pope — towards Genoa. —His Irruption into the Neutral State of Tuscany, and Seizure of English Property at Leghorn.—Campaign against Wurmser.—First Campaign against Alvinczy.—Second Campaign against Alvinczy.—Expedition against the Pope, and subsequent Peace.—Surrender of Mantua.

BONAPARTE, having formed the blockade of Mantua, hastened to fulfil the views of the Directory concerning the Pope and Tuscany. The Pope had not acknowledged the French Republic, chiefly on spiritual grounds, and was therefore considered to be in a state of war with France. A French column entered the northern Papal territories called the Legations without meeting any resistance, and occupied Bologna on the 18th June. Ferrara and Ravenna were occupied soon after. A contribution of four millions of francs was laid upon Bologna, one of the same amount upon Ferrara, and two millions and four hundred thousand francs upon Ravenna. Bonaparte repaired in person to Bologna, and there agreed to an armistice with the Papal government, in order to give the Pope time to send envoys to the Directory to negotiate a peace. All these armistices or respites granted by Bonaparte were paid for enormously dear. In the present instance the Pope was to pay twenty-one millions of francs, independent of the *contributions levied in the* Legations, and to give *up one hundred pieces of* art, between paintings

and statues or vases, and five hundred MSS., at the choice of the French commissioners who were sent to Rome for the purpose. He was, moreover, to close his ports against all vessels of the powers hostile to France, and to liberate all persons imprisoned for political motives. The French were to retain military possession of the provinces of Ferrara and Bologna, and, moreover, of the citadel of Ancona. This armistice was signed on the 23d of June. Bonaparte, however, proceeded at once of his own accord to effect the final separation of Bologna from the sovereignty of the Pope; he convoked the Senate or municipal council of Bologna, and made them swear fidelity to the French Republic. The Monte di Pietà of Bologna was stripped of those deposits which exceeded the value of two hundred livres, or about seven pounds sterling. At the same time the population were required to give up their arms. The people of Lugo, a country town between Bologna and Ravenna, being more spirited than the rest, and indignant at the vexations and outrages committed daily, not so much by the French soldiers as by their Italian followers, rose in arms for the defence, as they said, of their religion, their property, and their families. Other districts joined that of Lugo. Augereau, who commanded in those parts, sent a column against them, with a summons to lay down their arms within three hours under pain of death. The ignorant and too confident people refused to listen to the summons; the French attacked them, and after losing about two hundred men, they entered the town, which was set on fire. About one *thousand of the* inhabitants were put to death, but *the women* and children were spared. Another

rrection broke out in some districts in the nnines, on the borders of Genoa, especially at uata, which was put down by the division of nes after some loss. Severe orders were given Bonaparte, that any town or village in which renchman was killed was to be burnt; that rever the inhabitants made any resistance, the es should be burnt and the men put to death. parte wrote a threatening letter to the Senate e Republic of Genoa for harbouring in its ter- y men who infested the rear of the French , and killed the scattered French soldiers; old the Senate that, if it did not prevent excesses, he would bring fire and sword and oy the guilty villages and communes. At the time he told Faipoult, the French envoy at oa, to provide for the safety of the deposit of ey, bars, plate, and jewels, extorted from Parma Lombardy, which had been sent to Genoa to t the disposal of the Directory. The answer ipoult, dated 24th June, 1796, and which is ished in Bonaparte's correspondence, is remark-

He says that the money and bars, deposited e hands of a Genoese banker, served to pay day to day the drafts of the French treasury, nting already to about four millions of livres; as for the jewels, diamonds, pearls, &c., it necessary to take them to pieces and ascertain respective value, an operation which took a time, and must be done in his (the envoy's) nce, in order that no article should be pur- d. Besides this business, the envoy proceeds te that the old *senators of* Genoa were hostile *French, and that* a revolution was necessary, *ght be effected* by an armed force, and with

the banishment of about fifty individuals ill disposed against France. "Genoa cannot resist, if you approach it with 15,000 men and a train of cannon and mortars; but you must issue a proclamation that you only intend to liberate the people from the tyranny of a few patrician families who have monopolised all the powers of the state. Send me an engineer, who will go round the external line of fortifications, and will determine upon the mode of scaling them, and fix upon a favourable position between the outer wall and the body of the town for placing mortars and howitzers to keep Genoa in respect." Another grievance against the Senate was that the English cruisers had seized several French vessels under the guns of Genoa; which was true, but which was a retaliation for the daily infringements of neutrality committed by the French themselves. The Directory, however, wrote to Bonaparte, that for the present it would be imprudent to break openly with Genoa; but that after the affairs of Rome and Tuscany and Naples were settled, it would be then time to demand a solemn reparation for all the offences of which the government of Genoa had been guilty towards the French republic.

From Bologna Bonaparte suddenly marched upon Tuscany. The Grand Duke had not been guilty of any infraction of neutrality, but Bonaparte and the Directory did not want neutrals. They wanted the Grand Duke to close the port of Leghorn against the English, and as the Grand Duke would not or could not do that, they did it for him, intending, at the same time, to seize and *confiscate* the property of English merchants who *were confiding* in the security of a neutral state.

Some flimsy pretext was put forth about the French flag not being safe in the port of Leghorn, as the Grand Duke had not the means of resisting the English maritime forces in case they should violate the rights of neutrality as they had done at Genoa. No instance, however, was adduced of such an attempt having taken place at Leghorn; but as Bonaparte wished to surprise the English at Leghorn, he gave out that his troops were passing through Tuscany on the road to Rome. The advanced guard, commanded by Murat, having crossed the Arno, turned suddenly to the right, and appeared at the gate of Leghorn. The English residents, however, had had scent of the movement, and most of them had embarked, and had sailed in the English vessels which were in the harbour for Corsica. On the 27th of June Bonaparte entered Leghorn without opposition; he sequestrated the ships, goods, and property of every sort belonging to the English, Austrians, Portuguese, and Neapolitans; he even arrested the governor of the Grand Duke, charging him with having favoured the escape of the English, and placed General Vaubois as military commandant of the town and harbour, with a garrison of about 2800 men. Bonaparte then left Leghorn, leaving his instructions to General Vaubois to maintain strict discipline, to keep on friendly terms with the civil officers of the Grand Duke, and to conciliate the Tuscan troops, and keep a watchful eye upon them. But after his departure many acts of violence were committed by the French agents and commissaries which Bonaparte himself exposed in a letter to the Directory, dated 20th July. "A swarm of *Genoese speculators has* pounced upon Leghorn to

enrich themselves with the spoils" (meaning th
property of English and others which had bee
seized and ordered to be sold by auction). "
have written to our Consul Belleville, who is g
nerally esteemed, that he will be personally answe
able for all dilapidations. I herewith enclose tw
letters of General Vaubois; the Leghornese me
chants are treated with a harshness greater tha
that used towards English merchants; this h
given alarm to the mercantile interest all ov
Italy; we are looked upon as Vandals; even t
merchants and people of Genoa, till now favou
able to us, have turned against us." It appea
that the native and other neutral merchants
Leghorn were ordered to give an account of a
property and balances in their hands belonging
their English correspondents and other subjects
the powers at war with France, and that to avo
this breach of trust the Leghornese agreed to p
five millions of livres as a ransom for the whol
" If our conduct in administrative matters," Bon
parte goes on to say, " is detestable, our politic
behaviour towards Tuscany is no better. I a
stained, whilst there, from issuing any proclam
tion, or any other act of government. You wi
see by the annexed proclamation how little my i
tentions have been attended to. The idea of drivi
away the emigrants not only from Leghorn b
from fifty miles around in virtue of a proclamatio
is as useless as it is ill-advised. The emigrants
Leghorn are very few, and the Grand Duke h
already ordered their removal. It would have be
much more simple to cause the Tuscan authoriti
to arrest three or four of them; the rest wou
soon have gone off of their own accord. This

ıssuming jurisdiction over fifty miles of
a very bad effect, unless we mean, con-
e instructions you have given, to assume
l the policy of ancient Rome." Vaubois,
vith what he saw, but could not prevent,
his recall.

n for the French aggressions at Leghorn,
sh Admiral Nelson presented himself
ıdron before Porto Ferrajo, a fort and
the island of Elba, on the 9th of July,
oned the Tuscan governor to admit a
rrison into the fortress, in order to pre-
French from taking possession of it, as
lone at Leghorn. Nelson at the same
d troops, and constructed a battery which
d the town. The governor, unwilling to
place bombarded, and perhaps thinking
e of the two belligerents must take pos-
the place, it was better to have the Eng-
brought in money, than the French, who
way, opened the gates to the English
er duly protesting in the name of his
and bargaining for the neutral rights of
, who were not to contribute in any way
port of the British garrison. Miot, the
inister at Florence, made a great noise
claiming against English perfidiousness
n connivance, as if the French had not
first example of violated neutrality at

Bonaparte received the news more
he expected them; he had intended to
o Ferrajo himself, but he had not the
ıand, and *he wrote* to the Directory that
nglish were masters of the sea, and Elba
nd, it would have been difficult to pre-

vent them from taking it. In the present condition of affairs in Italy," said he, "we must not rouse new enemies against us, but wait for the end of the ensuing campaign. You will then perceive that it is not advisable to leave the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in the hands of a brother of the Emperor of Germany; but till then, I should advise you not to indulge in any threats or hostile steps against the court of Tuscany." The general who gave all these wary suggestions was a soldier of fortune, only twenty-seven years old, but he had all the Italian perspicacity and craft of the age of Machiavelli. The cunning of the Directory was vulgar and low; that of Bonaparte was allied to great political foresight. As for considerations of moral justice, they were altogether out of the question with both.

When Bonaparte left Leghorn to return to his army in Lombardy, he visited the small neighbouring town of San Miniato, near the banks of the Arno, where a collateral branch of the name of Bonaparte had been settled for many generations. The actual representative of this branch was an old canon, who received the General as a relative of whom he might well be proud; and as Bonaparte before leaving him inquired if he could oblige him in any thing, the canon with disinterested simplicity asked him to use his influence with the Pope to obtain the canonization of a long-deceased member of the family, one Bonaventura Bonaparte, who had lived a holy life, and died in odour of sanctity.

In the first days of July Bonaparte was again with the army in Lombardy, directing the operations for the siege of Mantua. That fortress lies on an island in the midst of a lagoon formed by the

incio, and can be approached only by nar-
seways. Art had strengthened the already
osition so as to render it nearly impregnable,
through hunger. The court of Vienna
30,000 men from its armies on the Rhine,
ered them to march into the Tyrol to join
ins of Beaulieu's army. Marshal Wurmser,
n officer of considerable reputation, was
l with the supreme command of this new
army of Italy. Bonaparte in his dis-
ated Roverbella, 4th of July, calculated its
at about 49,000 men, besides 10,000
light troops or militia, and the 8000 men
garrison of Mantua. He stated his own
the field at 44,000, with which he took a
along the river Adige, and the southern
y of the lake of Garda, his extreme right
on the Venetian fortress of Legnago, of
e had unceremoniously taken possession.
te from Verona on the 24th of July that
r was moving down large columns by the
of the Adige and of the Brenta:—"We
bservation, ready at the first opportunity to
e Adige, and resume the offensive. Woe
r of us who makes a blunder in his calcu-
"

right column of the Austrians, under Quos-
h, marched along the western shore of the
Garda, attacked a French division at Saló,
it, and advanced to Brescia, which the
ns entered on the 29th of July. At the
me Marshal Wurmser with the main body
army descending along the valley of the
forced the defile of La Corona, and entering
s, drove the French centre under Masséna

back upon Castelnovo, and pushed for
relieve Mantua. Another Austrian colum
ened Verona. Bonaparte was a mome
plexed on which side to face the enemy;
resolved to march against Quosnadowich, b
could effect his junction with Wurms
quickly raised the siege of Mantua, lea
cannon in the trenches, burning part of
riages, and carrying off or destroying as
he could of the stores. Collecting his divi
marched them rapidly against the Austria
which being too extended gave way after a
resistance, and evacuated Brescia, Saló,
and Desenzano, and retired again into the h
bordering on the Tyrol. This took place
first days of August. Meantime Wurm
reached Mantua, where the garrison recei
in triumph, and they set about destroy
trenches made by the French, and brin
more than a hundred pieces of heavy o
which had been abandoned, and collectin
and provisions for the fortress. Wurmse
ever, was losing a precious time, during w
right wing under Quosnadowich was being
by the French. Wurmser had heard of
tenant's first successes, but did not susp
Bonaparte would have had time to col
forces and overwhelm Quosnadowich in so
period. When he received the news he
out of Mantua by the road to Brescia, s
and routed the French division of General
at Castiglione, thus threatening the flank
naparte's army, whilst Quosnadowich,
recruited his forces, moved down aga
Saló, drove away the French and adv

, which he also took, and was on the point
ing his junction with Wurmser at Castigli-
This was an anxious moment for Bonaparte,
as been stated that he proposed falling back
Po, which would in all probability have
the fate of the campaign against the French,
Augereau advised him strongly to try his
once more, and lead his men boldly into
Augereau himself attacked the Austrians'
d guard at Castiglione, on the 3rd August;
stance was obstinate, but a concealed move-
ade by a French division in the rear of the
n position decided the affair, and the
obtained possession of Castiglione before
er had time to arrive with the main body of
y. This was the first battle of Castiglione,
ch both parties sustained a severe loss.
r sharp engagement had taken place at the
ime between the Austrian right and the
under Masséna, at Lonato. A French
under General Pigeon attacked Lonato,
repulsed by the Austrians with the loss of
ld pieces, and the General was made pri-
The Austrians then extended their front
to surround Masséna's corps, when Bona-
oved his reserve, attacked the centre of the
ns, and drove it back towards Desenzano, on
e of the lake, from whence, however, Quos-
ch managed to withdraw his troops towards
This was called the battle of Lonato. On
of August Bonaparte with the main body
army gave battle to Wurmser in front of
one; but at *first he* made a feint attack,
retired, in order to draw out the Austrians,
division under General Fiorella, stationed

at Pozzolo on the Mincio, was turning their
flank. This stratagem succeeded. The Austri
attacked in front and flank, gave way after a st
born resistance, and withdrew behind the Min
This was the second battle of Castiglione, in wh
Augereau acted an important part by attacking
Austrian centre, and it was for both these ba
that he afterwards obtained the title of Duk
Castiglione. The Austrians lost 3000 men
tween killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides th
cannon; the French loss was about 1000.
including the previous five days' fighting,
Austrians had lost 20,000 men, and the Fre
nearly 10,000. Wurmser, having no assistanc
expect from Quosnadowich, from whom he
separated by the whole breadth of the lak
Garda, after reinforcing the garrison of Man
withdrew, hastily up the valley of the Adige
the Tyrol, followed closely by the French,
forced the pass of Caliano above Roveredo,
entered the city of Trent. Wurmser's inten
seems to have been to draw the French within
narrow valleys and passes of the Tyrol, in
midst of a hostile population, supported by
Austrian troops which remained in the coun
whilst he, by turning by the valley of the Bre
should reach again the plains of Mantua, and
oblige the French to retrace their steps, or perh
place them between two fires. Crossing the mo
tains between Trent and Bassano, he brought
head-quarters to the latter place. He depen
upon General Davidowich, whom he had lef
the Tyrol, being able to defend the defiles of Ro
redo and Caliano, but French courage and i
tuosity carried everything before it, and on th

tember the French entered Roveredo. Bo-
e, who had guessed the purpose of the Aus-
general, and who had intelligence at the
an head-quarters among Wurmser's own
determined on following him by the same
vhich he had taken, and thus cut off his
nication with the Upper Tyrol. Wurmser
s head-quarters at Bassano, and had sent a
n against Verona, when he was surprised by
arte, of whose rapid advance he was kept
ely in the dark; a battle ensued on the 8th
ber, in which the Austrians lost 6000 pri-
and their artillery and baggage. Wurmser
5,000 men left, his communication with the
an hereditary states was cut off, and he took
esperate resolution of making his way to
a as fast as he could, and throwing himself into
rtress. With a rapidity of movements then
l with an Austrian army, he outstripped the
h who were close after him, darted through
za, and avoiding Verona and its French
n, he surprised Legnago, where he crossed
lige, marched day and night, drove before
French division that endeavoured to stop his
at Cerea, dispersed another body at Sangui-
nd at last arrived and encamped under the
of Mantua. It was altogether a spirited and
xecuted march, worthy of Bonaparte himself.
l combats followed between Wurmser—who
frequent sorties—and the French, at first with
s success, but in the end the Austrians were
d to confine themselves within the fortress, of
the French *resumed the* blockade.

the latter part of September Bonaparte re-
to Milan, to attend to the internal affairs of
r.

Italy for the territory which we intend to kee
the left bank of the Rhine, and that the unfa
able turn of the war in Germany must weake
desire that we should otherwise feel of res
from despotism that part of the Italian peni
over which your own abilities and the brave
the army have given us a momentary domin
The reverses in Germany here alluded to wer
defeat of Jourdan, who was driven back o
Rhine, and the consequent skilful retreat of M
through the Brisgau, which precluded all ho
the French armies of the Rhine co-operating
Bonaparte against the hereditary states of Au
Bonaparte, on his part, was perfectly aware
he could not much depend upon the repub
enthusiasm of the population of Lombardy, v
enthusiasm, if any, existed as yet only amo
minority of the people of the towns. The h
classes, the clergy, and the peasantry were
rally against the French. Bonaparte, however
that a republican movement in the towns of
were it only for the moment, would make a
diversion in favour of the French army, and
magnified in his proclamations, would have
influence with the Italian states. The first
of Lombardy which hoisted of its own acc
republican standard was Reggio, a third-rate
south of the Po, in the duchy of Modena. C
Paradisi, a native of Reggio, who was present
a party to the proceedings, has given, i
'Observations on Botta's History of Italy,' a
unvarnished tale of the affair of Reggio, whic
got up as a precedent for revolutionizing the
of Italy. The Duke of Modena, the last
descendant of the house of Este, was abs

. The regency which he had left at Mo-
ad obtained an armistice from Bonaparte by
several millions of livres. There was a
garrison at Modena, but at Reggio a few
s only were stationed. The French troops,
, and commissaries were allowed free passage
h the state. " Towards the end of August
of Corsican boatmen and pontoneers in the
service, going to join the army which
led Mantua, halted at Reggio for the night,
suddenly leaving the barracks in which they
quartered, they paraded about the streets
republican hymns. They then adjourned
public-houses, where they met with several
d dissipated people of the town, whom they
with wine; after which they persuaded
f them to go to one of the bastions and dig
ulberry-tree, which they attempted to plant
middle of the square, as a tree of liberty.
being unable to take up the pavement, they
tree leaning against the wall of a house, and
midnight they all went home. Next morn-
me of the principal inhabitants becoming
nted with the occurrences of the night, and
ing that the Corsicans had not acted thus
t instructions or encouragement, repaired
orsican commissary or agent, who was sta-
at Reggio to provide for the wants of the
army. This person at first boldly denied
e or his superiors had any thing to do with
vement, saying that he had strict orders not
rfere in the internal affairs of the country;
erwards, *taking aside some* of the inhabitants,
ressed his satisfaction, as an individual, to
self in a place from which the first sparks

rison made no resistance, and the ducal au
were deposed. Bonaparte issued one of h
festoes, saying that the armistice with Mo
at an end because the duke had failed to
whole contribution, and because the reg
sent provisions into Mantua, and that the
Reggio and Modena were thenceforth plac
the protection of the French republic. M
the Directory, in answer to his letter, enjoi
not to excite the people of Modena agai
sovereign; to which Bonaparte coolly rep
it was now too late, as the thing was alrea
The inhabitants of the mountainous dis
Garfagnana, situated among the Apenni
not relish the new order of things, and res
republican authorities; but Bonaparte sen
them General Rusca with a body of troo
seized a number of the insurgents, some
were shot, and others carried away prisc
order to teach the rest to love French libe

Bonaparte directed a congress to asse
Modena, consisting of deputies from Bolog
rara, Modena, and Reggio, in order to c
themselves into a republic, which was sty
padane, and to vote the formation of an
legion of 2500 men auxiliary to the Frenc
At Milan he established a council of stat
administration of the Milanese, subject to
trol of the French commander-in-chief.
same time he wrote a long letter to the Di
complaining in a tone of marked bitterne
dilapidations of the commissaries and co
who were with the army, and some of wh
believed to be patronised by the Directors
ministers. "Since I have returned to M

rectors, I am busy making war against the
, many of whom I have had tried and pu-
; but I must now denounce others to you, at
k of being slandered by a thousand tongues,
fter saying two months since that I aimed at
Duke of Milan, now say that I want to be
f Italy. You had probably reckoned that
ployés should pilfer a little, but that at the
me they would do their duty and keep within
nds of decency. But they rob in such a
nd impudent manner, that if I had a month's
I might have them all convicted. I have
d many and brought them to trial, but they
he judges. Everything here is bought and
One commissary, charged with having levied
ribution of 18,000 livres on the town of
or his own private account, has only been
ced to two months' imprisonment. The city
mona furnished more than fifty thousand ells
linen for the use of our hospitals; the vil-
ave sold it—they have even sold the mat-
and bolsters; they turn everything into
. It is impossible to produce evidence; they
ld together. . . . . Attempts are being
o bribe my secretaries in my own ante-room:
missary at war is charged with having sold a
f bark which the King of Spain had sent
r medical stores. . . . . Four millions of
h goods have been seized at Leghorn, the
of Modena has paid two millions more, Fer-
nd Bologna have made large payments, and
e soldiers are without shoes, and in want of
s, the chests are *without* money, and the pa-
in the hospitals are sleeping on the ground."
goes on naming the different commissaries,

contractors, and other employés, concluding with very few exceptions that "they were all thieves." He recommends the Directory to dismiss them and replace them by more honest men, or at least more discreet ones. "If I had fifteen honest commissaries, you might make to each of them a present of 100,000 crowns, and yet save fifteen millions. . . . . If I had a month's time to attend to these matters, there is hardly one of these fellows but I could cause to be shot; but I must set off to-morrow for the army, which will give great joy to the thieves." Bonaparte's presence was required at the army, as a third Austrian army and a third general were advancing into Italy. At the end of October General Alvinczy having assembled between thirty and forty thousand men at Belluno on the river Piave, was marching towards Vicenza and Verona, whilst Davidowich with about twenty thousand more was advancing on the side of the Tyrol. The two armies were to meet on the banks of the Adige near Verona, and then march together to relieve Mantua. Bonaparte had between thirty and forty thousand men in all. He determined to attack Alvinczy on his march, and having collected the divisions of Masséna and Augereau, he encountered the Marshal's advanced guard at a place called Le Nove, near Bassano, on the river Brenta, on the 6th of November. All the efforts of Augereau and Masséna could not break the Austrian line, and as Alvinczy himself was coming down with large reinforcements, Bonaparte ordered a retreat upon Verona. He received news about the same time that Davidowich had forced all the French positions in the Tyrol, had defeated General Vaubois with the loss of 3000 men and

elve pieces of cannon, had entered Trent and veredo, and was driving the French down the ley of the Adige towards the plains of Lom- dy. Had Davidowich followed up his successes, would have decided the campaign, instead of ich he loitered more than a week at Roveredo. antime Alvinczy, following up the French main ıy, took position at Caldiero near Verona. Bo- arte issuing out of Verona attacked the Aus- ns at Caldiero on the 12th November, but was in repulsed with great loss, and obliged to with- w his troops within Verona. The next day he ote a desponding letter to Paris, in which he apitulated his losses; his best officers killed or unded, his soldiers exhausted by fatigue and vations, he himself in danger of being sur- nded. He however took a sudden resolve to n the position of Alvinczy, and throw himself his rear. Marching quietly in the night of the h out of Verona as if to fall back upon the ncio, he descended the right bank of the Adige, ssed the river at Ronco, and moved on quickly a cross-road towards Villanova in the rear of vinczy, where the Austrian baggage and stores re stationed. The Alpone, a torrent which ers the Adige below Ronco, flowed between the ench and Villanova. The ground between the pone and the Adige is one impervious morass ersected by several causeways, one of which ds to a bridge on the Alpone in front of the lage of Arcole. On the morning of the 15th of vember, Augereau attempted to carry the dge, which was *defended* by a body of Croats *Hungarians with artillery*. A storm of grape *and of musketry* from the houses which

command the bridge, checked the advance o
French column. Three times Augereau, La
and other officers led them to the charge, and
times they were thrown back with fearful
Bonaparte on perceiving this, dismounted fro
horse, and snatching a standard, headed hi
his grenadiers towards the fatal bridge. E
was to no purpose; the shower of musket an
non shots fell so thick that the grenadiers
obliged to fall back, and the Austrians cha
them across the bridge, a close and confuse
gagement ensued; when Bonaparte, who ha
mounted his horse, was thrown out of the caus
into the morass, in which he sank up to his m
but was saved by the efforts of some grena
Meantime Alvinczy being made acquainted
what was taking place in his rear, quickly ch
his front, marched reinforcements to Vill
and Arcole, and withdrew his stores. Bona
however had gained one object, namely, to pr
Alvinczy from attacking Verona and movi
by his right to join Davidowich. The nex
the French resumed the attack, but the positi
Arcole was now defended by the main bo
Alvinczy's army, and the French were agai
pulsed. On the third day, the 17th, the
became general, Augereau crossed the Alpo
a temporary bridge below Arcole and adv
upon the village, while Masséna attacked an
trian column which had advanced by th
bridge, and routed it with considerable loss.
vinczy however was maintaining his ground a
cole, when Bonaparte sent a small body of
with trumpets round on the flank of the e
ordering them to blow as loud as they could

so ordered the garrison of the neighbouring
s of Legnago to advance against the left of
strians, who, exhausted by three days' con-
ghting, fancied that a fresh French division
rning them. Alvinczy then ordered a re-
pon Montebello towards Vicenza, which he
l in good order, as Bonaparte had no means
uing him. It is stated that this retrograde
ent of the Austrian general, whose army
yet unimpaired, was brought about by an
us secret communication from Bonaparte,
formed Alvinczy that France was willing to
eace, and that Clarke the negotiator was
for Baron Vincent to enter into a con-
, during which he, Bonaparte, would keep
f within the line of the Adige. It is certain
onaparte after the fight of Arcole found him-
a crippled condition. He wrote to Carnot
he action of the third day—"Never was a
f battle so obstinately contested; the enemy
merous and determined. I have hardly any
l officers left." They were almost all killed,
ed, or prisoners. The object of preventing
ction of the two Austrian armies was how-
ained through the unaccountable delay of
owich, who at last, as if roused from a slum-
n the very day that Bonaparte was driving
zy away from the Adige, pushed down
the banks of that river, carried the defiles of
, defeated Vaubois with the loss of two thou-
risoners, and advanced into the plain of Pes-
. But it was now too late. Bonaparte,
g a small garrison with all his wounded at
a, marched against Davidowich, and drove
ck into the Tyrol. It is stated in one of

the works abovementioned that whilst Bona
was thus engaged, and Alvinczy's outpos
mained yet in the neighbourhood of Verona,
Capuchin friars having come out of that city
stopped by the Austrian videttes, and gave in
ation as to the condition of the French in
rona, where there were but few effective so
left, besides an enormous quantity of wounded
the field of Arcole. Alvinczy is said to ha
ceived this information on the 20th, and to
ordered a march upon Verona, to the great
faction of his officers, who expected an easy ca
of that town; when all on a sudden in the n
of the road Alvinczy himself gave the orc
countermarch upon Vicenza,—upon which an
trian colonel is reported to have broken his
in a rage of disappointment and shame. W
ever we may think of this and other similar r
of those times, which may be seen in the 'Re
la Campagne de Bonaparte en Italie,' or the
moires tirés des Papiers d'un Homme d'Etat,'
other works which treat of that epoch, a g
suspicion of disloyalty and foul play recurs
voidably to the mind, whilst considering
astounding reverses of the Austrian armies in
Italian campaigns. We know that the Au
soldiers fought bravely, that their generals
officers of tried abilities and experience, that
generally had a superiority of numbers ove
French, that in several combats they obtaine
advantage, and yet the result of each succ
campaign was most disastrous, and army
army was absolutely thrown away. The
does not appear natural. It has been part
counted for by the slowness of Austrian mov

asted with French lightness and impetuo-
isted as these were by their new system of
, which discarded all incumbrances of stores,
aggage, and other customary appendages
nforts of European armies. Much was
o Bonaparte's able strategy, his eagle eye,
of conception, and equal rapidity of exe-
Still these cannot account for all; they
ıccount for the mismanagement at Monte-
d Dego, for the weak defence of the passes
yrol whilst Wurmser was making his flank
nt upon the Brenta, for the surprise of the
arters at Bassano, for the fatal inaction of
vich at Roveredo, and for the other errors
ıczy's campaign. There are no miracles in
yet the good fortune of Bonaparte in that
war appears almost miraculous. The Aus-
mies in Germany had been fighting for years
the French, with various success, but had
ırred such sweeping disasters. The charac-
ıe two Austrian commanders in Italy, Beau-
Wurmser, is above suspicion; that of
y, against whom insinuations were made at
e, was redeemed by the confidence of his
ereign, who gave him afterwards important
ds and bestowed honours upon his old age.
ıe of the subordinate officers, especially of
in that and the subsequent wars, have not
so clear. Names have been mentioned
rges distinctly made. In the 'Récit de la
ue en Italie,' Bonaparte is reported to have
Milan, after the war was over, in allusion
ticle in a German newspaper, the 'Ratisbon
,' *which insinuated* that he had bribed the
generals:—"*It is* true that I have spent

much money, but not to win over the genera
thought it better for my purpose to try the
and I have had no reason to regret it." One
certain is that he spent very large sums for
service, whilst the Austrians, who had not the
der of Italy at their disposal, could not aff
be so generous, and were generally ill su
with information.

After the retreat from Verona, Alvinczy
his army in cantonments on the Brenta be
Bassano and Padua; Davidowich remained
Tyrol at Roveredo and Ala, from whence h
soon afterwards recalled by orders from Vi
Bonaparte placed his troops along the line
Adige, reinforced the blockade of Mantua,
then returned to Milan. The King of N
made his peace with France, but the Pope
tinued in a hostile attitude. The French
tory were anxious to make a separate peace
the Emperor, independent of England and the
allies; this was their paramount object, espe
since the reverses of their armies in Ger
They were afraid of public opinion in F
which was loud in favour of peace; they
harassed by the royalists of La Vendée, they
suspicious of their own generals, and especia
Bonaparte, and to crown all, they were d
among themselves. At the suggestion of C
General Clarke was appointed diplomatic n
ator to proceed to Italy, and to propose an
tice to the Austrian commander, as a prelim
step towards concluding peace. Bonapart
not seem to relish this idea from the firs
guessed that Clarke was sent to watch and
him on what he considered as his own grou

he guessed right. Clarke arrived at Turin about the end of November, and Bonaparte hastened to send him a copy of a letter which he had sent to the Directory to discountenance the thought of an armistice before the surrender of Mantua. His reasons were ably stated. An armistice could be only injurious to the French army. Clarke, however, insisted, saying that his orders were precise. It was then that Bonaparte told him plainly that "if he chose to second his own views, he should see him at head-quarters with pleasure; if not, he might go back to those who had sent him." Clarke went to Milan, saw Bonaparte, was captivated by him, and wrote a report to the Directory which concluded by saying that it was fit that the commander-in-chief should continue to direct all diplomatic operations in Italy. Soon after an Austrian emissary was seized whilst on the point of entering Mantua, and letters from the Emperor and Alvinczy were found upon him directing Wurmser to hold out until relieved, which would be in about a month. This of course put an end to all thoughts of the armistice; but as Alvinczy had meantime applied to Bonaparte for passports for Baron Vincent to proceed to Vicenza in order to confer with Clarke, Bonaparte gave the necessary directions, and the two negotiators met on the 3rd of January, 1797. Meantime the war party had regained the ascendancy at Vienna, and after two or three conferences at Vicenza, Clarke was told that he could not be received at Vienna, as the Emperor had not acknowledged the French Republic; but he was referred to the Marquis Gherardini, the *Austrian ambassador at* Turin, whither Clarke *repaired, and Bonaparte* was left untrammelled to

pursue his own course. Bonaparte h
two months his own secret agent Cha
enna, by whom he had sent a letter a
the Emperor, and who was in indirect c
tion with some of the ministers; but thi
now ordered off and escorted to the ou

During this period of interruption of
tions Bonaparte assumed a haughty,
tone towards the Venetian governmen
accused of having shown a marked p
the army of Alvinczy. The provvedit
vernor of the mainland, having writte
complain of the excesses committed
soldiers in the territories of Venice, h
tauntingly that it was all a rhetorical an
that the French troops respected prope
and religion; that he denied that any
been violated in the Venetian territory,
he wrote on the 8th of December, and
3rd of the October preceding he had hi
ten to the chief of his staff to place pat
posed half of Venetian and half of Fren
on the road from Verona to Bassano
excesses of the military, who pillaged
tated the country. And in another o
9th of June he had said that it seemed
of robbers had agreed to meet in th
provinces for the sake of plunder. A
excesses, the report of the podestà of
Bonaparte, dated 4th of December, des
with minute particulars. Farms deva
naries and cellars emptied, cattle ta
houses burnt, furniture destroyed, wom
some men who tried to protect their
daughters killed, the churches desecra

all this was done not in a hostile but in a country, which all the while supplied the army with provisions, quarters, and every-hey required. It is true that these excesses ostly committed during the field operations, rried marches and countermarches of the divisions—that Bonaparte himself could not evented them; and that the Austrian soldiers r part committed similar violences, though ller extent. But it is also true that some rench superior officers did not keep a strict e even in the walled towns; that at Verona ens were insulted in the streets, and no re-s obtained, as it was impossible to point delinquents in the continual change of can-s for the various regiments; that the pro-demanded for the army always exceeded, by a third, the regular allowance for the umber of soldiers, a trick which Bonaparte acknowledged at St. Helena was of con-ctice in his armies in order to magnify to ls of the natives the number of the French

arte gave orders to General Baraguay s to take possession of the town and castle amo by any means. Baraguay executed r on the 27th of December, "by a combi-as he says himself, "of force and artifice." nted himself at the gate of the town with ment of dragoons, followed by infantry; ne slight opposition on the part of the e forced his way into the lower town, gal-the drawbridge leading to the upper town, e wanted to speak to the governor, and ced himself on the bridge to prevent its

being pulled up, he gave time to his men t
and take possession of the gates, and then h
fied to the governor that he had orders
possession of the place by force, if requir
the governor submitted to what he could no
prevent. Bonaparte wrote to the Provv
Battaja at Brescia, telling him that the g
of Bergamo was ill-intentioned towards the

On the 28th of December Bonaparte sen
Directory a very remarkable letter, stati
policy towards the people of Lombardy.
are here, in the Milanese territory, three
1st, those who are subservient to France
low our directions; 2nd, those who are in
for liberty and national independence; 3
party friendly to Austria, and consequently
to us. I support the first party, restra
second, and put down the third. As
country south of the Po, Modena, Bologn
there are likewise three parties: 1st, the fri
the old governments; 2nd, the partisans o
tional constitution somewhat aristocratic;
partisans of the French constitution or dem
I endeavour to put down the first; I supp
second, because it is the party of the wealt
prietors and of the clergy, who exercise g
fluence over the mass of the people, whic
our interest to win over to our side; I rest
third, which consists of young men, of wri
those who, as in France and everywhere el
liberty merely for the sake of revolution."
language this from a General of the French
lic, addressed to the Executive of that Rep

Early in January, 1797, Alvinczy, who
been reinforced, mustered again nearly

men, began to move his columns towards the Adige. One division under Provera marched upon the lower Adige with the intention of crossing it and relieving Mantua; another column assailed Verona, but was repulsed by Masséna; whilst the main body under Alvinczy himself was coming down from the Tyrol, following the right bank of the Adige. Bonaparte, who was at Verona, was for a while perplexed as to where the chief attack would be made by the Austrians. He learnt, however, through a spy that Alvinczy himself was moving down upon Rivoli, and that the attack on Verona was only a feint. He then ordered Masséna to march quickly with his division to Rivoli; and it was high time, for Alvinczy having forced the pass of La Corona, was pressing hard upon Joubert, who was posted on the heights of Rivoli, and had sent a division to turn him. But he found that instead of Joubert alone Bonaparte and his whole army were there, whilst his own divisions were scattered, and his artillery and cavalry were not yet arrived. This Bonaparte knew, and he gave orders accordingly. The battle began early in the morning of the 14th of January. The French left was giving way, when Masséna rushed in with his division and restored the fight. But the Austrians succeeded in possessing themselves of Rivoli, which was the centre of the French position. Twice was Rivoli taken by the Austrians, and twice retaken by the French, with tremendous loss on both sides. The French under Masséna remained at length masters of Rivoli, whilst two Austrian divisions were turning that position by its left. But it was an hour too late. Bonaparte has said himself that Alvinczy's plan was good,

without a general, and they now send a
without an army."

The Aulic Council at Vienna, in its co
report to the Emperor upon Alvinczy's
paign, observed that "a kind of fatality s
follow the Austrian operations in Italy,
the French having possession of Verona,
and other positions around Mantua, it see
possible for the Austrian divisions to co
so as to break the enemy's line. But the
the report proceeded, "consists mainly in
all the plans conceived by our generals a
known to the enemy before they are exec
was treachery that caused Wurmser's con
to fail last year, and it is treachery again
drawn the same misfortune upon Alvi
General Bonaparte, in his report, says th
indications gave him a clue as to the tru
Alvinczy....This is the third time th
conceived for the deliverance of Mantua
completely. The principal column of o
reached Rivoli after ten days' march throu
tains covered with several feet of snow.
wing were entering Rivoli as conquerors
was charged by cavalry; the Croats did n
well. Two regiments threw down their
order spread through the whole line, and
regiments and the Croats caused the l
battle, when Bonaparte was being surrou
6000 men.....Generally speaking the
troops have laboured under the disadv
attacking the enemy on a too extende
ference, whilst the French in their exce
tion had a central point of defence with

ving from the centre to any point of the cir-
rence, and overcome our scattered forces
uperior numbers."

naparte, after the surrender of Provera,
ed into the Papal States. The Pope had
d to submit to the harsh terms of the Direc-
and had assembled his troops in the Romagna.
was no deception in this, as he was unjustly
d of by Bonaparte; he acted openly as an
, and refused to renew the negociations,
gh pressed to do so by the French agent at
. Now that he had lost all chance of assist-
rom Austria, he made a show of resistance;
seven or eight thousand men could hardly be
ed to arrest the march of the conquerors of
They fought, however, on the river Senio,
aenza, lost about a thousand men, and then
, pursued by the French, who took Ancona
oreto, the famous sanctuary of which was
d of the images and the few valuables that
been already removed by the Papal autho-
nd which were sent to Paris. The French
the Apennines, and advanced to Foligno.
I. sued for peace, and Bonaparte, who did
nk that the time was yet come to revolu-
all Italy, and who was, moreover, impressed
e importance of the spiritual influence of the
France and other countries, was very will-
grant him terms. He behaved with unusual
s towards the Papal State; he severely for-
y violence against the inhabitants; he pro-
the clergy and the churches, and he even
red the French emigrant priests who, pro-
at home, had taken refuge in the Papal
, *and provided for* their support. All this

was not quite in accordance with the int
the Directory, who wished to destroy
the temporal dominion of the Pope; but
had begun to act upon his own counsel i
matters. He was not only a general, h
Dictator of Italy. The Papal envoys, am
was Cardinal Mattei, met him at Tole
were received by him with a marked court
astonished the free-thinking soldiers of the
He dictated to them the conditions of
namely, the formal cession of the provin
logna and Ferrara, and of Avignon; the
of Ancona by the French till the gener
the payment of thirty millions of livres, l
delivery of the remainder of the sculptu
ings, and MSS., as agreed upon in th
armistice; and lastly, that the Pope sho
enter into any alliance with the enem
French Republic, and should close his po
them. Bonaparte said nothing about th
tion of the bulls and briefs concernin
matters which the Directory had insisted
which had been the main cause of the in
of the negociation. He made a politica
a religious treaty. The conditions being
the Pope at the end of February the treat
to the Directory for its ratification, and
withdrew his troops from the remaining
ritories, and returned to Lombardy.

Whilst Bonaparte was making his s
paign in the Papal State, the fortress
capitulated at the beginning of February.
Wurmser, reduced to the last stress thr
of provisions, and through sickness amo
rison, asked for honourable terms, whic

freely granted. The general and his staff were not to be prisoners of war; they did not give up their swords; two hundred horsemen and five hundred other men at Wurmser's choice went out free with him; among the rest several French emigrants, at whose escape Bonaparte winked. Bonaparte would not witness the surrender of his aged antagonist. Whatever may have been his real motives—and Bonaparte, even at that early period, seldom acted from mere impulse of feeling—there was a touch of chivalrous delicacy in the young conqueror's conduct towards a brave but unfortunate old warrior, which it is pleasing to record, it being like a passing sunny gleam shooting across his dark and stormy path. He wrote to the Directory, that he had granted the Austrian general—a gallant veteran of more than seventy years of age—such terms as he thought in his judgment were due to an honourable enemy, terms which could not but enhance through the world the dignity and generosity of the French republic. "Wurmser," he said, "had done all that a brave officer could do; after his defeat at Bassano he marched for five days in the midst of hostile columns, crossed the Adige, overcame all opposition, reached Mantua, and resolutely threw himself into it; he had since made repeated sorties, fighting ever valiantly, though not unsuccessfully; he had held out in the fortress nearly six months; and now, with a garrison woefully reduced by famine and pestilence, he had obtained an honourable capitulation. And yet," Bonaparte added significantly, "there will be men in Vienna, as there are everywhere else, ready to throw stones at those who are persecuted by fortune—who will cast blame upon Wurmser's ho-

noured grey hairs. I would not countenan
malice of such." This he wrote to that ve
rectory who, a few months before, had sug
to him to take a paltry advantage of the e
laws against emigrants in order to fright
Wurmser, who was a native of the Frenc
vince of Alsace, into a surrender—a proposal
Bonaparte had treated with deserved scorn.
parte found at Mantua an immense park of ar
besides an arsenal well supplied with fireloc
stores, and ammunitions, and pontoons. Th
ing of Mantua properly terminated the Itali
and the news of it filled the rulers of Fran
joy. Augereau, whom Bonaparte sent to I
deliver the numerous standards taken fr
Austrians, was received by the Directory a
Councils with the usual dramatic pomp, and
by inflated rhetorical speeches such as we
tomary in France in those times.

CHAPTER IV.

Campaign against the Archduke Charles.—Armistice of Judenburg.—Preliminaries of Leoben.—Insurrections in the Venetian State.—Occupation of Venice.

BONAPARTE did not tarry long in his winter quarters. On the 10th of March he gave the order to advance and attack the Archduke Charles's line on the extreme frontier of Italy. On the banks of the Piave he was joined by General Bernadotte with twenty thousand men from the army of the Rhine. Bernadotte, who was five or six years older than Bonaparte, had acquired a military reputation in the German campaigns. All the general officers of the army of Italy were personally devoted to their leader who had achieved such wonderful victories, which Bernadotte, just come from another field, knew only by report. Bernadotte was of a susceptible temperament; he had an opinion and a judgment of his own, and he was not disposed to implicit subserviency beyond the duties of military subordination.

After visiting Bonaparte, who entered into a long and apparently full-hearted conversation with him on his military prospects, Bernadotte on returning to his quarters was anxiously asked by some of his more intimate officers as to what he thought of the far-famed commander of the army of Italy. "*I have seen,*" answered he, "a young man of some six or seven and twenty who assumes the

tone of a man of fifty, and this, in my
bodes no good to the Republic." Bern
at that time a staunch republican. This
which is reported in Bernadotte's life,
mentioning here, inasmuch as the subsequ
of one of the two parties exercised no s
ence upon the fortunes of the other. S
the French crossed the Piave without m
sition, as the Archduke had rested h
defence on the Tagliamento, the last It
on that side. The Tagliamento, an Alpi
was not yet swollen by the melting of
and the French crossed it easily in seve
being opposed chiefly by the cavalry, a
trian infantry, consisting mostly of recruit
great resistance. The French had no
large numerical superiority over the Aus

Masséna with the central column c
Carnic Alps by the pass of Pantaffel or
which was abandoned by the Austrian
Ocksay against the express orders of the
who hastened to stop the march of the F
a battle ensued at Tarvis on the 24th of
which the Austrians were worsted.
Bernadotte with the right column mar
Carniola, entered Palmanova, a Venetia
invested Gradiska, and took Laybach ar
Bonaparte moved his head quarters to G
whence he moved rapidly to Villach,
Drave and entered Klagenfurth, the hea
Carinthia, from whence he wrote, th
March, a letter to the Archduke Charle
ing him in flattering terms to be the
Germany and the benefactor of mank
ducing the Emperor to listen to the

which the French Directory had already
. "I don't mean to say that you may not yet
Germany by your arms; but even supposing
hances of war to turn favourably to you, your
ry will not feel the less the ravages of war."
is note the Archduke returned a polite answer,
g that he was not authorised to treat of peace,
hat he should communicate to Vienna the
ures made by General Bonaparte. The latter
continued to advance. On the 2nd of April
rchduke made a stand at Neumarkt, but was
defeated. Bonaparte arrived at Judenburg
pper Styria, thirteen stages distant from
a; the advanced guard pushed on to Leoben,
stages further, or about sixty miles from
a. The idea of the Archduke seems to have
o draw the French further into the interior
hereditary states, whilst fresh troops were
g from Hungary and from the Rhine, and
ake a bold stand under the walls of Vienna,
capital the Court was preparing to leave and
into Hungary. The Archduke had received
ation that the Austrian corps in the Tyrol
General Laudon, after driving back the
detachments opposed to it, had advanced
valley of the Adige to favour the insur-
in the Venetian provinces, where the
try were rising against the French. These
movements in his rear gave great anxiety
aparte. But there was at Vienna an influ-
party that was much alarmed and anxious
ce. The Austrian prime minister Thugut
clined *for peace, if he* could but recover
dy for his master; and the Emperor, after

considerable demur about recognising t
Republic and giving up the left bank of
gave his consent to treat. Generals
and Meerfeldt arrived at Judenburg o
of April, and had a conference with
and demanded an armistice, which was ag
till the 13th. Bonaparte moved his hea
to Leoben, and Masséna with the advan
posted himself at Bruck, near the Semm
which is the last defile of the Noric Al
side of Vienna. It is worthy of remark
parte, many months before, had laid
Directory a plan of combined operatio
armies of Italy and of the Rhine, the resu
was that they should dictate peace on t
of the Semmering. He now accompl
object with his own army alone. Fro
entrance into the hereditary states he ha
a severe discipline to be maintained,
thing required for the army to be punct
and he had assured the inhabitants of
that they should not suffer from the op
the war. His object was now to conq
But a few weeks before he had told his
Bassano that they would free the br
garians from the yoke of the House of A
reduce that proud court to the rank of a
state.

It was at Leoben that Bourrienne, wh
Bonaparte's schoolfellow at Brienne, an
afterwards shared his scanty pittance
whilst Bonaparte was unemployed at Pa
the head-quarters. Bonaparte had writt
to come to be his secretary. From th

'Memoirs of Bourrienne,' though written in a loose memorandum style, furnish a useful assistant to the biographer of Napoleon; an assistant, however, not to be always implicitly trusted.

The intrigues at Vienna, which led to the preliminaries of Leoben, are deserving of attention. The Emperor Francis himself was single-minded, and ready for a protracted struggle; Lehrbach and some others of his councillors held with him. Thugut, however, although no favourer of France, looked beyond the mere Italian question; he looked to Germany, and he perceived that Prussia was endeavouring to extend its influence at the expense of Austria, under the shield of its neutrality. Lucchesini, the Italian minister of Prussia at Vienna, had ascertained Thugut's sentiments at an early period, and in February, 1797, he made a journey to Italy to confer with General Bonaparte, whom he saw at Bologna. The secret policy of Prussia at that time, and for years after, greatly favoured the views of France, for which she was so fitly rewarded at last by Napoleon. There was another influence at Vienna in favour of peace, and it was that of Queen Caroline of Naples, the aunt and stepmother of the Emperor Francis. The presence of the victorious French army in Italy kept her in perpetual alarm for the safety of her kingdom; she knew that she was hated by the republicans as much as she hated them, and she sighed to see them clearly out of the Peninsula. She instructed accordingly the Marquis del Gallo, her ambassador at Vienna, a man of diplomatic shrewdness, who enjoyed *great influence* at that Court, *through the credit of the* Empress, whom he had *exerted from Naples at the* time of her marriage.

Many of the nobles of Vienna favoured thes
secret agencies; and the citizens of that luxurio
city became greatly alarmed when the French arm
advanced into the heart of the hereditary state
and threatened the proud capital which had no
seen an enemy before its walls ever since the tim
when the turbaned Ottomans encamped before i
and were defeated by the brave Sobieski. On th
other side, the French Executive Directory wer
not much inclined to entrust General Bonapart
with such an important negotiation as that of th
peace with the Emperor, and they gave hi
General Clarke as a sort of check, which, how
ever, owing to the determined character and astut
ness of the commander-in-chief, proved no chec
at all. Bonaparte told Clarke to go to Turin t
dictate a treaty of alliance to the prostrate King
Sardinia. Meantime he was writing to the Arch
duke Charles. A courier arrived at Vienna on th
22d of March, bringing the news of the treaty
alliance concluded, or about to be concluded, b
the King of Sardinia with France, and this new
added to the general despondency. On the 25t
it was resolved in a secret council to ask for a
armistice, in order to settle the preliminaries
peace. It is said that the party for peace, whic
reckoned several very influential persons in th
Aulic Council, contrived so as not to reinforce th
Archduke in a manner to enable him to make a
effective stand and give battle to Bonaparte, an
this not certainly from treacherous motives, bu
because they feared the risk, especially as they ex
pected every moment that the French armies o
the Rhine would resume the campaign. The
preferred concluding a favourable peace while

t time. But in order not to leave the con-
of the peace entirely at the discretion of
arte, they ordered General Laudon to make
onstration from the Tyrol towards the Vene-
rritories, and sent agents to rouse the pea-
of those territories against the French, that
arte might feel alarmed for his communica-
On the 29th of March a great council of
was held at Vienna, at which the English
sador was present. Baron Thugut stated the
l position of affairs. "After five disastrous
igns, Austria, betrayed by Prussia, forsaken
ssia, bore alone the brunt of the conflict.
al Bonaparte was at Klagenfurth, twenty
from Vienna. It was expedient to listen to
als of peace." On the 31st of March,
arte, informed by emissaries of all that was
g at Vienna, wrote his conciliatory letter to
chduke Charles, proposing, as basis for nego-
, the cession to France of Belgium and the
ank of the Rhine, and the independence of
ardy. The Archduke reported this to Vienna,
the basis was considered as inadmissible,
counter-proposition was sent back through
al Meerfeldt. On the 7th of April Generals
eldt and Bellegarde arrived at Bonaparte's
uarters at Judenburg, and after some demur
e part of the French commander, who said
e was not authorised to conclude an armistice,
e of six days was agreed upon on the formal
t of the Austrian envoys, and for the ex-
d purpose of arranging the preliminaries of
ace. On the following day (8th of April)
arte wrote a confidential letter to the Di-
to account for his conduct. The French

armies had not yet crossed the Rhine; and he was in the heart of the hereditary states, with the Archduke in his front, the Hungarian levy en masse on his right flank, Laudon and the Tyrolese on his left, and the Venetian insurrection in his rear. He had laid down the cession of the left bank of the Rhine as a *sine quâ non*, but he had left the question of Lombardy as a debateable point.

At Vienna the Marquis del Gallo was fixed upon by the credit of the Empress and of Thugut as the negotiator of the preliminaries. On the 15th of April he arrived at Bonaparte's head-quarters at Leoben. Bonaparte, assuming a cool distant air, began by observing that his name did not sound German-like. Gallo said that he was the Neapolitan ambassador at the Imperial Court. "But we have no pending negotiations with the Court of the Two Sicilies that I know of; we are at peace. Has the Emperor no negotiator of his own, no diplomatist of the true Austrian school? Is the old aristocracy of Vienna extinct?" This was a home-thrust to the courtier-diplomatist, who was jealous of his interest at Vienna, and he became supple and obsequious, and at last Bonaparte and he came to a thorough understanding. Bonaparte thus acquired from the beginning a superiority over the other, which he well knew how to avail himself of. The first condition he exacted was that Trieste, which had been retaken by a body of Croatians, should be evacuated pending the negotiations. Gallo and Bonaparte then agreed upon a reciprocal secrecy during the conferences. General Meerfeldt, who was associated with Gallo, was kept in the background. Thus by a concourse of circumstances, which appeared as if purposely

ed, two Italians, a Corsican and a Sicilian,
ft to settle the destinies of the two principal
ntal states and of the best part of Europe.
l Clarke, the long-appointed plenipotentiary
Directory, was at Turin, employed, at the
ion of Bonaparte, in the very inferior nego-
with the King of Sardinia; and Bonaparte,
colleague he ought to have been in the
tions for the preliminaries with Austria,
t for him to join him at Leoben in time for
ng too late. The first article agreed upon
n Bonaparte and Gallo was the cession by
peror of Belgium and the left bank of the
the natural boundary of France as pro-
l by the Convention. The second article
d by Gallo was the restoration to Austria
luchy of Milan, with the addition of a por-
the Venetian territory, or of the Legations
ized by the French from the Pope. "Had
d to this," observed Bonaparte in his dis-
of the 16th of April to the Directory,
would have been concluded at once; but
given in a counter-proposition which has
rwarded to Vienna." On the 18th Baron
t arrived at Leoben with the answer of the
n cabinet, and the preliminaries of peace
gned on that day. The principal points
separate peace between the French Repub-
his Imperial Majesty the King of Hungary
hemia, Archduke of Austria, &c. The
of peace between France and the German
to be negotiated afterwards at a place which
appointed for the purpose, and at which
l and the other allies might send their envoys.
gave up all her claims upon Belgium, and

recognised the left bank of the Rhine as the fro
tier of France. Austria made over to the Cisa
pine Republic that part of her Italian territori
which lay on the right or western bank of t
Oglio, including the whole duchy of Milan; a
was to receive in compensation the Venetian pr
vinces of Istria and Dalmatia, Brescia, and part
the Veronese; Venice to be indemnified with t
Papal Legations. Mantua was to remain to Austri
The preliminaries of Leoben were signed by Gall
Meerfeldt, and Bonaparte.

On the 19th of April Bonaparte wrote to t
Directory to inform it of the signing of the pre
minaries. "Our military situation," he wro
"was not safe: the court was leaving Vienna; t
Archduke being reinforced would have made
stand before the capital; the Hungarians we
ready to fall upon our right flank, and Laud
and the Tyrolese, supported by the Venetian ins
rection, were threatening our rear. As soon as
foresaw that the negotiations were assuming
serious turn, I sent for Clarke, who had your f
instructions; but after waiting ten days, I thoug
it best to sign the preliminaries myself. I h
your full powers over all the military operation
and, in my position, the preliminaries themsel
were a military operation. Calumny will impu
to me ambitious views; but my career, both ci
and military, has ever been straightforward. No
however, I feel that I ought to leave Italy; and
beg you to send me, with your ratification of t
preliminaries, the necessary directions concernin
the Italian affairs, together with my leave of a
sence to return to France."

Bonaparte, however, anxious to conclude h

usiness of the peace, immediately dis-
he Adjutant-General Leclerc to the
mies on the Rhine, to signify to them
ure of the preliminaries. Hoche had
e Rhine, beaten the Austrian General
l advanced to the Mein, when he was
r the message, as well as Moreau, who
d Suabia. Germany was again at peace.
gradually withdrew his army from Styria
thia, and located them in the Frioul and
Venetian territories.
rectory answered on the 4th of May,
eir ratification of the preliminaries, but
rt of half-expressed regret at being pre-
n taking greater advantage of the recent
that have immortalised the French
ich occupy Germany," a hint rather
towards the aspiring General of the
taly. The Directory were beginning to
of his celebrity, and strove to oppose to
tary fame of Moreau, Hoche, and other
f the first years of the Republic. They,
praised Bonaparte as "a general who
great name in the history of the war of
ut they could not, they said, listen to
for retirement; his presence being still
to consolidate the Lombard Republic,
ispose of the affairs of Venice, which
had represented as acting a treacherous
st the French.
fortunate state, situated between the two
g parties, had prepared its own ruin by
hered to an unarmed neutrality. Bona-
ing Frederic of Prussia, said, "There
rals where there is war." The war had

been carried chiefly on Venetian ground.
parte, by stratagem, or force, or threats, had
garrisons in all its fortified towns, Verona,
era, Legnago, Bergamo, Brescia, Palm
he had made the government of Venice
his army for nearly a twelvemonth with
more that was required for its sustenan
habiliments; he had applied to his own
Venetian artillery and ammunition found
fortresses; and he had treated the officer
Senate and the Senators themselves who
remonstrate with him, with less than
courtesy. But this was not all. Whilst
marching against the Archduke Charles,
concocted in a club at Milan broke out at B
against the sovereignty of Venice. The
Venice still floated over the town; the V
Podestà Ottolini and the other civil aut
were administering the country, and kee
friendly intercourse with the French milita
occupied the castle. Towards the begin
March an officer of the French staff, who
of the Milan revolutionary club, gave info
to the Podestà of Bergamo that he had som
of importance to communicate, if he wo
send a trusty person to Milan to confer wi
The Podestà sent his secretary to Milan, wh
the 9th of March, the officer in question to
that a conspiracy was on the point of explo
the three Venetian provinces of Bergamo,
and Crema, which were to revolt against the
proclaim their independence, and place the
under the protection of France. He mentio
names of the chief conspirators, most of
were Venetian subjects, and the rest Mila

all provided with a certificate from
, or the other French commanders, quali-
as being attached to the French army of
t the movement would break out in eight
ys; that the conspirators were to have a
y secret meeting on the Venetian terri-
hich he would give timely information,
the Venetian authorities might arrest
and thus prevent the explosion. He
t the French military authorities would
direct part in the conspiracy, but once
tion effected, they would support it and
rve their own purposes. Being told by
ry that Venice would not be ungrateful
im, the Frenchman said that his conduct
sult of his convictions, being disgusted
reachery that was used towards Venice;
peace was made, the Senate might then
him. The next day, the 10th, the
returned to Bergamo, and Ottolini dis-
courier to Venice with the information,
y of the list of the conspirators. The cou-
ver, was intercepted, and the letters were
the French military commandant of the
Bergamo. On the 12th the French gar-
ed itself in a hostile attitude, pointed
rds the town-house, doubled the guard at
and sent strong patroles to perambulate
. At the same time the French com-
ent for the principal citizens, and show-
the list of the conspirators, required them
eir names to an act declaring themselves
nt of the *Venetian* Senate and desirous
the new Lombard-Milanese Republic.
itated, but being threatened by the com-

mandant, assented at last. A municip
was installed, the Venetian flag was lov
the French commandant intimated to th
Podestà that if he opposed in any way
ment, he and the other Venetian offic
suffer for it. The next morning, the
French officers, with two of the new mu
repaired to the residence of the Podestà a
him to depart within an hour, otherwise
be arrested and taken to the castle of Mi
few companies of Venetian troops in the
disarmed, and the Podestà and the oth
went off to Brescia. Four days after,
hundred insurgents from Bergamo a
joined by several Poles and Frenchmen, a
by Lecchi, a nobleman of Brescia, marc
the latter town, where the Provveditore
afraid of the French garrison in the cas
although it made no hostile demonstratio
loudly said by the insurgents to be in th
opposed no resistance, but confining his
tian garrison in their barracks, awaited
The insurgents then proclaimed the ind
of Brescia, arrested Battaglia, and gave
guarded by the French in the castle. T
of Battaglia in this affair was pusillanim
extreme, if it was not traitorous. If th
of the French at Bergamo had been an
neutral towards the Venetian authoritie
still more openly hostile at Crema, a
later. There a detachment of Frenc
troops asked of the Venetian authorities
in to rest for the night, and the next
larger body appearing at the gates, t
opened them by force and let in the

who disarmed the small Venetian garrison, took possession of the town-house and of the public offices, threatened the Podestà, and obliged him to depart. Unlike the revolution of Brescia, that of Crema was effected entirely by the French military; the inhabitants took little or no part in it. Thus the three provinces west of the Mincio, constituting about one-third of the continental territories of Venice, were lopped off from the dominions of the metropolis.

The Senate, on hearing the first news of Bergamo and Brescia, asked the French minister Lallement for an explanation; but the latter professed the greatest astonishment, especially at the affair of Bergamo; said that it was contrary to all his instructions, and that it was to him an inextricable riddle. The Senate then sent Francesco Pesaro and another deputy to General Bonaparte, whom they met at Goritz, in pursuit of the Archduke Charles. Bonaparte received them rather coolly; he expressed surprise, saying that he knew that Bergamo was most attached to the Venetian government; he said that he would give orders that the commandant of Bergamo be superseded and tried, which last, however, was never done. He added, that he should not intermeddle between Venice and its revolted subjects, whom the Senate had a right to reduce to obedience, provided it did not interfere with the French garrisons of Bergamo and Brescia. And when the deputies entreated him to give orders to those very garrisons to co-operate with the Venetian forces in restoring order, he excused himself by saying that the enthusiasm of democratic opinions having been of use to him in the progress of his arms *in Italy*, he could not consistently o

prudently turn round against those who pr
themselves partisans of the French Republic
he should have positive orders from the Di
to that effect; but he suggested at the same
the surest means of stopping the spreading
insurrection, the concluding of a treaty of
between Venice and France, as the King of S
had just done. This, however, the Venetian
declined, as they had no instructions for t
ject; and then, in answer to their remons
concerning the exactions of the French mili
the Venetian territories, Bonaparte said, tha
Senate agreed to pay a million of livres per
as long as the war should last, he would put
to all local requisitions and forced contrib
and he hinted that the Senate might avail
for this object, of the funds at Venice belon
the Duke of Modena and the other enem
France. Thus ended this desultory conf
which took place on the 23d March. Bo
has denied having been a party to the rebe
the provinces against the Venetian gover
he told Bourrienne that he had too much
to countenance tumults in his rear, whilst
advancing into the Austrian hereditary state
he had given the impulse before; he had
fested, on many occasions, a hostile spirit
Venice, and his subalterns who remained be
Lombardy were not so cautious as himself.
months before these events, both the Direct
Bonaparte had contemplated the expedie
offering to the Emperor a compensation out
territory of Venice.

We must now compare Bonaparte's decl
to Pesaro with his confidential letter to

ritten on the following day, the 24th of
nd dated Goritz:—"M. Pesaro, savio
the Republic of Venice, was sent here
of his colleagues to demand explanations
the events of Brescia and Bergamo. . . .
on with regard to M. Pesaro was rather
it is not just now when the fortress of
a is not yet provisioned, when we are in
he resources of the Frioul, and of all the
of the Venetian governors, in order to
ovisions for our columns which are en-
the defiles of Carinthia, that the moment
rrel ought to be selected. But it was
xpedient that the Venetian government
allowed to send four or five thousand
ush those persons at Bergamo and Bres-
re attached to us. . . . . I have told M.
at the Executive Directory had not for-
t the Republic of Venice was the old ally
; and that we were desirous of protecting
nly requested to avoid the shedding of
d not to consider it as a crime if some
citizens were better inclined towards the
han towards the Austrians. . . . . We
od friends, and he appeared contented.
t object in all this is to gain time."
surgents of Bergamo and Brescia being
a number of men from the Lombard and
gions lately formed as auxiliary to the
rmy, undertook to revolutionize the rest
untry. But the country people were at-
Venice, and disaffection only existed
minority of *the local* nobility and of the
the towns, and especially in Brescia, as
himself acknowledged in his letters.

The hardy peasantry of the valleys of I
and Brescia of their own accord rose in arm
the rebels who were committing acts of
The insurgents had entered by force the
Saló on the banks of the lake of Garda,
peasantry, assisted by the inhabitants of Sal
the place and made four hundred prisoner
whom were some French soldiers, and ma
Polish legion. This legion, formed o
refugees and of deserters from the Aust
vice, was raised by General Dombrowsk
end of 1796, according to a plan laid b
Directory; who, to avoid the article of th
constitution which forbade the enlistmen
reign troops for the service of the Republi
them to the account of their subordinate
new Lombard republic, which was to
clothe them; but the legion was of cour
the command of the French generals, w
use of it in the civil war between Venic
revolted subjects. The Poles assisted in
throw of that ancient republic, which was
much by the same arts by which their own
Poland had been erased from the list of
Themselves the victims of oppression
own country, the Poles became, through
subsequent career in the service of Fra
brave but unreflecting instruments of a
injustice in other countries which ha
offended them. Lallement was writing
tially from Venice to Bonaparte on th
April:—"There is no doubt that Gener
*brow*ski and the Polish legion have ta
with the insurgents in the affair of Sal
clamorous in demanding satisfaction for

diers killed at Saló, but I am aware that the
th is already known here. . . . . Do you sup-
e that the French soldiers who have been fight-
these six years in the name of liberty, will not
port those whom they consider as their brethren
the same cause? No authority will be able to
train them, whilst the insurgents, knowing this,
l act more boldly, and the explosion will be-
ne general. I see already an instance of this
the Polish legion." General Kilmaine, who
left in command at Milan by Bonaparte, wrote
him on the 3rd of April that the peasantry of
highlands of Bergamo were arming to attack
reduce the town of Bergamo, and that their
-cry was "Death to the Jacobins and to the
nch!" And he added, that the Venetian go-
rnment ought to have sent its regular troops to
uce Bergamo, without reflecting that there was
rong French garrison in the town and castle,
ch evidently protected the insurgents. When
Venetian authorities at Verona at last sent
ps together with volunteers to attack the insur-
s, the French commandant at Peschiera opposed
r crossing the Mincio, and a French officer,
drieux, the same who had acted a double part in
affair of Bergamo, and who was now at Brescia,
g as adjutant-general of a motley body of
Lombards, Poles, and refugee Italians from
y part, signified to the Venetian officers that he
ld not allow any attack against either Brescia
rgamo, and would fire upon any armed party
should approach. And he published a sup-
l proclamation of the Provveditore Battaglia,
g *the peasantry to* arms and to kill all the
h, *upon which a* certain Lahoz, who com-

manded the Lombard legion, declared that
trality was broken, and that Venice was at
France. Battaglia was the last man to w
a document, as he was notoriously in Bo
confidence. Bonaparte himself afterwards
ledged that the proclamation was a forger
yet General Kilmaine wrote on the 5th
on the authority of this apocryphal docun
he had no doubts of the hostile views of t
tians, that he had given orders to disar
peasantry of Bergamo, and he concluded
gesting the expediency of intercepting so
couriers which Grimani, the Venetian an
at Vienna, was sending to the Senate, as
long and frequent conferences with the
Prime Minister gave reason to believe
Senate was hatching some treachery ag
French army. And, in fact, Baron Th
hinted confidentially to Grimani that
movement of the peasantry of Bergamo an
might, by joining that of the neighbouring
effect a useful diversion in the rear of th
army. That movement, however, had
ordered by the Senate; it had been spont
consequence of the irruption of the rebel
gamo and Brescia, supported by the Fre
rison, and the orders from Venice had
rather than encouraged it. The local a
at Verona had exerted themselves to save
portant city from the insurgents who were a
against it from Brescia. There was no di
at Verona, and the people of all clas
strongly attached to Venice. The count
offered themselves as volunteers by thousa
deputies of the different districts consult

Venetian Provveditore and the other authorities; and it was agreed to form several strong detachments of country militia, mixed with some regulars, and place them on the principal avenues by which the insurgents might approach. The commanders, who were chosen by acclamation, were Counts Maffei, Emilj, Valenza, and Veritá, all noblemen of influence in the country. Meantime the Venetian garrison within the town of Verona was reinforced by one or two Sclavonian battalions sent from Padua. But the castles and the town gates were in possession of the French, and the Venetian troops furnished only the internal guards and posts; a critical position for a neutral city to be in. The French mistrusted the Venetians, who on their side mistrusted the French, and frequent altercations took place in the streets, which the Venetian authorities sedulously tried to compose. In the country matters were still worse. The armed peasantry being irritated at the overbearing conduct of the French military, their exactions and other violences for a long season past, and being more removed from the eyes of the Venetian authorities, were not in the humour to forbear any longer, and considering themselves the lawful defenders of their government, they shouted "St. Mark for ever!" resisted the French detachments which wanted to make their way through their positions, and they killed some Frenchmen, especially stragglers. General Balland, who commanded at Verona, thought that matters were assuming a threatening aspect; he gathered his men within the castle, collected provisions, pointed the batteries against the town, and told the Provveditore that at the first hostile movement *he would batter* Verona to ruins. The Prov

escort of regular soldiers which had been
protect him, he came down into the town
the tumultuous multitude, who fell upo
and would have killed him, but for the Pr
tore and other magistrates, who protected
the risk of their own persons, and conduc
to the palace. Being asked there why th
batteries had fired upon the town, he sa
General Balland thought that he was goin
attacked, especially when he saw a Venet
tachment fighting in the street with a patro
Italian or Cispadane legion, which was a
to the French. These Italian auxiliaries
posed of hot-headed young men and of d
characters from the towns of Lombardy
among the principal actors in the trag
Venice; they were the scouts and the
hope of the French army. Beaupoil, h
agreed to a convention, by which a full
should be granted for all that was past,
previous friendly relations be restored
the French and the Venetian authorities.
poil signed the convention, and returned
castle for the sanction of his superior
who, however, refused, and dictated anoth
vention, demanding, among other things,
the population be disarmed within three ho
vain the Venetian authorities remonstrated
thing was impossible in so short a time.
expiration of the three hours he began to fi
upon the town. The fury of the people in
and they resolved to storm the castles, thr
the Venetian authorities to consider them as
if they did not order the regular troops to
in the assault. In this dilemma the Pr

nelli and his colleague not wishing to com-
eir government to open hostilities against
, resolved to leave the town, thus disavow-
e acts of the people which they could no
control. They withdrew to Vicenza. The
took the guns from the ramparts, and pointed
t the castles. The garrison of one of the
hoisted a flag of truce, but when a number
people advanced to the gate, a discharge of
shot strewed the street with mangled bodies.
rincipal castle meantime was firing upon the
vith red-hot balls and with shells. Erizzo,
editore of Vicenza, urged his colleagues to
to Verona, and not despair of their country.
did so, and proposed an armistice, which
d accepted. But the conditions of the
h commandant were so harsh that the depu-
the people would not listen to them, and the
began anew. The Provveditore Erizzo then
from Vicenza with a reinforcement of regu-
vith artillery and ammunition, accompanied
neral Stratico, of the Venetian service. He
ceived with acclamation by the whole popula-
hich was now unanimous against the French.
ime it was announced that three French co-
were marching against Verona, threatening
it to fire and sword. General Stratico,
examined the fortifications as well as the
n of the castles occupied by the French,
ed that he could not resist the combined
s from the outside and from within for
than twenty-four hours. The fighting and
from the castles had lasted five days. Ne-
ons were again entered into ; but the French
l Kilmaine having arrived in sight of Verona,

demanded a surrender at discretion. The deputies that went to the castle to arrange a tulation were arrested as hostages. The P ditori Giovannelli, Erizzo, and Contarini, that all was lost, then left Verona, and haste Venice to give the dismal news. The ci abandoned to themselves, sent Count Verit of their leaders, to General Kilmaine, who some demur, agreed to respect lives and pro But even this condition was not kept. The F did not murder the inhabitants, but the town, t not given up to indiscriminate pillage, was matically plundered. Counts Emilj, Valenz Veritá, three leaders of the people, were tr court-martial, and shot. The Venetian r troops were made prisoners of war.

Bonaparte, even before he knew of the V occurrences, had ordered Kilmaine to take p sion of Padua, disarm the Venetian troops, the officers and the governor, and send ther soners to Milan; to do the same at Treviso sano, and Verona; and to send moveable co to chastise the mountaineers who had killed F soldiers. "In this war against the valley must dissolve all meetings of people by threa their villages; fall suddenly upon some v where the people are not strong, and burn i all the towns of the continental dominions yo organise a municipality of the principal ci and a guard of the best democrats. You arrest all the Venetian nobles, and all indiv most attached to the Senate, and let their *answer for* what may happen at Venice. A *operation* must be effected together, twenty *hours after* Junot shall have quitted Venice

dressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of
ra Ferma, saying that he would free them
from the dominion of Venice. A few
afterwards he consigned the mover to the
n of Austria.
deputies of the Senate appointed previous to
ir of Verona found Bonaparte at Gratz in
on the 25th April. He had then signed the
aries of Leoben, and was on his way to
o Italy. The official report of the three
nterview which the deputies Donato and
iani had with Bonaparte is a remarkable
l document. The deputies fixed upon two
-one was to try to convince the General
at had happened could not be ascribed to
etian government, which had done all that
to avoid a rupture; that the French local
ders had been everywhere the assailants in
g the neutrality, &c.: the second point
ed the future, namely, how to prevent the
ce of such misunderstandings, supposing
French government continued in the sen-
which it had all along professed, of wishing
t peace with Venice. After listening to
guments, Bonaparte, instead of replying to
ried out, "Well, are the prisoners liber-
—"The French, the Poles, and some from
are free."—"No, I will have all free;
arrested for opinions, for being favourable
e; I will come myself and break open the
I will have no state inquisition; opinions
free."—"Yes, but free equally for all,
ould not be if a few turbulent men were to be
to overawe by force the opinion of a whole
n which is attached to its ancient govern-

ment." — "I will have all those free wh
arrested for opinions, and I have a list of the
"But your list, perhaps, does not explain w
they are arrested for mere opinions, or whetl
treason and other crimes; those of Brescia,
stance, whom you have mentioned, were sei
the act of fighting against the loyal people o
who were defending their town against rebe
"But," said Bonaparte, changing the subject
own soldiers who have been murdered; you
them to be murdered. It is true that the pr
ation of Battaglia was not written by him,
was printed at Verona by order of the S
The truth is, that this apocryphal proclamati
first printed—not at Verona, but at Milan
newspaper called 'Il Termometro Politico,'
was edited by Salvatori, a native of Lom
who had been a notorious emissary of the I
Directory, and who is mentioned with co
—as those men generally are after they
served the purpose of the moment—by Del
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his
to General Clarke, dated 30th December,
Salvatori, however, continued to make h
busy for the purpose of revolutionising Ital
he composed the proclamation which he ascr
Battaglia, in order to bring matters to an is
tween Venice and France. The paper appe
the 5th April, but the proclamation was ant
the 20th March. The whole transaction is
tery of iniquity. Salvatori went on actin
scout to the French, until Bonaparte, havi
come Emperor, cast off such ignoble instru
when Salvatori, being reduced to extreme d
threw himself into the Seine at Paris.

aparte went on saying to the deputies that government of Venice had not the power of ining the people, it ought to exist no longer. people hate the French because they are do so by the nobles." To this the deputies ed that the people did not like the French, se they had seen their fields, their houses, and furniture destroyed during the operations of ar. "Well," cried he, "unless you punish ose who have been guilty of offences against rench, unless you disarm the people, liberate isoners, send away the English minister, I e war against you. It is for this that I have peace with the Emperor, and have given up ea of going to Vienna; I have now eighty nd men at my disposal; I have twenty gun-; I will allow no more Inquisition, no more e; I shall prove a new Attila to Venice. t I had the Archduke Charles before me, I l to Pesaro at Goritz the alliance of France, he declined, because he wanted to arm the ation and cut off my retreat. Now I will no more alliance, I will dictate the law. I that as your government had not the means fending its continental territory and prevent-ie belligerent powers from trespassing it, so not now the means of disarming the people; l do that myself." And then he went on g about the dungeons, the pozzi, the canal o, and other antiquated traditions of the Ve-n government of former ages, which had long ne obliterated. The conclusion was that they submit to his will and discretion. "Your *nment," said he, "is old*; it must terminate." *ith this he dismissed* the deputies. Mean-

time another fatal incident occurred at V
A French armed vessel attempted to force i
into the inner port of Venice against the st
regulations of the place and the summons
officers of the port batteries, who at last fire
it. The Frenchman returned the fire.
Sclavonian vessels happening to be alongs
the Frenchman, their sailors leaped on boa
killed the captain and several of the crew.
Bonaparte heard of this, he demanded that t
captain, the state inquisitors and others,
the rest the Senator Pesaro, should be give
him, and he issued a proclamation from Palm
on the 1st of May, declaring war against V
He ordered the Venetian flag to be pulled d
all the towns and forts of the mainlan
marched troops to the coast to blockade V
Venice, surrounded by its lagoons, protecte
numerous flotilla and formidable batteries, de
by eleven thousand trusty Sclavonian troop
between three and four thousand native s
besides a still respectable navy of several s
the line and smaller vessels, open by sea to
ance from abroad, mistress of Dalmatia and
—Venice could have shown a bold front yet
Bonaparte's threatenings: but there were
traitors and many cowards in its council
fancied that they could by submission aver
doom. These men circumvented the timid
who, instead of consulting the Senate, conv
conference in his apartments, consisting of h
councillors, together with the heads of the
departments of the State. The discussio
warm. Francesco Pesaro, Giuseppe Priu
Niccolo Erizzo were for resistance; and

proposed to comply with the suggestion of Bonaparte of altering the fundamental laws of the Republic, Pesaro opposed it, saying that the moment was too critical for that, and that a revolutionized State would meet with no sympathy from the great powers, and would be sacrificed in the end, whilst the old Republic, with its recollections of a thousand years, could still maintain its place on the political map of Europe, in the approaching negotiations for a general peace. Hints of the same tenor had been given by the Venetian ambassador at Vienna. The opposite advice however prevailed, namely, that the Doge himself should propose to the Great Council the expediency of making an organic change in the constitution, and adopt a more popular form. The old government, the Doge, the Senate, and the Great Council abdicated their powers; they sent away their best defenders the Sclavonian troops back to Dalmatia, and as the lower orders of Venice, with the arsenal and dockyard men, threatened to defend their government against its own members, the Venetian commander of the lagoons sent his boats to carry over a French division into Venice during the night. A letter from the Polish officer, Sulkowski, to Bonaparte, of the 17th May, relates these extraordinary transactions. The partisans of the revolution having asked the advice of Villetard, the French chargé d'affaires, as to the new form of government which would be most acceptable to General Bonaparte, a provisorial municipal council was formed, until the people should elect their representatives. The tree of liberty was hoisted *on the square of St. Mark*, the old colours of the *Republic were publicly* burnt, and the fleet and the

arsenal were placed at the disposal of the Fre
All these things were done about the middl
May, 1797. The disgraceful intrigues whicl
to this unexampled political suicide are relate
the collection of documents already quoted.

CHAPTER V.

e's Conduct towards Venice—Negotiations for at Udine and Passeriano—Revolution at Genoa—of Fructidor at Paris, sanctioned by Bonaparte—of Campoformio—Bonaparte's Departure from nd Return to France.

ARTE, being returned to Milan, issued on of May the following order against the of Verona :—

t. I.—The city of Verona shall pay a contri- of 120,000 sequins, which will serve to de- expenses of the army.

It shall pay moreover a contribution of sequins to be distributed as an indemnity the officers and soldiers of the garrison, and olumn that has reconquered the town.

—All the pledges in the Monte di Pietà he value of fifty livres shall be confiscated. of an inferior value will be restored to the

—The commissary in chief will make out a nt of the losses sustained by individuals of rison and in the hospitals, which will be in- ed by means of a third contribution to be n the town and territory of Verona.

All the horses for riding or carriage within *shall be seized for the* use of the army.

Verona shall furnish to the army a contri-

bution in kind of 40,000 pairs of shoes, 2000 boots, cloth for 4000 coats, and 12,000 trousers and gaiters, linen for 12,000 shirts, besides 12,000 hats and 12,000 pairs of hose for the use of the army.

VII.—All the gold and silver of the churches, and public and government establishments, shall be confiscated.

VIII.—A military court shall assemble immediately to try fifty of the principal leaders of the insurrection against the French, who shall be sent in chains to Toulon, and from thence to Guiana, and all their property confiscated. If among them there should be any Venetian nobles, they will be shot.

IX.—The whole province of Verona shall be disarmed; and whoever shall contravene this order shall be sent to hard work at Toulon for six years.

X.—All the paintings, museums, collections belonging either to the town or to individuals, shall be confiscated; those among the owners who may be entitled to a compensation, will receive it out of the property of the persons condemned by the military court.

XI.—The general of division Augereau, the chief of the staff, and the commissary in chief, will see the present order executed.

BONAPARTE."

Augereau himself appeared shocked with the misery of Verona. He wrote to Bonaparte on the 9th of May, telling him that every thing had been plundered before his arrival; that the Monte di Pietà, in which were deposited effects for fifty millions of livres, had been broken open and emptied *without* any formality whatsoever; that the same

at Vicenza, where there had been
ı, and where the French troops had
thout any opposition; that a commis-
t, had been arrested on the charge of
nd that he believed that many officers
mplicated in it; that arbitrary sei-
made in the warehouses, shops, and
; that Verona was a desert; that the
e churches had been seized to pay
bution imposed by General Kilmaine,
t, there was hardly anything more to
ı, and that consequently he could not
iew contribution of 120,000 sequins
ied. As for the country, it had been
re and plunder, many villages were
the families were wandering about
fficers without any superior authority
ie rank of commandants of particular
committed acts contrary to justice,
ilitary discipline: reclamations were
om every quarter. "No one," re-
eau, "is more hostile than I am
ans; no one wishes more than I do
ench blood; but I am also inimical
d persecution. If some Frenchmen
lty of these, it behoves me to comfort
, and make them forget that they
their sufferings to my countrymen.
further instructions," etc.
wrote from Montebello, a country re-
Milan, to the Directory, to inform
occupation of Venice, in consequence
ith the municipality. "My objects
rst, to enter the city without diffi-
possession of the arsenal, and be

enabled to take out from it all that suits
the plea of the secret articles; second, t
bled, if we do not make peace with the
to turn to our advantage all the resour
Venetian State; third, to avoid the odiu
ing from the violation of the preliminaries
in what concerns the Venetian territory,
same time to afford pretexts for facilitatin
ecution of them; fourth, to counteract t
which will be raised in Europe, by bein
say that our putting a garrison into Veni
a provisory measure, and an act of prot
licited by the Venetians themselves." I
sequent letter, 26th of May, he tells the
that Venice might be given to the Emp
make-peace. "Venice," he says, "whic
in a state of gradual decay ever since the
of the Cape of Good Hope, and in conse
the rivalship of Trieste and Ancona, ca
survive the blows we have inflicted upo
population is stupid and pusillanimous,
made for liberty. Destitute of land and d
water, its doom seems to belong to those
we are giving the mainland. We shall
ships, strip the arsenal, take away all th
we will ruin the bank, and we will keep
ourselves." Machiavelli himself could
given more crafty advice to the Medici
Borgias of his time. The Directory, how
demurred about giving up Venice. In t
time Austrian troops went, agreeably to
articles of the Leoben preliminaries, t
Istria and Dalmatia. The inhabitants
remote provinces, who were traditionally
to old Venice, rather than recognise th

icipality sprung up in the capital,
ietly to the Austrian government.
an troops in garrison at Zara, when
lelivering up to the Austrian general
ian standard of St. Mark, burst into
the last time kissed that antient and
l ensign. The behaviour of the Dal-
it emergency seems at variance with
ited assertions of the oppressions prac-
enetian government towards its sub-
a extended its dominion along the
as far as Cattaro in Albania.
on their side were not idle. They
ed two Venetian ships of the line and
and several smaller vessels, putting
thousand French soldiers bound to
nunicipal council of Venice wrote to
governor at Corfu that the squadron
him reinforcements, and a supply of
the arrears due to the civil and mili-
of the late government. The fleet
fu on the 29th of June; the governor,
rders of the new Venetian authorities,
French soldiers into the town; and
oment Corfu and the other Ionian
a possession of France.
From his head-quarters of Montebello
the law to all Italy. After disposing
turned his attention to the sister
enoa. Ever since the beginning of
ar, Genoa had been the subservient
France. It was through the terri-
a that the French armies had pene-
edmont and Lombardy, it was from
enoa that they had been supplied

with provisions; Genoa became the d
plunder of Italy; thither were sent all
and precious metals seized in the Mon
and in the palaces and churches of nor
delivered by the Dukes of Modena and
well as the English goods seized at Leg
there the gold and silver were melted
jewels picked out, and the whole sold u
perintendence of the Directory's diplon
Faipoult. Genoa had also paid several
livres to the military chest of Bonapart
name of a loan. Its harbours had affor
tion to the French armed vessels and
which had landed troops, stores, and a
on its neutral coast under protection of it
and when Nelson, indignant at this bar
nivance, had seized some of the French
to the shore, a great outcry was raised
violation of Genoese neutrality, and
imperiously demanded that the Senate s
away the English and Austrian envoys,
mand was complied with. All this the
Genoa had done, and now Bonaparte in
manded the abdication of that very Sena
as he said, it was an aristocracy. The
Genoa, ever since the time of Andrea
been governed by the patricians, but th
order was not close and exclusive as at
families being admitted into it from ti
A club of democrats, joined by emig
other parts of Italy, and secretly enco
Faipoult, Saliceti, and other agents of
Directory, conspired against the Senate;
22nd of May they sallied out, about s
hundred in number, assumed the French

kade, broke into the arsenal, took possession of gates, and attacked the Ducal Palace, where, ever, they were repulsed by the regular guard. antime the working classes, the porters, boat- , and workmen of the docks rose against the -styled patriots at the cry of "Long live our ce, our religion, and the Virgin Mary," retook arsenal, armed themselves, and drove the de- rats before them from post to post. Many of latter were killed, and some Frenchmen among rest; for as they all wore the same cockade, the ple made no distinction. A strong detachment, ever, was sent by the Doge to protect the house he French envoy, where several of the revolu- ists took shelter. Faipoult writing to Bona- e acknowledged this:—"The government," he, "has done all that it could do, not being master of those who defended it. The patriots shown a total want of judgment and prudence; have assumed the French cockade, and by so g they have endangered us; they have had re- se to disgraceful means, by liberating the galley s and other prisoners to recruit their numbers, h conduct has disgusted the whole town, and y good citizens have withdrawn themselves them in consequence. In the midst of the y some Frenchmen have been killed, as they all the same cockade. Tranquillity being now red, the trades are being assembled to consult t the changes which may be expedient in the titution of the Republic; the great majority, ever, is for maintaining the governing power e order of the nobility." Bonaparte on re- *ng these accounts* assumed a most angry tone, *nt his aide-de-camp* Lavalette with a threat-

ening letter to the Doge, demanding satisfaction, and a reform in the constit had long before written to the Directo object was to drive away from the go Genoa about twenty families who were towards France, and to recall about e banished families which were friendly to so as to form a government devoted to

The Senate sent envoys to Bonapart tated the conditions of a treaty by w was to pay four millions to France, to constitution into a more popular form lature to be composed of two elective c the executive to consist of twelve senat over by the Doge. The ultra-democrat wished to exclude the nobles from the n ment, but Bonaparte told them that th only unjust but was also imprudent, an constitutional country all classes had a represented, and to share in the offices a the administration. Upon the whole t of Bonaparte towards Genoa was mor than towards Venice. The country pe ever, disliking these innovations, revolte alarm to the very gates of Genoa; bu put down by a mixed French and Genc commanded by General Duphot. killed; others being taken, were tried martial, and shot or sent to the galleys. sequence, however, was, that Bonapa French division under Lannes, who, un of assistance, took possession of the trip tions and the castles of proud Genoa.

The news of the eventful changes *been effected* in the two principal repu

mere general, and in the name of ecutive, without the participation of gislature, gave rise to some oratory olard, a deputy to the Council of lred, censured the conduct of the Our troops," said he, "are in Ve- s given up to us; the oldest govern- pe is annihilated, and then it re- under a democratic form; and all hout any communication of it to the ıcils, who only became acquainted public report. The Directory has e, and a treaty with Venice, without f our legislature. Even if we had by the Venetians, had we the right against their internal political insti- taking an active part in their sud- '. . . . But the experiment being tried and having succeeded, has been just Genoa, and with a like success." otion for demanding explanations tory about its extraordinary conduct ıg. It was referred to a committee, s smothered in the new revolution of aparte at his head-quarters of Monte- ed by a kind of court and supported ieutenants, was already too powerful Directory or the Legislative Councils. Cispadane and Lombard Republics tate which he called the Cisalpine gave it a constitution on the model of e, with Legislative Councils and an ectory. Bonaparte appointed the di- *nisters, the judges*, and in fact all *thorities*. On the 9th of July the

checked at once the spirit of the insurg
were not supported by the mass of the p
The rebels were easily overcome by the kin
and were treated with great rigour, man
being executed as traitors. Thus at on
same time the democrats of Genoa were l
Bonaparte, those of Milan were despise
those of Piedmont were abandoned to th
of the king, and those of Venice, after ha
excited into insurrection, were given u
tria. Such was the policy of General B
who was styled by some the Liberator of

The conferences for the final treaty
between Austria and France began at M
between the Marquis del Gallo and Bona
were afterwards adjourned to Udine, in
tian province of Frioul, whither Clarke,
Directory had associated with Bonaparte
as plenipotentiary of the French rep
well as Count Meerfeldt on the part o
Projects and counter-projects were pro
conferences lingered on, and Bonaparte
remained at Montebello, became impati
party for peace at Vienna had received
the Emperor was made aware of his tru
and of the great resources of his empi
raised his demands accordingly. It ap
that the Court of Vienna was building h
the discord that raged at Paris in the
Councils, and even in the Directory. T
club of royalists who had gained over n
ential men of the Republic, and General
among the rest, for the purpose of restor
stitutional monarchy under Louis XVII
gru had been in correspondence with C

é, and evidence of this was found among the
s of a French emigrant at Venice, the Count
raigues, whose arrest was one of the condi-
exacted by Bonaparte and his agent Villetard
epoch of the democratic revolution of Venice.
arte forwarded these papers to the Directory.
ne writers have upbraided the Venetian Senate
is, but they have overlooked dates; it was
the virtual abdication of the Doge that the
's who sold their own country gave up the
nt Count and his papers.
tria having entered into separate negotiations
France, the English cabinet also thought
to make overtures to the Directory for
This was about the beginning of June
The Directory pointed out Lille in Flan-
a place to carry on the negotiations. Lord
sbury, the same who had failed in an at-
the year before at Paris to conclude peace
cert with Austria and the other allies, was
appointed plenipotentiary for a separate
between England and France. He repaired
le towards the beginning of July, and was
net by Letourneur and Maret, the envoys of
rectory. On the 8th of July he delivered
t diplomatic note in these terms: "England
estore to France all her colonies. As for
lies of France, namely, Spain and Holland,
nd will also conclude peace with them on
ion of retaining possession of the Cape of
Hope, the port of Trincomalee in Ceylon,
e island of Trinidad in the West Indies."
s not unreasonable proposal, considering that
d had always been victorious at sea, the
ry replied, on the 15th of July, that the

French government expected *as a pre*
condition of the peace that England woul
all the conquests she had made from Hol
Spain, as well as from France. The neg
after this lingered on for several weeks.

Meantime Bonaparte was addressing his
on the internal polity of France, telling t
if required, "they would recross the Alps
rapidity of the eagle in order to put d
royalists, and defend the constitution of
III." General Hoche, who commanded
Rhine, followed the example, and even m
division upon Paris, which was stoppe
march by an order from the Legislative
Bonaparte had no particular affection or re
the Directory, but he perceived that the in
struggle was got up by the royalists, who
succeeded, would of necessity destroy
He was also offended at the manner in wh
had spoken against him concerning Venic
urged by Barras and the majority of the D
to support them against the Legislative
which had repeatedly threatened to impea
for their arbitrary usurpation of all the p
the state, he sent to Paris General Auge
violent republican, a bold and active offic
no capacity for politics, and therefore only
an instrument. The opposition party in t
cils was mixed; some were sincere rep
having Carnot at their head, and who
maintain the constitution, but to restrai
moderate and unprincipled abuse of aut
the Executive, and the scandalous venality
and Rewbell; others were royalists, who
their intentions by associating themselve

ublicans. Pichegru, the president of the Coun- of Five Hundred, was at the head of these. e majority of the Directors, Barras, Rewbell, Réveillère Lepeaux, who were called the Tri- viri, endeavoured to stigmatize the whole as alists who, in the language of the times, were the pay of England. Pichegru proposed to ve, on the 17th Fructidor (3rd September), for ecree impeaching the Directory for having vio- d the constitution in attempting to overawe the slature by military force. The centre, or entre" as it was nicknamed, of the council, id, or gained over by the emissaries of the ectory, prevailed upon Pichegru to defer his ion till the following day. The Directory, their part, having appointed Augereau com- ndant of Paris, had taken their measures. The t morning, 4th September, the Tuileries were rounded with troops, and Augereau entered the ll of the Council and arrested about sixty depu- and took them to prison. The remainder or ectorial party having assembled again, appointed ommittee of public safety, presided by Sieyès. documents from Venice transmitted by Bona- e were made the groundwork of the charges nst the arrested deputies, and without any very t scrutiny, between forty and fifty members of Council of Five Hundred, and ten or twelve of Council of the Ancients, besides the two Direct- Carnot and Barthélemy, and a number of news- r editors and other individuals, were sentenced e transported to Guiana. Carnot, however, ged to escape. Merlin de Douai and François *Neufchateau were substituted* as Directors in *place of Carnot* and Barthélemy. The elec-

tions of no less than forty-nine departments were annulled. The result was that Barras and his friends became all-powerful in France, and arrogant in proportion. Barras wrote to Bonaparte in a tone of exultation:—"The infamous journalists will now have their turn. The resolution of the Five Hundred will be adopted (giving to the Directory the power of suppressing any newspaper and pamphlet). Conclude peace, but let it be honourable; not the infamous proposition of Carnot (Carnot, just before his fall, had told La Valette, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, who was at Paris watching the events in his master's interests, 'that the safety of the Republic depended on peace, whatever might be its conditions'). Let the Rhine be the boundary," continued Barras; "let Mantua belong to the Cisalpine Republic; and don't give up Venice to the House of Austria. Such are the wishes of the present Directory." At the same time the Directory recalled Clarke, who was Carnot's friend, and entrusted Bonaparte alone with the negotiations. This was what Bonaparte had long wished; but at the same time he did not forsake Clarke, who had proved to him a docile and submissive colleague. Augereau, who appeared intoxicated with his successful coup d'état, and considered himself as the saviour of the Republic, wrote to Bonaparte, that amidst the thousand and one reasons of Clarke's recall, was "his correspondence with Carnot, in which he called the generals in the army of Italy a gang of robbers." Bonaparte wrote to Talleyrand, the new Minister for Foreign *Affairs*,—"General Clarke has acted loyally in his *diplomatic* negotiations; he has not displayed any *great talents*, but he has shown goodwill, activity,

nd a sort of character. Remove him from the egotiations if you like, but you must not ruin im, or you will commit a great injustice.....I emand urgently for him a diplomatic position of econd rank, and I warrant that the government will not have to repent the appointment. He has been entrusted with a most important mission; he knows all the secrets of the Republic; it would be unbecoming our dignity to have him proscribed. I am told that he is charged with having written what he thought of the generals of the army of Italy. I don't see any crime in that; why should an agent of the government be accused for having told what he was commissioned to inquire about? They say that he has written against me also. If this be true, he has written it to the government, and he had a right to do so. He may have thought it necessary. Public morality is founded upon justice, which does not exclude energy, being, on the contrary, the result of it."

The news of the events of Fructidor rendered the cabinet of Vienna more inclined to listen to terms of peace, but at the same time it made the majority of the Directory, the triumvirs, more unmanageable and more arrogant in their demands. They showed this disposition at once towards England. They recalled Maret and Letourneur from Lille, and substituted two members of the late Convention, Treilhard and Bonnier, who, on the 16th of September, abruptly asked Lord Malmesbury f he had powers for restoring to the French Republic and its allies all their colonies. Lord Malmesbury replied that he had not the powers for hat. "Then *go and fetch* them," courteously *ejoined the two ex-conventionalists*. And the next

morning they sent him his passport, with
quit the French territory within twenty-fo
Lord Malmesbury quitted Lille on the 1
on the 20th he arrived in London. This
second time within a twelvemonth that the
Directory had unceremoniously broken off
gotiations with England, and this second ti
land was treating alone, and her demands
no means unreasonable, as she was not a b
conquered party. So much for those who
that the continuation of the war was o
English obstinacy and faithlessness. B
himself was disgusted at the conduct of th
tory, which he saw would throw fresh obs
the way of a peace with Austria. He had
given to Count Meerfeldt on the 11th
tember the following project, which he co
as an ultimatum: "The Rhine and Ma
France; Venice as far as the Adige to
Mantua to the Cisalpine Republic." M
set off for Vienna to lay this plan be
cabinet. Gallo, on his side, had paved
for a favourable reception of it by mean
court influence, and of letters from Queen
of Naples, the mother of the Empress,
most anxious for the cessation of hostilities
On the 21st of September Bonaparte wrot
Directory: "Meerfeldt will probably ret
few days with an answer. But if you p
your determination not to give up Venice,
much of the possibility of peace; hostili
begin again in October, and everything
thrust again upon chance." After much
sion in the council at Vienna, Meerfeldt
to Udine with fresh instructions, and was

by the Count Louis von Cobentzel, of a
ustrian family, an experienced diplomatist,
ined for peace. He was the bearer of an
h letter from the Emperor to General
te, which said, "that the Count was pos-
his most unlimited confidence, and was
d with full powers to receive and accept
osition which may be conformable with the
s of justice and the reciprocal position of
racting parties, and to conclude the treaty
gly. After this fresh assurance," continued
eror Francis, "of the spirit of conciliation
entertain, you will perceive that peace is
hands, and that the happiness or misery of
of men will depend upon your determina-
may be mistaken as to the means best
to terminate the calamities which have so
solated Europe, but I shall at least have
solation of reflecting that I have done
ng in my power for that object. . . . .
esolved upon the course which I now take
pinion I have of your character, and the
have conceived towards you, and of which
here the pleasure, General Bonaparte, of
ou my assurance."

parte saw that the negotiations would now
n good earnest. He took up his head-
at Passeriano, in a country seat belonging
Doge of Venice, a few miles from the town
e, where the Austrian plenipotentiaries had
idence. On the 27th of September Bona-
d his first interview with Cobentzel, who
e attended by a numerous suite, and dis-
great pomp and state. That very night
e wrote to Talleyrand that the congress

was opened; that M. Cobentzel had pu
exorbitant pretensions at first, "but," added
believe that he has power of making peace
ing to my proposal of the line of the Adige.
dinner, when the Germans are disposed to
have talked with him for three or four
amidst much gossip, I thought I perceiv
the Emperor wishes to bring his policy into
with ours in order to oppose Prussia. .
Besides the line of the Adige, M. Cobentzel
the Papal Legations. . . . . I told h
I was not even authorised to give him Ve
the Adige, and then I thought I perceived a
of surprise and disappointment. . . . .
keep Venice for the very last moment, after
received fresh letters from you."

Meantime the Directory had appointed A
to the command of the armies on the Rhine
gereau issued a turgid proclamation, thre
the Emperor, and boasting that he would
Vienna. All this greatly annoyed Bonapar
thought he perceived that the Directory wa
give him a rival. He received a letter fr
aide-de-camp La Valette, who told him that j
and calumny were busy at Paris concernir
Bonaparte wrote a reproachful letter to the
tory, complaining of spies being sent to hi
quarters, of Augereau's mischief-making,
contradictory instructions sent to him con
the negotiations in Italy: "It is evident," I
on to say, "that the government is acting
me as they acted towards Pichegru after
miaire (when the Directory took away hi
mand from him). I beg of you to acc
resignation, and appoint another in my pl

e shall make me continue in the service after s unexpected mark of ingratitude on the part of e government. My health is greatly impaired, d I am in need of rest. I wish to mix again th the mass of the citizens. I have had for a ng time a great power entrusted to me, and I ve used it on all occasions for the benefit of my untry. If those who do not believe in my virtue spect me now, so much the worse for them. My n conscience and the opinion of posterity will be y reward. The country being now tranquil and ee from the dangers which have threatened it, ere can be no inconvenience in my quitting my st." This was the third time that Bonaparte d tendered his resignation, knowing all the hile, Bourrienne says, that it would not be ac-pted. But his letter gave serious alarm to the irectors. Rewbell, La Réveillère, and Barras mself exclaimed against the young Corsican neral's ambition, which pretended to dispose of ace and war at his will, to destroy ancient re-ublics and give up their spoils to monarchs, which emed to patronise kings and princes, and refused revolutionize Piedmont and Rome. "What does e mean by all this?" they asked each other. But erlin and Neufchateau, the two new Directors, ggested prudent counsels, especially with regard a general of so much reputation, and who was ntrusted with such an important negotiation with e Emperor. It was at last resolved to dispatch ottot, Barras' private secretary, and a man of rewdness, to Passeriano, in order to sound the al intentions of Bonaparte, to whom the Directory rote *a long conciliatory* letter, disclaiming all *spicions of him,* and explaining several other

points to his satisfaction. Bottot arrived
seriano early in October. Bonaparte receiv
coolly. At a public dinner, in presence
Austrian diplomatists, Bonaparte accused
rectory of ingratitude, reckoned his vario
jects of complaint in a loud voice, and tur
Bottot, "Just look," cried he, "passing fro
to little matters, look at my secretary Bour
case. He possesses all my confidence, he
trusted with all the details of the pending
tiations, and yet your Directory will not e
name from the list of emigrants. This is
ceivable, and moreover very stupid, for he
my secrets, he knows my ultimatum, and h
by a single word realise a fortune and la
your infatuation. Ask M. del Gallo if it
so." A general murmur drowned some
that Bottot attempted to make. Bourrien
that Del Gallo had truly offered him an e
Bohemia with a handsome income if he w
him know Bonaparte's real intentions as
ultimatum, and he adds that this offer, w
communicated to his master, possibly ga
to the improbable story of the Emperor
offered a principality to Bonaparte, whose
tion was already soaring towards much
destinies.

Bottot, however, in his private intervie
Bonaparte, brought him into a better tempe
had been instructed by the Directory to insi
revolutionizing Italy. Bonaparte asked
the whole of Italy was to be revoluti
Bottot's instructions on this point were vag
indefinite. Bonaparte shrugged up his sh
and asked for more precise orders. Mea

peace, and the revolutionary project was ad-
d.
ut this time General Bernadotte, whom
arte had sent to Paris ostensibly to present
tandards taken from the Austrians, and who
tnessed the affair of Fructidor, in which he
o part, returned to Passeriano with dis-
s and verbal instructions from the Directory.
g the latter was one from Réveillère Lepeaux,
izing Bonaparte, in case of the war breaking
ain, "to give to the conquered provinces any
f government he chose,—democratic, aristo-
or even theocratic." Bonaparte interrogated
lotte at length concerning the intentions of
rectory, the public opinion, and the resources
nce in case of a new war, and also concerning
nding negotiations with Austria. "Make
by all means," replied Bernadotte. "The
ory are offended at the little docility you
owards them; the armies of the Rhine are
iendly towards you; the republicans are
ng and mistrusting you; the royalists, had
been for the events of Fructidor, would have
hed you. The people of Paris are still en-
tic of your renown; you are the idol of that
hich would have sent you to the scaffold on
ys of Vendémiaire. I repeat to you, make

furnish me with the means for sustainin
"You must not rely upon that: the na
large wishes for peace; you have already
the head of the Germanic Empire to ackno
the Republic; and if now, instead of plac
existence again at the mercy of the chances o
you consolidate it by peace, your glory wil
in its full splendour. This, however, is not
the wish of the Directory, which, feeling i
weakness, sees no other means of protract
existence but by keeping the destinies
Republic in a state of uncertainty. The
mind is too much agitated in France to a
carrying on a fresh war without resortin
dictatorship; but then your own position w
one of danger, for, whether you proved vic
or not, you would be an object of suspicion
dictatorial power." It was then that Bon
raising himself, cried out, "Well, I am d
I shall make peace." This conversation is
in the 'Life of Charles XIV., King of Swed
Touchard Lafosse.

After another interview with Cobentzel,
parte wrote to the Directory on the 10th of O
"We are near the conclusion of the treaty:
be signed to-night or broken off altogether.
are the conditions:—We are to have the
the Rhine, and thence to Kerpen, Julier
Venloo; Mayence, with all its fortifications;
islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, and the
tian districts of Albania. The Cisalpine will
to the Adige and the Po, with Mantua, Pes
and Ferrara, and about three millions and a
people. Genoa will have the imperial fiefs
Emperor will have Dalmatia, Istria, and

an territory as far as the Adige and the Po,
he city of Venice. France gains four mil-
' inhabitants on the side of the Rhine, besides
ree millions and a half of the Cisalpine Re-
The house of Austria loses a million and
in Lombardy, and two millions and a half in
m, instead of which it gets about two millions
Venetian States. . . . . I have been induced
e to these terms by the following considera-
—1. The advanced period of the season, which
vourable to an offensive war in the cold defiles
Alps. 2. The weakness of my own army,
would have to sustain the shock of all the
al forces. 3. The death of General Hoche,
e bad system of operations adopted on the
4. The distance intervening between the
of the Rhine and the hereditary states of
a. 5. The political nullity of the Italians.
hardly 1500 Italians with my army, most of
are the refuse of the large towns. 6. The
rupture of the negotiations with England.
being deprived, owing to your not having
l the treaty of alliance with the King of Sar-
of the assistance of the Piedmontese troops,
I am obliged to leave 6000 additional men
garrisons of Piedmont and Lombardy to
them. 8. The evident desire of the French
for peace; a desire which manifests itself
mong the soldiers. 9. Because it would be
dent to risk sure advantages and French blood
ople who have but little love for liberty, and
tle worthy of it, and who by habit and cha-
and tradition hate us heartily. The city of
e *reckons perhaps three* hundred patriots; but
terests shall be provided for, and they will

join the Cisalpine Republic. The aspirations of
few hundred men are not worth the lives of 20,0
Frenchmen. 10. Lastly, the war with Englan
which will open to us a new field for active ope
tions, more vast and splendid. The English peo
are worth much more than the Venetians; and
we oblige their government to make peace, t
commerce and the advantages which we shall
tain in both hemispheres will be a great step towa
the public happiness." And in another place
said that "the Austrians were slow and pa
monious, and the French Republic had no rea
to fear them in its military projects, whilst
English were generous, enterprising, and intrigui
and there could be no tranquillity for France u
the British monarchy was destroyed." The hat
of Bonaparte against England was of early d
and was founded upon a true though confu
notion of the English power and of the Eng
character, which he could not help respecti
although it stood in his way. He felt that
could not despise England, and he hated it
more for that.

The final conclusion of the treaty with Aus
was deferred for some days after the 10th.
story has been told and generally believed, t
Bonaparte being impatient of the protracted de
of Cobentzel, eyeing a valuable china tray wh
the Count had received as a present from Cathe
of Russia, asked Cobentzel whether the posses
of Mantua by the Emperor was a sine quâ no
the conclusion of the peace, to which the Co
having answered in the affirmative, Bonap
cried out, "Then war is declared; but mark
before the end of this autumn I will shatter

rchy to pieces like this piece of clay;" and with
ie dashed the tray to the ground, and broke
o fragments. Bourrienne denies the story as
st improbable piece of stage heroics. "I
nly know nothing of any such scene; our
ers at Passeriano were not quite so bad."
ienne relates that Bonaparte's determination
ke peace proceeded from the information he
ed from Paris of the mistrust of the Direc-

the 13th of October, at day-break, the Alps
e Frioul appeared covered with snow, owing
sudden change in the weather. Bonaparte
told of this by Bourrienne, leaped from his
an to the window, and then quietly said,
at! before the middle of October! What a
y this is! Well, we must make peace." And
ote to the Directory, "The summits of the
tains are covered with snow; I could not,
ling to the terms agreed upon, recommence
ties before twenty-five days, and then we shall
ried in snow." The snow came very oppor-
to back his already made-up determination
ncluding peace. He told Bourrienne, after
lly inspecting the returns of the various divi-
of his army, "There are nearly eighty thou-
ffective men; I feed, I pay them; but I can
only sixty thousand into the field on a day of
. I shall gain it, but afterwards my force
e reduced perhaps twenty thousand, between
, wounded, prisoners, missing, detached, &c.
how can I oppose the Austrian forces which
narch to the defence of Vienna? It would
e *a month before the* armies of the Rhine
upport me, if even they were able to do so;

and in a fortnight all the roads and passe
deeply covered with snow. It is settled
make peace. Venice shall pay for the ex
the war, and the boundary of the Rhine
Directory and the lawyers say what they

The final treaty was signed in the nigh
17th of October, 1797, and was dated fro
Formio, an old ruinous castle half way
Passeriano and Udine, out of regard for di
etiquette. Early in the morning of t
Bonaparte sent Berthier and Monge to P
the treaty for the ratification of the Direct
could do no less than sign it. Talleyra
to Bonaparte in return on the 26th October
is made at last, and a peace worthy of B
Receive my hearty compliments upon it,
General. The Directory is satisfied, the
delighted. Every thing goes on we
Italians will perhaps utter loud cries, but
little consequence. Adieu, General, peac
adieu, with friendship, admiration, res
gratitude," &c. &c.

Meantime Bottot being returned to P
reported to Barras what he had seen and
the head-quarters at Passeriano. He then
Bonaparte a confidential letter dated 22nd
before the news of the final treaty had
Paris, assuring him of the cordial frien
affection of the Directory for him, and te
that he must have been deceived on their
" Perhaps the Government commits mar
perhaps it does not see things so clearly a
but only mark the republican docility wi
it has listened to your remonstrances. Au
but you yourself sent him; the error is both

rectory's. Bernadotte—he is with you now.
t—he is recalled from Rome. The treaty
ardinia—it is ratified. Bourrienne—he is
from the emigrant list. The revolution of
is adjourned. Do, Citizen-General, enlighten
rectory. I repeat to you, their hearts are
; they only require instruction, which they
from you!"

ng all this time the democrats of Venice were
g of a Republic and Independence; they
nted with great solemnity the tree of liberty
quare of Saint Mark, and the French gar-
raced the show. But they were at dissension
emselves, and with their former fellow-sub-
f the mainland. The people of Bassano,
Vicenza, Verona, now that the Senate was
e, had no veneration for the municipalists
ice. The latter sent plans of republican
itions to Bonaparte, who, Foscolo says, took
ible of revising one of them, which he sent
Venice. They declaimed violently against
ns, and especially against the Emperor.
otte, who commanded at Udine, and who
om Bonaparte the conditions of the treaty,
ed all republican demonstrations on the
the inhabitants of Frioul, telling them that
nore prudent to wait for the events. Bona-
aving returned from Passeriano to Milan,
o Villetard, the French chargé d'affaires,
cording to the treaty just concluded, the
troops must evacuate Venice, and that they
be succeeded by the Austrians; but that
ne the Venetian democrats who had com-
hemselves and who preferred emigrating
nd refuge at Milan, and that the re-
naval and military stores and other ob-

jects belonging to the late Venetian go
might be sold to make up a fund for their
Villetard, ashamed of the part he was forc
communicated these news to the municipal
who received them with stifled cries of g
imprecations. Was it for this that they
excited against their former government,
that their country might be spoliated, parc
and delivered into foreign hands? The
the offer of participating in the spoils
country, or to have anything more to do
administration. Villetard wrote a warm
Bonaparte, in which he told him that as t
cipal officers refused to share in the spo
their country because they were not yet fam
the corruptions of politics, there only rer
establish a military government at Venice
on his instructions until it was to be e
Bonaparte's reply has often been quote
unfeeling tone:—"I don't understand the
of your letter. The French Republic
make war for other people. We are
obligation to sacrifice 40,000 Frenchmer
the interests of France in order to please
babblers, whom I should more aptly call
who have taken a fancy to have a universa
all over the world. I wish those gentlem
make the experiment of a winter-campa
me. The Venetian nation exists no long
populations of Italy, and the Venetian
ticular, are little adapted for liberty.
choose, they may still defend themselves
the French troops shall have evacuated the
they may act as they please." And he
quibbling on the words of the treaty
French Republic did not deliver Veni

Austria, but only consented that the
ıould occupy it. General Serrurier was
ed by Bonaparte to complete the sacri-
ice. Having stripped the arsenal and
nd the stores of biscuit and salt, sent to
s of war, broken to pieces or sunk those
ınfit for sea, and having stripped the
rge Bucintoro of its gold ornaments,
garrison finally evacuated Venice in
98. Soon afterwards the Austrian troops
sion of Venice and its territory as far
e.

7th November, 1797, Bonaparte quitted
Rastadt, passing through Switzerland.
n named by the Directory head minister
ress to be assembled at Rastadt for the
ation and settlement of the German
The conferences promised to be very
atory, and that did not suit his temper.
e merely signed a military convention
very of Mayence by the Emperor against
-delivery of Palmanova and Venice to
ns, which completed the treaty of Campo
d then he set off for Paris, where he
the 5th of December at his house, Rue

precious effects. Bonaparte told Bo
the quicksilver mines of Idria in Ca
he seized in his advance against th
Charles, furnished the greater part of
sessed. He has said that he remitte
times twenty millions to the Director
spent in secret service, no doubt; muc
between generals, commissaries, and
part of it went to pay the soldiers;
tell what became of the rest? Regu
were not kept in those times, and Bo
self could not, as he has acknowle
dilapidation. It is, however, melanch
that Italy was plundered; thousand
ruined; the public credit of its severa
hilated; and yet hardly one-fourth o
that was wrung from her can be ac
The French treasury was not the r
though some individuals became so.
rally the result of plunder and spoliati

On the 10th of December a splend
tival was given in the great court of
bourg palace, the residence of the
honour of the general of the army

struggling to obtain their freedom, had
l with kings. In order to obtain a con-
founded upon rational principles, they
ged to overcome the prejudices of eighteen
during which period religion, feudality,
ism have governed Europe in succession.
date of the peace which you have just
l begins the era of representative govern-
You have effected the organization of the
ion, whose vast territory is circumscribed
fixed by nature itself. I have the honor
r into your hands the treaty signed at
mio, and ratified by his Majesty the Em-
When the happiness of the French people
secured on the best organic laws, the rest
e will then become free." This last sen-
full of meaning both for the Directory
France. Barras made in return a prolix
l speech, full of fulsome eulogy, extolling
e above all the heroes of antiquity; and
by inviting him to go and hoist the tri-
flag on the Tower of London. Bonaparte
been appointed to the command of the
led "of England." But this was only a
appointment. On the 10th of February,

the preparation for the Egyptian expedi
he had suggested to Talleyrand in th
August, and which the Directory had co
influenced, as it appears, by the wish o
from Europe an ambitious and censori
general, whom they feared. It is said
parte offered himself as a candidate for
torship, at the first periodical renewal of
members, but that he was opposed as beir
of the age of forty required by the const
that office. It was after this disappoin
he made up his mind wholly to go to E
told Bourrienne, who asked him if he
determined to quit France, "Yes, I
everything else; they don't want me
ought to upset them and make myself
that would not do yet. The nobles w
consent to it; I should find myself alo
tried the ground. Everything wears o
my glory is already forgotten; I must
East, the land of great empires and gre
tions." In April, 1798, he was appointe
in-chief of the army of the East. The
exercised no direct control over Bonap
parations for the expedition; it merely
signature of one of its members to what
proposed as being required. When he
order signed, he ran to the Luxembou
Merlin de Douai, who was the most as
his post, afforded him his signature. The
general, Lagarde, did not countersign a
papers relative to the expedition, as Bon
not wish him to be acquainted with its s
was Bonaparte who organised the ar
East, collected ships, and communicate

al Brueys. He transmitted to Toulon
ons of livres of the money taken at Bern
l Brune, and which the Directory placed
rte's disposal. The finances were badly
in those times; the revenues were anti-
nd squandered away, and the treasury
money to spare.
us incident which occurred at Vienna
r a moment the preparations for Egypt.
e, who had been sent as ambassador to
rial Court, had conducted himself in a
y and temperate manner, and had made
tious display of the tri-coloured flag and
blican insignia. This moderation was
nted at Paris, and Bernadotte received
from the Directory to hoist the tri-
flag above the gate of his hotel. The
nd at Vienna, already not favourable to-
French, was still more exasperated by
ncipled invasions of Switzerland and
cted by the Directory whilst the negoti-
a general peace were pending at Rastadt.
athered in front of the ambassador's
lled down the flag, broke into the apart-
l destroyed the furniture. Bernadotte
a. The Directory, on receiving the
ght of giving Bonaparte the command
against the Emperor. The embarkation
ps for Egypt was put off. Bonaparte,
reated the occurrence of Vienna slightly,
ing that could and should be made up;
rote to Cobentzel, with whom he had
a sort of intimacy, to meet him at
order to come to some political arrange-
might "*solve* the questions which the

treaty of Campo Formio had left unsolved." Directory had information of this correspon and became again suspicious. It is said tha words passed between the Directors and Bon at the Luxembourg, that Bonaparte tendered his resignation, upon which Rewbell, one Directors, handed him a pen, saying, "Si General;" but that the more prudent snatched away the pen. It was after this that parte told Bourrienne "the pear is not yet and he set off for Toulon on the 3d of Cobentzel is said to have been much disapp in not finding him at Rastadt.

CHAPTER VI.

Malta, Egypt, and Syria.

TE set sail from Toulon the 19th of May, ting advantage of the absence of the blockading squadron, which had been ray from the coast by a violent gale of he French fleet consisted of thirteen ships e, a number of frigates and smaller vessels, ransports; having on board about 36,000 s, a select staff, chiefly from the army of ut 10,000 sailors, and 100 men of science s. The expenses of this large armament plied, not by France, but by the treasures the French at Bern in Switzerland, and contributions levied at Genoa and Rome, st city had been lately occupied and by the generals and commissaries of the . The secret about the object of the ex- was well kept; some said it was destined e or Turkey, some for Egypt, others for Before sailing, Bonaparte addressed to his e of his high-sounding proclamations, tell- that "they formed a wing of the army England;" that "the genius of liberty d made France the arbitress of Europe her to be likewise the arbitress of the seas he most remote lands!" Nine months is, whilst *negotiating* in Italy the peace *tria, he had sent* a proclamation, in the

name of his army, to the sailors of Admiral B
fleet, then in the Adriatic, saying, "Comr
soon as we shall have made peace on the co
we will join you, in order to conquer the li
the seas. Without your assistance, brave
we can establish the glory of the Frenc
only within a small corner of the co
United with you, we shall cross the seas,
national glory will reach the most remote r
These words showed both the determined
of Bonaparte against the maritime power o
Britain, and his fantastic ambition, whicl
upon Europe as too narrow a field for its
tions, and which dreamt of Asiatic and
conquest, and of following the historical
the Macedonian conqueror of old. He gi
ther, and rather amusing, evidence of his ad
to classical precedents, when he promi
soldiers at Toulon that he was going to ta
to a rich country, where each of them shou
seven acres of ground for his lot—a promis
became afterwards the subject of many joke
the soldiers when treading their weary way
the sands of Egypt.

The French fleet arrived before Malta
9th of June. Bonaparte had long before
making war in Italy, proposed to the Dire
seize upon that important island. The D
had at first objected to it, on account of the s
of the place, and also because the Order of S
had maintained neutrality, and had on sev
casions afforded refuge and protection to
ships and seamen. After Bonaparte ha
sure of Corfu, by the partition of the Vene
minions, he wrote to Talleyrand on the

ober, 1797, from Passeriano, where he was con-
ling his definitive treaty with Austria: "Why
ld we not seize upon Malta? Admiral Brueys
d easily put in there and take possession of it.
garrison of La Valetta consists of 400 Knights
one regiment of 500 men at the most. The
ve inhabitants, who number 100,000, are tired
he Knights, who are become very poor, and
ot support themselves. It is with a view to
that I have confiscated the property of the
er in Italy. With the island of S. Pietro ceded
s by the King of Sardinia, and with Malta and
fu, we should be masters of the whole Medi-
anean." Talleyrand answered him on the 23rd
he same month: "The Directory approves of
r ideas concerning Malta. The Order of St.
n having elected for its Grand Master M. Hom-
h, a German, the Directory has become con-
ed in its former suspicions, that Austria has its
s upon that island. Austria wishes to become
aritime power, and it is for this that she has
wn so much eagerness to take possession of
ia and Dalmatia. Malta would be the more
venient for her purpose in proportion to the
uence which Austria possesses in Naples and
ly. Austria has also extensive views over the
kish provinces of Bosnia and Albania, in which
might be joined by Russia. It is our interest
heck all increase of the maritime power of
tria, and therefore the Directory wishes you to
all necessary measures to prevent Malta falling
its hands." Bonaparte then dispatched a
et agent, Poussielgue, under the pretence of a
mercial mission to the Levant, with ample
y credit and letters for several of the Knights

who were known to be in the French
pecially for the treasurer, Bosredon, a
mander of the artillery, Bardonenche
the Knights, who were natives of Fran
for some time in correspondence with
Barras, who had been himself in his
the Order. The discipline of the Orde
had long since become relaxed, Malta
of sloth and licentiousness, their vow
war against the Mussulmans had bec
letter, and when the squadron of the
out for its periodical cruise, it seldom
Turkish or Moorish foe, but it sailed
round the coasts of Italy and Fran
into the harbours of Sicily, Naples, G
seille, and so on, giving entertainmen
and then returned to Malta to enjoy r
truth is, that the Order of St. John
monastic military orders, had outlive
of its ancient institution, which was,
tide of Moslem conquest which threat
time to overwhelm all Western Eur
danger had long since passed away, an
cal state of Europe was essentially al
confiscation of the property of the Orde
Belgium, and Italy in consequence o
lution, led to financial embarrassments;
Knights, poor, and imbued with the
doctrines of the times, became restless

altogether. Things had come to this pass, that either the Order must, in order to lengthen its existence, have placed itself under the protectorate of Russia or Austria, thereby losing its independence, or allow itself to be swallowed up by the French Republic. Poussielgue spent several weeks at Malta, gave frequent banquets to the Knights of the French party; was presented to the Grand Master, Hompesch, a weak, credulous man, to whom he made public profession of friendship on the part of the Directory, but let drop some hints about the difficulty of maintaining the neutrality of the Order amidst the maritime war which raged between England and France, and the possibility of an equivalent being offered to the Grand Master and the other dignitaries. With his friends he spoke more plainly, and the result was that the defences of the island were neglected, and no preparations were made in case of an attack. Admiral Brueys with some ships of war was quietly allowed to take soundings round the coast for several days. In a letter which Bonaparte wrote to the Directory in November, 1797, and in which he enclosed a copy of his instructions to Poussielgue and of a letter to the French Consul at Malta, he said that "the real object of the mission of Citizen Poussielgue is to give the finishing stroke to the projects which we entertain concerning Malta." When at last Bonaparte appeared with his fleet in sight of the island he knew that things had been well prepared for a favourable reception. He sent a messenger to the Grand Master, demanding to be allowed to enter the great harbour with his fleet, *to take in water and provisions.* The Grand Master *replied that according* to the statutes of the

Order only two armed vessels of any foreign powe
could be allowed to enter the harbour at a time
Bonaparte replied that this was tantamount to
declaration of war, and gave orders for landing o
several points of the island, which was effecte
with hardly any opposition. Bosredon and othe
French knights told the Grand Master that the
could not fight against their countrymen. Last
the Spanish diplomatic agent strongly urged th
Grand Master to sue for terms, and to send Bo
redon himself as negotiator. The result was
most disgraceful and uncalled-for surrender on th
part of the Order, whilst still in possession of a
impregnable fortress, and with the daily expectatio
of the arrival of Nelson's English fleet, which w
scouring the sea in quest of the French. Th
Order made over the sovereignty of Malta an
Gozo to the French Republic, with all the publi
property, including artillery, ammunition, an
fleet; and Bonaparte, in the name of the Director
promised a principality for life to the Grand Ma
ter, with a handsome allowance, and a pension
from thirty to forty pounds a-year to each of t
Knights. The Directory, however, paid no gre
attention to these promises. On the 13th of Ju
the French were put in possession of La Valle
and its adjoining forts. As Bonaparte, attend
by his staff, was winding his way through the e
tensive and massive fortifications that girdle
capital, and which appeared as if deserted by th
defenders, General Caffarelli said, with a shru
"It is a lucky thing, General, that we have n
with somebody to show us the way, and open
gates for us, otherwise I don't know how we sho
have found our way in." The inglorious ca

counterpart of that of Venice. In
s the chief officers of the State be-
rder.
appointed a provisional government,
which he placed his friend Bosredon;
nights and the Grand Master away,
all the gold and silver of the treasury
nd of the churches and houses of the
were melted into bars and carried on
; and leaving General Vaubois with
the island, he sailed off on the 20th
o days after his departure, Nelson,
lish fleet, arrived off Malta; he saw
ed flag flying on the ramparts, and
eet gone, no one knew whither. He
or the coast of Egypt, but on arriving
on the 28th of June, he found no
here, and he steered for the coast of
day after his departure from Alexan-
ch fleet hove in sight. Bonaparte,
at the English fleet had been there
e, ordered an immediate landing of
few miles eastwards of the town of
Whilst the operation was taking
f war appeared in sight. Bonaparte
s the English fleet returning, which,
t encumbered and unprepared con-
French fleet, might have occasioned
n of the whole armament. In his
said to have exclaimed, "Fortune!
andon me? I ask but a few days'
leaping into a small boat, he reached
dst a terrific surf, in which many of
drowned. The strange sail proved
frigate. On the 2nd of July about

4000 men were landed. He formed them in
lumns, and early next morning he marched
towards Alexandria, which closed its gates
them. France was at the time at peace wit
key; its chargé d'affaires, Rufin, was at Co
nople, a Turkish ambassador was residing at
There was a French Consul at Alexandria,
soon as his countrymen arrived, repaired on
The Turks of Egypt had no idea of being at
Secure about their neutrality, they had re
few days before to Nelson the entrance of
bour of Alexandria for some of his frigates.
parte sent a summons to the Turkish autho
Alexandria, saying that he had come by an ag
with the Porte to curb down the refractor
looks; but the story was disbelieved, and t
mons disregarded. The French soldiers sc
walls, others burst open the gates, and th
was stormed. Several hundred Turks were
After two or three hours Bonaparte restore
and having assembled the native authorit
sheikhs and imauns, among whom was the
El Koraim, who was known as a faithful
of the Porte, he told them he had not
their enemy, but only to punish their opp
the rebellious Mamlooks, who set at defia
authority of the Sultan; that the French r
God and his Prophet, and the Koran; that
they had overthrown the Pope and the Kn
Malta, the old enemies of true Moslems; th
ought to tell the people to look upon the
as their allies, their brethren; and that m
they should retain their honours and offices
to the military control of the general com
the garrison.

addressed also to his soldiers an order of the
elling them that they were about to undertake
uest, the effect of which on civilization and
erce would be incalculable. "The blow you
out to strike against England will be the
ned and the most keenly felt that she can
just now, until the time comes when you
e her her death-blow. We must make fa-
marches and fight some battles, but we
ceed in all we undertake: the destinies are
. The Mamlook Beys, who favour exclu-
the English commerce, whose extortions
our merchants, and who tyrannize over the
nate inhabitants of the Nile, a few days
r landing will no longer exist. The people
t whom we are going to live are Moham-
. The first article of their faith is this:
is no God but God, and Mohammed is his
t.' Do not contradict this. Behave to
s you have behaved to the Jews—to the
. Respect their muftis, their imauns, as
pected the rabbis and the bishops. Extend
eremonies prescribed by the Koran, and to
ques, the same toleration which you showed
ynagogues, to the religions of Moses and of
hrist." And he went on telling his soldiers
ey must accommodate themselves to the
of the country, respect the women, the
s, and private dwellings, and abstain from
; and he administered other good advice,
owever was only attended to as long as the
met with no resistance from the natives.
they advanced inland, and especially after
s of the destruction of their fleet by Nelson,
nd all against them, Mamlooks, Arabs, and

Fellahs. "No Frenchman," says Bourr
secure of his life who happened to stray
from a town or the corps to which he
Soon after, the Sheikh of Alexandria, S
med El Koraim, who was reputed w
arrested by order of Bonaparte, on
corresponding with the Mamlooks. B
sued an order condemning him to pay
tion of three hundred thousand francs, i
which he was to lose his head after fiv
was justice after the Oriental fashio
went to Cairo to justify himself. He
to pay the fine at once, but he refused,
if it was his fate to die, he might just a
his dollars. He was executed at Cairo
of September, 1798, and his head w
through the streets as that of a traito
But his money could not be got at. Th
however, facilitated the collection of
contributions, by intimidating other
who were not such determined fatalists

On the 6th and 7th of July the arr
from Alexandria for Damanhour on
Cairo. The soldiers suffered much fron
were annoyed on their march by partie
On the 10th the head-quarters were at
where a flotilla, which had ascended th
Rosetta, came up with the army. O
Bonaparte resumed his march along th
of the Nile, and the next day came in si
Mamlook cavalry near the village of
The French formed squares with the
the angles. The Mamlooks, unused t
tactics, assailed the squares furiously, t
attacked the various sides in turn, but

ression on them, and lastly galloped off,
600 dead on the sand. Meantime the
flotilla had become engaged with a Turkish
of gun-boats from Cairo, and suffered se-
: next day the French resumed their march
ds Cairo. On the 21st of July Bonaparte ar-
in sight of the Great Pyramids, and saw the
e Mamlook cavalry in splendid array, under
rad Bey, who had formed an intrenched camp
mbabeh on the Nile; but his artillery, being
out carriages, could not be moved, and his in-
ry was despicable. This Bonaparte soon dis-
ered, and he moved his columns out of the reach
the guns, ready to form squares to repel the
acks of the cavalry. Mourad charged with great
avery with five or six thousand horsemen, but the
sult was the same as at Chebreiss. One of the
rench columns being attacked whilst in motion
as disordered at first, but it had time to form a
quare, and then it repelled the repeated charges of
Mourad Bey. The Mamlooks showed the most
desperate courage; two-thirds of that brilliant ca-
valry were laid low, and the rest retreated with
Mourad Bey towards Upper Egypt. The intrenched
camp being forced, a frightful butchery took place;
and the guns, the camels, and the baggage fell into
the hands of the conquerors. Bonaparte called
this "The Battle of the Pyramids." Ibrahim Bey,
who was on the other side of the Nile, as well as
the Pacha of the Porte, evacuated Cairo, the inha-
bitants of which sent a deputation to General
Bonaparte for the surrender of the town. He pro-
mised them security and protection, and on the
25th of July he made his entrance into Cairo. H
appointed a Dewan of seven natives for the m

tenance of order, in concert with the milit
mandant. He wrote to the Pacha of th
repeating the story that the French had
Egypt to extirpate the Mamlooks who we
to the Sultan, and that he would take ca
cure for the Sublime Porte the continuanc
customary tribute paid by Egypt. Before
off from Paris he had urged the Directory
Talleyrand as Ambassador Extraordinary
stantinople to cajole the Sultan into a co
of the French temporary occupation of
and to endeavour to bring about an alli
tween the Porte and France. The success
an embassy was most improbable; Talley
no wish to be sent to the castle of the Seven
where Rufin, the French Envoy at Consta
was in fact shut up with all his legation a
the French invasion of Egypt became
Bonaparte, however, pretended to be an
the Directory for not attempting the hope
of reconciling the Porte to the occupatio
of its finest provinces.

Ibrahim Bey with a body of Mamlooks
treated towards Belbeis on the road to Syria
parte followed him; an encounter took
Salahieh, in which the body of French cav
ing ventured too far, were severely handle
Mamlooks. At last Ibrahim was driven
the desert. Mourad Bey, however, remain
valley of the Nile above Cairo, and cont
give employment to the French divisio
Desaix which Bonaparte had sent after hin

Meantime Nelson attacked the Fren
anchored in the roads of Aboukir, and
it, on the 1st of August, 1798. The ne

d Bonaparte at Salahieh by an aide-
eneral Kleber, who commanded the
lexandria. Bonaparte immediately
iro. He perceived at once the whole
loss. Bourrienne observed to him
rtune would have been much greater
llen in with the French fleet before
d taken place. "We are blockaded
is true, but we have provisions and
us wait to see what the Directory
s." "The Directory!" cried out
the Directory consists of a set of
They envy and hate me, and will be
perish here. Besides, you see how
army is: not a man wishes to stay."
bout writing a report of what had
he Directory at home. "The whole
ourrienne, "never appeared in Bona-
hes, whenever it was any way against
knew how to disguise, to alter, or to
hen necessary. He not unfrequently
ispatches of others when they ran
s views." Bourrienne drew up a
tter for the Directory, stating plainly
Brueys could not enter with his fleet
ort of Alexandria, which would not
of the size of his, and that imperious
obliged him to wait in the road of
n opportunity to proceed to Corfu.
however, were not effectual, the left
forced, and the fleet was destroyed.
aving read this draught, Bonaparte
d Bourrienne "that it was too vague,
pointed enough. Besides," said he,
ke it appear that Brueys was blame-

less. This will not do. You don't kn
you have to deal with. I will tell y
write."

Bonaparte threw the blame of the
fleet on the unfortunate Admiral Brueys,
dead, could no longer contradict him.
that he had given orders to the Admiral
Corfu; but Bourrienne asserts that Bo
not wish the fleet to leave Egypt, at
after he had taken Cairo, and was pla
the danger of a reverse; he even hi
secretary the possibility of his embarki
return to France with the fleet, after hav
Egypt, and then by an attack, real
upon the coast of England, to oblige t
to recall their own fleet from the Me
Bonaparte, in his dispatch to the Direc
10th of August, seems almost to disclos
"I am of opinion," says he, "tha
Brueys did not wish to proceed to Cor
had ascertained that he could not enter
Alexandria, and that the army, of whic
news for a considerable time, was beyo
cessity of retreating." Bonaparte ha
reasons for wishing to keep the fleet ne
to protect the coast of Egypt against
or landing from the sea, and to intercep
from Turkey, which might undeceive th
Egypt concerning the story he had to
his having come to take possession of t
in concert with the Porte, and in order t
the rebellious Mamlooks. But the firm
Sultan, denouncing the French invasio
his provinces in the midst of profoun
whilst the Minister of the French

at Constantinople, came to dispel the mist
eyes of the most credulous. The signal
tance against the invaders appears to have
ven from the minarets of the mosques all
country.
nsurrection of Cairo broke out on the 21st
. It was an ill-concerted popular out-
nd was easily put down by the troops and
lery. On the second day the great mosque
ed open by cannon, and a number of people
l taken refuge in it were massacred. It is
t 5000 Moslems were killed on that day.
third day the insurrection was at an end.
us prisoners were taken to the citadel. "In
e to an order which I wrote every even-
ys Bourrienne, "twelve were put to death
ccessive night, and their bodies being put
ks were thrown into the Nile. There were
men included in those nocturnal execu-
Bonaparte, in a letter he wrote to General
six days after the restoration of tranquil-
d, "Every night we cut off thirty heads;
ope, will be an effectual example." But
nne thinks that in this instance he purposely
ated the extent of his severity. Bonaparte
cruel by temperament, but in his political
ions his nature was stern and unbending,
looked upon men as either instruments to
or obstacles which must be removed.
be of Arabs in the neighbourhood of Cairo
prised a party of French soldiers. Bona-
dered his aide-de-camp Croisier to surround
e, destroy their huts, kill all the men, and
e *women and children* into Cairo. Eugene
nois accompanied the expedition. Next

day the party returned. "Several poor Ar
had been delivered on the road, and the
had perished. About five o'clock, a troo
laden with sacks arrived at the place of
The sacks were opened, and a number
rolled out before the assembled populac
butchery ensured for a considerable time
of the little caravans which were obliged
in all directions for the service of the arn
this, horrible as it appears to men of con
manity in Europe, was nothing very unco
the Arabs and other Orientals, who had
ject to that sort of discipline under the T
other masters for ages. Had Bonaparte
in carving out for himself an Empire in
which seems to have been at the time a
vision of his, he might have made for
very tolerable kind of an Eastern Despot,
Kebir, and have perhaps spared Europe all
mities of the fifteen years that followed. B
temperament and his notions of governn
more suited for the Oriental than the
condition of society. Such a man in
might have been more useful than mis
whilst in Europe, after his attainment
preme power, he proved more mischie
useful.

After the insurrection was put down, I
issued one of his characteristic proclam
which he told the Egyptians that he was
of fate whose appearance was foretold in th
that resistance against him was as impious
unavailing, and that he could, if he c
every one to account for his most secret
as nothing was concealed from him.

ius Mussulman, lifting up his eyes, ejaculated
h! and credited the assertions of the Frankish
ler.

the month of December, Bonaparte went to
and ordered some military works to be con-
ted there, as he was afraid of an armament
English India arriving in the Red Sea. He
d over the ford at low water to the wells of
s on the Arabian coast, where he received
ations from the monks of Mount Sinai and
some Arab chiefs of Tor. He returned to
he same night; the tide was coming up, and
rty was thrown into some confusion, but no
nt occurred.

his return to Cairo he began to think seriously
ding Syria, where Djezzar, or "the Butcher,"
of Acre, had begun hostilities by the Sultan's
, and had seized the fort of El Arish on the
ian frontiers. Bonaparte, whilst professing
t peace with the Sublime Porte, had written
to Djezzar and to Ali Pacha of Janina,
them to declare themselves independent, and
e his allies. Ali Pacha was then fighting on
nks of the Danube against Paswan Oglu, and
t or could not attend to Bonaparte's invita-
and old Djezzar, instead of listening to Bona-
advances, cut off, after his usual fashion,
ad of the French messenger.

s worthy of remark that Bonaparte's eulogists
ards reproached the English for having
themselves with the cruel Djezzar, an alliance
, as well as that of the still more cruel Ali,
arte had actually courted at one time.

intercepted letter from the Director Barras to
rte contained the following piece of advice,

which the Director might have spared, parte was no novice in these matters Mussulmans are attached to their religi must indulge them in their prejudices. those who are hostile, crush those who by force, massacre and pillage; but with th use craft to keep them passive, respect t gion, their women, and their property, *become fully their master.* Sow dissensi the weak against the strong," &c.

On the 25th of January, 1799, Bonapa to Tippoo Sahib as follows:—"You m formed of my arrival on the shores of the with a numerous and invincible army. anxious to deliver you from the iron yo English, I request you to send me by t Muscat or Moka an account of your situation. I also wish that you would Suez or Cairo some able and trusty whom I might hold converse." It app this letter remained unanswered, as Tipp Seringapatam soon after, whilst Bonapa Syria. Bonaparte often talked of his marching through Persia to India. over some finely drawn maps of the v vening wildernesses, mountains, and rive his classical aspirations, which exercise chievous influence upon his southern im he already fancied himself treading the s favourite hero Alexander; but these vag at last laid aside for more tangible object march to Syria was resolved upon. In *secure* Egypt, it was necessary to take po *the* Syrian fortresses on the coast. On *February*, the expedition, about 12,

d the desert, following the coast of the Me-
nean. On the 17th it reached El Arish,
surrendered the next day, the garrison being
liberty. On the 25th Gaza also surrendered,
ou after the army entered the fertile valleys
ia. On the 4th of March Bonaparte began
ge of Jaffa, in which there was a considerable
n. After three days the place was stormed,
e garrison defended itself obstinately in the
and houses, and an indiscriminate massacre
llage followed, which Bonaparte himself in
patches describes as frightful. Part of the
n, consisting chiefly of Albanians, retired
large square building with a court in the
, determined to sell their lives dearly. Bona-
ent two aides-de-camp, one of whom was
e Beauharnois, to restrain the carnage, if
e, and to save the unarmed inhabitants. The
ans cried out that they would surrender if
ives were spared, and the aides-de-camp
t it best to stop the fighting by promising
quarter. The prisoners then gave up their
nd were marched to the camp in two divi-
mounting in all to 4000 men, according to
enne, but only to 1500 or 2000 according
rs. Bonaparte was walking with Bourrienne
t of his tent when he saw this multitude of
proaching, and he said to his secretary, in a
vexation, "What do they wish me to do
ese men? Have I provisions for them?—
convey them to Egypt or France?" And
erely reproved the aides-de-camp for taking
risoners. "I told you to stop the carnage
omen, children, and old men, the peaceful
nts, but not with respect to armed soldiers.

What am I to do now with these unfor
tures?" The prisoners were ordered
indiscriminately, in front of the tent
hands tied behind their backs. An e
gloomy restrained fury was depicted in
tenances. They were allowed a small
biscuit and bread, which the scanty s
army could ill afford. A council of w
on the same day, to determine what wa
with these men, but no decision was co
daily reports of the Generals of divisi
They stated the scantiness of the ratio
murs of the soldiers at seeing their bre
enemies who ought to have perished b
according to the laws of war, as Ja
taken by storm. The report of Ge
division was the most alarming, as
symptoms of mutiny among the sol
Council assembled again on the follow
was attended by all the Generals of divis
cussed at length the various measures
be adopted concerning the prisoners.
be sent to Egypt? It would require
escort which would weaken the already
army. And how could provisions for t
through the desert be spared? Sho
embarked? There were no ships—
friendly sail was to be descried in
Should the prisoners be set at libe
would either go and reinforce the Pac
or throw themselves into the mountains
of the line of march, join the Naploosian
the army in flank and rear. The Tur
little accustomed to give quarter, ha
parole or word of honour. Could th

armed in the midst of the French columns? Be-
es the question of food, the evident danger of
rching in such a company through an enemy's
ntry, and on the eve of a battle, made this ap-
r the worst of all resolves. The third day
ived without any solution of the question.
urrienne states that Bonaparte was to the last
hing to save the men, and looking out for the
earance of some friendly vessel. The murmurs
he camp increased; danger became imminent.
the 10th of March the order was given, accord-
to the unanimous opinion of the Council, to
ot the prisoners. There was no separation made
the Egyptian from the other prisoners, as some
e stated, for there were no Egyptians among
n. It is not true that the men of the garrison
El Arish which had been set free were recog-
d among the prisoners. This kind of justifica-
has been set up in the memoirs compiled at
Helena, or from recollections of St. Helena,
ch have been given out on the authority of
oleon. The justification would be worse than
real reason for the act, which was not revenge,
the stern policy of war. War has many unavoid-
horrors, and it is for this that it cannot be too
h repeated that war should not be entered upon
slight grounds, as all the responsibility falls
the originators of the war. Once engaged in
he army must protect itself by every means in
power. In this instance, the responsibility of
unjust and disastrous expedition to Egypt, in
of peace with the Porte, is shared equally
ween Bonaparte who advised it, and the French
cutive Directory who approved of it. Leaving
, however, these general grounds, and revert-

Berthier, was conducted as a field operation; easy taking of Jaffa had inspired the French an overweening confidence; the heavy ordn had not yet arrived; and yet on the first br being made on a tower at an angle of the w the assault was ordered on the 28th of March, a failed. The ditch was found too deep; the br beyond the reach of the storming party. Tw jutant-generals were killed. The besieged frequent sorties, one of which, on the 4th of A being led by Englishmen, explored a mine desi to blow up the tower, and a countermine was b in consequence. During the month of April ral assaults were led against the tower, hu French were obliged to retire. On one occ they entered the tower, but could proceed no ther. Bonaparte then resolved upon effectin other breach in the curtain. Meantime the S had issued another firmaun, denouncing in nant terms the unprovoked aggression of French, and calling upon all his subjects to to repel the invaders. A large force asse at Damascus, crossed the Jordan, and advanc Nazareth to relieve Acre. They were join the mountaineers of Nabloos or Samaria, wh from the first shown themselves hostile t French, and had annoyed them severely in advance, whilst the other Syrians further and especially the Druses, showed them rather favourably inclined towards them, made Bonaparte say that had he taken Ac would have had the population of Syria flock *his* standard, and might have founded an emp *the* East. Setting aside all imaginative amp *tion* to which he was prone, there is little do

he taken Acre he would have marched upon and
ed Damascus, where he would have found a rich
y; but it is very uncertain whether he would
been able to keep that city and country with
small disciplined force at his command. On
8th of April Kleber with a small division
ntered the numerous cavalry of the Turks in
lain at the foot of Mount Tabor; he formed
re, and maintained his ground till the after-
, when Bonaparte himself advanced to his
e, and sent Murat in the rear of the enemy.
Turks, attacked on all sides, were completely
d, with the loss of several thousand men and
heir baggage. Bonaparte then quickly re-
d to his camp before Acre, where the arrival
me eighteen-pounders from Jaffa enabled him
rry on his operations with greater vigour.
English and Turks had availed themselves of
nterruption of the siege to establish advanced
and intrenchments outside of the town. The
ch attacked these works repeatedly in the
part of May, but could not take them. On
th of May a Turkish fleet with reinforcements
Rhodes hove in sight, and Bonaparte deter-
d on making a last desperate effort to storm
lace before the reinforcements could land.
he night of the 7th of May an assault was
upon the tower, in which Colonel Boyer was
d, but the French effected a lodgment in it.
next day, 8th of May, General Lannes gal-
y led the assault up the breach in the curtain,
ed it, but found himself stopped by an in-
hment within, which closed all ingress into
own; *the French* were exposed to a murder-
re from the surrounding buildings. General

Rambaud was killed, Lannes was severely w
and the party, after losing many men, were
to give up the attempt. On the 10th of
more assaults were made, one early in th
ing, in which General Bon was mortally w
and another in the afternoon, in which two
were killed, and one of Bonaparte's aides-
was badly wounded. This was the eight
cessful assault: the trenches and ditch w
with the slain; the stench was dreadful, an
was spreading fast in the camp. General
was wounded in the trenches, and died so
Bonaparte's obstinacy at last gave way,
made preparations for a retreat. He had
information that a Turkish fleet was prep
land troops in Egypt, where the Mamlo
giving full employment to the French forc
had been left in the country. In the nigh
21st of May the army broke up its cam
Acre. The sick, of whom there was a gr
ber, many with the plague, were removed
all the horses that could be spared were pr
the purpose; the heavy artillery was sp
thrown into the sea; Bonaparte and all hi
marched on foot. He issued an order of
to the soldiers recapitulating the successes
during a three months' campaign in the
Syria against hosts of enemies, the guns
taken, the prisoners, the standards, the
Gaza, Jaffa, Caiffa, &c. "A few days yet,
might have taken the Pacha of Acre an
ruins of his fort; but the taking of a small
is not worth the delay. The season for la
Egypt recalls you thither to defend that
quest of France." In his heart, howev

ly the disappointment; and he acknowledged after life. He was particularly vexed with dney Smith for the part he had taken in the e of Acre, and more especially for some pro- tions addressed to the Christians of Syria, in me of the Sultan, in which the French and General were spoken of as people who had d the religion of Christ. Some very angry pondence passed between the French head- rs and the English commodore. A dispatch Sir Sidney Smith, dated the 12th of May, ons the arrival of Hassan Bey, Governor of s, having on board the Turkish regiment of flick and some other troops, come just at the f time, after the siege had lasted fifty days. were landed immediately, and sent to assault ench works, which they did, and spiked four but were at last forced to withdraw into the

"What has most annoyed Bonaparte has the distribution among his soldiers of the mation of the Sublime Porte of the month bruary. He has published an order of the lling me a sort of madman, and charging me aving shipped the prisoners and deserters on of vessels infected with the plague. A de- tells me that he breaks out into frequent ves against me and my nation." This very dney had constantly endeavoured to save the f the French prisoners, and had some time insisted upon and obtained of the Porte the ance of a detachment of French prisoners by Admiral Nelson and released on parole, o being seized by the Turks on the coast of a *island, had been confined* in the bagnio of *tinople. On the* 2nd of June Bonaparte

was a far better man than his antago
sented him to be. "I observed his cond
at the time, and I remarked in him
spirit which sometimes hurried him i
eccentricities; but I can affirm that his
towards the French was that of a gall
I have seen many letters in which
acknowledged that they were fully sen
good treatment which the French exper
fell into his hands. . . . . As to the en
French prisoners on board a vessel infe
plague, the improbability of the cir
besides the notorious facts of the case,
odious charge!"

The check which Bonaparte met wit
added to the destruction of his fleet by
to the recollection of his former enco
the English in Corsica and at Toulon,
added to that deep-rooted hostility
English power which influenced so muc
sequent political conduct. Wherever
was sure of finding the English in his w

and the mountaineers of Nabloos, who
l on the flanks of the line of march, were
kill and mutilate every unlucky straggler
it. The sick who had no means of convey-
able to keep up with the columns, dropped
burning sand, and there lay waiting for
om. The French narratives agree in re-
ng this Syrian campaign as having exhi-
accumulation of horrors seldom equalled
istory of war. The army halted at Jaffa,
r to clear the hospitals and the stores.
te is said to have exerted himself to the
to remove the sick. There remained a
mber of plague-patients who were too far
be removed. The General did not like to
em behind at the mercy of the Turks.
ome one else, put the question to Desge-
he head physician, whether in such a case
not have been an act of humanity to give
ium. Desgenettes replied gruffly that his
was to cure, and not to kill. No order
en to administer the opium; none was
ered; and, in fact, says Las Cases, there
opium in the medicine-chest. A rear-
as then left at Jaffa after the departure of
in body; and when the rear-guard left,
patients were dead except one or two,
appears, became ultimately prisoners of the
. But some one had heard of the question
Desgenettes, and the love of the horrible
o spread the report that the General had
l his own sick, and the tale was believed
been believed by many ever since. Bour-
Bertrand, Miot, and other Frenchmen be-
to the army of Egypt, did believe it.

Bourrienne maintains that opium was actually ad
ministered, perhaps without Bonaparte's actua
order. Bonaparte's suggestion to the physician
supposing him to have made it, originated in
mere impulse of humanity, uncontrolled by highe
moral and religious principles. The charge, how
ever, was loudly proclaimed throughout Europe
especially by Sir Robert Wilson, who believed
true, and this greatly annoyed Bonaparte at th
time, and afterwards; and as it was coupled wit
the true charge of the previous massacre of th
Turkish prisoners, Bonaparte's agents boldly de
nied both, and abused Sir Robert Wilson for havin
"slandered," as they called it, the French arm
and its General. But when at St. Helena, Bona
parte, whilst simply denying the poisoning, ac
knowledged the shooting of the prisoners, whic
is, perhaps, the more horrible of the two deed
but which at the time had been almost thrown int
the shade by the strange report of a general po
soning his own sick, whom, if he really did n
know how to dispose of, he might have left behin
at the mercy of the Turks, without incurring a
great obloquy for this, a common occurrence
a retreat.

The army, after resting three days at Jaffa, a
blowing up the fortifications of the town, continu
its march towards Gaza. The columns had ord
to burn the villages and the crops, and the flam
spread far and wide over the plains to the foo
the mountains. At Gaza the fort was blown
but the town was spared. The army then ente
the desert, provisioned El Arish with part of
cattle plundered in Syria, and proceeded to Kat
where Bonaparte likewise left a garrison. On

way through the desert the French surprised and burnt the camp of a small Arab tribe, the only inhabitants of that wilderness, who, Berthier says, had committed depredations; the camels and other cattle were carried away, and the scanty crops the Arabs had reared in some few patches of cultivated soil were set on fire. This was Bonaparte's farewell to Syria and the East. The loss during this Syrian campaign was stated by Berthier at only 500 killed, 1800 wounded, and 700 dead of the plague, which calculation Miot considers as very moderate. Others state the killed at 1200, which is more probable. The siege of Acre alone is said by some to have cost 3000 men.

Bonaparte hastened to Cairo, where he made his entrance with much solemnity at the head of his troops: the same day he addressed one of his Oriental proclamations to the inhabitants:—"He returned to Kahira the well-guarded, the chief of the French army, General Bonaparte, who loves the religion of Mahomet; he is returned well and sound, thanking God for the favour which he lavishes upon him. He has entered Kahira on the 19th Moharrem, by the gate of victory; this day is a glorious day, there never was the like. All the inhabitants came out to meet him; they have seen and acknowledged that it is the same General Bonaparte in his own person, and have become convinced that the stories told of him during his absence were false. He has defeated Djezzar and his valley bands, who gave out that they were going to invade and conquer Egypt. He took El Arish, Gaza, and Jaffa; he granted protection to the inhabitants of Gaza, but the misled inhabitants of Jaffa would not submit; they resisted for three days,

their camp. At this news, Bonaparte from Cairo to Alexandria, assembling all he could collect, about 10,000 men, and diately gave orders to attack the Turks object was evidently to gain time, and to their position for the co-operation of the Ma from Upper Egypt, or of the Sultan's fo Syria, in order to attack Alexandria. Bon however, was not the man to allow them ti that. He reconnoitred the Turkish position, was rather strong, extending from sea to se ported by a redoubt on its right, and by gu on the left. Whilst looking at it, he told who accompanied him, "The forthcoming will decide the fate of the world," meanin bably, his own future projects concerning and Europe. Murat, who did not penetr hidden meaning, replied, "It will decide, events, the fate of the army; but one thing our men are determined to do their duty; th have no cavalry, and if ever infantry was cha cavalry, theirs shall be to-morrow by mine." morning, 25th of July, the attack took pla column of French infantry dislodged the from the redoubt, whilst Murat broke t their line and cut off their retreat. But the had a second and stronger line in the narrow of the isthmus, strengthened in the centre b redoubt studded with cannon. The French n against both extremities of the Turkish li Turks stood the attack manfully, and fe slowly, and the French on reaching the were obliged to halt and fall back out of the *the* batteries. Murat, who had charged the *left,* found himself exposed to a cross-fire

the redoubt. There was a moment's
ıe French ranks; but the Turks, in
for cutting off the heads of the slain
reward allotted in such cases by old
from their ranks, and rushed out of
nents, and gave Murat an opportunity
loubt and fall upon their rear. This
ic in the main body of the Turks.
o was watching attentively, seized the
ıt, brought forward his reserve, and
doubt. It was now no longer a fight,
r; the Turks, pressed on all sides by
ıshed towards the sea, and thousands
lves into the shallow water, where
t at leisurely by the French. Their
ored too far off to afford them any
he sea, according to Bonaparte's ex-
overed with turbans. Murat charged
ommander, Mustapha Pacha, in the
oukir, wounded him, and took him
naparte received the Pacha with ci-
ıised him for his bravery; in truth,
ght remarkably well on this occasion.
boukir, garrisoned by 1200 men, de-
or several days; at last the men, un-
th the forms of capitulation, came out
hrew down their arms, and cried
quarter, which was granted. The
victory were most important. Egypt
o the French for the present, and
uld boast of a victory which re-
everses he had sustained in Syria.
care to make the most of it in his
ich he sent before him on his return

eturned to Cairo early in August,

bringing with him Mustapha Pacha, his
his Kiahya, to grace his triumphal
Before setting out for the battle he had
kind of proclamation to the divan, or
council of Cairo, in which he told the
Turkish fleet was landing troops near Al
and that he was going to kill all those w
not lay down their arms, and bring the
soners. And he kept his word. He add
edification of the people of Cairo, that
with the Turkish fleet there were some
"men who detest those who believe in
God, because according to their error the
believe in three Gods, and therefore ev
sulman who was on board a vessel where
was hoisted was worse than an infidel, fo
hear every day the name of the true and
blasphemed."

About this time, if not before, Bon
solved in his mind to leave his army and
France. He had been informed by pri
munications from his friends at Paris,
by the newspapers which Sir Sidney S
sent him by a flag of truce, of the reve
French armies, of the loss of Italy, of t
discontent in France concerning the inca
corruptions of the Directory, of the diss
the Directors among themselves, of the
audacity of the royalists and Vendéans,
threatened the Republic with dissolutio
parte told Bourrienne that the files o
papers received from the English comm
cided his resolve; but there seems hardl
that he had received more confidential an
information from home. His brothers
Lucien were both of the Council of th

dred; Lucien was a friend of Sieyès, and kept house at Paris, of which his sister Marianne did the honours, and was connected with many political and literary characters of the day. Lucien wrote to Napoleon, complaining of the misgovernment of the Directory, and urging him to return to France. This letter is said to have been intercepted by the English cruisers, but another letter from Joseph proved more fortunate. Miot, in his 'Memoirs of the Egyptian and Syrian Campaigns,' says that a Greek named Boorbaki, master of a merchantman, then in the port of Leghorn, happening to go to Paris on business, had occasion to see some one of Bonaparte's family with whom he had been previously acquainted in Italy. He was offered a thousand louis d'or if he would go to Egypt and deliver a letter into Bonaparte's own hands. The letter was from Joseph, and contained a full statement of the condition of France, of the dissensions between the Directory and the Council of Five Hundred, and of the spirit of the various parties. Joseph urged his brother to return to France, saying that his presence was desired by those who wished to save the State, meaning Sieyès and his friends, and that he would find the public mind prepared in his favour. It has been said that a letter from the Directory, requesting his return, was joined to this letter, but this is very doubtful, for three of the Directors were certainly not in the secret, and it could only have been by a trick of Sieyès that their signature could have been procured. However this may be, Boorbaki undertook to deliver Joseph's letter, hastened to Leghorn, and *from thence sailed to* Egypt, where he gave the *letter to Bonaparte*, who then resolved to depart.

really had no existence except in nar
serves to show how little the people at
least the actual generation, gain by r
effected through violence.

Bonaparte left Cairo about the middl
gust, ostensibly for a tour of inspection
Lower Egypt. He arrived on the 22nd
andria, whither he had ordered Berthie
Murat, Andréossy, and Marmont to n
Admiral Gantheaume had, by his order,
two frigates and two smaller vessels for
the morning of the 23rd, the wind havi
the English blockading ships from the co
parte and his followers embarked on bo
the frigates and sailed off. Gantheaume
to avoid the English cruisers, sailed to
ward along the coast of Tripoli and T
then veered to the northward, passing we
Sardinia and Corsica. The two frigate
on the 30th September in the gulf of

rsica again. "No," said Bonaparte, "that take us to England, and I want to get to ." The next day they anchored safely at , on the coast of Provence. As soon as it e known that General Bonaparte was arrived, ran on board, the general commanding the n went also, and the quarantine laws were rded. Some one spoke to the people about ger from the plague. "Better the plague he Austrians," they replied, alluding to the n army on the neighbouring frontiers, which ned France with invasion, and which the seemed confident that none but Bonaparte lrive away.

leaving Alexandria, Bonaparte wrote an letter to General Kleber, with an order of appointing him to the command-in-chief of ny of Egypt. That army was now reduced ut 20,000 men. Considering the constant g they had had for more than a twelvemonth, pulse they had met with at Acre, and the by the plague, the loss of the French cannot sidered as very great. Bonaparte told Klehis letter, that the news of the loss of Italy termined him to return to Europe; and he him to send Junot and Desaix after him. ttered him with hopes of succour from ; but if he should receive neither assistor orders from the government during the ine months, or if the plague should make s in the army, he told Kleber that he be justified in making peace with the Porte, t the cost of giving up Egypt; endea*g, however, to put off* the final evacuation *country till the* general peace. "You

appreciate as much as I do the impor
the possession of Egypt, and how unfor
would be for France to let this fine co
into the hands of another European pow
approaching dismemberment of the Tur
pire.... You know my views concerning
nal policy of Egypt; whatever you do, t
tian part of the population will cont
friends; but we must prevent them becom
lent towards the Turks, whose religious f
we must soothe and lull asleep. We ough
purpose to cultivate the friendship of
sheikhs of Cairo, who influence the opini
rest of Egypt....Endeavour to seize fi
hundred hostages from among the Maml
Arabs, and send them to France by the fi
tunity. They will be detained one or tw
France, and will become acquainted with
ners. I will try to send you a compan
atrical players, which I consider an i
accessory to the army, and for beginning
change in the habits of the country. I q
with great regret; the interests and the
our country alone can induce me to it, b
still be with you in mind and heart; the ar
I entrust to you are all my children, as I
full evidence of their attachment to me.'
the order of the day was made known, t
dren" murmured loudly at being deserte
putative father. Kleber himself wrote a
to the Directory, dated September, 1799,
he expressed his dissatisfaction in no subdu
This dispatch fell into the hands of the
and a copy of it arrived at Paris after th
tion of Brumaire. Had the original

tion previous to that day, it might have
a formidable weapon in the hands of Bona-
opposers. Commissary Poussielgue wrote
ame effect, describing the destitution of the
nd the emptiness of the military chest, but
charge, as it has been stated, the general-
with having subtracted millions from it.
report may have spread at the time, but
ne says that it was utterly false. Bona-
ft Egypt with only a few thousand francs.
r, he never forgave Poussielgue for his
General Reynier, in his Memoirs, gives
oomy picture of the state of the army of
fter Bonaparte's departure.
rogress of Bonaparte from Fréjus to Paris
ind of triumphal march. The bulletin of
ry of Aboukir, which he caused to be dis-
all over the country, added to the general
sm. Men's minds were ripe for a change,
lost all confidence in the Directory, and
the necessity of a strong settled govern-
The coup d'état of Fructidor effected by the
had given to the army a feeling of its po-
nportance. The Legislative Councils and
nstitutional machinery were no longer con-
s inviolable. A fresh organic change was
pon as unavoidable, and on the arrival of
te all eyes were turned to him as the fittest
f the approaching movement.

CHAPTER VII.

Revolution of Brumaire.—Bonaparte First Con

On arriving at Paris, the 16th October, Bonaparte proceeded to the palace of the Ex at the Luxembourg, and told the Directo having been apprised of the reverses of the arms, and that the allies were threatening he was come to defend it. The Directors, among themselves, affected to believe hi took no notice of his having left the army o without leave, and of his having broken t rantine regulations on his arrival in Sieyès, one of the Directors, who was in th of the true motives of Bonaparte's return, dismissed Bernadotte from his office of wa ter, under the pretence of giving him act ployment. Bernadotte, in disgust, asked retirement. It was said that as soon as h of Bonaparte's landing, he sent word to rectors that they ought to bring him to desertion, and that Barras replied, "We strong enough for that." Barras had agai his brother directors Sieyès and Ducos, remaining two were republicans, but of n city. The republican party, with Gener reau, Bernadotte, Jourdan, Augereau, and *jority* of the Council of Five Hundred, w *retain* the existing constitution, but at t *time to* restrain the exorbitant power of t

and to turn out Barras, who was considered
most unprincipled of the Directors. Sieyès,
a majority of the Council of the Elders, were
ates, and waited for an opportunity of re-
ling the constitution. Fouché, the Direc-
minister of police, intrigued against his
s. Bonaparte decided upon joining Sieyès,
ing to turn the movement to his own ad-
e. Talleyrand, Cambacérès, and other per-
f note were tired of the Directory, and
upon Bonaparte as the fittest person to
he lead in the movement. Bonaparte com-
with Sieyès the plan of operations. They
to avail themselves of Articles 102 and
the existing constitution, which gave to
uncil of the Elders the power of transfer-
he sittings of the legislative body from
to some other place, in order to protect
against intimidation. Bourrienne, after re-
ng a number of petty intrigues, thus sums
"The short political crisis which preceded
8th Brumaire was not marked by anything
dignified or noble than the previous revo-
ary movements. All these plots were so
ptible, and were accompanied by so much
y, falsehood, and treachery, that for the
r of human nature it is desirable to cover
nder a veil." We think that for the safety
human race they cannot be too much made
and exposed. Bonaparte was sure of seve-
nerals and colonels of regiments, such as
, Lannes, Leclerc, Sebastiani, and even,
ome hesitation, of Lefebvre and Moreau.
ld *them that* a great military nation like
was not to be led into ruin by a few in-

will march against those who shall a
overthrow illegally the existing order o
"Oh! as for that," said Bonaparte, "I
secure on that score; I have taken m
tions, and you will not receive any
For the rest, believe me that I only wa
the Republic. I ask nothing for mysel
retire to Malmaison amidst a circle of fr
if you will be one of them, you shall be
"A friend! that may be; but I think
would be the most imperious of masters;"
nadotte, taking his leave, and, as he passe
the crowd of officers in the outer apar
perceived Moreau, but did not see e
gereau or Jourdan. The substance of
conversation was told by Bonaparte to
the evening of the same day, and it has
confirmed in the Life of Bernadotte,
thentic report.

Meantime the Council of the Elders
at the Tuileries between five and six in
ing, being convoked by extraordinary
which were not sent to those members
known to be unfavourable to the movem
Directors, Sieyès and Roger Ducos, w
Council. A decree was proposed and c
dering the removal of the two Councils c
the Legislative body to St. Cloud, for t
ing day; all debate and deliberation to be
till then. General Bonaparte was charge
execution of the decree, and was to tak
sures required for the security of th
representatives. The general comma
military divisions of Paris, the National
the troops of the line within the divisi

l under his orders; and all the citizens were
d him their support whenever required by
General Bonaparte was to be summoned to
ouncil of the Elders to take his oath, and to
rt measures with the Commissioners of the
Councils. The present decree was to be imme-
y communicated by a message to the Council
Five Hundred and to the Executive Direc-
and copies of it to be printed and sent by
s to all the communes of the Republic.
was the famous decree of the 18th Brumaire,
began Bonaparte's dictatorship. Cornet,
lent of the Council of Elders, went to Bona-
's residence, between eight and nine, and read
n the decree in the presence of the crowd of
rs there assembled. The drums beat; the
ral mounted his horse, followed by a numerous
and rode to the Tuileries. Being intro-
l into the hall of the Council of the Elders,
ddressed the assembly, telling them that they
sented the wisdom of the nation, that by their
utions of that morning they had saved the Re-
e, and that he and his brave companions
d support them. "It would be in vain," con-
d he, "to look out for precedents. Nothing in
ry resembles the end of the eighteenth century,
nothing in the end of the eighteenth century
bles the present moment. We wish for a re-
e established on true liberty—upon civil liberty
d a national representation; and we shall have
I swear it in my name, and in the name of my
ren in arms." In this manner he avoided
g any specific oath to the existing constitution.
majority of the Council being packed, ap-
d him; and then he came out and reviewed

the troops in the Place du Carrousel, rea
the decree of the Council of the Elders
them that the Republic had been badly adr
for the last two years, but that, by their
he expected to restore liberty, victory, a
Ten thousand troops were stationed at
ries and in the immediate neighbourho
Lefebvre. Bonaparte gave to Lannes
mand of the guard of the Legislative Bod
mont that of the artillery and the milita
to Murat the command of St. Cloud, and
the guard of the Luxembourg. The three
who remained at the Luxembourg, Bar
lins, and Gohier, saw themselves forsaken
body. Barras, who had had a private
with the persuasive Talleyrand, thought
his separate peace with Bonaparte, and s
for the purpose. Bottot found the Gen
Tuileries surrounded by a brilliant staff.
ing the tone of an angry master, Bon
braided the Directors in the person
"What have you done," cried he, "with t
which I left to you so prosperous and
I left her at peace, and I find her at w
her victorious, and I find her overcome by
I left you the millions of Italy, and I
spoliation and misery. What have you
the hundred thousand Frenchmen, my c
in arms and in glory? They are no mo
This state of things cannot last: before t
it would lead us to despotism. But we wa
public—a republic founded upon equality
civil liberty, and political tolerance. It
means of a good administration that all
will forget the respective factions with

ssociated themselves to save their existence.
ave defenders of their country have claims
full share of its confidence. We who have
ted the Republic by our toils and our courage
to be treated, as some factious men would
s, as if we were the enemies of the Republic.
ll not allow any one to assume to be more
ic than the brave men who have been
ed and maimed in the service of their coun-
These last sentences foretold that the army
be henceforth the arbitress of France. The
ory itself had taught it this lesson in the days
ndémiaire and Fructidor, of which it now
the reward. Bonaparte then took Bottot
nd told him that if Barras abdicated imme-
, he had nothing to fear personally. It ap-
hat Talleyrand had already alarmed him by
nd some disclosures of certain secret nego-
s with the Bourbons. Gohier and Moulins,
first news of the movement of the Tuileries,
oposed to Barras that, as they still composed
jority of the Directory, they should outlaw
arte and appoint Bernadotte to the command
is. Barras, however, refused to put his sig-
to the order, sent in his resignation to the
il of the Elders, and set off for his estate of
ois. The Secretary-General Lagarde then
ed that, as there was no longer a majority of
rectory, all legal measures became impossible;
set off for the Tuileries. Gohier and Mou-
emained prisoners in the Luxembourg under
ard of Moreau.

Council of the Five Hundred, which was not
licated in the conspiracy as that of the Elders,
their usual hour at the Tuileries, where they

received the message from the other Co
journing the sitting to the next day at S
They separated amidst cries of "The Rep
the Constitution for ever!"

In the evening Bonaparte returned ho
rently well pleased with his day's work
thing had gone smoothly with him, as h
only to deal with friends; but the next d
be a day of trial, especially as the majori
Five Hundred were known to be hot Re
Sieyès was very uneasy about the result,
posed to Bonaparte to arrest about forty of
violent members of the Council. Bonapart
but at the same time commissioned Salicet
ber of the Five Hundred, to communicate
to his colleagues the danger they had incu
from which Bonaparte had saved them.
nœuvre succeeded, and when next mornin
of the deputies, with Jourdan and Augere
Bernadotte's house, they appeared influ
favour of Bonaparte by either gratitude
Bernadotte advised them to adopt a co
middle tone in the approaching sitting. '
of you," said he, "ascend the tribune, an
fair statement of the internal and external
of France, showing that our situation i
means so bad as it has been represented;
are in a position to obtain a treaty of peac
as that of Campo Formio; that Paris is
tranquil, and that mutual confidence only i
Admit the decree of the Elders, however
in form, but propose as a security for the co
to join a colleague with General Bonap
you appoint General Bernadotte to be
league, send me the decree, and in less th

I shall be amongst you with my aides-de-camp, part of the troops upon which I can depend, then we will see. If you should think it sary to outlaw Bonaparte, you will always on your side one of the two generals named ie Councils, and a strong part of the army." deputies repaired to St. Cloud with the in- on of following this advice, but as the sitting ed it became so stormy, the members were so ed, that precious time was lost in words, ges- ations, and vain theatrical display, and no ion was come to.

t one o'clock, P.M., the 19th Brumaire (10th ember, 1799), the sitting of the Elders was ed. After some warm remonstrances on the of the Republican minority about the hasty irregular convocation of the preceding day, the nation of Barras and the other members of Directory being reported, it was proposed and ed to replace them according to the forms lished by the Constitution. This was the criti- noment. Bonaparte, who was informed of all was going on in the hall, entered it hastily with hier and Bourrienne. He made a poor display is oratory. All the speeches that have been bed to him on that occasion differ from each r, "and well they may," says Bourrienne, "for nade no speech, but delivered a series of ling, unconnected sentences, and confused es to the President's questions." He talked of ing on volcanoes, of secret agitations, of being d a new Cæsar and a Cromwell, although he acting in obedience to a decree of the Council Elders. *He often* repeated the words Liberty quality. "*But the* Constitution," asked one

of the deputies; "you forget the Consti
Bonaparte's countenance warmed up: "T
stitution! you violated it—the 18th Fruc
Floréal, in Prairial. Hypocrites, intriguer
We will establish liberty and the Republic.
abdicate the extraordinary powers with whi
invested, as soon as the dangers which thre
Republic shall have passed away." "W
these dangers?" asked the President; "
yourself, General." Bonaparte then charge
and Moulins with having proposed to him a
revolution. This most improbable charge
a great tumult. Some cried out for a
committee, others said "No committee;
France know the particulars of the cons
Bonaparte became more and more embarra
these interpellations, and instead of gi
explanation of his first charge, he mad
charges against the Council of Five Hundr
he said, wished to return to the Reign of Te
Revolutionary Committees, and the guilloti
murmurs now grew louder and more thre
and Bonaparte became more incoherent in
He addressed himself at one time to the
who gazed at him with astonishment, and
moment he appealed to the soldiers in th
yard, who could not hear him. He said
going to the Council of the Five Hundre
any orator," added he, "paid by foreigner
attempt to put me out of the pale of the
him beware! I shall appeal to my bra
panions, I shall trust to their courage an
fortune." The President told him calmly t
himself, to reveal the particulars of the
which he said that he had been urged to joi

nered out the same vague, unconnected
ns as before, repeating, "I have nothing
," though in reality he had said nothing.
nt observed that there was nothing, abso-
ing before the House upon which the
ld deliberate. The assembly became
mpatient. Bourrienne pulled Bonaparte
he skirt of his coat, whispering to him,
, General; you don't know what you are
Berthier also motioned him to withdraw,
after stammering out a few more un-
rds, Bonaparte turned round, exclaiming
e who love me, follow me." The usher
ew aside the tapestry curtains which
the door, the sentinels made no oppo-
Bonaparte, on reaching the court-yard,
breathe more freely; he leaped upon his
was saluted by the acclamations of the
"Had the President," observes Bour-
n seeing the General move towards the
out 'Grenadiers, let no one pass,' it is
what might have been the result."
ncil of the Five Hundred was assembled
of the palace. They began by swearing
the existing constitution by acclamation,
ext drew up a message to the Directory
explanations, when Lucien Bonaparte,
een appointed President shortly before,
compliment to his brother, and partly
maintained the reputation of a stanch
, read the letter of resignation which
addressed to the Councils, and in which
ector told them that "the glory which
ed the return of the illustrious warrior
e had had the honour of opening the

path of glory, and the striking marks of con
given him by the Legislative Body, had con
him (Barras) that to whatever post he might
forth be called all danger to liberty wo
averted, and the interests of the army be en
That as for himself, " he cheerfully returne
the rank of a private citizen ; happy, after so
storms, to resign unimpaired the administra
the Republic, which had been, in part, com
to his charge." Questions arose in the Cou
to the validity of the resignation ; some one
what had become of the other Directors.
Bonaparte made his appearance, followed
company of grenadiers, who stationed themse
the entrance of the hall. Bourrienne d
accompany him to the Five Hundred, bein
off with a message to Josephine. All account
that Bonaparte was saluted by loud and in
vociferations, owing chiefly to the sight of
diers, who had escorted him to the door. " No
here, no armed men !" cried out several
deputies ; " we will have no dictator, no sol
the sanctuary of the laws. Down with the
Outlaw the new Cromwell !" Some ordered
parte to withdraw. He attempted to spea
his voice was drowned in the general
Several members crowded round him, but i
true that daggers were raised against him.
parte, partly pushed, and partly of his own
made for the door, followed by a crowd, wh
grenadiers coming forward, placed him in th
of them and escorted him out. On this o
there was a sort of struggle between the
and some of the deputies, and one of the
by name Thomé, had a piece of his coat

e whole extent of the violence alleged
perpetrated.
naparte had withdrawn, his brother
President of the Council, endeavoured
der in the Assembly. His situation was
ing to his close relationship to the
e general animadversion. He observed
neral had probably no other object than
me important communication to the
l he begged that he might be recalled
ith calmness. But calmness was out of
n; Lucien was interrupted at each sen-
ciferations of "Bonaparte has sullied
"Bonaparte is a disgrace to the Re-
. Lastly, nearly the whole of the
e, crying out, "Outlaw him! put to
ne outlawry of General Bonaparte."
said, "Will you have me outlaw my
?" and as the Assembly persisted in
uestion put from the chair, Lucien left
ascended the tribune, renounced the
p, and threw off his robes. At this
naparte sent into the hall a company of
who, surrounding the President, led him
court. Lucien then mounted on horse-
side of his brother, and addressed the
follows: "Citizen soldiers, the Presi-
Council of Five Hundred declares to
ne majority of the Council is at present
by a few of its members, who are
daggers, and who threaten their col-
h death. These brigands, who are no
e pay of England, have rebelled against
of the Elders, and are talking of out-
General who is charged with the exe-

cution of the decrees of that Council. These madmen by so doing have outlawed themselves. In the name of the people, I require you to rescue the majority of its representatives. * * * General, and you, soldiers and citizens, you will only acknowledge as legislators of France those who will rally round me, their President. As for those who will remain in that hall, let them be expelled by force. They are not the representatives of the people, but the representatives of the dagger. Let that be their title, and let it follow them everywhere, so that whenever they show themselves to the people, every one may point at them and designate them by the name of representatives of the poniard. Vive la République!" The soldiers, however, seemed still to hesitate. Lucien then drew his sword, exclaiming, "I swear that I will stab my own brother to the heart, if he ever attempt anything against the liberty of France." This dramatic stroke succeeded, the soldiers cried out "Vive Bonaparte!" and at a signal given by the General, Murat, at the head of a body of grenadiers, marched into the hall, and ordered the soldiers to clear it by order of the President. At some of the deputies demurred, the soldiers hurried them out with their bayonets; many jumped out the windows, which were low, and dispersed in the gardens, leaving some of their habiliments behind. It was night, and the Council of the Elders was assembled in another wing of the palace, quietly awaiting events. Lucien now set about collecting a few of the deputies, who being in the conspiracy had remained in the palace. It appears that they were no more than thirty; but assuming the name of the Council of Five Hundred

a decree, stating that the Directory "existed
ger, and that the individuals hereafter named
sixty in number) were no longer members of
tional representation on account of their
s and illegal acts, especially in the sitting of
rning." Another decree instituted a Pro-
l Executive Commission, consisting of three
rs who should be styled Consuls, and nomi-
ieyès, Roger Ducos, and Bonaparte as such.
ouncil of Elders passed a resolution to the
urpose. About one in the morning Bona-
nd his two colleagues appeared before the
l of Elders, to take the oath "to the sove-
of the people, to the Republic, one and
led, to liberty and equality, and to the repre-
e system." The two Councils then adjourned
lves indefinitely, after appointing a Legislative
ssion of fifty members, taken from both
ls, which was to frame the plan of a new
ution. About three o'clock in the morning
11th November, Bonaparte left St. Cloud
n to Paris. Bourrienne was in the carriage
m. Having reached his house, and saluted
he, who was in a state of great anxiety, he
ourrienne, "I said many absurd things
y. I like better to speak to soldiers than
ers. Those fellows awed me. I have not
ed to public assemblies, but I shall be in
He then complained of Bernadotte, whose
ons to the deputies of the Five Hundred he
en informed of. And then, dismissing
ne, he said "Remember, we sleep at the
ourg to-night." Later in the morning,
te sent his brother Louis to the Luxem-
liberate the ex-Director Gohier, and tell

he told Louis that he had often admired it,
he then respected the General, but that now
had become an usurper, he should not
away, he should leave it to his (Bonaparte's)
Gohier was honest, but was formal and
quential, and devoid of political capacity.
he was first told a few days before, that B
and Sieyès were upsetting the constitutio
Tuileries, he replied with droll gravity
how can they upset the constitution at the T
whilst I hold the great seal of the Executi
at the Luxembourg?" Gohier happene
President of the Directory in his turn at t

At the first sitting of the three Consuls
having asked "Which of us shall preside
Ducos replied, "The General takes the
course." Bonaparte began to state his o
concerning the various branches of the Ad
tion, with so much facility and in such
authority, that Sieyès, after the sitting, tol

the restoration of the public tranquillity,
irty-eight individuals to be banished to
ut Cambacérès, Minister of Justice, hav-
report showing that such severe measures
nnecessary, the persons proscribed were
remain in various places in France
surveillance of the high police. Several
of the Council of the Five Hundred
arrested after the affair of St. Cloud;
dotte remonstrated warmly with Bona-
inding him of his promises previous
h Brumaire, and they were released.
of the Directorial Government was not
by the French people, who had neither
it nor confidence in it. But the forced
f the Legislative Council, which, added
ner violation of the Legislature in Fruc-
years before, extinguished all chances of
in France, irritated the Republican party
naparte, and that party, though silenced,
entirely subdued during the fifteen years
atorship. The following is Lucien's apo-
ten many years after, in his reply to the
of Lamarque, for the part which he
in that eventful crisis:—"We were
that the immense majority of the French
rove our proceedings, but our audacity
ait for the legal manifestation of the
France. . . The conqueror of so many
s confused for a moment, not through
but because he was going to usurp a
h he had not then—the right of dissolv-
gislature; we hesitated, because we had
et of the scaffold and of being stigmatised
if we had failed, without having time to

maire, a commission of fifty members, ch
equal numbers from the two Councils, was ap
to propound certain alterations in the Cons
of the year III. But by the word alterations,
and Bonaparte meant a totally new Const
After some days Bonaparte summoned the C
sioners to assemble at his residence in the
bourg. Some of the members were offe
this, but they all obeyed, and Bonaparte a
the Presidency of the Commission as a m
course. He then asked Sieyès to deve
plan of a new constitution. After Siey
explained it, Bonaparte exclaimed, "That
very fine, but that there were objections t
of the details." He then desired Citizen
to take the pen and act as secretary. The
sion was resumed day after day. Bonapart
objections, and suggested alterations, and th
each successive article to the vote, and
wrote down the resolutions. The Commissi

apostrophe disconcerted the Assembly.
however, apologised afterwards to Mat-
vivacity. The first important question
that of the electoral franchise, the
ll Representative Constitutions. Uni-
ge appeared only fit for small democra-
the Swiss Cantons, or for new commu-
as those of the United States, in which
no great traditional inequality of rank
. But in a single great state, like
h more than thirty millions of people,
great majority were poor and illiterate,
clear notion of political rights, quali-
voting at elections were considered
e, and they had been accordingly re-
he Constitution of the year III. And
ctoral law had not worked well. At
number of Royalists were elected, and
measures of the 18th Fructidor were
necessary to expel them. Then the
r violent Revolutionists, came in, and
ected in their turn on the 22nd Floréal.
elections, however, they were returned
he 19th Brumaire dispersed them once
ere had been a succession of party
ccompanied by periodical violations of
ution. In order to obviate this evil,
osed that the people should no longer
r representatives directly, but should
f candidates for seats in the House of
ives, and that an upper house, styled
should select the representatives from
candidates. But who was to appoint
s? *It* was *the* Executive, that is to
uls, who appointed them. Thus were

didates for seats in the Legislature, were ma
in each department. They amounted to abo
thousand in all France. Then there were
departmental lists, out of which the Executi
to choose the administrative and judicial o
The number of persons eligible to these am
to 50,000. Lastly there were the communa
from out of which municipal and other local a
ments were to be filled. These lists included
half a million of persons. All the rest
nation were neither electors nor eligible. In
to complaints which were afterwards broug
ward against this system, Bonaparte confes
his Council that "fifty men assembled in a t
emergency for the object of framing a consti
had not the right of disposing of the liber
the people . . . . . but the nation could no
remained without some sort of organization,
bad one was better than none. The gover
must have intermediate bodies between it a
people at large, for it is better to have to de

1. In a confidential letter which he wrote to leyrand as early as September, 1797, when neral of the army of Italy, from his head-rters of Passeriano, on the subject of the con-ution to be given to the Cisalpine Republic, he erved that, "Notwithstanding our boastings, our usand and one pamphlets, our never-ending eches, and our perpetual babbling, we are still t ignorant of the moral science of politics. We e not even defined as yet the meaning of the cutive, legislative, and judicial powers. Mon-uieu has given wrong definitions of them, be-e his work is but an analysis of what existed or had existed before him. Montesquieu had eyes fixed upon England. . . . . The lish have entrusted to the House of Commons power of voting the supplies, and they have right, because the English constitution is one rivileges—it is a dark ceiling, but with mould-of gold. The House of Commons being the power that, well or ill, still represents the on, it ought to have the right of voting the nue and the expenditure. But in a country re all authority emanates from the people, why ld we give to the Legislative Body the right of ing peace and war, and that of levying the s? . . . . . I see only one thing which we e really defined, and that is the sovereignty of people; but we have not been so successful in ning what is constitutional, nor in the distri-ion of the various powers. The organization he French people is as yet a mere outline. . . . government, as I conceive it, ought to be con-*red as the true representative of the nation, it ought to govern* according to a constitutional

charter and organic laws. Such a government should be divided into two very distinct magistracies, both elected by the people. One is the Executive, the other ought to watch rather than to act; it ought to constitute, as it were, the Legislature of the Executive, the great council of the nation, by which all important administrative measures ought to be sanctioned. This council ought to be numerous, but no one should be admitted into it without having previously filled some office of importance, and acquired a practical knowledge of administrative business. As for the Legislative Body properly so called, it ought to concern itself solely with making the organic laws, or changing them, not in two or three days, as they do now, but after four or five months' deliberation. This Legislative Body ought to be impassive, without ears or eyes to all external agencies; without rank in the Republic, and without prospects for ambition, and it would not then overwhelm us with a thousand special laws, which become annulled as soon as their absurdity is made manifest, so that, in result, we are a people without legislation, though encumbered with three hundred folio volumes of laws. It is a great calamity for a nation of thirty millions, and in the eighteenth century, to be obliged every now and then to have recourse to the bayonet in order to save the country. Violent remedies are evidence against the legislators; a constitution which is given to men ought to be calculated for men."

Sieyès' idea of a Senate corresponded in great measure with Bonaparte's notion of a great magistracy; only instead of being elected by the people, *half its* members were appointed for the first time

he Consuls or Executive, and for life, and Senate afterwards filled its own vacancies a triple list of candidates, one furnished by Executive, one by the Legislative Body, and her by the Tribunate. The Senate became eforth Bonaparte's favourite council. As for Legislative Body, he held it in little favour, soon reduced it to a nullity; and when, at the of 1813, the "Mutes," as they were called, vered their speech, his indignation at their umption knew no bounds: he told them that were not the representatives of the people, but ly a council of administration, inferior to the te and to the Council of State; and that he, oleon, was the true representative of the na-

Thus we see to the last in him the same ons about the nature of a government which he expressed to M. Talleyrand at the beginning is career. The idea of a Tribunate to discuss projects of law was a peculiar feature of Sieyès' , which Bonaparte did not much like; but he ght proper to allow it to remain for the pre- , as a sop to the Republicans.

he institution of the Senate being one of the projects of Sieyès which was adopted, became, hibaudeau says in his Memoirs, a lure to the bers of the Constitution Commission, who, g before them the prospect of being made se- rs or councillors of state, gave up all thoughts pposing Bonaparte in his amendments to the of his system. Bonaparte quickly perceived those articles and provisions in Sieyès' plan, ch might check the power of the Executive, *he insisted upon* their being altered or modi-

The result was a constitution after Bona-

parte's own heart. The formation of the Executive was one part of Sieyès' plan, which that metaphysical legislator most prided himself in; it was called the summit of his pyramid. A Grand Elector, a sort of president for life, was to be chosen by the Senate. He was to have an income of six millions of francs, a guard of three thousand men, and the palace of Versailles for his residence. All the acts of government were to be issued in his name, but his only functions were to be the appointment of two Consuls, one for peace and the other for war; the first to have under him the ministers of justice, of the finances, and of the home department, and the other those of foreign affairs, and of the war and naval departments. The Grand Elector was to have the power of dismissing either of the Consuls or both, and of replacing them; but if he abused this prerogative, the Senate could remove him by *absorbing* him, that is to say, receiving him in its own bosom, and appointing some one else to the office. It was evident that Sieyès destined the sinecure of Grand Elector for himself, and Bonaparte and perhaps Cambacérès to be Consuls for war and peace. When this part of the constitutional project was laid before the Commission, Bonaparte assailed it at once with a volley of ridicule and sarcasm. "The Grand Elector was merely the ghost of a fainéant king of the old Merovingian dynasty. What man of common spirit would condescend to act such an ignoble part? Do you think the nation would allow a mere hog at Versailles to receive six millions a-year for doing nothing?" The project was *immediately* put aside, and the Commission substituted that of a First Consul appointed for ten years, *with two* assistant consuls appointed by him, and

uld have only a consultative voice in his
. The prerogatives of the First Consul were
eater than those of a constitutional king.
the initiative of all the laws; made war or
commanded the armies, militia, and navy;
d to all diplomatic, administrative, and mu-
offices; and, in short, held in his hands all
ngs of the machinery of the state. Some
can members of the Commission proposed
the prerogatives of this supreme magistracy,
aparte was determined to frustrate and si-
l such endeavours. It is well to observe
at the members of the Commission, which
s bartering away in secret conclave the
overeignty of the nation, were themselves
mplicated in the illegal acts of the 19th
re, and had therefore no safe position upon
o fall back; their only chance of safety
refore to push forward the car of him for
enefit they had violated the existing consti-
Bonaparte, who knew this, checked every
at stubbornness on their part by saying—
I will have it your own way, I will have no
do with your plans, and a civil war must
consequence." To the offer of making him
-in-chief of all the armies, with the power
otiating with foreign States, he replied—"I
ady Consul, and I shall remain at Paris."
proposed to establish great departmental
nicipal councils, independent of the Exe-
and which should administer their own
ffairs. Bonaparte, however, replied, that
stitution must not enter into all these details,
will be provided for by especial laws." It
efore said in the project of the new consti-

tution that the local administration in the districts and communes was subordinate to the ministers. The communes under the reign of Bonaparte remained in the most abject dependence, and their present condition is not very greatly improved. The history of the municipal and communal administration in France is very instructive. The progress of the Revolution in that country after 1792 was attended by a continued advance towards the centralization of power in the hands of the Executive and in the ministerial offices of the capital, sweeping off in succession all local independence or franchise which could protect the country people against the arbitrary acts of any faction that should succeed in obtaining possession of Paris. Those who wish to know more on this subject may consult Leber, 'Histoire Critique du Pouvoir Municipal;' and Barante, 'Des Communes et de l'Aristocratie en France.'

The project of the new Constitution being completed, at least to the satisfaction of Bonaparte, about the middle of December, it was ordered to be printed and published preparatory to its being laid before the people for their acceptance. In the preamble to the project, Boulay de la Meurthe passing in review the three or four previous Constitutions, observed that "they had all failed because there had never been a government regularly organised which could resist the two extreme factions, the Royalists and the Demagogues." In reply to the cry of alarm of the Republicans who said, "that in the new Constitution there was no *guarantee* left for the liberties of the people; *some one* pithily replied, "We are now reduced *to this* pass, that if we can no longer secure

of the Revolution, we must, at least,
men who made the Revolution and their
interests."

wers of the State, according to the new
ion, consisted of, 1. Three Consuls, Bo-
eing First Consul for ten years, but re-
These formed the Executive and proposed

2. A Tribunate of 100 members, one-
renewed every year, which discussed the
f laws, and approved or rejected them.
islative Body of 300 members, one-fifth
yearly, which received the report of the
laws approved by the Tribunate, and voted
y ballot, and without discussion. If a pro-
w obtained the majority of the votes, the
istered it, as soon as the Consuls promul-
The Senate consisted of eighty members
njoying an ample salary; its sittings were
ed doors. The members of the Tribu-
of the Legislative Body were appointed
enate out of lists of candidates given by
oral colleges of the departments. The
f the Senate were secret; those of the
e Body were dumb; the Tribunate was,
the only deliberative assembly in the State,
l not the power of originating any law.
ars after Bonaparte did away with the
altogether. Unlike the former Constitu-
of the year VIII. said nothing concerning
m of the press, religious freedom, or the
of justice, which matters were left to
islation; but it recognised the right of

nstitution of the year VIII. was nothing
a series of regulations for the political



was convinced that France could exist
monarchy. To frame a Constitution in
without aristocracy, is like attempting t
balloon. The ideas of Napoleon were fi
order to realize them he was obliged t
time and opportunities. The Consul
duced unity of administration, and this w
paratory step. That step once taken,
was indifferent as to the forms and dend
of the various constituted bodies. Wis
sisted in proceeding on from day to da
losing sight of the polar star, by the di
which Napoleon was to lead the Revoluti
harbour which he had intended for it." C
occasion he said, "My reign began fro
that I was made First Consul." Clear-sigh
understood it so at the time. Garat, in
to the Council of the Elders, in presen
with the new Constitution, told them, th
had intrusted one man with the power

guarantees to the French the exercise of
ıts, without depriving the government of
required to maintain the public tran-
ınd to furnish the armies with the means
y. The names of the first magistrates
by the Constitution are of themselves a

rmer Constitutions had been laid before
ıary Assemblies of the citizens of the
districts; but, on the present occasion,
books were opened in the chief towns of
ective districts, and the citizens were
o come and register their votes. The
vere not finished before the 7th of Fe-
800, when the Constitution was declared
been accepted by the majority of the
The scrutiny of the registers gave three
ınd eleven thousand assenting votes, and
thousand five hundred and sixty-two
ıts. In a nation of thirty millions, three
of votes could hardly be considered as
ical majority, but the number was much
han on the occasion of former Constitu-
The Revolutionary Constitution of 1793
one million and eight hundred thousand
d that of the year III. (1795) reckoned
ion and fifty-seven thousand only. The
Constitution of the year VIII. was cer-
ıuiesced in by the great mass of the French
ho were weary of agitation and of fac-
l proscriptions, and panted for security
e.

the suffrages of the people could be col-
e *Constitution* was proclaimed in Paris,
arte appointed Cambacérès and Lebrun

for his colleagues. Sieyès, disappointed at the fall of his Grand Elector scheme, declined being one of the subordinate Consuls, and he accepted instead a seat in the Senate, with a salary of 25,000 francs, and the estates of Crosny, near Versailles, which belonged to the State. The three Consuls then appointed, on the plea of the urgency of the occasion, one-half of the Senators, and the Senate, without waiting for the lists of candidates from the departments, appointed the members of the Legislative Body and of the Tribunate. So that in reality Bonaparte may be said to have appointed the whole of the Legislature and Executive. In his choice he professed the system of amalgamating all parties. "I will not govern," said he, "by means of a party. I have opened a wide road for all capable men who choose to walk on with me. I have in my Council of State moderate constitutionalists, or Feuillants, as they were once called; I have also some Royalists, and lastly, I have some Jacobins too. I like honest men of every party and colour." The ministers were, Talleyrand, for the Foreign Department; Berthier, for that of War; Gaudin, for the Finances; Laplace, and afterwards Lucien, for the Interior, or Home Department; Abrial, for that of Justice. The installation of the Council of State took place in December, and that of the new Legislative Body and the Tribunate on the 1st of January, 1800. The Tribunate held its sittings at the Palais Royal, the Legislative Body at the Palais Bourbon.

On the 19th of February, 1800, the First Consul Bonaparte left the Luxembourg Palace, which had been allotted to the Senate, and took possession of the Tuileries for his residence. A fire of

set off from the Luxembourg, escorted
itary, with the music playing. The three
nd their retinues were in full costume,
rivate carriages were few, and the rest
ney coaches. Bonaparte, on arriving at
ries, hurried up the grand staircase, fol-
a crowd who had their eyes fixed upon
his eyes were attracted by no object or
particular; his countenance was fixed
vable; he entered the splendid apartments
moments, then came out again, mounted
, and reviewed the troops in the court.
review he received the various Ministers,
vhom presented to him his secretary, and
officers of his department. Three days
first diplomatic levee took place. The
r of State, Benezech, charged with the
administration of the palace, acted as
f the ceremonies, with an usher's rod in
; he introduced the foreign ambassadors
abinet of the Consuls, who were attended
Ministers and Councillors of State. The
of the Interior received the ambassadors
oor of the Cabinet, and the Minister of
Affairs presented them to the First Consul.
bassadors of Spain and of Rome, the
s of Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, Baden,
assel, and the Ambassadors of the New
, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Re-
attended the first Consular levee.

cts of the new government bore still at
the emblems of the Republic, a female
d clad in ancient drapery, with the legend,
ique Française, Souveraineté du Peuple,
Premier Consul." This legend was

END OF VOL. I.

POLEON BONAPARTE:

HIS SAYINGS AND HIS DEEDS.

BY A. VIEUSSEUX.

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im *to St. Helena*—His altercations with the Go-

the plunder of foreign countries. These resources however were exhausted. The armies were not paid, and when Dubois-Crancé, the War Minister of the Directory, was asked by Berthier, whom Bonaparte had appointed in his place, for the accounts of the different corps, he answered all questions by saying, "We neither pay, nor victual, nor clothe the army; it subsists and clothes itself by requisitions on the inhabitants of the countries on which it is quartered." Such a wretched system was now at an end. An additional per centage was put on all direct taxes during the war, the payment of which was strictly enforced, responsible officers were appointed receivers in every department, and regular accounts were kept. A great resource was created by the "cautionnements," or securities in cash which every public functionary was obliged to pay into the Treasury, and the amount of which was placed at the disposal of the State for the current expenditure. The bankers and other capitalists of Paris lent twelve millions of livres to the new government. The funds, which previous to the 18th Brumaire were quoted nominally at 7, rose to 18, and shortly after to 24.

Bonaparte retained for himself, and under his own direct control, the departments of War, Marine, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and the Police. His first acts were beneficent. He revoked the proscription of the priests, closed the lists of the emigrants, and soon after allowed most of them to return to France; he recalled from Guiana forty of those who had been transported by the Directory in Fructidor; he liberated from prison the "hostages," as they were styled, being the relatives of Royalist families, whose good behaviour was thus intended to be

secured. Bourrienne says that Bonaparte assumed at that period a right which his own made constitution did not give him, the royal prerogative of mercy; and he rejoiced in exercising it whenever the imperious necessities of his policy, to which he would sacrifice everything, stood not in his way. He felt a real pleasure in saving men under the sentence of the Revolutionary laws. The secretary, who gives several instances of this, adds, "Such was Bonaparte First Consul; I do not speak here of Napoleon Emperor." Soon after the two days of Brumaire he went to visit the prisons unexpectedly; on his return he said to Bourrienne, "What brutes those Directors were! To what a condition they have brought our public establishments! The prisons are in a shocking unhealthy state; the prisoners are miserably fed .... When I was in the Temple I could not help thinking of the unfortunate Louis XVI.; he was an excellent man, but too meek and gentle. He knew not how to deal with men. And Sir Sidney Smith! I made them show me his apartment. If the fools had not let him escape, I should have taken Acre. There are too many painful recollections connected with that prison. I will certainly have it pulled down some day or other." And he did so after a time.

The notorious General Mack, who had commanded the Neapolitan army in 1798, was prisoner at Paris, with other Austrian officers. Mack, it appears, escaped from Paris in April, 1800. Bonaparte, on being informed of this, said to Bourrienne, "Mack may go whither he pleases, I am not afraid of him. But there are some other Austrian officers who were made prisoners with him; among the rest is a Count Dietrichstein, who belongs to a great

family in Vienna. I will liberate them
the moment of opening a new campaign,
produce a good effect. They will see t
not afraid; and who knows but this may pr
some admirers in Austria?" And accor
gave an order for liberating the Austrian
"Bonaparte's acts of generosity, as well a
of severity," observes Bourrienne, "and
of individuals, were the result of deep cal

He made a lucky hit to captivate the
Paul of Russia, whom he knew to be grow
what cool towards his allies, Austria and
There were in France several thousand
prisoners, who had been taken chiefly in
Bonaparte had them all newly clothed and a
and sent them back to Russia without ex
condition of any sort. This act won the
of the Czar for the First Consul.

The remains of the Vendeans, under
of Chouans given to them indiscrimi
their enemies, kept the north-west of
alarm. Bonaparte sent General Brune a
of 35,000 men, with instructions to em
ciliatory measures until the last extre
avoid as much as possible the shedding
Bonaparte himself addressed a proclamat
inhabitants of "the departments of the
which, after acknowledging that many
many arbitrary acts, had been committe
late government, that "the great prin
social order had been violated," he prom
to redress those errors; he told them tha
pressive laws of the forced loans, of the
of banishment, were repealed—that othe
tory measures would follow—that liberty

was guaranteed—that a full amnesty would be granted—and he exhorted the people of the west to avail themselves of it, to return to their peaceful labours, and to give up all idea of reviving an impious and unnatural war. Fouché, the Minister of Police, employed secret means to sow dissension among the Vendean chiefs. The priest Bernier, who enjoyed great influence in the country, became an advocate of peace. Count de Bourmont, Georges Cadoudal, the sturdy yeoman of Britanny and General of Division by commission of Louis XVIII., MM. d'Autichamp and de Chatillon, received a passport to repair to Paris, where they had interviews with the First Consul. The interview with Georges has been related by Bourrienne, who witnessed it from his cabinet with the Aide-de-Camp Rapp, without being able, however, to hear the particulars of the conversation, which was long and animated, Bonaparte and Georges walking at the time backwards and forwards in the great saloon of the Tuileries. Georges, it seems, persisted in his sentiments of fidelity to the Bourbons; and Bonaparte at last dismissed him, telling him that he might return to his own country as freely as he had come to Paris. After he was gone, Bonaparte told Bourrienne, in a tone of regret, "He does not take a correct view of things; but the very exaggeration of his principles is derived from noble feelings which must give him a great influence over his party. We must, however, bring this business to an end." The final convention between General Brune and the Vendean chiefs was signed in February. Some of the chiefs accepted the amnesty and remained in France, others banished themselves from their

country and repaired to England. This was the third pacification of the Vendée, and it was the last; the first having been concluded in 1796 after the death of Charette, and the second in January, 1799, by General Hédouville. Soon after this, Count de Frotté, who had acquiesced, though reluctantly, in the capitulation, wrote letters to his friends expressing his doubts of the sincerity of the Consular government, and recommending them to evade as much as possible the delivery of their arms. These letters being intercepted, Frotté and several more were arrested, tried by court-martial, and shot without delay. One young man, Toustain, sixteen years of age, was of the number, and his youth, and the intrepidity with which he met his death, excited much commiseration. These summary executions exasperated the Chouans, and Georges among the rest, who swore to avenge them on the head of Bonaparte. These men were in correspondence with the Count d'Artois (afterwards Charles X.) who was in England, and who was still dreaming of a restoration by force.

About this time Louis XVIII., who was then at Mittau, in Russia, wrote a flattering letter to the First Consul, in which, after thanking him for having accepted his high station, he urged him to restore France to her legitimate king. Bonaparte hesitated about answering this letter. Some time after Louis wrote a second epistle, in which he told Bonaparte that he ought to be convinced of his esteem, and if he doubted his gratitude he had only to fix his own reward and that of his friends. "As to my principles," said Louis, "I am a Frenchman, merciful by disposition and also by *the dictates* of reason. You, the victor of Lodi,

Castiglione, and Arcole, the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, cannot prefer vain fame to real glory. But you are losing precious time. Together we may ensure the glory of France. I say *we*, because I can do nothing for France without you, and you cannot secure her happiness without me. General! Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I long to restore peace to my people." It was not till seven months after the date of the first letter that Bonaparte answered both together in September, 1800, as follows:—"Sir, I have received your letter, and I thank you for the civilities which you have addressed to me. You must not seek to return to France. You could not do it without trampling over a hundred thousand dead bodies. Sacrifice your interests to the repose and happiness of France, and history will render you justice. I can feel for the misfortunes of your family, and I shall learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with all that can contribute to the tranquillity of your retirement." Bonaparte told Bourrienne, in conversation on the subject of these letters, that as he had no children there was no prospect of future stability in France. "If I do not live thirty years to complete my work, you will have a series of civil wars after my death. My brothers could not govern France; you know what they are. A struggle will take place between the most distinguished generals, each pretending to succeed me." And when Bourrienne hinted that a voluntary restoration with proper guarantees might obviate these evils, Bonaparte replied, "Do you imagine that I have not thought of it? But look at the difficulties; how many acquired rights, how many material interests, how many individuals, would be endangered.

The Bourbons would think that they have reconquered their inheritance, and would dispose of it as they pleased. And then the emigrants and the priests. . . None but fools would trust them. My resolution is taken, therefore let us say no more on the subject. I know that those women plague you. Let them mind their knitting, and leave me to do what is right." This was in allusion to Josephine and her daughter, Hortense, who were inclined for a restoration.

Bonaparte was not partial to the Revolution and its principles, although he made use of them as long as they served his purpose. He had, above all, a settled aversion to the liberty of the press. In January, 1800, he issued a decree, stating that the Consuls of the Republic, "considering that some of the journals printed at Paris were instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic, ordered the Minister of the Police to limit the number of the journals during the continuation of the war." And the decree went on to specify which journals were to be allowed to appear; with this provision, that if any of them should insert articles derogatory to the respect due to the institutions of the country, the sovereignty of the people, and the glory of the French arms, or offensive to the governments which were the friends and allies of France, even if such articles should be extracted from foreign journals, the offending journal or journals would be immediately suppressed. And this proved no vain threat. The Minister of the Interior had the censorship of theatrical compositions. Bonaparte said in the *Council* of State that the character of the French *people* required that the liberty of the press should

be limited to works of a certain bulk; but that newspapers and pamphlets ought to be subject to the inspection of the police. The 'Moniteur' was declared to be the only official journal. The First Consul made it his organ of communication with public opinion at home and abroad. Its political articles were often abusive of the enemies of Bonaparte, and they expressed what he wished to be believed. "It required some experience in historical criticism," observes Thibaudeau, "to find out the real aim of those oracular sentences, and to distinguish truth from falsehood; for, whilst common readers take to the letter all that they read in official journals, discriminating persons know that in most cases those journals contain nothing but mutilated truths or positive falsehoods, but which the governments think useful to their policy." What a comment on official journals! And yet Napoleon, at St. Helena, is reported to have said that there was not a single sentence in the Moniteur which he could wish to have struck out. There is no doubt that the columns of the Moniteur afford a faithful mirror of Bonaparte's policy to the end of his public life. There was in the Moniteur an official and a non-official part: a distinction by which the responsibility of an offensive article could, if required, be disavowed by the government.

The Consuls framed a plan for the administrative organization of the departments. The departmental councils of administration, elected by the primary assemblies of the people, were abolished. The administration was entrusted to a prefect for each department, appointed by the Executive, removable at will, and who corresponded directly

with the Minister of the Interior. A Council-General in each department convoked by the Government once a-year, assessed the respective shares of the taxation to the various communes, voted the additional per centage for the local expenditure, and had the right to represent to the Minister of the Interior the wants and wishes of each respective department. The members of these General Councils were named by the Government, and received no salary. Lastly, there was in each department a Council of Prefecture, which decided upon all disputes and reclamations on the part of the tax-payers. At the head of each commune were a mayor and a municipal council, appointed by the prefect; thus a complete gradation of power was established, all depending on the Executive, or, in other words, on the First Consul. "The administration is the business of one man," said Ræderer, the reporter of the Council of State, in the preamble of the project. The project passed the Tribunate and Legislative Body by considerable majorities, and became law.

The Prefectships were places of great importance, and well paid; and they were filled by the First Consul after mature deliberation. He chose men of known capacity and determination, and likely to execute strictly and firmly all orders they might receive from Paris. Many of the newly appointed prefects were men who had figured in the Convention, "men of the Revolution and of resolution," as Bonaparte said, who were willing to serve a strong power which alone could secure, if not the theories of the Republic, at least the material interests of the men of the Revolution.

The judicial system was re-organized upon simi-

lar principles. Instead of judges elected by the people, and renewed every five years, a system which had been productive of incapacity and confusion, and which had been repeatedly infringed upon by the creation of special courts, such as the Revolutionary tribunals and military commissions, the First Consul insisted upon having permanent courts of justice, all the members of which were to be appointed by himself, a justice of the peace in each commune, a tribunal in the first instance in every arrondissement or district, a Criminal Court in every department, twenty-nine Courts of Appeal distributed among the chief towns, and at the summit of all a Court of Cassation for all France, sitting at Paris. The institution of the jury was retained, but by a new law on the nomination of jurymen, the prefects exercised a paramount influence in the choice. Bonaparte afterwards suspended repeatedly the functions of the jury, "which," he said, "was dangerous in times of political excitement; for then juries are apt to judge from party or personal feelings." By an article of the Consular Constitution, the First Consul had the right of suspending, in cases of urgent danger to the State, the ordinary course of the laws, to proclaim martial law, and to arrest individuals.

The police was not the least remarkable part of the Consular administration. The ministry of the police had been a creation of the Directory. Under the old monarchy there was a police in the large towns for the cleanliness, order, and security of the streets and places of public resort. At Paris there was a Lieutenant-General of Police; after the Revolution, the Directory instituted by a law a Minister of Police for all France, who cor-

responded with the Ministers of Justice and of the Interior. His business was to watch over all suspected individuals, and take precautionary measures for the internal safety of the State. The new Consular constitution said nothing about the number of the ministers or their respective functions. Bonaparte found Fouché Minister of the Police, and kept him, the more readily as he had been of service to him on the 18th and 19th Brumaire. Besides, Fouché was intimate with the Jacobin party, which Bonaparte feared, and he could be instrumental in discovering and defeating their plots. The law concerning the new organization of the departments stated that the mayors and their assistants had charge of the police of their respective departments, but that in the large towns, such as Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, Bordeaux, there should be a Commissary General of Police, having under him Commissaries for each district, and that the whole should receive their orders from the Minister of Police. The head of the police for the city of Paris, was styled Prefect of Police. The Minister of Police had the gendarmerie at his disposal. His chief business was of a political nature. The civil police for the protection of property and persons was left to the subordinate local agents. Bonaparte, however, not choosing to trust entirely to Fouché, organized his own secret police, as a watch over that of the Minister. At one time Junot was the Director of the secret police, the agents of which wrote daily bulletins which were laid before the First Consul. They consisted of hearsays picked up at the hotels, coffee-houses, and less respectable places. On one occasion Bourrienne was reported to have said something concerning the

irst Consul intending to make himself king. onaparte was angry with Junot, called him a fool, id told him to state to him facts and not inven- ons. It appears that the crafty Fouché, who had scovered the names of the agents of the palace- olice, as it was called, had purposely invented ie story about Bourrienne, in order to amuse him- lf with Junot's credulity. Bonaparte himself has nce acknowledged that all his police was of very ttle service to him, except to keep him in con- nual fretfulness and anxiety. He said that the olice agents invented more than they discovered. nd in speaking of the common practice of open- g letters, he said that "the post-office, like the olice, caught only fools." And yet he continued countenance these practices till the end of his ign. He even established, when Emperor, a mili- ry police in his armies, to discover the officers ho were disaffected towards him. The number f informers employed by the various police was ry great, and consisted of men of all ranks in fe.

The Council of State was an important creation f the First Consul. The business of the Council f State was to discuss in a consultative manner ch projects of law as the Consuls, or rather the irst Consul, intended to lay before the Tribunate id Legislative Body, and then to communicate the id projects to the Tribunate, and give plausible asons for their being proposed. The Council f State was quite a monarchical institution; it as, in fact, the Privy Council of the First Consul, ho divided it into sections corresponding to the epartments of the administration, war, navy, inances, interior, justice, public instruction, etc.

Each section was composed of those members who were supposed to be best acquainted with the correlative departments. The meetings of the Council were held at the Tuileries or at St. Cloud, as Bonaparte happened to be at either of those palaces. The whole Council met at least twice in the week, but in the intervals the sections were engaged in separate deliberation. Minor affairs were taken into consideration by the united Council in the absence of Bonaparte, but the more important matters were reserved until he was present. He often kept the Council sitting from nine in the morning till five in the evening, with only a quarter of an hour's adjournment to take some refreshment. He also sometimes presided at the deliberations of the separate sections, from ten o'clock in the evening till five in the morning, and did not appear more fatigued at the end than at the beginning of the meeting. It was the same thing with the army: he stood the fatigues of the field better than any one else. Endowed with iron nerves and a restless activity, he made no allowance for the weakness of others. He frequently complained that the Council did not work fast enough. Men of his temper, and there are many in every rank of life, are unconsciously tyrants; they expect others to do as much work as themselves, without reflecting on the inequality of our nature. Bonaparte took great pains in the formation of his Council of State, and he called to it the ablest men he could find in each branch of administration. Thibaudeau, Petit de la Lozère, Locré, Cormenin, have given accounts of the Council of State and its deliberations at various *epochs*.

Bonaparte, soon after he became Consul, wrote, by the advice of Talleyrand, a letter to King George III., just as he had written one to the Emperor Francis during the Italian campaign. But George was a constitutional King, and could only reply through the channel of his Ministers. Bonaparte's letter was plausible; it deprecated the continuation of the war, and expressed a wish for a general peace. Lord Grenville replied in the King's name to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. He began by laying the responsibility of the origin of the war upon the French Convention, which had first declared it; he commented on the Revolutionary propagandism which had proclaimed the overthrow of all existing governments, and on the system of aggression, spoliation, and conquest against countries which had done nothing to provoke it, such as Holland, Switzerland, and several of the Italian States. The most solemn treaties had been used merely as affording time to prepare for fresh invasions. In the meanwhile, all the governments that had succeeded one another in France had made professions of a pacific disposition, which, when put to the test, proved deceptive and evasive. The men who now had assumed the reins of government put forth similar professions. But their installation was of too recent a date to give evidence of the principles by which the new government would be conducted, or to afford reasonable hopes of their stability. Europe must be convinced, first, that the gigantic plans of ambition and the projects of destruction, avowed by the former governments of France, were abandoned, before it could venture upon fresh negotiations. *The best* guarantee of such a change of *principles might* be found in the restoration of the

old dynasty; "but, however desirable
might be," added Lord Grenville, "h
does not consider it as the only possi
of a solid peace. His Majesty does
the right of prescribing to France
be the form of her government, or
hands she shall vest the authority
to conduct the affairs of a great and
nation. His Majesty looks only to the
his own dominions and those of his all
the general safety of Europe. Whenev
judge that this security can in any
attained, his Majesty will eagerly em
opportunity of concerting with his
means of obtaining an immediate an
pacification." Bonaparte had made th
in compliance with the general wish
but he said himself that he was not so
was rejected, and that the answer fro
afforded him a secret satisfaction, as wa
cessary to keep up the energy and un
French State, which was ill organized,
maintain his own influence over the im
of the people. Besides, he was not sorr
to the English opposition an excuse fo
the blame of the war upon the Pitt
Accordingly, Talleyrand published an of
which he sent to Lord Grenville, in whi
burthen of the origin of the war was
amidst an artfully arranged confusion
stances and dates. Talleyrand went on
France, "at the beginning of the Re
had professed a desire for peace,
clination for conquest, and a respec
independence of all governments; b
soon as the Revolution broke out,

whole of Europe became leagued against France, and that this league was acting long before it avowed its acts. Thus Talleyrand jumbled up together the very distinct epochs of the first National Assembly, which established a constitutional monarchy; of the second, or Legislative Assembly, which declared war against Austria; and of the Convention, which destroyed the monarchy and preached revolution all over the world, that being, as Brissot said, "the secret of their power." And he likewise confounded the case of Austria, Prussia, and Sardinia, which had formed the first coalition, with that of England, which would not join it, and which professed a strict neutrality. Again Talleyrand was in fault, when he stated that England virtually declared war in January 1793, by ordering away the French Minister, Chauvelin. The truth is, that Chauvelin had been the Minister accredited by Louis XVI.; and that when that king was deposed and imprisoned, in August, 1792, Chauvelin's diplomatic character ceased, and he remained in England as a private individual; still, however, carrying on a sort of extra-official communication with the English government. Meantime the French attacked Holland, and their armed vessels entered the Scheldt, against the stipulations of existing treaties. Lord Grenville, on the 31st December, 1792, remonstrated against these encroachments, and told Chauvelin that "England would not consent that France should arrogate the power of annulling at her pleasure the political system of Europe, under the plea of a pretended natural right, of which she makes herself the only judge. If France be desirous of maintaining friendship with England, she *must show herself disposed* to renounce all views of

aggression, and to confine herself within her own territory, without violating the rights of other governments." In all this there is nothing about the internal affairs of France. But, as no satisfactory explanations were given, Chauvelin, who had made himself obnoxious in other respects, received his passports as a private individual, under the Alien Act, and the Convention soon after declared war against Great Britain. It would have been utterly impossible for England to remain at peace with France in 1793, not because the French had chosen to depose their king and bring him to trial, but because the party that ruled France at that epoch waged war against the whole political and social system existing in Europe, and had assumed the office of arbitrators over the rights and liberties of nations. We refer those of our readers who wish to see further into this important question of the first origin of the war, to the 'History of the Politics of Great Britain and France, from the time of the Conference at Pilnitz,' by Herbert Marsh. Even President Washington and his cabinet had decided, in April, 1793, that the war on the part of France was an offensive war; and that therefore France had no claim to the assistance of the United States.

Bonaparte caused Talleyrand to write to the Austrian Prime Minister, Thugut, proposing to assemble a Congress for peace, but he received an evasive answer. The Austrians at that time had conquered Italy, and were on the frontiers of France, and therefore they considered themselves in a far better position than when they had concluded the treaty of Campo Formio three years before.

About this time a remarkable work was published at Paris by M. T. de Hauterive, a diplomatist of the old school of Choiseul and Vergennes, and now employed in the Office of Foreign Affairs under Talleyrand. It was entitled 'The State of France at the end of the year VIII.' It was a sort of manifesto of the policy of the First Consul. Hauterive's object was to prove that this policy was to recover for France the political influence which she had in Europe in the seventeenth century, at the epoch of the peace of Westphalia, but with a due consideration of the increase of the other powers, such as Prussia, Russia, and Austria, which, according to the author, required a corresponding increase of the power of France. Hauterive dwelt pointedly on the vast development of the maritime and colonial power of England, and his remarks displayed the feelings of Bonaparte on the subject; "Had the war of the Spanish succession," said he, "turned out more favourable to France, the maritime system of Europe would have remained longer subordinate to the interests of the Continental politics; Holland and Portugal would have continued independent of England; England herself would not have changed her government; the family of the Stuarts would have been restored, and the English nation, less powerful and less wealthy, would not have made all the States of Europe pay so dearly as they have done for the advantages which it has derived from its maritime power and commercial prosperity." In other words, England would not have stood in the way of France becoming the first power in Europe. Hauterive then went on to say that a new *system of the* law of nations was necessary *to Europe, as the* old system had been de-

stroyed by the preponderance of the maritime interests. "The basis of the maritime interest of France is an alliance with Holland, Spain, and Genoa." And he appealed to Turkey, the Barbary States, Naples, and Portugal, and even to Sweden, Denmark, and the United States to join the French maritime confederation; leaving, of course, England alone. "France," said he, "has laid the foundations of her federative continental system. The most important conditions of this system are already realized; others depend on the chances of the war, and on the will of the belligerent powers. In this state of uncertainty, France will trust to the energy of its system of warfare, and to its watchfulness in strengthening its maritime federal relations." In speaking of the war-system of France, Hauterive made some candid confessions. "The French armies in the last campaigns, though generally less numerous than those of the enemy, have seldom presented themselves for battle in numbers disproportionate to those opposed to them. In the memorable campaigns of Italy, the illustrious General (Bonaparte) was, perhaps, never in any one single battle inferior in numbers to the enemy before him. Constantly accelerating the march of his various corps, and triumphing over time and distance before he tried the chances of a battle, he had already at the time of action overcome every difficulty, and had made himself sure of beating the enemy over whom he had, by his celerity and genius, acquired the advantage of numbers—an advantage the greatest of all in the judgment of men who know that a field of battle is *not* a theatrical stage; and that the incidents of a *combat* are neither fictions nor prodigies, but real

combinations skilfully conceived and vigorously executed. These remarks may excite the surprise of the careless observer, but they will not escape the eye of the accurate historian. . . . The French have of late years brought the art of war to perfection. Their armies have always established the theatre of the war amongst the neighbouring nations. Little more than one year's occupation of Italy (1796-7) saved France an expenditure of one hundred and sixty millions of livres." Lastly, the author resumed the future policy of France in these terms: "France has just conquered the alliance of Switzerland. If she cannot extend her federative continental system by peaceful means she will substitute military influence; and if the Princes of Europe will not become her allies, she will force into her alliance those States which are unable to defend themselves, and she will press into her service all their resources for defence and for subsistence. The recent treaties with Holland, Spain, Switzerland, and some Italian States exhibit our position with regard to our friends and allies. The treaties concluded with Prussia, and indirectly with some of the northern States of Germany, show our position with respect to neutrals. Our late treaties with Austria and with some princes of Southern Germany, and the events which have occasioned the rupture of those treaties, reveal the position of France with regard to her enemies." Hauterive's work is worthy the attention of the historian, as disclosing already in 1800 the favourite political scheme developed by Bonaparte in the subsequent fifteen years, of a great European confederation, *having* France for its centre and its *great mover; in other* words, the establishment of

a French Protectorate over Europe. The book was translated into English and German and commented upon, especially by Gentz, who replied to it in his 'State of Europe at the end of the Eighteenth Century,' and in his 'Considerations on the Origin and Character of the actual War against France.' Gentz asserted that France had already attained a greater increase of territory and population than was consistent with the balance of power in Europe, and that under the specious name of a federative system she meant in reality to absorb all the minor States around her.

Bonaparte now turned his whole attention to the war against Austria. He gave to Moreau the command of the army on the Rhine; and he prepared himself, in secret, to take the command of the war in Italy; but as this was an infraction of the Constitution, he gave Berthier the nominal rank of General-in-chief of the army of reserve which was assembled at Dijon. This army consisted of hardly 22,000 men, many of them raw conscripts, a poor artillery, and hardly any cavalry. In the month of April, Carnot, the Minister-at-War, ordered all the depôts, all the disposable old regiments to join the army. On the 5th of May, Bonaparte informed the other two Consuls and the Ministers that he was going to inspect the army of reserve, but that he should not be long absent. He arrived at Dijon on the 7th, and on the next day he set off for Geneva, having ordered the various columns to march in that direction. On the 10th he was at Lausanne, where the advanced column of the army under General Lannes passed him on its way to St. Bernard. The artillery was in charge of Marmont, and Marescot

at the head of the engineer department. At foot of the mountain the cannon was dis-unted and placed on sledges and hollow trunks rees. Lannes crossed the mountain on the 15th May, and the centre column under Berthier on 16th. They met with no enemy until they ched the fort of Bard, in the valley of Aosta, ere there was a small Austrian garrison. The commanded the only road by which the army ld enter the plains of Italy. The soldiers ued it by climbing a high mountain on the left; the artillery was drawn at night through the age of Bard, at the foot of the castle, as quietly possible, the street having been previously wn with straw and dung. Bonaparte remained Lausanne till the 19th, and on the 20th he as-ded the St. Bernard, whilst the heads of his umns were already in the plains. The fort of d still held out. On the 23rd Bonaparte ved in sight of it, climbed up the mountain ch commands the fort, and having examined it, ered a battery to be placed in a particular spot, which, a few days after, the fort was obliged to render. Bonaparte meantime proceeded on to town of Ivrea, which Lannes entered after ring before him an Austrian division. The nch head-quarters were placed at Vercelli, thus atening at the same time the two capitals of rth Italy, Milan and Turin. But the army which crossed the St. Bernard was not the only force which Bonaparte depended. General Moncey, h 25,000 men, detached from the army of the ne, had crossed German Switzerland, and was cending into Italy by the St. Gothard and the ks of the Lake Maggiore, whilst General

Thureau with another corps was crossing Mont Cenis and taking possession of Suze; and General Bethancourt, with one more division, was passing by the Simplon into the valley of the Ossola. All these forces, when united, would amount to nearly 70,000 men, without including the army of Suchet and Massena, in the Riviera of Genoa.

The Austrian Commander-in-Chief, Baron de Melas, was all this time at Nice, from whence he had driven away the French under Suchet. On the 4th of June Massena surrendered Genoa to the Austrian General, Ott. General Melas then carried his columns back across the Apennines to face Bonaparte in the plains of Lombardy. The position of the two armies was complicated. Bonaparte was at Milan, having his advanced guard on the Po, and therefore in the rear of the great Austrian army, whilst he himself was between that army and the other Austrian corps which were at Brescia on the Adda and in the Tyrol. If he lost a battle he had no retreat except across the Alps into Switzerland. His plan was grand, but very bold. Whilst at Milan a spy, who had been very useful to him in his first Italian campaign, was introduced to him. "What! you here," exclaimed Bonaparte, "not shot yet?" "General," replied the spy, "when the war recommenced, I resolved to join the Austrians, as you were then far away, and follow my trade; but, to tell you the truth, I am tired of it. I only wish to get enough together to retire. General Melas has sent me through the lines, and I can render you some service. I can give you an exact account of all the Austrian troops and their commanders. I can tell you the exact condition of the fortress of Alessandria. You know

I will not deceive you, but I must carry back information to my general." "Oh! as to ' said Bonaparte, "the enemy is welcome ow my forces and my position provided I know nd he be ignorant of my plans. I will give thousand louis d'or if you do not deceive me." rienne then wrote down, under the dictation of spy, the names of the Austrian corps, their ers, their position, and the names of the als. Bonaparte stuck pins on the map to mark cular places according to the information thus rted. He learnt that Alessandria was without sions for a siege, and that Melas had many and was in want of medicines. Berthier was ordered to draw up a nearly accurate statement ie French forces and their present position, h the spy took to General Melas, who rewarded handsomely for it. After the battle of Ma-. Bonaparte, having found the information ved through this man accurate and useful, ed Bourrienne to pay him a thousand louis. spy then said that he bade farewell for ever to dious profession. Bonaparte told Bourrienne he regarded this incident as a favour of fortune. nnes and Victor, with the divisions in advance, ed the Po near Piacenza. They were met at tebello, near Voghera, by the Austrian ge- Ott, with thirty battalions, chiefly Hungarian adiers. A battle took place on the 9th of ; both Austrians and French fought bravely; charged repeatedly; the village of Casteggio aken and retaken several times. Berthier in espatch says, "There never was a more brisk And Lannes, whose intrepidity is well *n, said a few days* after in presence of Bour-

General Melas concentrated his forces at A
dria, for the object of fighting a general battle.
parte left Milan with the main body of his arm
rejoined his advanced division near Voghera.
French army crossed the river Scrivia, and ad
to S. Giuliano. The Austrians remained still
left bank of the Bormida, with only one d
posted in advance at the village of Marengo
right bank of the river, which division retire
the French columns drew near. Bonaparte t
that Melas would refuse battle, and either cr
Po at Casale or march by the Riviera of
towards Parma and the Lower Po. He th
sent Desaix's division to Rivalta to wat
Genoa road. At seven in the morning the
Austrian army, 40,000 strong, was seen c
the Bormida, and advancing in three columns
ported by a splendid cavalry. The centre
marched straight upon Marengo, drove the
before them, and carried the village. The fi
of the French was broken and thrown int
fusion. The second line, under Lannes, mai

"What do you think of all this?" "The battle is lost," said Desaix; "but we are yet in time to gain another." The aged Melas, after seeing the French in full retreat, rode back to Alessandria to rest himself, as he had been so many hours on horseback, and left the command to General Zach with orders not to advance with the line beyond S. Giuliano, but to send the whole cavalry in pursuit. Zach marched with the centre column, consisting of five thousand Hungarian grenadiers, against Desaix. It is said that, having received a false report that Massena was arriving with fresh troops from Genoa, Zach sent his cavalry in that direction, leaving his column of infantry unsupported in the midst of the plain between Marengo and S. Giuliano. Soon after Zach himself was taken prisoner in a charge by the French cavalry, which the Austrian general, who was short-sighted, mistook for his own. The Hungarian column however was still moving steadily on, when the younger Kellermann, at the head of a body of French heavy cavalry, charged the column in flank, penetrated between its divisions, and cut that formidable body into two, whilst Desaix's advancing division charged the head of the column, which then gave way. Desaix was shot, and fell dead without uttering a word; the sentence attributed to him was composed after the event. Had the Austrian right and left closed upon Desaix's division, they might even then have obtained the victory; but there was no commander-in-chief in the field to give orders, seven of their generals were killed or wounded, Zach and his staff were prisoners; and the Austrian right and left wings, seeing the *centre* routed and in full retreat, *effected a corresponding* movement, but in perfect

order, and withdrew across the Bormida, having an advanced post on the right bank. The loss in killed and wounded was nearly equal in the two armies, but the French took several thousand prisoners. In the evening, however, Melas was reinforced by a corps of eight or nine thousand men, and he had other reinforcements within call; his position was strong, supported by numerous fortresses, and the campaign was by no means decided. But here another of those strokes of fortune which had already favoured Bonaparte in the former war against Wurmser and Alvinczy came to his assistance. He employed an Austrian officer of the staff whom he had taken prisoner to negotiate a military convention with Melas; he exaggerated the difficulties of the Austrian army, its communications being cut off; he told him that he knew that Alessandria was but ill provided; and he threatened Melas with the fate of Wurmser. The old general was alarmed for his communications, his enormous train and baggage, which would probably be lost if he attempted a flank movement in presence of so quick-sighted an enemy as Bonaparte, and ultimately he consented to an armistice, which was signed at Alessandria on the evening of the 15th of June, the day after the battle. The Austrian army was to withdraw by Piacenza to Mantua and the line of the Mincio, retaining Ferrara and Ancona, as well as Tuscany. And, in order to be allowed to do so without opposition, General Melas surrendered to the French the fortresses of Tortona, Alessandria, Piacenza, Fort Urbano, Pizzighettone, Turin, Cuneo, Ceva, Savona, and Genoa. He thus gave up by a stroke of the pen all Piedmont and Liguria, the conquest of which had cost the Au-

nd Russians so many battles the year before.
ms of the armistice of Alessandria astounded
, and excited murmurs among the Austrian
The Emperor, however, ratified the con-
. It is said that Bonaparte insinuated to
hat the occupation of the fortresses of Pied-
y the French would be only temporary, and
y would serve as the base for the reconstruc-
the Sardinian monarchy.
battle of Marengo was the most decisive
Bonaparte's rising career; it won him the
ncy both in France and abroad; it gained
e crown. Had he lost that battle, a fresh
ion at Paris would probably have hurled him
is newly acquired station. When on the
e first news arrived at Paris from the field
le, stating that the French army was re-
in disorder, the Republican party was all
on; they held conferences, they talked of
Moreau, Bernadotte, and Carnot consuls,
ing the Senate proclaim the deposition of
rte, that "little Corsican" as they called
o had through his rash ambition again placed
ublic in jeopardy. They made no doubt that
au who commanded in Holland, Bernadotte
s with the army in the Vendée, Moreau with
y of the Rhine, Jourdan, and others, would
the movement. It is stated in the life of
XIV., of Sweden, that Bonaparte, when
o set off for Italy, told Bernadotte, whom
just appointed to the command of the Army
West: "I am going to run again the chances
le. If I should fall, you will be at the
40,000 *men, within* reach of Paris . . . .
of the Republic will be in your hands."

The Republicans of Paris, however, had not much time allowed them for consultation. The next day, 21st, the First Consul's despatch arrived, announcing the victory. The conspirators slunk back again into the shade. Bonaparte, however, had been made acquainted with their machinations by the police. There is a curious letter from Lucien to Joseph in Bourrienne's Memoirs, written after the news of the battle of Marengo, by which it appears that the Royalists had been also intriguing at the same time as the Republicans.

Bonaparte went from Marengo to Milan, where he was received with great rejoicings. He established an Executive Committee of Government for the Cisalpine Republic, and also a Provisional Consulta or Legislative Council. He appointed to office mostly men of property, of character, and moderate opinions, and discarded the more violent democrats. He talked much of peace, of religion, and of learning, and he re-opened the university of Pavia, which had been closed during the late Austrian invasion. After a few days he set off to return to France, leaving to Massena the command of the army of Italy. In passing through Turin, he appointed an Executive Council for Piedmont. Every thing was to be provisional in Italy until the peace.

He was greeted at Lyon with acclamations, and he laid the first stone of a new square, Place Bellecour. In travelling through Burgundy he exclaimed once to his secretary, Bourrienne, "Well! a few more events like this campaign, and my name will go down to posterity." "I think," replied Bourrienne, "that you have already done enough to secure lasting fame." "Yes, I have done enough,

In less than two years, I have won
, and Milan; but for all that, my dear
I to die to-morrow, I should not, at
ten centuries, occupy half a page of
ory." Upon which Bourrienne remarks
ie that in an historical summary a few
nough to relate all the conquests of
and Cæsar, and all the devastations of
d Timur; and he adds, "Is it worth
desolate the world for so slight a
" Bonaparte, it seems, thought it was;
ment of posthumous fame mainly con-
pervert his judgment in his subsequent
h more than the alleged restlessness of
people; for the French people in general
peace, and their acclamations on his
aris were owing as much to his having
n armistice which foreboded a general
o the splendour of his victory. It was
nilar to that exhibited after Campo For-
like feeling was manifested subsequently
erlitz and after Tilsit. The people
each victory, because they fancied it led
peace. The army may have formed an
o this general feeling—an exception
parte, by increasing the army beyond
ion, transformed or assumed to have
into a rule.

Bonaparte was in Italy, Moreau had
veral marked successes in Suabia, and
d to Ulm and Munich; but as the armis-
sandria became extended to the armies of
l fighting was suspended. The cabinet
sent to Paris General St. Julien, who
" *July signed* with Talleyrand the pre-

liminaries of peace between Austria and France on the base of the treaty of Campo Formio. Austria however was engaged by treaty with England, not to conclude a separate treaty. It was therefore proposed that plenipotentiaries of the three powers should meet at some place to be appointed for the conclusion of a general peace. But the First Consul observed that pending the negotiations a maritime armistice ought to be entered into between England and France, that the blockade of the French ports should be raised, and all export and import of provisions and ammunition be free, even to Malta, which was then on the point of surrendering to the English, and to the French army in Egypt, which was then expecting a joint attack from the British and Turkish forces. Such an armistice could only be imposed upon a power defeated and obliged to sue for terms, and England was far from being in that condition. The first use Bonaparte would have made of the armistice would have been to send reinforcements to Malta and Egypt, and thus deprive England of the probability of having those two conquests to offer as equivalents at the general peace. The British government, therefore, refused the proposal of the armistice, the Emperor refused to ratify St. Julien's preliminaries, and Austria prepared itself for a renewal of hostilities.

CHAPTER IX.

Sympathy of Paul of Russia for Bonaparte—Northern maritime league—Various conspiracies against Bonaparte—Winter campaign of Moreau—Treaty of Luneville, between France and Austria—English expedition to the Baltic—Death of Paul of Russia—English expedition to Egypt—French camp at Boulogne—Bonaparte's negotiations with the Pope—Concordat.

PAUL, Emperor of Russia, being seized with a sudden fit of admiration of Bonaparte's military successes, forsook his allies, Austria and England, and made overtures to France. He had taken particular offence at the English having hoisted their flag on the ramparts of Malta, after the surrender of that island to the British forces on the 15th of September, 1800. Paul had a whim of making himself Grand Master of the Order of Malta, although that order was strictly Roman Catholic; and Paul belonged to the Greek Communion, which dissents from Rome. But he contrived to make the exiled Grand Master Hompesch give up to him his nominal dignity; and a knot of emigrant knights assembled at Petersburgh confirmed this informal nomination. It had been agreed by a convention between the allies, that Malta should be restored to the Order of St. John. To the remonstrances of Paul, the English Minister replied, that England had taken military, and not definitive, possession of Malta, until the general

peace. Paul had meantime made overtures of peace to the First Consul, through his ambassador at Berlin; and the Prussian cabinet favoured the negotiation. The restoration of the Russian prisoners of war above noticed, one of Bonaparte's political inspirations, had succeeded in captivating the erratic mind of the Czar. In September, 1800, the Count Rostopchin, by order of Paul, sent a note to Paris, stating the disposition of his master to enter into negotiations with the First Consul, on the following conditions:—"The restoration of Malta to the Order of St. John, of which his majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, is Grand Master. 2nd. The restoration of the King of Sardinia to his dominions, as they were before the entrance of the French in Italy. 3rd. The acknowledged integrity of the States of the King of the Two Sicilies, and of the dominions of the Electors of Bavaria and of Würtemburg." Bonaparte, without committing himself by any specific declaration upon any of these matters, admitted, in general terms, the claims of the Emperor of Russia as the basis of the negotiation, and suggested, moreover, that the Emperor should put himself at the head of a northern maritime league, to assert the rights of neutral States against what the Consular diplomacy called the despotism of Great Britain over the seas. This suggestion had been anticipated by the Russian cabinet. Towards the end of the previous July, some English frigates, which were cruising before the mouth of the Scheldt, attempted to visit several Danish merchant ships under convoy of a Danish frigate, which were suspected of containing stores for the French ports. The frigate opposed the search, and fired upon one of the English boats

and killed a man on board. A fight ensued; and the Danish frigate was obliged to surrender, after losing several men. This incident excited the wrath of Paul, who thought of reviving the ideas of Catherine about the neutral northern league, of which the Danes, the Swedes, and the Prussians, should become members. Paul immediately dismissed the English Minister, Lord Whitworth.

This question of neutral rights at sea is too serious and intricate, and too apt to become again a source of misunderstanding between nations, not to require here a few words of explanation. The principal points of the question are, 1st, The right of vessels of a neutral State to trade with one or both the maritime belligerents. 2nd. The right of the ships of the belligerent powers to search neutral vessels. 3rd. The right of the belligerent vessels to blockade the ports and coasts of its enemy.

The right of neutrals to trade with belligerent States has been generally recognized, with certain limitations; one of which is that they should not carry contraband articles, such as ammunition and arms of any sort, timber, and other materials for naval construction; in short, any implements of warfare. Provisions intended for a blockaded port are also considered to be contraband. Another restriction is, that neutrals should not carry merchandize or property of any sort belonging to one or the other belligerent. This, however, has been a great subject of dispute. The principle that "free bottoms make free goods" has been insisted upon at various times, especially by France. And yet a French ordonnance de marine, of August, 1681, *declared all vessels* loaded with property of the

enemy to be good prize. Afterwards, however, the French made alterations in their laws concerning prizes, in favour of particular nations. In 1744, they allowed Denmark, Sweden, Holland, and the Hanse towns, to trade from port to port on the coast of the belligerents, and carry goods the growth of the country, except contraband goods. In 1778, France offered to extend the privilege to all neutrals, "provided England would also accede to it." The English Minister refused, saying, that England could dispense with the trade of neutrals, whilst France could not, so that the apparent generosity of France was all to the disadvantage of England. Holland, in the time of its maritime greatness, issued very severe regulations concerning neutrals. In 1689, it declared all the coasts of France to be blockaded, and forbade any trader entering the French harbours. Spain, in the time of its ascendancy, treated neutrals with a like severity. It appears, in fact, that all maritime states, in the time of their ascendancy, have professed rigorous principles concerning the trade of neutrals, but that as their naval power declined, and they became the weaker party at sea, they found it to their advantage to advocate the rights of neutrals, whose trade enabled them to protract the war against their more powerful rivals. Neutrals have an interest in the continuation of maritime war: they appropriate to themselves its gains, whilst they avoid its dangers. In all the disquisitions concerning the rights of neutrals, from Albericus Gentilis and Grotius down to Galiani and Azuni, there is nothing positive, nothing that can be derived as á priori. The only solution of the question concerning neutrals can be found in the positive stipulations of treaties between

nation and nation. Portalis himself, one of Bonaparte's councillors, acknowledged in a report, made in 1800, that the laws concerning the seizure of neutral ships had varied according to circumstances, and that "the policy of the times had constantly modified the principles of public law."

Another restriction upon the trade of neutrals is concerning the extent of their traffic along the coast of the belligerents. It has been laid down as a general principle that neutral vessels shall navigate freely to any port of countries engaged in maritime war, but not from port to port of either of them, because the coasting trade, or "cabotage," as it is called in French, has always been considered as the private right of each country. France, for instance, has always in time of peace laid such a tonnage duty upon foreign vessels engaged on her coasting trade as to amount to a prohibition, but she has occasionally taken off the duty when the pressure of war has made it necessary for her to avail herself of neutral vessels to carry on her coasting trade.

With regard to the right of searching neutral vessels, it is the only means of ascertaining whether those vessels have any contraband article. Vattel says that a neutral refusing to be visited is liable to condemnation as a lawful prize. Rayneval, who wrote under Bonaparte, admits the right of visiting of neutrals, even when under the convoy of a man of war. Stipulations have been entered into at various times between different nations, such as between England and France, by the treaty of Versailles of 1786, and between England and Russia in 1802, as to the manner of exercising this right of search.

Lastly comes the question concerning the right of

one of the belligerents to blockade the harbour of the other. It is generally understood that in order to constitute this blockade, there must be a sufficient blockading force to render it hazardous for a vessel to enter the harbour. There have been undeniably great abuses of this right of blockade, especially in the last war between England and France, when Bonaparte, with hardly a man-of-war at sea, declared the British islands to be blockaded, and the Executive of Great Britain in return declared all the harbours of France to be in the same predicament whether there was a force present to support the blockade, or not. But to the honour of England it ought to be recorded that the Prize Admiralty Court did not subserviently admit of this right of "paper blockade." Sir William Scott decided that "in the very notion of a complete blockade, it is included that the besieging force can apply its power to every point in the blockaded state. If it cannot, it is no blockade of that quarter where its power cannot be brought to bear."

Returning from this digression to our course of narrative, it will be enough to state that Paul of Russia put himself in a state of war against Great Britain, sequestrated the English ships and cargoes, and imprisoned the crews, and that Denmark and Sweden joined him in defiance of England, to the great satisfaction of Bonaparte, who had, however, at the time, other important concerns nearer home.

Since the Revolution of Brumaire, the two extreme parties in France, the Jacobins and the Royalists, had vowed vengeance against the First Consul. Both saw that he was the great obstacle to their respective designs; the clear-headed of both parties

perceived that he was working for himself, that he had no intention of being either a Monk or a Washington, that he had identified himself with the power, the glory, and the ambition of France, and would allow no one else to wield them or share them with him. But they also perceived that the whole structure he had raised rested upon himself, and that if he were removed the fabric would crumble to pieces; for such is the condition of a government suddenly emerged from the chaos of Revolution at the beck of a daring mind; it has no stability, it wants the broad base of custom and prescription, which requires more than one generation to lay and to consolidate. The intellect of one man, however powerful, cannot alone cast a whole nation into a new mould. A pamphlet which appeared about September, 1800, entitled 'Parallel between Cromwell, Monk, and Bonaparte,' and which seemed intended to sound public opinion upon the subject of an hereditary Consulship, added to the exasperation of the zealous Republicans. Lucien, who was then Minister of the Interior, sent copies of the pamphlet to the prefects of the departments. Some of those officials, who had figured in the Convention, were startled; they inquired of Fouché, the Minister of Police, who was connected with them by former sympathies, what was meant by it. Fouché hastened to Bonaparte and remonstrated with him about the bad effect which such a publication, coming from the ministerial offices, might produce upon the national mind. Bonaparte affected surprise, said it must be some blunder of his brother, and told Fouché that he ought to have had the author arrested and sent to the Temple. After Bonaparte was gone, Fouché

said to Bourrienne with a sardonic smile:—"A easy task for me to send the author to the Temple As soon as I saw the book, I ran to Lucien an represented to him the impropriety of it; and the Lucien showed me the manuscript of the work with corrections and additions in the First Consul' own hand!" Soon after, Lucien gave his resigna tion, and was sent Ambassador to Spain, with in structions to force Portugal to detach itself from th British alliance. About the same time, Carnot gav also his resignation as Minister of War, becau he knew that he was suspected of countenancin the Republican party. A nickname was foun by the police to stigmatize the violent men of th party; they were styled "les enragés," "dog-bitten, or "mad dogs," and the citizens of Paris wer cautioned to be on their guard against this ne species of mad dogs, which were threatening thei lives and property with a repetition of the atrocitie of the Reign of Terror. It was true that a knot revolutionary enthusiasts were conspiring, or rathe talking loudly of conspiring, against the Fir Consul, but the police had its emissaries amongs them, who first encouraged and then betrayed them Several means were proposed to get rid of Bona parte. Some were for attacking him in his countr residence of la Malmaison: and Juvenot, a forme aide-de-camp of Henriot, Robespierre's general went to reconnoitre the place; but he was arreste by order of Fouché, and his plot was defeated Others proposed to shoot the First Consul in th street, and one man, Chevalier, constructed a infernal machine which was to blow him up; bu *the machine* exploded before it was finished, and Che *valier* with some of his accomplices were seized

Two artists, Ceracchi, a sculptor from Rome, and Topino-Lebrun, a French painter and pupil of David, both having their heads full of the classic legends of Greece and Rome, conceived that, as a new Cæsar had arisen, a new Brutus was wanted to complete the parallel, taking for granted that Brutus the assassin of Cæsar was really a democrat. They were joined by Giuseppe Arena, a Corsican and a retired officer, brother of Bartolommeo Arena, the member of the Council of the Five Hundred who had spoken most vehemently against Bonaparte in the days of Brumaire; by Demerville, formerly secretary to Barrère, in the Committee of Public Safety; by Diana, an emigrant from Rome; and by several others, among whom was Harel, a reduced officer in needy circumstances and discontented. Their intention was to stab Bonaparte at the Opera House. Harel, having been initiated in their plans, revealed them, not to Fouché, but to the First Consul himself, who desired Bourrienne to supply him with money. Harel went on fomenting the plot, buying daggers and pistols, and engaged to find four determined fellows to assist in doing the work. Meantime he reported at the Tuileries all the movements of the conspirators and the progress of the conspiracy. It was publicly announced that the First Consul would attend the performance of a new Opera on the 11th October, and it was agreed that Ceracchi, Diana, and Harel, with his four men, should repair to the Opera and there kill Bonaparte. On the previous day Harel received his instructions from the police, as Fouché was now in the secret, and the police gave Harel four men who were to act the part of conspirators. On the evening *of the 11th,* Bonaparte, being informed of

everything, went to the Opera under a strong escort. "He put on a great coat over his green uniform," says Bourrienne, "and was accompanied by his aide-de-camp Duroc and myself. He seated himself in the front of his box. When we had been in the theatre about half an hour, the First Consul told me to go and see what was going on in the lobby. I went out and heard a great uproar, and I understood that several persons, whose names I did not hear, had been arrested. I informed the First Consul of it, and we immediately returned to the Tuileries." The fact was, that the sculptor Ceracchi had been arrested, and a dagger, it is said, had been found upon him; his countryman, Diana, had been also seized, but with no weapon on his person. This was the extent of their actual attempt. They were taken to prison, and examined, and in consequence of their depositions and those of Harel the informer, Arena, Demerville, Topino-Lebrun, and others, were also arrested in their houses. They were not tried for several months after. There is an account of their plot by one of their friends, Angeloni, a native of the Roman State, who died in London at a very advanced age in 1842, in his reminiscences entitled 'Esortazioni Patrie,' London, 1832.

Meantime another and a more dangerous conspiracy was got up by the Royalists. Bonaparte's fears were all directed towards the Jacobins, because he knew that they were men of action, and that they had no principle to stand in their way. He feared the Royalists less because they were gentlemen, and had some scruples of honour; but here he made *a mistake* in confounding the courtier Royalists, *the* Bourbon nobles, with the popular Royalists of

La Vendée, the hardy partizans of Britanny, the friends of Charette and Georges Cadoudal, and of other chiefs risen from the ranks of the people, as is the case in all civil wars, when the mass of the population is appealed to and put into motion. These men, who may be called the democrats of Royalism, were attached to their old institutions, just the same as the peasantry of South Italy, of Spain, and of the Tyrol; and this is what Bonaparte did not or would not understand. Fouché, the Minister of Police, who knew his old friends the Jacobins pretty well, was not at all in the secret of the Royalists, and he was obliged, in order to watch them, to trust to agents not always to be depended upon; for the Royalists, unlike the Jacobins, had money at their disposal. It was known to the police that there was a Bourbon committee at Paris, which corresponded with the Count d'Artois (afterwards Charles X.) in England, who acted independently of his brother (Louis XVIII.), who was then in Russia. This committee had been organized previous to the fall of the Directory; its object was to bring about a restoration by any practicable means. The Royalists had lost all hopes of Bonaparte acting the part of Monk, and a pamphlet, by the elder Michaud, entitled 'Adieux à Bonaparte,' which appeared about that time, expressed their conviction. It has never been proved that this committee or its principals in England directed the plan for assassinating the First Consul; but there were in Paris fanatical Royalists, Vendeans or Chouans, wild men from Britanny, who were not very scrupulous about the means, and who were in direct correspondence with Georges Cadoudal, *who was then in England*. The death of Bona-

parte appeared to their excited imaginations the certain prelude to a restoration. Two countrymen of Georges, named St. Régent, a naval officer, and Picault de Limoëlan, who had served in the war of La Vendée, followed by a number of other Chouans, had found their way to Paris. St. Régent had become acquainted with the experiment of Chevalier and his infernal machine, and he constructed another machine upon an improved plan consisting of a barrel filled with powder, balls, grape-shot, and grenades, which was to explode by means of a long match at a given signal. On the evening of the 24th December, 1800, the barrel, placed in a one-horse cart, was drawn to the corner of the Rue Nicaise on the way from the Tuileries to the Rue Richelieu. The First Consul was going that evening to the Opera. Just as his carriage had cleared the fatal machine, the explosion took place. A number of persons were killed and wounded, and the neighbouring houses and shops in that densely inhabited district were extensively injured. Bonaparte's carriage was slightly damaged. He ordered the coachman to drive on, entered his box apparently calm, but his eye turned anxiously round; he left soon after and returned to the Tuileries, where the great hall on the ground-floor was filled with functionaries waiting for his appearance. As soon as Bonaparte entered he exclaimed with great bitterness: "This is the work of the Jacobins: they have attempted my life. . . . There are neither nobles, priests, nor Chouans in this business. . . . I know myself what I am about, and they must not think of deceiving me. They are the cut-throats of September, the *assassins* of Versailles, the brigands of the 31st of *May*, the conspirators of Prairial, who have been

and are in permanent revolt against every succeeding government. It is scarce three months since my life was attempted by Ceracchi, Arena, Topino-Lebrun, and the rest. Since these men cannot be restrained, they must be crushed: France must be purged of these ruffians." The next day the Council of State was assembled, and proposed to create special or extraordinary courts to try the guilty. Bonaparte said that the proceedings of a special court were too slow for such atrocious guilt, that the public vengeance ought to be as prompt as lightning: "We must shoot fifteen or twenty men, and transport about two hundred more, and avail ourselves of this opportunity to clear the country of them. The head quarters once dispersed, the followers, the journeymen of the suburbs, will return to their work, and ten thousand individuals who belong to the party will forsake it altogether. . . . At the crisis of the conspiracy of Catiline, Cicero had the conspirators put to death, and said that by so doing he had saved his country. I should be unworthy of the great mission which I have assumed, if I were not to show severity under such circumstances. France and Europe would despise a government which, when a whole district of Paris is blown up, should merely proceed by an ordinary criminal trial for such a crime. . . . I am so convinced of the necessity of making an example, that I am ready to summon before me the villains, interrogate them, and sign their condemnation. I am not speaking for myself; I have braved many other dangers, and my good fortune has saved me; but this is a question of social order, of public morality, and of national reputation." *The Council, however*, disapproved of the

proposed mode, and preferred a military commission to pass judgment on the accused. Chevalier and his accomplices in the first infernal machine were so tried, and were executed. Ceracchi, Topino-Lebrun, Arena, and Demerville, were sent before the ordinary criminal court, condemned, and guillotined. Diana was acquitted. 'Procès instrui par le tribunal criminel du département de la Seine contre Demerville, Ceracchi, Arena, et autre prévenus de conspiration contre la personne d premier Consul Bonaparte, Paris, Pluviose, A IX.' But another and truly arbitrary measure wa that of a list of proscription made out by Bonaparte assisted by Fouché, containing the names of 13 individuals, most of whom had figured in the violent epochs of the Revolution, and who were to b transported beyond the seas without trial. Severa of them were noted as leaders of the massacres but there were also included in the list those members of the Council of the Five Hundred who ha been most violent in opposing Bonaparte on th 19th Brumaire. And yet Fouché strongly suspected and he stated his suspicions to Bonaparte, that th Jacobins had nothing to do with the infernal ma chine of December. After some consultation, an a few alterations in the list, the individuals pro scribed were seized and transported. A declara tion of the Senate (or Senatus Consultum as was styled somewhat pedantically) of January, 180 sanctioned this arbitrary measure of the Executive on the plea "that it was required for the preser vation of the constitution." At last, on the 31st January, Fouché having obtained sufficient evidence *of the* guilt of St. Régent and the other Chouan *made* his report to Bonaparte, who then could

longer deny that he had been mistaken in accusing the Jacobins. Those who were transported, however, underwent their doom, Bonaparte said, "for their former crimes;" and St. Régent and his accomplices, being discovered, were tried and executed.

A change had meantime come over the councils of Austria, and Count Cobentzel repaired to Paris, and afterwards to Luneville, the place fixed upon for the negotiations for peace. Bonaparte appointed his brother Joseph and General Clarke to treat with Cobentzel. The latter wished to treat in concert with England, but England would not concede the preliminary armistice by sea which Bonaparte wanted; and notes and counter-notes were exchanged at Luneville until Bonaparte, becoming impatient, ordered Moreau to resume hostilities in Germany, and sent Macdonald to cross the Splugen into Italy, and make a diversion in favour of Brune, who was to attack the Austrians on the Mincio. This passage of the Splugen in December was much more arduous that of the St. Bernard had been in the month of May, but yet it was little noticed in comparison. Moreau made a short and brilliant campaign. He gave battle to the Archduke John at Hohenlinden, and completely defeated him on the 3rd December. He then crossed the Inn and was marching upon Vienna, when the Archduke Charles, who had in the hour of danger superseded his brother, proposed an armistice at Steyer on the Ems, on the 25th December. This armistice led to the peace of Luneville, which was signed on the 9th of February, 1801. Austria agreed to a separate treaty, upon the basis of the *former treaty of* Campo Formio. She retained

in Italy the boundary of the Adige; but
Duke of Tuscany was obliged to give
minions, which were intended for the
Parma, but which were shortly after
Bonaparte to the Duke's son, under th
Kingdom of Etruria. The Emperor, ir
lity of head of the Germanic Empire,
the cession of the left bank of the Rhine
and the Diet assembled at Ratisbon r
stipulation on the plea "of the urgency
cumstances." The treaty of Lunevill
peace to the Continent, and was the subje
rejoicings in Paris. A peace with En
expected to follow as the consequence
the change of ministry which took place i
about this time seemed to remove one
the resuming of the negotiations. Eng
ever, prepared itself to treat on favourab
by two measures of vigour, namely, the
of Egypt and the overthrow of the nort
time league. In March, 1801, a large
for the Baltic, under Admiral Sir Hy
with Nelson as his second in command
1st of April, the fleet anchored before C
The Danes having refused to treat, N
charged with the attack on the town and
took place on the 2nd of April. The Da
bravely; their line of defence was strong
it not been for Nelson's indomitable dete
the attack would have miscarried; for a
Sir Hyde Parker made signal to disconti
which Nelson took no notice of. In resu
took or sunk six Danish line-of-battle s
number of smaller vessels; and an armi
agreed upon, Nelson went on shore to

the Crown Prince of Denmark, and the league of the armed neutrality was given up by the Danes. The fleet then sailed into the Baltic, and appeared before Carlscrona, when the King of Sweden also agreed to renounce all hostilities against Britain. Sir Hyde Parker then sailed for Revel, where the Russian fleet lay, when he received the news of the death of the Emperor Paul, which had occurred on the 24th of March, but which was not communicated officially for some days after. The mode of that death is well known. The nobles, the military, and the ministers were weary of the capricious and cruel rule of Paul; of his innumerable sentences of banishment to Siberia, and of his fickle policy, which was ruinous to the interests of Russia. A palace conspiracy was hatched in order to oblige the wayward Czar to abdicate in favour of his eldest son. Paul, finding himself alone, surrounded by the conspirators, was going to sign the act, but suddenly he altered his mind, said he was emperor and would remain emperor. A scuffle ensued; Paul defended himself stoutly; the conspirators felt that they could not recede, as their own lives were at stake, and they overcame the emperor and strangled him. They then repaired to the apartments of Alexander and saluted him emperor. On receiving these news, Sir Hyde Parker returned to Denmark, and Nelson being soon after appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Baltic, sailed for Revel: but the Russian fleet was no longer there; it was safe in the port of Cronstadt. Nelson was disappointed, for he had made sure of it at Revel. He went to Cronstadt, and there sent a note demanding the liberation of the British subjects and the restoration of the British property which had been seized

by Paul. On the 16th of May, the cabinet of Alexander sent an evasive answer, and it was only in the beginning of June that the embargo was raised and the British subjects were liberated. On the 17th of June, and not before, friendly relations were re-established between England and Russia. So much for the insinuation thrown out by Bonaparte in the Moniteur, that the English expedition to the Baltic and the tragical death of Paul were connected events, originating from the same source. Bonaparte was greatly vexed at the news of the death of Paul, for he had built great hopes on the influence which he had acquired over the weak mind of the Czar. Besides the injury resulting to England from the Northern Confederacy, he had hoped to join some day the fleets of the Baltic powers with his own, and thus acquire at least temporary command of the British Channel, so as to be able to land an army in England. Another still more visionary scheme was that of marching a combined Russian and French Army by land to India, and Paul was quite elated at the prospect. The days of march had been calculated, one hundred and twenty days from the Rhine to the Indus. Capefigue, the French historian, gives the text of a proclamation intended for the Mohammedan populations of Hindostan, in which they were told, that "they were to be relieved from the oppressions and despotism of the English by the kind sympathy of Russia and France." All accounts agree in representing Bonaparte as dreadfully agitated at the news of Paul's death. Another event, not quite so unexpected, came to add to his disappointment.

The London Gazette, announcing the landing of the English in Egypt and the battle of Alexandria,

arrived at Malmaison one evening in April, 1801. Bourrienne translated the article to Bonaparte, who pretended to doubt its truth; and Lannes, Bessières, and Duroc, who were in the saloon, smiled incredulously. Bonaparte said to Bourrienne in a jeering tone, "Bah! you don't understand English." The secretary was nettled, and he said with warmth, "How, General! can you believe that the English government would publish officially so important an event if it were not true? Do you think that a government having any self-respect would, in the face of Europe, state a falsehood respecting an affair the truth of which cannot long remain unknown? Did you ever know an instance of so important an announcement proving untrue, after it had been published in the London Gazette? I believe it to be true, and the jeering smiles of these gentlemen shall not alter my opinion." Bonaparte having called Bourrienne into his library, said to him: "Why are you vexed at such trifles? I assure you I believe the news but too confidently, and I feared it before it came. But they think they please me by thus appearing to doubt it. Never mind them."

In February, 1802, a person of the name of Doublet, who had been French Commissary at Malta before the surrender of that island to the English, called upon Bourrienne at the Tuileries. He complained bitterly that a letter, which he had written from Malta to the First Consul, in February, 1800, had been altered in the Moniteur. In that letter, Doublet, after congratulating the First Consul on his new dignity, informed him of the alarming state of the garrison of Malta. "Hasten *to save Malta with men* and provisions," said he;

"no time is to be lost." The Moniteur printed quite the reverse. "Your name inspires the brave defenders of Malta with fresh courage; we have men and provisions." Doublet said that this placed him in a very disagreeable situation, for he had been accused of having "concealed the real situation of the island, in which he was discharging at the time a public function." Bourrienne stated the complaint to Bonaparte, who shrugged up his shoulders, and laughing, said: "Take no notice of him, he is a fool." And Bourrienne adds: "I very seldom saw letters or reports published as they were received. And when the path of candour and good faith is once departed from, any pretext can be put forward to justify bad conduct. What sort of a history would a man write, who should consult only the pages of the Moniteur?"

In consequence of the peace of Luneville, the French armies of Germany, Italy, and Switzerland returned home, and 150,000 men were now to be distributed among the garrisons of France. It was a question what to do with these men, accustomed to live in free quarters at the expense of foreigners. Bonaparte sent the greater part of them to encamp on the coast of the channel from Abbeville to Antwerp. It was a demonstration against his remaining enemy, England, and it was at the same time a pretence for keeping them in exercise and in the practice of field manœuvres. This was the origin of the camp of Boulogne; intended, as it was stated, for the invasion of England; a threat which, at that epoch, was meant to influence the British Government in favour of peace, of which Bonaparte *stood in* need to consolidate his newly-assumed *power.* He collected in the harbours of Boulogne,

St. Valery, Calais, Etaples, &c., a numerous flotilla, which Nelson attacked repeatedly, but with no very great effect, as it was protected by land-batteries and supported by a numerous army.

The re-establishment of the Church in France was one of the first thoughts of Bonaparte after he became First Consul. It coincided with his notion of order and unity; and it appeared, moreover, to him a measure of political necessity. The exaltation of Cardinal Chiaramonti to the Papal See in March, 1800, was favourable to his views. Pius VII., a meek, pious, and single-minded pontiff, was anxious, above all things, to restore France to the communion of the Church. He cared less about temporalities: his zeal was spiritual. Bonaparte, on his part, in his short sojourn in Italy during the Marengo campaign, took every opportunity to show his respect for the Church, and his good-will towards the clergy. When he entered Milan, after crossing the St. Bernard, he caused a *Te Deum* to be sung in the Cathedral, which he attended himself with great solemnity. Having afterwards summoned the parochial clergy of Milan to his presence, he told them that he was attached to the Roman Catholic religion, and that he would protect it; that the vexations which they had experienced during his first occupation of Italy in 1796 were not owing to him, for he was then merely an officer of the Directory, which did not care about religion; but that now, having full power vested in his hands, he would use it for the protection of the Church. "Modern philosophers," he went on to say, "had laboured to persuade the French that the Catholic religion was the *irreconcilable enemy of all* democracy; hence the cruel

persecution to which the French Republic subjected religion and its ministers—hence all the horrors which befel the unfortunate people. . . . In whatever state of society, no man can be virtuous and equitable without knowing from whence he comes and whither he is going. Reason alone cannot fix our ideas on this subject; without religion we must be continually groping in the dark; there can be no good morality without religion. A society without religion is exposed to all the shocks of violent passions, and falls a prey to internal discord and ultimate ruin. France, instructed by her misfortunes, has opened her eyes; she has found out that religion is the sheet-anchor which alone can keep the vessel of the State steady in the midst of political agitation. She has therefore recalled religion to her bosom. I do not conceal from you that I have contributed to this good work. I can tell you that the churches are again opened in France, and that the people see with pleasure their old pastors in the midst of their flocks. . . . As soon as I shall be able to communicate with the new Pope, I hope to complete the work of reconciliation. . . . I wish this expression of my sentiments should remain impressed on your memory, and I approve that it be made public through the press, in order that my intentions should be known not only in Italy and France, but throughout Europe." This speech was accordingly published in Italy, and was also translated and published at Coutances, in France, where it was thrown out as a feeler of public opinion. The condition of France in this respect was very different from that of Italy, for the latter country had ever remained Catholic, even during the first French conquest; and although

religion and its ministers had been ridiculed and insulted by a few here and there, still they had never been proscribed by an act of authority, and public worship had never been forbidden or interrupted as in France, where, over a great part of the country, no religious worship had been performed for eight or nine years, and religious ideas were become obliterated, or at least much weakened in the minds of the people. The Catholic clergy in France were divided into two classes: the "constitutional clergy," who had sworn allegiance to the Republic, and the "refractory," who had refused to do so, and had been persecuted, banished, or obliged to conceal themselves in consequence. The bishops of this last party had mostly emigrated, and were living in England. These two sections of the clergy were in open hostility against each other. The government of the First Consul protected the persons of both; it allowed the Constitutionalists to perform service in the churches, and it winked at the refractory performing theirs in oratories or private houses: but it had not recognized either party officially as constituting a church. In Thibaudeau's 'History of the Consulate,' we find the following gross summary of the religious statistics of France in 1801, including Belgium and the other annexed countries: seven millions and a half of Catholics who followed the constitutional priests; seven millions and a half who followed the refractory priests; thirteen millions of persons nominally Catholics, but who observed no mode of worship, either through indifference or on account of the persecution or interruption of religion under the Convention and the Directory; three millions *of Protestants and Jews*; and about four millions

of persons belonging to no religion whatever, by their manner of thinking and acting.

After the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte invited the Pope in a courteous manner to enter into negotiations concerning the Church in France. He at the same time gave orders to his generals to respect the Papal territory. The Pope sent several prelates and theologians to Paris to confer with the First Consul, who appointed on his part his brother Joseph, Cretet, a councillor of state, and Bernier, a Vendean priest, who had been already very active in the pacification of his own country. These parties began to treat for framing a Concordat between France and the Papal See. As the negotiations proceeded, fresh difficulties arose; Bonaparte became impatient, and threatened; the Pope's negotiators raised scruples of conscience, quoted precedents, wrote to Rome, and meantime the business made no progress. There were three great difficulties in the way: 1st, the question of the celibacy of the priests, many of whom had married during the anarchy of the church. Pius VII. did not think himself authorized to violate the canons of the Council in favour of them. "He might absolve those who had infringed the rules of church discipline, but he could not in any case proclaim the infraction as a principle." 2nd, the sale of church property effected during the Revolution. Pius was ready to give way on this point, and to guarantee the purchasers of ecclesiastical property, provided the French government insured a proper sustenance by way of indemnity to the ministers of the church. 3rd, the question how to *induce the* refractory emigrant bishops to give in *their* resignation, and if they refused, how to replace

em, for replaced they must be, as they would not knowledge the French Republic. This was the ost delicate point of all, for it involved the old ntroversy about the contested rights of the allican Church, and its alleged independence of e Pope, a matter which Bonaparte and his coun-lors could hardly be expected thoroughly to ndle in the presence of the experienced canonists the Court of Rome. In this case, however, ome was rather favourable to the views of the rst Consul; for they tended to assert her supre-acy over all the sees of the world. It was agreed at the resignations, if not voluntary, should be ade obligatory on the emigrant French bishops. ardinal Consalvi was sent by the Pope to expedite e business, and the bases of the Concordat were at st fixed upon. The Roman Catholic faith was eclared to be that of the Consular government and the majority of Frenchmen. A new distribution dioceses was to be made all over France. All e former titulars were to vacate their sees. The rst Consul was to have the nomination of the w bishops, and the Pope would give them the nonical institutions as practised under the old onarchy. The bishops would appoint the parish cumbents of their respective dioceses, subject to e sanction of the government. The government ould provide suitable emoluments for the bishops d parish priests. The worship of the Catholic ligion was to be public and free, but subject to e police regulations which the government should ink proper to enforce for the sake of public tran-illity. The Pope declared, in his name and in the me of his successors, that the purchasers of *urch property should* never be molested. No

mention was made of the monastic orders, to the re-establishment of which Bonaparte was decidedly hostile. The Concordat was signed in July, 1801, by Cardinal Consalvi, who then set off for Rome to have it ratified by the Pope.

During these negotiations, Bonaparte was fain to elicit the sentiments of several of the councillors of state on the subject of religion and a national church. Thibaudeau reports a remarkable conversation which he had with one of the councillors, most probably Thibaudeau himself: "On the 2nd Prairial, the councillor of state N—— dined at Malmaison. After dinner, the First Consul took him alone into the grounds, and led the conversation to the subject of religion. He spoke at length against the various systems of the philosophers, and also on public worship, on deism, on natural religion, &c. 'All that,' said he, 'was nothing but ideology.' He repeatedly called Garat the leader of the ideologists. 'Hear me,' said he; 'I was walking about this solitary spot last Sunday evening; everything was silent around, when the sound of the clock of the church of Ruel suddenly struck my ear; I felt deeply affected, for such is the power of early impressions and of education. I then said to myself, how great an influence these things must have upon simple and credulous men! Let your philosophers, your ideologists, answer that. There must be a religion for the people, but this religion must be in the hands of the government. At present, fifty bishops, emigrants, and in the pay of England, lead the clergy of France. We must destroy their influence, and for *this the* authority of the Pope is required. They *must* vacate their sees, or the Pope will supersede

them. We will declare that as the Catholic religion is that of the majority of Frenchmen, the exercise and worship of it must be legally organized. The First Consul appoints fifty new bishops, and the Pope gives them the canonical institution. The bishops appoint the parish incumbents, and the State pays them. They must all take an oath of fidelity to the government; those who refuse shall be transported. The Pope sanctions the sale of the church property, and thus he consecrates the Republic. They will sing in the churches Salvam fac Rempublicam. The bull is arrived, and there are only a few expressions to alter. People will say that I am a Papist: I was a Mohammedan in Egypt; and I shall be a Catholic here for the good of the people. I do not believe in religion. . . . But the idea of a God' . . . And then raising his hands towards the heavens: 'Who then has made all this?' he exclaimed. N—— now spoke in reply, after having listened in perfect silence. 'To discuss the necessity of religion,' said he, 'would be foreign to the present question. I will even grant the utility of a public worship. A worship must have priests; but priests can exist without forming an embodied clergy, without a hierarchy animated by one spirit, and ever aiming at one and the same object. A hierarchy is a power, and a colossal power. Were the hierarchy to have for its head the chief of the state, it would not be half so formidable; but as long as it acknowledges a foreign prince for its head, it is a rival power. There never was an opportunity so favourable as the present for effecting a great religious change. You have the constitutional priests, the apostolical *vicars of the Pope*, and the emigrant bishops in

England, and many shades in each of the three sections. Citizens and priests are all disunited, and the great body of the nation looks on all this with perfect indifference.' 'You are mistaken,' said the First Consul; 'the clergy exists, and will ever exist as long as there is a religious feeling in the people, which religious feeling is inherent in the people. There have been republics, democracies, but never a state without religion, without worship, without priests. Is it not better to organize the public worship, and place the priests under proper discipline, than to leave every thing to go on at random? The priests now preach against the Republic; ought we to transport them? No; let us bind them down by proper regulations, and let us win them over to the Republican government.' 'You will never,' replied N——, 'win them over sincerely. The Revolution has deprived them of their honours and of their wealth; they will never forget that; they will always be in a state of war against the new institutions. Scattered as they are now, they will be less dangerous than when organised and reunited.' 'Shall I,' cried out the First Consul, 'shall I do the very reverse of what Henri IV. did?' 'Those were different times,' observed N—; 'for my own part, if there is to be a national religion, I should prefer Protestantism. We are much more favourably placed than England or Germany at the time of the Reformation: in the present state of minds, you have only to say a word, and Popery is overthrown, and France becomes Protestant.' 'Yes, one-half of it; but the other half remains Catholic; and we shall have *quarrels* and contentions without end. Why provoke resistance on the part of the clergy and the

people? Enlightened persons will not rise against Catholicism, because they are indifferent. I therefore avoid much opposition at home, whilst abroad I may, by means of the Pope . . . .' but here he checked himself. 'Yes,' said N——, 'but at the cost of other sacrifices which will make you dependent on him. You have to deal with a skilful antagonist, who is always stronger against those who keep on terms with him, than against those who have broken with him altogether. Now everything looks smooth and fair, but when you think that you have done with the Pope, you will find yourself mistaken.' 'My dear friend,' said Bonaparte, 'there is neither sincerity nor belief amongst men. . . . . There is nothing more to be taken away from the clergy. . . . . It is now a mere political question. . . . . Things are gone too far, and the course I have taken appears to me the safest.' 'Why,' replied N——, 'as the bull of the Concordat is arrived, all I can now say is perfectly useless.' And here the conversation ended."

The Papal Bull, beginning with the words, "Ecclesia Christi," was expedited in September, 1801. It sanctioned the Concordat as signed by Consalvi. The French negotiators had wished to fix a term past which the Pope should not refuse any longer the investiture to a government candidate for a vacant see; but the Court of Rome was determined on asserting its full prerogative, and the First Consul thought proper to yield. This very clause became a great subject of controversy several years after, when Bonaparte and the Pope had begun to quarrel upon other grounds. Some days after the arrival of the bull, the First Consul

communicated to the Council of State assembled the articles of the Concordat; and told them that there would be fifty bishops and about six thousand parish incumbents. He said that he had at the same time regulated the affairs of the Protestants. "The Calvinists," said he, "have their metropolis at Geneva, and there is no difficulty about them. The Lutherans shall have a Synod at Strasburg. As for the Jews, they form a nation apart, which interferes with no other sect, and they are too few to meddle with them." He then dismissed the Council without having asked their opinion concerning the Concordat, which was considered as being within the attributions of the Executive, just like a measure of police.

The Pope sent a circular brief to the archbishops and bishops in England, eighteen in number, entreating them to give in their resignation, with a promise that they should either be re-elected to the new sees, or that some compensation would be made to them. Four consented; the rest refused, and were superseded. The bishops residing in France gave in their resignation. By the distribution of the dioceses there were in France ten archbishops with 25,000 francs each annual income, and fifty bishops with 15,000 francs. Most of the old bishops who had resigned were appointed to the new sees. The signature of the Concordat was announced with great pomp at Paris, and Bonaparte attended high mass at the cathedral, where a *Te Deum* was chaunted. On his return from the ceremony he asked General Delmas what he thought of it: "It was a fine piece of *mummery*," growled the General, "it only wanted *the presence* of a million of men who have been

l in destroying that which you are now re-
lishing." Delmas, having on another occasion
ted his strictures, was dismissed the army and
hed. The military in general were most
sed to the restoration of church ceremonies.
parte, however, would be obeyed, and his irre-
ible will, aided by his indifference to scruples
onscience, surmounted all obstacles. The
Fournier, a returned emigrant, having
ely censured some of the regulations result-
rom the Concordat, was seized by the police
sent to a mad-house. The Minister of the
ior wrote to the prefects not to allow the pub-
on of pastoral instructions, charges of the
ps to their diocesans, or any other writing
the clergy, without having first examined and
oved of them. In this manner Bonaparte
the clergy of France in total submission; his
r was so absolute, so omnipotent, that any at-
t at resistance was immediately crushed. The
y, with few exceptions, proved very docile;
praised him in no measured terms, they
ed him in raising his conscriptions, they
d him a new Cyrus, a new Mattathias; and Bona-
had reason to say, as he did at St. Helena,
he had never regretted having signed the
ordat.

me months after the signature of the Con-
t, the articles of it, having been sanctioned
ie Legislative Body, were published, together
a series of regulations upon matters of disci-
, which had been formed by the First Consul
s Council, but which were so inserted as to
them appear part of the text of the Con-
t itself. The principal regulations were, that

no bull, brief, or decision from Rome should be acknowledged as valid in France without the previous sanction of the government; that no nuncio, or apostolic vicar, should be sent by the Pope without a similar approbation; that appeals against abuses of church discipline should be heard by the Council of State; that no priest be ordained before twenty-one years of age, nor without his having an income of at least 300 francs; that professors in the ecclesiastical seminaries should subscribe to the Four Articles of the Gallican Church; and lastly, that the grand vicar of each respective diocese should exercise the episcopal functions after the demise of the bishop, and until the nomination of his successor, instead of vicars elected *ad hoc* by the chapter, as prescribed by the Council of Trent. This last clause was the most disliked at Rome, as it affected the spiritual jurisdiction of the Church. The Pope remonstrated, but the First Consul would not listen to remonstrances. Regulations concerning the discipline of the Protestant Churches in France were issued at the same time with those concerning the Roman Catholic Church. The Protestant ministers were also paid by the State.

The 'Moniteur' extolled the Concordat "as the most glorious act of the Consular Government, which had gathered together the scattered branches of Christianity, and had restored the altar of the Gospel, overthrown during ten years of barbarism. That eternal moral code of nations had again assumed its ancient place. The Christians of Rome and those of Augsburg were again become brethren at the voice of the chief of France. Religious intolerance, like political fanaticism, after producing by turns the persecutors and the persecuted, had

lisappeared for ever, together with the conspiracies nd the sacrileges of the Revolutionary times. The aw which protects and the Gospel which consoles nankind, had joined hands for the happiness of rance. . . . True philosophy had again found in eligion its natural auxiliary, and the atheist, riven away from the temple, had yet time left for epentance. False philosophy had no longer any nfluence, and the system of abstract deism had anished before the light of truth." Leaving out ome flourish in the above passage, it is true that the Concordat was a prudent and beneficial act of the Consular Government. It satisfied the religious vants of those who were attached to the old religion, but did not constrain any one to join a hurch of which he might not approve. It ensured liberty of conscience and mutual toleration, wo important boons in our age.

CHAPTER X.

First negotiations of the Consular Government with England—Preliminaries of peace signed in London—Important negotiations of Bonaparte with Spain and Portugal—French expedition to St. Domingo—Toussaint l'Ouverture—His defence—He is kidnapped and taken prisoner to France—Dies in a fortress in the Jura mountains—Bonaparte establishes the Italian Republic, and makes himself President of it—He changes the constitution of Holland—Negotiations for a treaty of peace with England—Peace of Amiens, March, 1802.

In August, 1801, negotiations were entered into between M. Otto, a French diplomatist who was staying in London as Commissary for the French prisoners in England, and Lord Hawkesbury, Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Addington administration which had succeeded that of Mr. Pitt. England agreed to restore the French, Spanish and Dutch colonies, with the exception of Ceylon and Trinidad. Egypt was to be restored to the Sultan, and Malta to the Order of St. John. France promised to evacuate the kingdom of Naples, Tuscany, and the Papal State, and to acknowledge the integrity of the territories of Portugal, the ally of England. The Republic of the Ionian Islands was recognised by France. The other questions, such as the indemnity to the House of Orange, and the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia, were adjourned to the final treaty of peace. The pre-

liminaries were signed in London, on the 1st October, 1801. Hostilities were ordered to cease. The news arrived at Paris on the 3rd, and a salute from the Hôtel des Invalides announced to the people the joyous news. The town was illuminated. Similar rejoicings took place in London. Both countries were tired of war. Lord Cornwallis was appointed English plenipotentiary to negotiate the definitive treaty, and Amiens was the place appointed for the negotiations. The day after the preliminaries were signed, the news arrived of the capitulation of Alexandria, and the evacuation of Egypt by the French.

Meantime, Lucien had been negotiating at Madrid a treaty with Spain, or rather with Godoy, the all-powerful court-favourite, by which the country of Louisiana or New Orleans, which had been ceded by France to Spain in a former treaty, was restored to France. As an equivalent for this, the weak and effete Court of Madrid stipulated that France would assist Spain in conquering Portugal, which was outlawed for remaining the ally of England, and that, moreover, the fair region of Tuscany, under the classical name of Kingdom of Etruria, should be given to the son of the Duke of Parma, a prince of the Spanish branch of the Bourbons, who had lately married a daughter of the King of Spain, on condition, however, that his father the Duke of Parma should renounce for his heirs the sovereignty of Parma and Piacenza, which were to be placed at the disposal of France. And in order to make advances for the attainment of these objects, the Court of Madrid declared war against Portugal, without a shadow of reason, except that Portugal, using its rights of a neutral

entered the Spanish frontiers as auxilia
need. This mockery of a war betwee
Lisbon did not last long, and in June,
vention was concluded at Badajoz for t
cessation of hostilities, Portugal engag
close its ports to the English vessels.
appeared in great wrath when he h
treaty (this was previous to the nego
England); and he gave orders to his troo
to cross Spain to march against Po
Courts of Lisbon and Madrid became b
Lucien was urged to mediate with h
brother, and under his auspices th
hushed, and by a secret article twent
francs were placed by the Prince Regen
in the hands of bankers at Paris, to be a
of the First Consul. Lucien, accor
French historians, received for himself
several millions of francs, chiefly in d
other precious stones, and Talleyran
were not forgotten. "From the tim

but money to all; and when he wanted to enrich a man, he gave him the embassy of Madrid or of Lisbon, countries which had not yet been drained, like Italy and Germany, by a French invasion, and where an envoy was sure to make his fortune, because he had to do with weak people who had their hands full of the wealth of Mexico and of the Brazils." The definitive treaty with Portugal was published in September, 1801. The only article of any importance was the cession to France of a part of Portuguese Guiana.

The United States of America had been plundered by the Directory of about ten millions of dollars, their ships and cargoes having been confiscated under the plea that they had allowed themselves to be visited by the English cruisers, and had thus lost their nationality. When the Consular government was established, the Americans sent envoys to Paris, who concluded a convention by which France engaged to repay the amount of their losses.

A treaty was also concluded in October, 1801, with Russia, and diplomatic relations were re-established between the two powers. Another treaty was concluded with the Ottoman Porte, the principal conditions of which were the acknowledgment by France of the Republic of the Seven Islands, and other former Venetian possessions on the Continent of Epirus, under the protection of Turkey, and the evacuation of Egypt by the French troops.

As soon as the preliminaries of London were signed, Bonaparte ordered the fleets of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon, joined by Dutch and Spanish ships, to be got ready to sail for the West Indies. Twenty thousand men were ordered to em-

bark under General Leclerc, Bonaparte's brother-in-law. It is said that the regiments most noted for their Republican sentiments, especially those who had served in Germany under Moreau, were chosen in preference. Most of the Polish auxiliaries of Dombrowsky's legion were shipped for the same service. The expedition sailed in December, 1801. Its principal destination was the Island of St. Domingo, or Hayti, where the blacks had emancipated themselves, and had formed a republic under the presidency of Toussaint l'Ouverture, one of the most remarkable men of the negro race. Brought up a slave, Toussaint had risen by his natural abilities and his application; he was made overseer on his master's plantation, and at the first revolt of the blacks he remained faithful to his master. But when, after the deposition and execution of Louis XVI., the negroes thought themselves no longer bound to the mother country, Toussaint joined the Spaniards who occupied a part of the island, and who were then at war with France, and fought with them against the French partizans of the Republic. The Spanish Governor gave him the rank of Colonel. He showed himself merciful, and he spared the lives of many of the whites. When the French Convention, in February, 1794, proclaimed the total freedom of the blacks, and sent a Commissioner, Laveau, to St. Domingo, Toussaint was satisfied; he entered into communications with Laveau, forsook the Spaniards, and at the head of his black troops swore fidelity to the French Republic. Having assisted the French commissioners in suppressing an insurrection at Cape Town, he was created General of Division *and* Lieutenant-Governor under Laveau. He

le himself most useful in restoring order and
ce throughout the country, and inducing the
cks to resume their work on the plantations as
labourers. When Laveau quitted the colony
1796, he appointed Toussaint military com-
nder-in-chief, the new Commissioner Santhonax
ining the civil power. The Directory at home
the Legislative Councils were loud in their
ise of Toussaint; they called him a better Spar-
us. Soon after, Toussaint induced or obliged
nthonax to embark for France, and he wrote to
Directory that this was a measure required for
peace of the country; and he sent at the same
e two of his sons to France, as hostages, to be
cated there. The Directory appointed General
douville Governor of St. Domingo; but mean-
e Toussaint had entered into negotiations with
English, who had possession of Port-au-Prince
other points on the coast, which were given up
him by a secret convention. This raised Tous-
nt very high in the estimation of the inhabitants
all colours, and General Hédouville found that
was a mere cypher by the side of the negro
ef. Soon after, an insurrection at Cape Town
luced Hédouville to embark. A quarrel then
ke out between the mulattos, or men of colour,
der Rigaud, and the blacks under Toussaint, in
ich the latter had the advantage. When Bona-
rte became First Consul, he sent a new commis-
ner, Raymond, with a conciliatory proclamation
the blacks, and the confirmation of Toussaint's
nk as General commanding at St. Domingo in
name of the French Republic. Toussaint
n marched a considerable and well-organized
ck force into the Spanish part of the island,

saint promulgated in 1801, and by which
appointed President of the colony for life.
however, to the sanction of the French Re
Bonaparte was highly offended at this; he t
that Toussaint was aping him, and exposing
sarcastic comparisons; he had rooted pre
against the black race. His wife Josephine
Creole, and had been the mistress of slaves, and
parte exclaimed that the assumption of the s
authority by Toussaint was an insult to Franc
it was high time to put an end to this far
government; that military honours did
well on the heads of monkeys. His instruct
Leclerc were framed with great art.

Leclerc was directed to flatter and win o
mulattos or men of colour, and to favour th
termarriage with the whites. But with re
the blacks, they were to be pacified and subj
at any cost. After they had submitted,
black general and other superior officers
be shipped off for France, and all the men dis
except a small force to be officered by whi

acts of the Convention and the Directory were
ogated, and the colonial ordinances of Louis
V. were again to be enforced as regulations of
ipline. Toussaint was to be neutralised by fair
nises, if possible, but be closely watched, until
pportunity should offer itself to seize his person
ship him off for France.

Meantime Bonaparte wrote a letter to the negro
f, which was enclosed in a golden casket, to be
vered by his own sons who were sent to accom-
r Leclerc's expedition. "We acknowledge,"
the letter, "the great services which you have
lered to the French people. It is due to you and
ie brave blacks that the French flag still waves
St. Domingo. Raised by your talents and
course of circumstances to the supreme com-
d, you have put an end to civil war, stopped
cruelties of a few ferocious men, and restored
gion and the worship of God, from whom every-
g is derived. The constitution which you have
ied has many good points in it; but it contains
rs which are contrary to the dignity and the
reignty of the French nation, of which St.
ningo forms but a part. The circumstances in
ch you were, encompassed by enemies, without
tance from the mother country, justified for the
the use of that constitution; but now that
umstances are happily altered, you will be the
to pay homage to the sovereignty of the nation
ch reckons you among its most illustrious
ens, on account of your services, your abilities,
the strength of mind with which you have been
d by nature. Place an unreserved reliance
n our esteem, and conduct yourself as one of the
cipal citizens of the first nation in the world."

20,000 men, besides which the whole b
lation was armed, constituting a numer
The country was thriving, the blacks w
in the fields, and vessels of all nations
the harbours. Toussaint still professe
to the French Republic, but he would n
interference in the internal affairs of
Bonaparte, soon after becoming First
sent him his commission of general
ant, with a copy of the new constitution
and a proclamation addressed to the b
lation, in which he told them to rememb
French Republic alone had recognised th
and their equal rights; and he promi
new legislation based on the total a
slavery. Toussaint felt hurt at the tim
the First Consul had not written to
"It is not a mere exceptional favour t
that we want," said he to Colonel V
bearer of the dispatches; "it is the unec
knowledgment of the principle that every

blacks. He had no enthusiasm for abstract disinterested ideas; he valued none but material interests. In a discussion in the Council of State, concerning the colonies, he exclaimed against those who advocated the emancipation of the negroes. "Had you come to Egypt," said he to Truguet, "and preached to us the liberty of the negroes or of the Arabs, we would have hanged you up. How could the National Assembly think of giving liberty to a multitude of Africans,—men without any civilization, who did not even know the meaning of colony or what was France? Do you think that if the majority of the Convention had known what they were doing, if they had been acquainted with the colonies, they would have given freedom to the blacks? Few persons were then able to foresee the results of this; but feelings of humanity have always a powerful hold of the imagination. But at the present day to maintain the same principles, it cannot be sincerity, it is obstinacy and hypocrisy."

When the French fleet appeared in sight of Hayti, Toussaint had already determined on resistance. "A son," said he to his men, "owes submission to his mother; but if that mother is unnatural enough to seek the destruction of her own offspring, he must trust to God for his vengeance. If I am to die, I shall die like a soldier and a man of honour." The French fleet being refused entrance into Cape Town, Leclerc landed his troops at some distance, when Toussaint ordered the town to be set on fire, and he retreated into the interior, where the blacks kept up a desperate struggle for some months. At last several of the negro chiefs made their peace, and Toussaint wrote to Leclerc that the *war had no longer any* object but that of desolating

and Guadaloupe, where the slaves had be
cipated by decrees from the mother cou
black population was placed for ten years
under the regulation of the Executiv
this boded ill to the blacks; Toussaint fe
he foresaw a fresh struggle. The yell
which broke out among the French tro
fearful intensity in the summer of 1802, w
blacks a powerful auxiliary. Some interc
ters of Toussaint to his friends, in which
fested his hopes and intentions pretty cl
termined Leclerc to arrest him. He wa
by General Brunet to a conference; h
was overpowered, and he himself was seize
on board a ship bound to France. He
captain, that "by seizing him they had
the stem of the liberty of the blacks, bu
roots were many and deep, and they wo
out again." On arriving at Paris, Tous
sent to the prison of the Temple. Bonap
an aide-de-camp to induce him to reveal

which proved fatal to a man accustomed to the climate of the West Indies and to a life of incessant activity. He died in April, 1803. "Destitute of every comfort," says the writer of his life in the Biographie Universelle, "without hope of ever recovering his liberty; he expired stiffened with cold and worn out by sorrow; but according to the statement of his jailors, of a serous apoplexy." Public report said that he had been poisoned, but there is neither evidence nor probability of this useless crime, as the circumstances of his captivity were quite sufficient to cause his death, which will remain one of the dark spots in the life of Bonaparte; for if there was the excuse of state policy for keeping Toussaint captive, there was no reason for rendering his captivity so frightful. When Bonaparte complained so loudly of being detained a prisoner at large, surrounded by his friends, enjoying an ample supply of all the requisites of life, under the warm climate of St. Helena, did the remembrance of poor Toussaint, shivering in his lonely dungeon, deprived of even necessaries, amidst "a hell of ice," according to Madame de Staël's emphatical expression, ever occur to him? Was there any very great difference in the respective careers and the merits of those two men; and was the balance so much in favour of Bonaparte; all personal and adventitious circumstances being duly weighed in the scale? One thing, however, Bonaparte has acknowledged, namely, that the expedition to St. Domingo was an enormous blunder, and so was the expedition to Egypt and Syria, so was the invasion of Spain, and last, though not least, the expedition *to Russia.* It may be questioned, with*out presumption,* whether a man who committed

so many and such gross political blunders in fifteen years, is fairly entitled in history to the name of a great statesman.

Bonaparte, whilst availing himself of the cessation of hostilities by sea to reconquer the emancipated colonies of France, was at the same time strengthening his power on the Continent by remodelling his nominal allies, but real subjects, the Italian and Dutch republics. By a remarkable article of the treaty of Luneville, the two negotiating powers, Austria and France, had guaranteed "the independence of the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics, and the power to their respective populations to adopt such forms of government as they may judge proper." Bonaparte, however, did not mean to interpret this clause in its obvious sense; he intended to legislate for those republics on the model of France, the great central power, of which they were to be the humble satellites.

The Cisalpine or North Italian Republic was in a state of sad confusion. After the victory of Marengo, Bonaparte did not re-establish the former Executive Directory, but he appointed a Provisory Commission of Government of three members, enjoining them to repress all party reactions, to close the noisy democratic clubs, and to enforce strict order and obedience to the Government. The times were altered, and the French military and civil officers no longer descanted upon the popular topics of liberty and equality, as they had done in 1796-8. New methods were now resorted to by the conqueror; his possession of a great part of Italy was secured by the peace of Luneville; his main purpose had been obtained,

and the current of affairs ran smoothly, without any further bloodshed, and with few measures of rigour; all parties were weary and exhausted by former conflicts. The French generals, or governors, or ambassadors, Murat in Tuscany, Menou at Turin, Petiet at Milan, Saliceti at Lucca, St. Méry at Parma, Dejean at Genoa, lived in the Italian capitals in a princely style, caressed and courted by the nobility amidst festivals, banquets, and aristocratic splendour. The poor democrats were forgotten or despised, or if noticed it was only to hunt them out from place to place. Murat issued an edict at Florence ordering all the Italian political refugees from other parts of Italy to quit Tuscany and return to their respective countries. The rulers of the Cisalpine Republic likewise ordered them away in ten days' time. Most of these emigrants were Neapolitans or Romans who had been encouraged by the French three years before to revolt against their sovereigns, had been obliged to run away to save their lives when the French were driven away from Italy in 1799, had lost their property or means of support, and they were now driven back again by the French into the power of those sovereigns who could not be expected to look favourably upon them. It is true that Bonaparte made the King of Naples promise an amnesty, but it was hardly fair to force former friends to trust to a dubious amnesty from a common enemy. Just at that time Bonaparte was in high dudgeon against the democrats or "Jacobins," as he called them, especially in consequence of the conspiracy of Arena, Ceracchi, and other Italians against him; and his agents in Italy *had their cue from him*, and acted in consequence.

As for the internal condition of those pro-

vinces of Italy which constituted the Cisalpine Republic, it is accurately pourtrayed by several Italian contemporaries, and especially by Ugo Foscolo in his eloquent address, 'Orazione a Bonaparte nel Congresso di Lione,' an address which he wrote for the occasion, but which was too freely written to be read or laid before the First Consul. The author drew a frightful picture of the malversations, oppressions, and depredations that had been practised on the people of Italy by their so-called regenerators, both native and French, "the overbearing insolence of foreign proconsuls, the iron rule of French captains, the miserable condition of the Italian cities, where a foreign military power, mocking the people with the name of liberty, violated all the existing laws, and prevented new ones being enacted that might have operated as a check upon its own will; an armed power which, assuming all the authority of the former absolute rulers of the country, oppressed equally all classes and parties, and then taunted the Italians with not exerting themselves to attain a state of independence which it was predetermined that they should not enjoy." And the members of the Executive Commission, which Bonaparte had appointed, acknowledged afterwards, that "they had been obliged to trench upon the private economy of the citizens in order to provide for the necessities of the State, to shear them to the quick, and re-open wounds which were beginning to heal." At last, in January, 1802, Bonaparte convoked at Lyon an extraordinary "Consulta," or great deliberative assembly, intended to represent the Cisalpine *Republic*, and consisting of the members of the *Provisional* Government, of the Legislative *Body*, and of deputations from the clergy, from

the judicial order, from the professors of universities and colleges, from the municipal councillors and magistrates of the various towns and departments, from the officers of the national guards and of the regular regiments, and from the merchants and tradespeople. It was a motley assemblage, about four hundred and fifty in number, and little calculated for grave deliberation. There was not, however, much occasion for that. They were met at Lyon by Talleyrand, who instructed them what to do. They appointed a Committee of thirty members, which was to make a Report of the state of their country. The Report stated that during the few years that had elapsed since the institution of the Cisalpine Republic, the people of the various provinces of which it was composed had not become sufficiently acquainted or amalgamated with each other; that there were few if any men who were sufficiently known so as to inspire confidence; and that it was hopeless to attempt to form a native government capable of watching over the infant state, and impress it with the stamp of a national character; that, moreover, the country could not as yet be evacuated by the French troops with safety to itself; and that, in order to obtain a due consideration from the old Governments of Europe, it stood in need of the countenance of its powerful ally, and of the support of its strong arm. The Report concluded by expressing the wish "that the First Consul of France would favour the Republic by assuming the administrative government of it for a period sufficient to establish order and uniformity in all its *parts, and to* ensure stability and future *security.*" *Although* there might be much truth in

the statements of the Report, yet a more humiliating and spiritless declaration never came from a people pretending to be free.

While the Committee were busy about their Report, Bonaparte arrived at Lyon. The Report was then laid before him, and on the 26th of January, he repaired to the Hall of the Consulta and there addressed the deputies in a speech which, being a favourable specimen of his oratorical style, we shall transcribe in full.

"GENTLEMEN DEPUTIES,

"THE Cisalpine Republic which was recognised by the treaty of Campo Formio has gone already through many vicissitudes. The experiments of its first constitution did not turn out favourably. Being afterwards invaded by hostile armies, its existence appeared terminated, when the French people by the force of their arms drove, for the second time, the enemy out of your territory. Since then, every mode has been tried by foreigners to dismember you, but the protection of France overcame all their insidious efforts. You have been again solemnly acknowledged by the treaty of Luneville. Your territory has been increased by one-fifth, you are now stronger and more firmly settled, and have greater reason to hope in the future. Your country, composed of six different nations, is now going to be united under one constitution, better adapted to your habits and your circumstances.

"I have assembled you around me at Lyon, as being the principal citizens of the Cisalpine State. You have afforded me the information which I required in order to fulfil the sacred duties imposed upon me, both in my quality of First Magistrate of the French people, and as the man who

has mainly contributed to the formation of your Republic. The choices which I have made to fill the higher offices in your government, have been totally free from all local or party spirit. With regard to the first, that of President of your Executive, I have not found any one amongst you possessing sufficient claims on account of his services—sufficient independence from local prejudices—or sufficient elevation in the public estimation, to be entrusted with such a charge. The Report which I have received from your Committee, and which pourtrays with precision and truth both the internal and external conditions of your country, has deeply affected me. *I therefore consent to your wish.* I shall retain, as long as circumstances will require, the weighty care of your affairs. Amidst the anxious thoughts attending the station in which I find myself placed, whatever may be conducive to your prosperity and the consolidation of your existence as a nation, will always call forth my most eager solicitude.

"You have had until now only municipal laws and provincial statutes; you must, henceforth, have uniform and general laws. Your populations had till now local customs; they must assume national habits. Lastly, you have no army. The powers which might become hostile to you have strong military establishments. But you have all that is required to form an army, a numerous population, a fertile country, and the example afforded you by the first people in Europe."

He then promulgated the new Constitution of the "Italian," no longer Cisalpine, "Republic," of which he assumed the title of "President." The Electoral Body representing the nation was *to consist of three* colleges, one of three hundred *proprietors chosen* among the most wealthy; one

of the learned men, consisting of two hundred; and one of mercantile men composed of two hundred of the principal merchants and manufacturers. All the rest of the nation was disfranchised. The three colleges elected the members of the Legislative Body consisting of seventy-five members, which was to vote, but without debate and by ballot, on the projects of law laid before it by the Executive. There was a Council called also "Legislative," but which was in reality the Council of State of the President, and which prepared and discussed the projects of law. There was also a "Consulta of State" of ten members, which had the inspection of foreign affairs, and likewise the appointment of the judges and other magistrates. The President alone had the right of proposing the laws, and he had the appointment to all civil and military offices. This Constitution was still less popular than that of Consular France, but the generality of the people of Lombardy had no great taste for democracy; they had been unlucky in their late experiments of it, and they only wished now for peace and security. Bonaparte's presidency was to last ten years, but he was re-eligible. He appointed Melzi, a Milanese nobleman of Spanish extraction, to be the President in his absence. He likewise remodelled the Ligurian or Genoese Republic upon a similar system, only he did not assume its chief magistracy himself, but placed a native Doge at the head of that little state. Piedmont was administered as a French military government; its ultimate destiny being yet in suspense. Tuscany was transformed into the kingdom of Etruria under a Prince of Parma. Rome and Naples remained under their old sovereigns.

With regard to Holland, Bonaparte assumed

also, pending the negotiations with England, to recast its Constitution, and place the country more effectually under his own influence, dissolving the Legislative Chambers by a proclamation of the Batavian Directory, supported by a body of French troops placed within call. The Directory then promulgated a new Constitution framed at Paris, which was laid before the people for their acceptance, and was quietly proclaimed as the law of the State in November, 1801. Schimmelpenninck, the Dutch ambassador at Paris, was made President of the Batavian Republic. The whole affair was a copy of the French 18th Brumaire, without its noise and flurry. The new Constitution abolished all Revolutionary measures, revoked the confiscations and other penalties against the emigrants; it guaranteed property, and it was therefore received at a material boon by the reflecting Dutch. But in a political point of view, England was essentially interested in keeping the French away from Holland, whilst Bonaparte, through the instrumentality of his Dutch friends, was in reality the arbiter of the country. The English Cabinet demanded explanations as to the meaning of the organic changes which had taken place in Holland? Talleyrand replied in his placid plausible style, "That Holland had a right to organize itself as it best suited its interests, that the Batavian Republic was perfectly free, and had its ambassador at Paris like any other independent State. That, moreover, that which had taken place at the Hague was by no means an obstacle to further diplomatic arrangements; that it was only a progress towards the reconstruction of society agreeably to the views of *order and justice*, which were entertained by the

First Consul." This duplex explanation was very shallow, and when, after the occurrences of Holland, came the news of the more barefaced and dictatorial behaviour of Bonaparte in Italy, and his assumption of the Presidentship of the Italian Republic, the least clear-sighted might see the gradual development of Bonaparte's plan of dominion over western Europe. But there was at the time such a weariness of war, such a longing for rest, were it only for breathing time, that the provocations of Bonaparte did not interrupt the slow progress of the negotiations which were carried on at Amiens. Lord Cornwallis, after visiting the First Consul at Paris, where he was received with marks of the greatest distinction, had repaired to Amiens with Joseph Bonaparte and the envoys of Spain and of Holland. After many preliminary discussions, the articles of the treaty were agreed upon in March, 1802. They were framed upon the preliminaries of London of the year before. England restored all her conquests, with the exception of Trinidad and Ceylon. Malta was to be restored to the Order of St. John, and the King of Naples was to be invited to send a garrison to protect the neutrality of the island. The Prince of Orange, late Stadtholder of Holland, was to receive compensation for his losses. Egypt was to be restored to the Porte. Portugal, the ally of England, was guaranteed in the integrity of its dominions. The Republic of the Seven Islands was recognised. The French troops were to evacuate Naples and the Papal States. No mention was made of the King of Sardinia in the treaty. The treaty was *signed* by the plenipotentiaries on the 27th of *March*. Something was said about a treaty of

commerce between England and France; but Bonaparte set his face against it, and the matter was adjourned to future times. Bonaparte afterwards in his Council of State spoke with great praise of Lord Cornwallis for his integrity, and high sense of honour. "He never failed in his word. When at Amiens, the treaty was made ready, and he was to have signed it at nine o'clock in the evening at the Town House, but something occurred which prevented him going thither: he, however, sent a message to the French ministers that they might consider the treaty as signed, and that he should affix his signature to it the next day. That evening a courier arrived from England with instructions to refuse certain articles, and not to sign the treaty. Cornwallis was too loyal to avail himself of this incident; he wrote home to say that he had promised and should keep his word, and if the English government were not satisfied, they might refuse the ratification."

The treaty was all in favour of France, and with such an aspiring and captious mind as that of the First Consul, it was easy to foresee that it could not last long. It was at best an experimental truce. It was strongly censured in Parliament by Grenville and Wyndham, and out of doors by the newspapers, by whose free strictures Bonaparte felt sorely galled. He could not endure that as he was now at peace with England, the English journals should take the liberty to scrutinise his actions past and present. On the other side, the time that had elapsed between the preliminaries and the definitive treaty had cooled the first enthusiasm of the citizens of London for peace, and had given room for serious cogitations. Ominous clouds were gather-

ing fast above the horizon. The Peace of Amiens was a peace that afforded little comfort or security to reflecting minds on either side of the channel.

A singularity in the diplomacy of the treaty of Amiens was that whilst the two contracting parties stood upon equal ground, for England was victorious by sea and in Egypt, yet England may be said to have returned to the *status quo ante bellum*, by restoring all the French possessions; whilst France treated on the basis of the *uti possidetis*, by retaining all her conquests on the Continent. This double basis made the treaty hollow from the first. Its conclusion was partly owing to the clamour for peace in England, and the apparent inutility of carrying on hostilities without an object, and also to the wily diplomacy of Talleyrand, who endeavoured to confuse the question by trumpeting loudly the enormous acquisition of territory made by the English in India, the conquest of the Mysore, &c.; as if those conquests had been made over France. Talleyrand seemed to say, "Leave Europe to us, and we leave India and Asia to you. The share of England is splendid enough." All this, however, was far from regular orderly diplomacy; but the French Republic had assumed from the first a disorderly overbearing tone in its diplomatic relations which Bonaparte carried still higher.

CHAPTER XI.

Bonaparte Consul for life—Laws concerning the Colonies—Renewal of the Negro War at St. Domingo—New Codes of Laws for France—Public Instruction—Bonaparte's Council of State—Institution of the Legion of Honour—Foreign Relations—Encroachments of Bonaparte's policy—His Mediation in the affairs of Switzerland—Differences with England concerning Malta—Bonaparte's dictatorial tone—His confidential opinions concerning the Peace—His conversation with Lord Whitworth—King George's warlike Message to Parliament—Bonaparte's great wrath—Rupture of the peace of Amiens—Bonaparte arrests all the English in France—His other hostile measures.

In May, 1802, in the midst of the general satisfaction occasioned by the conclusion of the Peace of Amiens, the President of the Tribunate proposed to send a message to the Senate recommending to that body to bestow on the First Consul a splendid mark of the national gratitude. On the message being read in the Senate, one of the Senators proposed to extend the period of Bonaparte's consulship to ten years more after the expiration of the first ten years. Another Senator proposed next to make him Consul for life. Tronchet, the President of the Senate, put the first of the two motions to the vote, and it was adopted. When this resolution of the Senate was brought to the First Consul, he thanked the Senators, but said *that he could not accept* the prolongation of the

period of his Consulship unless it was sanctioned by the votes of the people. A Council of State was then summoned, which Bonaparte did not attend. The Senatus Consultum being then read, as well as the answer of the First Consul to it, Roederer said that a mere prolongation of the consulship afforded no stability or security; that a more efficient measure was required, which the Senate, however, could not originate; and that therefore the question to be submitted to the votes of the people should be, "that the First Consul be confirmed for life, with the right of appointing his successor." The motion being supported, especially by Portalis, who described Bonaparte as "a man on whom the destinies of the world depended, and before whom the earth stood in silent awe," the consulship for life was adopted by the Council; but on the question of the succession, five councillors, among whom were Thibaudeau and Berlier, did not vote. The next morning a resolution of the Consuls appeared in the 'Moniteur,' which said, that "whereas the people, when consulted upon their dearest interests, should have no limit put to their determination," it was resolved to lay before the French people the following question: "Whether Napoleon Bonaparte should be Consul for life?" and that register-books should be opened in every Commune for the citizens to inscribe their votes. The question of the succession was thus dropped for the present as premature.

The registers being in due time filled up and examined, there were found about three millions and a half votes registered, of which almost the totality were for the consulship for life. A Senatus Consultum of the 4th of August, 1802, proclaimed, in the name of the people, Bonaparte Consul for life.

wo days after, another Senatus Consultum was romulgated, effecting several essential changes in e Constitution, and still more centralizing the wer of the Government. The Senate was to cide upon all questions not foreseen by the Con-itution; it could annul the sentences of the courts justice whenever they might endanger the safety the State, and dissolve the Legislative Body and e Tribunate. The Tribunate was to be reduced one half of its present number. The Grand dge Minister of Justice was to have the superin-ndance of all the courts, and the power of sus-ending any of the judges.

In a conversation which Bonaparte had with a uncillor of state (probably Thibaudeau himself, ho relates it) he showed himself well pleased with e consulship for life. "I am now," said he, "on level with the other sovereigns, for, after all, ey are themselves for life only. They and their inisters will respect me more, when they see that y authority is no longer precarious." And then went on declaiming against the ideologists, the perty of the press, Sièyes, Garat, etc.

The First Consul laid before the Legislative Body project of law or bill on the administration of the lonies. The bill maintained the old system of very as before the revolution in all the restored lonies, as well as in the colonies beyond the Cape Good Hope. The bill said nothing concerning . Domingo and Guadaloupe, where the First Con-l had once said that as all the people were free, ey should remain free. The slave-trade was also -established under the tricoloured flag. The lonies *were placed* for ten years to come under *special regulations* which should be made for

them by the Executive. In some of the discussions in the Council of State relative to this subject, Bonaparte is reported by the Councillor Thibaudeau, in speaking vehemently against the emancipation of the blacks, to have made use of some very remarkable expressions concerning the Italians. "The whites," said he, "have been sacrificed, many of them have been murdered, and you will not allow the survivors to complain. It is said that the colonists are partisans of the English. . . . . Well, if I had found myself at Martinique at the time of the insurrection, I should also have been for the English, because above all we must save our lives. I am for the whites, because I am white myself; I have no other reason, but that is sufficient. Without going any further, would you have allowed the French to be made dependant on the Italians or Piedmontese? We should have been well rewarded for it; they would have treated us as the blacks have treated the whites. We have been obliged on the contrary to be well on our guard, and to keep those people in dependence; and if I had but to choose between sacrificing two soldiers of my army, or dooming all Italy to perdition, I should have sacrificed all Italy, because I belong above all things to my army, and am bound to take care of it. Even now we must keep a sharp look-out upon that country, and yet they are white like ourselves; they are a civilized people and our neighbours." Bonaparte's exaggerated notions of the importance of colonies to France, and his perpetual anxiety to rival England in maritime power, induced him to re-establish slavery and the slave-trade. But there were moments in which *he saw* things with a clearer eye; for instance, in a

discussion concerning the maritime inscription, which is the name given in France to the systematic conscription of sailors, as contrasted with their occasional impressment in England, he argued in favour of the former measure on the plea of the great geographical difference between France and Great Britain. "England," said he, "has an immense extent of coast, which supplies her with plenty of seamen whenever she wants them. France, on the contrary, even with her recent acquisitions, has a very dense body and less coast in proportion. Nature has not been favourable to us in this respect. England thus is like a bump on our nose—nature is for her. We must then make up for it by the force of legislation." As if legislation should endeavour to conquer nature, instead of adapting itself to the natural capabilities of the country! The law upon the colonies passed the Tribunate by two-thirds of the votes, and the Legislative Body by a much greater majority. Meantime the blacks and the men of colour of the island of Guadaloupe rose against the governor, Rear-Admiral Lacrosse, who was obliged to leave the island. Bonaparte sent an expedition under General Richepanse, who reconquered Guadaloupe without hardly firing a shot, arrested the leaders of the insurrection, and sent them to France. Lacrosse returned, and issued a decree establishing the old colonial regime, of which slavery was an essential condition. This was the signal for a fresh outbreak among the blacks of St. Domingo, where the French army, fearfully reduced by the yellow fever, was barely able to keep possession of the principal towns. The black population attacked Cap François in August, but were repulsed, whilst the naval

named Christophe and Dessaline, put the
the head of the insurrection. War resu
former atrocity. At the end of 180
34,000 French troops which had been
Domingo, there were not quite 10,000
and of these 7000 were in the hospitals.
the generals were dead, and Leclerc hi
in November. Rochambeau succeeded
command, and Bonaparte prepared to
troops for the desperate task of reconqu
colony. Soon after the war with Engl
out, and St. Domingo was lost to Fra
gether.

The compilation of a new code of laws
was an important undertaking of Bonap
sulship. In the year 1800, soon after his
to power, he appointed a commission co
some distinguished civilians, under the
of the second consul, Cambacérès, to fra
code. Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneau,
and Malleville, were members of the C

Boulay, Berlier, Emmery, Réal, Roederer, Thibaudeau, and Portalis. Bonaparte and Cambacérès attended most of the sittings of the section in which the various titles or heads of the projected code were discussed. Bonaparte took occasionally an active part in the debate, not indeed on technicalities which he did not understand, but on general principles, concerning which he went on discoursing in his usual off-hand way, sometimes expressing sensible and acute remarks, and at other times wandering away from the subject for the sake of illustrating it. He took an especial part in the discussion concerning the law on divorce. Thibaudeau, in his Memoirs, gives his own words on that and other subjects. The discussion in the Council of State having been closed, the various titles of the civil code were laid before the Tribunate, where some of the clauses met with a warm opposition. At length the whole code passed both the Tribunate and the Legislative Body, and was promulgated in 1804, by the name of 'Code Civil des Français.' After Napoleon became Emperor it was called 'Code Napoléon,' but it has since returned to its original appellation of 'Code Civil.' The general object and arrangement of the Code resembles that of the Institutions of Justinian, defining the civil rights of the citizens and their legal relations to each other, and it follows the distinction of laws concerning persons, and laws concerning property. With regard to the merits or defects of the French Civil Code, we must refer those who feel an interest in the subject to the professional works of French and foreign jurists, for instance, Locré, 'Esprit du Code Napoléon;' Malleville, 'Analyse Raisonnée de la Discussion du Code Civil;' Savigny, 'On the Aptitude of our Age

part in its discussion. The 'Code d
Criminelle,' or of proceedings in cri
was likewise discussed in the Council o
Bonaparte took a part in the earlier
especially concerning the institution
to which he was not favourable. Th
promulgated in November, 1808. The
'Code Pénal,' or laws defining crimes
ments, which code was completed in Jan
Many of its provisions are harsh and
despotism. Some of them have bee
under the present reign by the law o
1832. Lastly, the 'Code de Commer
the best of the French codes, was pro
January, 1808. These are sometimes
'Cinq Codes,' as having been all publish
parte's reign. He likewise published
code.

The various branches of public inst
tracted Bonaparte's attention at an early
in very unequal proportions. His chi
bestowed on the higher or scientific ed

the communes; and the consequence was, that elementary or popular education remained in a sadly neglected state throughout the whole of Bonaparte's reign. He, however, organised and centralised the whole system of public instruction under the name of "Université," an incorporated body possessing large funds, and of which all public teachers are members. At the head of this body is the Minister of Public Instruction, who fills up all appointments in the colleges and "académies universitaires," or local universities, of which there are twenty-six in all France. The Minister is assisted by a Council of ten members, men of distinguished reputation among the learned. Each "Académie" is under a Rector, who inspects all schools and colleges within his district, and corresponds with the Minister and Council of Instruction at Paris.

The discussion in the Council of State concerning the establishment of the Order of the Legion of Honour was one of the most important. Bonaparte said that a regular system of rewards was required to support the enthusiasm of the army. "The military fanaticism," he said on another occasion, "is the only fanaticism which is of any use to me, because it makes men indifferent to death." General Dumas opined that the proposed Order should be exclusively military. Bonaparte opposed this notion. "That might have done," he said, "in the feudal times, when the rulers were all warriors, and the rest of the people were serfs; when strength of body, agility, and courage, had a decided superiority over all other qualities. It is still the same thing now among the Mamlooks. Mourad Bey was the strongest and most able man of his *corps, or he* would not have been made a

Bey. When he saw me, he did not under
I could command my troops: he underst
when he became acquainted with our
warfare. The invention of fire-arms ha
the military system; and now the princip
by which a General is distinguished, suc
ligence, calculation, knowledge of men
trative science, are all civil qualities. I
some military men that a purely militar
ment would never suit France, unless
nation were first brutalised by half a c
ignorance. All such attempts will fail,
authors will fall victims to them. The me
man knows no other law but force;
everything to himself and to his corps. Th
on the contrary, looks to the general good
The former wills everything despotically,
appeals to reason, discussion, and truth.
tional honours and reward, therefore, are
civilian in preference to the military."
that strange versatile man reason in 1802
he anticipated the condemnation of his s
headlong career during the Empire; wh
thing was carried by military force; whe
self declared that he regulated his conduct
the opinion of his army, and boasted in rat
terms, that with 800,000 men at his di
could treat Europe as he pleased. So
more republican councillors of state objec
institution of the Legion of Honour as
"order," an organised body, a new ar
Berlier having mentioned the absence o
institution among the Romans, "It is very
said Bonaparte, "that in speaking against
tinctions you should quote the history o

people amongst whom they were most marked. All their institutions, social, military, political, and religious, were based upon distinctions. The Romans had a patrician order, an equestrian order, citizens, and slaves. Each of these classes had a different costume and different manners. They awarded distinctions as rewards for services rendered to the country; they had mural crowns, ovations, and triumphs. When the distinction between the classes gave way, when that fine patrician body was overthrown, Rome was torn to pieces; the people were nothing but a vile populace; and the proscriptions of Marius, Sulla, and the Cæsars followed in rapid succession. People are for ever quoting Brutus as the enemy of tyrants, and yet Brutus was nothing else but an aristocrat, who killed Julius Cæsar because Cæsar wanted to curtail the authority of the Senate in order to add to the power of the people. But history is misquoted to serve party purposes. Where is a Republic, in ancient or modern times, without honour or distinctions? You call them toys, baubles; but men are fond of toys, and are led along by means of them. I don't think that the French people care much about liberty and equality; the French have not been changed by ten years of revolution; they are still what the Gauls were, high-spirited and changeable. They have one feeling, that of *honour*. We must, therefore, administer to that feeling by giving them distinctions. See how they bow before the decorations worn by foreign diplomatists,—how they seem struck by them! What have our Revolutionary governments done? They have destroyed every thing that had a hold upon *men's minds, and* substituted nothing instead. They

conceived the bright idea of assembling together the citizens in the churches, where shivering with cold, they were made to listen to lectures and comments upon the Republican laws—a task already sufficiently irksome for those who are called upon to execute them. We have a government, authorities; but all the rest of the nation is like a sandy level. We must throw down upon this level some masses of granite, or we shall never have a Republic. Do you fancy that we can rely upon the people? The people will cry out, 'the King for ever,' or 'the League for ever,' just as it cries out now 'the Republic for ever.' We must give them a direction, a system of amalgamation. The institution of the Legion of Honour will be useful as a means."

After much discussion, the question of laying the project before the Legislature was carried in the Council of State by fourteen votes against ten. These ten voted for an adjournment. The project was vehemently opposed in the Tribunate, Lucien spoke warmly in favour of it, and it was passed by fifty-six votes against thirty-eight. It then went before the Legislative Body, where three orators from the Tribunate and three from the Government pleaded in favour of the project. The Legislative Body having listened to their speeches proceeded to the votes, which proved to be 166 for and 110 against the project. The opposition on this occasion was the strongest that had manifested itself since Brumaire, and it appears to have given Bonaparte considerable uneasiness.

In his foreign relations, the First Consul strode on with hasty steps from one encroachment to another. In June, 1802, in consequence of a treaty with the Court of Naples, he took poss

sion of the island of Elba, which, by the peace of Amiens, had been evacuated by the English, and also of the State de' Presidj, on the coast of Tuscany. In July, the Valais, which had for centuries past formed part of the Swiss Confederation, was detached from it and formed into a separate Republic under the protection of France, as Bonaparte wanted a free passage through it for his great military road leading to Italy by the Simplon. In September, the whole State of Piedmont was annexed to France, of which it formed six new departments. In October, the Duke Ferdinand of Parma died, and his Duchy was occupied by the French. Lastly, the First Consul forced his mediation upon Switzerland in respect to its internal affairs. Since the French troops had evacuated that country, agreeably to the conditions of the treaty of Luneville, civil war had broken out among the Swiss. The partizans of a single united republic, which had been imposed upon the Swiss by the French Directory, found themselves unable to resist the national feeling of the majority of the Cantons, which was in favour of a Confederation. This last party, however, had at its head Aloys Reding, and other men, who were known to be unfriendly to France. Bonaparte did not wish to give up his influence over Switzerland. He ordered Ney to advance into the country with a body of troops, and to summon both parties to lay down their arms, and send deputies to Paris to submit the whole question to his arbitration. This mandate was delivered at Berne by Colonel Rapp, Bonaparte's aide-de-camp, in October, 1802; and being supported by Ney's arms, it was obeyed. Reding *and others were* arrested and confined in the Castle

of Aarburg. Above fifty deputies from the various Cantons repaired to Paris. They were divided between Unitarists and Federalists. Bonaparte was inclined towards the latter system. "Switzerland," said he, "resembles no other country in Europe; its topography, the variety of its language and religion, its manners and social habits, give peculiar features to the land and the people. Nature has fitted your country for a Federal Government, and it is never a wise thing to oppose Nature. Past circumstances, and the spirit of ages gone by, established among you a set of ruling communities, having subject districts under them. New circumstances, and the spirit of the present age, have now introduced political equality over the whole of your territory. . . . The most important matter is the internal organization of each of your Cantons; your central or Federal administration being in fact of less importance than your Cantonal Governments. There can be no uniformity of administration amongst you; you do not keep a standing army; your financial means are very limited; you have no permanent diplomatic agents abroad. Placed among the mountains which are interposed between France, Italy, and Germany, you partake of the character of each of those countries. Political neutrality, the prosperity of your commerce, and a domestic and family-like administration, these ought to be the objects of your wishes. Some of your leading men, however, were attached by interest to the old system of privileges, and were, therefore, not favourably inclined towards France. But neither France nor the Italian Republic can allow a *political* system opposed to theirs to prevail amongst

you. The politics of Switzerland are necessarily allied to those of France. It is the defensive interest of France to have Switzerland for its ally.... I have caused the Helvetic Republic to be recognised by Austria at Luneville; I proposed the same at Amiens, but England declined the recognition. England has nothing to do with Switzerland. If the English Cabinet had ventured any official interference in your internal affairs, I should have annexed you to France, or I should have made myself your Landamman. . . ." After some conferences between the deputies and the First Consul, a new constitution was framed, which was styled the Act of Mediation, because the First Consul appeared in it as mediator or umpire. The Cantons were classed into three categories: 1st. The pure democracies, with their landsgemeinde, or general assembly of the people, and popular elections. Bonaparte himself supported those institutions against the opinion of several of the deputies. "Pure democracy in the smaller Cantons," said he, "is best for them. Those small democracies have been the cradle of your liberty; they give a distinct feature to Switzerland, and render your country interesting in the eyes of foreigners. Without them you would be like the rest of the Continent; you would be swamped and incorporated with the bordering states. The mountain democracies constitute real Switzerland, to which the Cantons of the plain have been annexed at a later period. I know that the system of those small democracies has its inconveniences, that it does not perhaps stand the test of reason; but it has been established for ages; it originated in the nature of *the country, the* climate, and the primitive habits

of the people. The institutions of the little Cantons may be unreasonable ; but when custom and reason are opposed, the former generally carries the day. You wish to do away with the landsgemeinde, but then you must not talk any more of democracy. A free people will not be deprived of the direct exercise of its sovereignty : it does not understand the modern inventions of a representative system, which takes away the essential attributes of a Republic. Why should you deprive those Alpine shepherds of the only excitement they have in their otherwise monotonous existence ?"

The second category was that of the town cantons, or old aristocracies. "In these," said Bonaparte, "every exclusive family privilege ought to be abolished ; but the members of the Great Council might be for life, subject, however, to a periodical scrutiny of their conduct. The little Council or Executive should be renewed by one third every two years." With regard to the third class, namely, the new cantons formed out of districts formerly subject to the old cantons, the social system being more popular and democratic, the members of the Great Council ought not to be for life. This should be the principal difference between them and the old cantons.

With regard to the formation of the central federal government, Bonaparte told the deputies that when he returned to Paris from Italy in 1797, he was consulted by the Directory concerning the affairs of Switzerland, and that he told them that the Pays de Vaud ought to be detached from Berne and formed into a separate canton ; that the *number* of the patrician families of Berne, and the

other aristocracies ought to be quadrupled, in order to obtain a majority friendly to France in the Councils: but that he never had advised the effecting of a revolution in Switzerland. "I never thought," said he, "of uniting you to France, because you could not bear the charges which the French have to sustain. My present mediation in your affairs has given me much trouble, and I hesitated before I undertook it. It is a difficult task to frame a constitution for a country with which one is imperfectly acquainted. Should my appearance on your stage prove unsuccessful, I might be hissed, and that I do not like. But now Europe expects France to settle the affairs of Switzerland, as it is generally acknowledged that Switzerland, as well as Italy and Holland, are under the influence of France." In conclusion, it was settled that a Federal Diet, consisting of deputies sent by all the cantons, should assemble once a-year in one of the principal towns by turns, to decide upon questions concerning the whole Confederation, and to mediate in all differences between one canton and another; and that the Landamman of the vorort, or canton where the Diet met for the year, should be the head of the Federal Executive.

The act of mediation framed upon the above principles was delivered by the First Consul at a public audience in February, 1803, to the Swiss deputation, and the new constitution was soon after put in force all over Switzerland, when the French troops evacuated the country.

Bonaparte's mediation in the affairs of Switzerland was, perhaps, the most liberal act of his public life, and he remained faithful to it to the end of *his reign.* The peaceful boundaries of Switzer-

land were respected by him throughout the wars of the Empire. Bonaparte, however, retained Geneva, which had been forcibly annexed by the Directory some years before, as well as the territories of the former Prince Bishop of Basle; and he kept the Valais under his protection, and afterwards annexed that country to France. He also took four Swiss regiments into his service, and he subsequently increased their number.

Austria saw with feelings of jealousy and alarm the dictatorial interference of Bonaparte in the affairs of Switzerland, a country bordering on her own frontiers. England made also some remonstrances which were not heeded. But there were other and more serious feuds between France and England. The annexation of Piedmont and Elba, the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, the French troops in Holland—all these destroyed the status quo contemplated by the peace of Amiens. England therefore hesitated to evacuate Malta, which, if even garrisoned by two or three Neapolitan regiments as it had been proposed, would not be safe from a sudden attack by the French. England had already made a disadvantageous peace, but the First Consul was rendering it still more disadvantageous by his never-ending encroachments. Such was the language held by many in England.

In the diplomatic relations, as well as in his public converse subsequent to the peace of Amiens, Bonaparte assumed an imperious overbearing tone towards England, as unusual in diplomacy as it was offensive to the feelings of an independent country. When the English ministers remonstrated against his successive encroachments in Italy, his

annexation of Piedmont, Parma, and Elba, his retaining military possession of Holland, his armed interference in the internal politics of Switzerland, his reply was, "You have no right to meddle with these matters; England has no right to interfere with what France does in any one point which was not expressly mentioned in the treaty of Amiens;" as if it were not an essential, nay, a vital question with England, to prevent one ambitious power extending itself over one-half of Europe, and thereby threatening her own existence as a nation. His rooted idea was to exclude England from the Continent. Napoleon was jealous, and pettishly so, of every kind of independence; and the sturdy and somewhat haughty independence of England nettled him sorely. Although he had flatly refused to enter into any commercial treaty with Great Britain, he sent commercial or consular agents to the ports of England and Ireland, mostly military men, who were busy surveying the country, the harbours, and the approaches of the various towns. His ambassador at London, Andréossi, was a distinguished engineer and artillery officer, and had other engineer officers attached to his suite, who travelled about England at their leisure. A letter from Talleyrand, addressed to the consular agent stationed at Dublin, recommended him to procure a plan of the port and roads, with all details of depth of water for ships of war and heavily laden transports, of the best wind to enter, &c. And yet Bonaparte, about this very period, discussing in his Council of State the propriety of a police establishment at Brest and Toulon, observed that, "a few days *since*, a captain of the English navy *visited the port and* dockyard of Brest, having a

passport as a merchant, and nobody had dared to arrest him. The military commandant only ordered him away in twenty-four hours. Had there been an especial commissary of police, he would have arrested him, and sent him to Paris, and I would have had him shot as a spy. No Englishman, not even a lord, nor the ambassador himself, must approach our naval ports." Whether the story of the captain was correct or not, Bonaparte's comments upon it show, what indeed became visible enough throughout his subsequent political career, that he had two widely different measures to mete with, one for himself and France, and another for the rest of the world.

A curious conversation, reported by Thibaudeau, between Bonaparte and one of his Councillors of State, soon after the conclusion of the peace of Amiens, exhibits the state of mind of the First Consul concerning the continuance of that peace. "Do you think," said Bonaparte, "that this peace will last long? I should wish it to last four or five years at least, in order to restore and recruit our navy; but I doubt whether it will last so long—I don't believe it myself. England fears us; the continental powers do not like us. But besides this, do you think that a peace of five years or more would suit the form and circumstances of our government?" "I think that a period of rest would be acceptable to France after a war of ten years' duration." "You don't understand me: I don't mean that a sincere peace is not advantageous to a solidly established government; but I doubt whether ours is so established as not to require fresh victories for its consolidation." "I have not sufficiently reflected upon this; but what *I feel is*, that a government which cannot consoli-

date itself except by war is very unfortunately situated." "The greatest misfortune would be not to judge correctly of our situation. . . . The French government of the day resembles in nothing the governments by which it is surrounded. It is hated by its neighbours, and is obliged to watch and restrain in the interior various parties of discontented men; and in order to overawe all its enemies, it stands in need of brilliant actions, of war in short. . . . . Old victories, seen from a distance, strike the mind no longer, and great works of art make no great impression except upon those who examine them with attention, and these are a small number. I shall multiply, however, this kind of works, for which posterity will give me greater credit than for my victories; but for the present there is nothing that can command attention so much as military successes; this is the misfortune of my position. A new-born government like ours is obliged to astonish and overawe others in order to consolidate itself. . . . *It must become the first of all governments, or it will fall.*" "And to obtain your purpose you see no other means but war." "I will put up with peace if our neighbours know how to keep it; but if they oblige me to take up arms before our swords become blunted by long inaction, I shall seize the opportunity as an advantage." "But, Citizen Consul, what period do you assign to this state of anxiety which would make us long for war in the bosom of peace?" "My friend, I don't see clearly enough into futurity to be able to answer the question; but I feel that, in order to expect stability and good faith in treaties of peace, either the governments that surround us must approximate more *to ours in their forms*, or our political institutions

must be brought into greater harmony with theirs. . . . . In our actual position, I consider all treaties of peace as mere truces, and my ten years' consulship as a period of almost uninterrupted warfare. My successors must do as they can. For the rest, I shall not act the part of an aggressor; I feel too well the advantage of leaving the initiative of that to the foreigners. . . . They will be the first to resume hostilities, or *at least to furnish me with just motives to resume them myself.* I shall keep myself ready for all events." "If so, Citizen Consul, the very thing which I said I feared a few moments since, is precisely what you are wishing for." "I am waiting to see; my principle is, that war is much better than a precarious peace; we shall see how this will turn out. Peace is just now of great value, for it has secured the recognition of my government by the power which had opposed it the longest; and that is an essential point gained. As for the rest, it will be according to circumstances."

We have given the above conversation at length, because it is of material importance in deciding the often debated question about the causes of the rupture of the peace of Amiens. Sentiments similar to the above are stated by Bourrienne and others as having been expressed by Bonaparte at that period. When a man is so much inclined to quarrel with his neighbour, when he thinks that it is of material advantage to him to quarrel, when he is anxiously watching for the first opportunity or pretence to begin the fray; it then becomes a most arduous matter for the other party to avoid the quarrel without submitting to indignities and humiliation. Such was the position which Bonaparte had assumed, and such is the position which those who

have inherited his passions without having the same excuse for them assume even now towards England. Malta afforded Bonaparte the pretence he eagerly wished for; but, even without Malta, there were other grounds enough to stand upon for strife. In the short space of a few months he gave numerous provocations to England. Independently of his encroachments on the Continent, he demurred at removing the sequestration laid upon British property; he forbade the importation of British goods not only into France, but also into the countries which he occupied militarily, such as Holland, Lombardy, Piedmont, Genoa, &c. He sent Colonel Sebastiani with a mission to explore Egypt and Syria; and that officer, on his return to France, wrote a report in which he stated that with a few thousand men France might easily reconquer Egypt—that the people were in love with the French and hated the English—that the inhabitants of the Ionian islands were ready to declare for the French; and after sundry accusations and abuse of the English agents in the East, he made the startling charge that General Stuart had tried to excite the Turks to murder him. Bonaparte caused this offensive report to be inserted in his official journal, the Moniteur, on the 30th of January, 1803. And yet, after this, he and his Minister Talleyrand pretended to complain of the attacks of the English press against the First Consul; and when the English Ambassador, Lord Whitworth, after observing that the paper war in England was independent of the government, whilst in France it was its very act and deed, instanced Sebastiani's report as showing evidently the ulterior views of the First Consul re-

specting Egypt, Talleyrand coolly replied that Colonel Sebastiani's mission was purely commercial!

Lord Whitworth, the English Ambassador, had a conference with Talleyrand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which his lordship declared that it was impossible for the king his master to think of evacuating Malta until he received satisfaction or compensation for the encroachments of France subsequent to the treaty of Amiens, and especially until he obtained satisfactory explanations with regard to the First Consul's intentions concerning Egypt; alluding to the official publication of Sebastiani's report. All at once, Bonaparte himself sent for Lord Whitworth to have a conference with him at the Tuileries on the evening of the 20th of February. This was the famous conversation which lasted two hours, and in which Bonaparte talked rapidly and with great animation, though in terms generally courteous towards his distinguished interlocutor. He began by complaining of the non-evacuation of Malta, and declared that, rather than consent to let England retain possession of it, he would sooner see England possessed of a suburb of Paris. At that time, this appeared to him tantamount to an impossibility; and yet, by a singular concurrence of events, he lived to see, twelve years after, the English in possession of the suburbs of Paris. As to Egypt, he said, he could conquer that country at any time he chose, but that he had no intention of doing so at the risk of a war, adding, that sooner or later Egypt must belong to France, either by the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte. Here the English diplomatist became *all* attention. Bonaparte then recapitulated a num-

ber of grievances he had against England, about its giving protection and pensions to the Royalist emigrants, who were perpetually conspiring against him, and whose emissaries landed every now and then on the French coast; about the continual abuse poured out against him in the English papers, and not only the English papers, which he cared less about, but in the French papers published in England, which aimed at exciting revolt and conspiracy in France against him; so that every wind that blew from England was pregnant with mischief and hostility towards him. He protested that he wished for peace, as his only offensive means against England was that of attempting a descent on its coast,—an operation always attended with great risk, and full of uncertainty in its results. Still, if war were to begin again, he would make the attempt, cost what it would. As this threat did not seem to produce any effect upon the British diplomatist, Bonaparte, assuming another tone, remarked, that if France, with nearly half a million of soldiers, and England with a fleet which commanded the seas, could come to a cordial understanding, they might command the whole world. Had England not exhibited a spirit of determined enmity against him, she might have shared the same advantages as France as to continental indemnities, treaties of commerce, and other securities: there was nothing that he might not have done to please England. But now the first question was to fulfil the treaty of Amiens to the letter, and not to give protection to the emigrants and to their incendiary writings.

Lord Whitworth quietly observed in reply, that *in England the* government had not, as in France,

a control over the press; that as for the
and other emigrants, those who received p
were entitled to it for their past services
the late war, and not as a fee for any pr
future attempts at disturbing the peace of Fr
attempts which some of them might be tem
make of their own head, but certainly not w
encouragement or connivance on the part
British government. His lordship was g
to advert to the many encroachments of the
government since the peace, when Bonapart
rupted him, by saying: "You mean Piedm
Switzerland, I suppose; they are mere
which you ought to have foreseen at the
the negotiations for the peace: you have
to speak of them now." After this inter
Lord Whitworth returned to his statement o
ances. Not one British subject had been
obtain redress or compensation for the
which he had sustained from France dur
war: whilst all the claims of Frenchme
England had been punctually satisfied. F
taunts and threats against England had bee
lished in the official paper; and the First
himself had said in public, that England alo
not carry on a war against France. And
First Consul had shown so much irritatio
attacks of individual English newspapers
nected with government, as to threaten p
that if those attacks did not cease, he
cross the Channel with four hundred th
men and demand satisfaction at the point
bayonet.

This long conference ended at last, by Bo
rising and telling Lord Whitworth that

direct Andréossi, his Ambassador at London, to discuss all these various matters with the English Ministers; after which he said a few civil things to the British plenipotentiary, and they parted.

On the 8th of the following March King George III. sent a message to both Houses of Parliament, stating, that in consequence of the military preparations which were being carried on in the ports of France and Holland, his Majesty had thought proper to adopt corresponding measures of precaution for the security of his dominions; and that he relied on Parliament to enable him to take such other measures as circumstances might require for the honour and interest of the country. Addresses were voted by both Houses approbatory of the Royal message. On the 10th of March another message expressed the king's intention of calling out the militia. The news of these messages had the effect of putting Bonaparte in a storm of passion. On Sunday, the 13th of March, at a grand levee at the Tuileries, he gave vent to his unrestrained feelings by addressing Lord Whitworth in a most peremptory, unbecoming manner; storming and raving against England, to the great amazement of the whole circle, and he ended by repeating the words, "Woe to those who do not respect treaties!" and then he rushed out of the apartment. Some languid attempts at renewing peaceful negotiations were made after this by Talleyrand, but it was merely for the object of gaining time in order to secure the French vessels at sea. Lord Whitworth, perceiving the drift, demanded his passports, and on the 12th of May left Paris. Some days after an Order in Council was issued for an embargo

English Ambassador to Holland, Lord [illegible]
other diplomatists. The French historian
figue justly observes, that Bonaparte had
any great respect for the established usa
international law, and that he felt alway
ease under any restraint of the kind.

War being now declared, although rather
than Bonaparte had anticipated, he resu
plan of a camp and flotilla at Boulogne, and
neighbouring coast, for the professed pu
invading England. Even the direction-p
the road from Paris to Boulogne bore th
"Road to London." At the same time a
army under Mortier marched through Holl
invaded Hanover. A conscription of 120,0
was ordered for the current year.

Piedmont had been united to France ag
former understanding with the Court of Rus
the restoration of the King of Sardinia. T
one of the causes that alienated Alexander f
First Consul. Bonaparte issued a curious
for all political crimes of which the natives

grants in Piedmont, whilst in France the emigrants were struck off the lists.

The indemnities to the German princes for the territories which they had lost on the left bank of the Rhine were a great source of political corruption. France and Russia had agreed to be joint mediators, and most of the princes became aware that their chance of being indemnified depended more upon the mediators than upon the Germanic Diet. The negotiations having been transferred from Ratisbon to Paris, the claimants flocked thither to solicit the First Consul and his influential minister, Talleyrand. "Germany was put up to auction," observes Thibaudeau, "in the offices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The stronger powers, however,—Prussia, Austria, and Bavaria,—did not wait for the decision either of the mediators or of the Diet; they seized what suited each of them best. Prussian troops occupied Hildesheim, Erfurt, Eichsfeld, and Munster; the Bavarians seized the towns on the Lech, and entered the bishopric of Passau; but Austria took Passau for herself, as well as Salzburg. By the Paris negotiations, Germany had been put up to auction, but now it was given up to pillage." Baden and Wirtemberg obtained considerable increase of territory through the French influence. The object of the First Consul was to substitute the influence of France for that of Austria, and to render the smaller German States his allies and dependants.

By a treaty with the United States, Bonaparte sold Louisiana to them for fifteen millions of dollars, and France thus lost the last territory she had on the North American Continent. He sold it pro-

bably because he thought that he could not defended it against the English; but his appears wanting in statesman-like foresig this as on other occasions.

CHAPTER XII.

rges' and Pichegru's conspiracy—Abduction and execu-
on of the Duke d'Enghien—Death of Pichegru—Bona-
rte is made Emperor of the French—Trial of Moreau—
rial and execution of Georges and his companions—
oronation of Napoleon—He makes himself King of
aly—His plans for the invasion of England—War
ainst Austria and Russia—Capitulation of Ulm—Battle
Austerlitz—Peace of Presburg—Battle of Trafalgar—
ar against Prussia and Russia—Peace of Tilsit—
uarrel with the Pope.

VARDS the end of 1803 a number of French
grants of various parties, having met in London,
posed to act in concert for the object of over-
wing Bonaparte's government. Generals Du-
riez and Pichegru, and Georges Cadoudal the
ndean, were the movers of the conspiracy: they
e supported by the Count d'Artois, afterwards
rles X. Their plans, however, were distinct,
igh leading to the same end,—a restoration of
Bourbons. Pichegru relied upon Moreau and
er generals who were dissatisfied with having
n the mere instruments of Bonaparte's elevation,
thus hoped to create a corresponding move-
nt in the army. Georges, the sturdy Vendean,
ed entirely upon his own countrymen. His idea
to collect a certain number of the bravest of
n in Paris, and then some day attack openly
First Consul in the midst of his guards, but

not to murder him treacherously. This intention is proved by existing documents, by the correspondence of the conspirators, and it is confirmed by a secret report of Desmarest to the Minister of Police, in which he says that Georges' adventurous idea of attacking the First Consul in open combat, and not in the dark as a hired assassin, was the main cause of his failure. The historian Capefigue has given a very fair and interesting account of the whole plot, its ramifications, and its issue, very different from the garbled statement published by Bonaparte's government at the time. Georges and his followers were landed on the coast of Brittany from an English ship commanded by Capt. Wright, and they made their way to Paris. Pichegru, with some other officers, also found their way to the capital, where he had some interviews with Moreau, who agreed with him about the expediency of a military movement in order to overthrow Bonaparte, but not to restore the Bourbons. Moreau still thought a Republic to be possible in France under a less ambitious chief. Meantime MM. Polignac and Rivière, aides-de-camp to the Count d'Artois, also repaired to Paris in order to examine the state of opinion and the strength of the disaffected, and then report to the Count. At the first news of an insurrectionary movement in Paris, one of the Bourbon princes was to enter France. In all this, however, there was no union between the various parties, each of them working out its own plan, without any direct communication with the rest. The French police having received early information of some part of the plot or plots, employed Mehée de la Touche, an old Jacobin and afterwards an emigrant, who

acted the part of a double spy. Mehée went to London, where he had interviews with the Royalist emigrants and the Bourbon princes, and exaggerated to them the reliance to be placed upon Moreau and the disaffected part of the army, and he encouraged the expedition of Georges and Pichegru. He also went to Germany and put himself in communication with Mr. Drake, the English minister at the Court of Bavaria, who supplied him with money to enable him to assist in disorganizing and overthrowing Bonaparte's government by means of an armed insurrection. Mehée then returned to France, reported to the police, and meantime continued his correspondence with Mr. Drake. The police, however, knew nothing positive concerning Pichegru and Georges, until a man of the name of Querelle, who had been arrested on suspicion, being sent to trial in January, 1804, confessed that he had landed five months before with Georges and others on the coast of Normandy, and that they had come to Paris to overthrow the First Consul. This deposition was placarded about Paris, and the conspirators were hunted down closely; Pichegru was betrayed by his host, Georges was seized in the street after a stubborn resistance, and the rest were likewise arrested. Bonaparte ordered also the arrest of Moreau, who had had secret interviews with Pichegru, though not with Georges. But the government eagerly seized the opportunity of implicating them all as co-partners in one and the same conspiracy, "to assassinate the First Consul," and styled them all, in the received phraseology, as "brigands in the pay of England."

It was reported to Bonaparte that the young

Duke d'Enghien, son of th
grandson of the Prince of
at Ettenheim in the Gran
believed to have entered
even to have visited Paris
stated that General Dumou
these reports were false, h
them, and he gave orders
though on a foreign terri
March a party of gendarme
the Rhine, entered the te
rounded the château of E
seized the Duke and his a
to the citadel of Strasburg.
was put into a postchaise
escort to the castle of Vin
where he arrived on the e
military Court had been
Consuls to assemble at Vin
and the seven officers who
been nominated by Bona
brought before the Court in
The charges against him w
arms against the French Re
in the pay of England; tha
a party of emigrants assemb
France, and had treasonal
the interior; and that he w
conspiracy formed at Paris
First Consul. The Duke
had borne arms under his
Revolution during the last
received a pension from E
only means of subsistence.
having had any communic



ez, or having entertained any treasona
dence with persons in France. Las
antly denied the charge of having c
ainst the life of the First Consul,
his indignation with great warmth
harge being brought against one of
Condé. The Court found him guilty
rst charges, and sentenced him to dea
the original judgment upon which
s executed: but as this judgment did
plicit or regular enough, another vers
framed the next day "after the exe
which the Duke was found guilty of
es brought against him; and it was so p
the 'Moniteur.' Capefigue gives the t
locuments. The Duke was led that v
rather early in the morning of the 2
, to the ditch of the castle, where a pa
rmes was drawn up, and where a gr
dy been dug for him. He refused to
ed, and at a given signal the gendar
the Duke fell dead, and was immediat
dressed as he was, in the grave, with
her ceremony. It is not true that
ote a letter to Bonaparte, but he had
a wish to have an interview with h
te at St. Helena said that he caused
Enghien to be tried and executed beca
equired for the safety and the interest
when the Count d'Artois was keep
ed assassins in Paris. "In a similar ca
again do the same." At another time
t he was obliged to strike terror among
s and put an end to their plots by show
y must not trifle with him: but in the w

an address to the First Consul expres
ments similar to those of the Tribunat
" During these transactions," says T
his Memoirs, " the First Consul
councils, to which he summoned severa
the great bodies of the Government, e
stipulated for himself and his friend
bunes wanted to lengthen the peri
functions to ten years instead of five,
of 25,000 francs instead of 15,000;
of the Legislative Body wished also fo
of salary as well as of the duration o
The senators wished their dignity to b
ditary in their families, and to hav
veto on the projects of law, and oth
besides. The Council of State alone
thing. Bonaparte, whilst listening t
matured his own plans, fixed the exte
power, and granted as little as poss
others."

At length a Senatus Consultum ap

e of God and the constitutions of the Republic." after, however, the "Republic" was sup- ed, and he styled himself Emperor "by the itutions of the Empire." The question of the litary succession was then put before the le for their sanction. It obtained the usual ber of favourable votes, about three millions. i came congratulatory addresses from every ter, from the public functionaries, the judicial is, the clergy, and the army, most of them ing with fulsome flattery. The army, how- was not altogether unanimous, and several rs resigned their commissions.

ius ended Bonaparte's consulship, which, with is stains, was the most interesting and useful d of his public life. It was a season of peace rance, and it afforded breathing-time to all pe. France was greatly indebted to Bona- 's consulship, during which he reconstructed ate, and laid the foundations of its permanent ness. He evinced, at least for a time, a re- for public opinion; he turned his attention vil matters; he re-organized the social system. ad for him the wishes and the hopes of many od man in every land of Europe. Had he satisfied with the consulship for life, had he tained at least the principle of a representative itution, had he turned his unquestionable ies to render France a great, industrious, en- ened nation, instead of a military and con- ng people, he might have lived in honour and in peace, regretted by mankind. But he pre- d the more vulgar part of a conqueror, of an *rt monarch; and* as such he will be chiefly re- *ered in history.* The period of his Empire,

present generation. We shall, the
through it with greater rapidity tha
hitherto, recording briefly the chief
momentous years, which to persons
nessed them appear now like the re
disordered dream.

Soon after the assumption of th
nity by Bonaparte, the trials of Ge
and the others accused of conspirac
a special court of twelve judges. A
Senate had previously suspended th
the jury in cases of attempt agains
the new Emperor. The trials laste
that of Moreau excited the greatest
reau spoke in his own defence by re
whole tenour of his life, and was ap
court. Several generals, his comp
Lecourbe, Dessolles, St. Cyr, expre
viction of his innocence. The co

meanour, and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Napoleon changed this sentence into that of perpetual banishment, and Moreau sailed for the United States. Georges and about twenty others were convicted of conspiracy, and sentenced to death. Twelve were executed, the others were reprieved. Georges died with his characteristic intrepidity.

Napoleon had requested the Pope to perform the ceremony of his coronation. After consulting his cardinals, Pius VII. determined to comply with his wish, and repaired to Paris for the purpose at the end of November, 1804. The coronation took place in the church of Notre Dame on the 2nd of December. The crown having been blessed by the pope, Napoleon took it himself from the altar and placed it on his head, after which he crowned his wife as Empress. The heralds then proclaimed the accession "of the high and mighty Napoleon I., Emperor of the French," &c. &c.

The Italian Republic was soon after transformed into a kingdom. A deputation of the Consulta or senate proceeded to Paris in March, 1805, humbly requesting Napoleon to accept the ancient iron crown, the crown of Italy, with the condition that the two crowns of France and Italy should remain united only on Napoleon's head, and that he should appoint a separate successor to the Italian kingdom. On the 26th of May the ceremony was performed in the cathedral of Milan by the archbishop of that city. Napoleon seized the iron crown of the old Longobard kings, and placed it on his brow, saying, "God has given it to me; woe to *him who shall attempt* to lay hands on it!" He *appointed his step-son*, Eugene Beauharnois, his

viceroy of the kingdom of Italy. On the 7th of June Napoleon, in person, opened the session of the Italian Legislative Body. About the same time the Doge of Genoa, Durazzo, repaired to Milan with a deputation of Senators, and expressed a wish on the part of the Genoese to be united to the French Empire. A decree of Napoleon, of the 9th of June, united Genoa to France. The Republic of Lucca was transformed into a principality, and given to Elisa, Napoleon's sister, and her husband Baciocchi, to be held as a fief of the French empire. Thus two more Italian Republics disappeared: San Marino alone remained.

In the preceding year (1804) Napoleon had assembled a large force on the shores of the British Channel, with a flotilla at Boulogne, and had given it the name of "The Army of England." The invasion of England and the plunder of London were confidently talked of among his soldiers. After his return from Milan he gave a new impulse to the preparations for the projected invasion, and spoke of it publicly as an attempt resolved upon. His real intentions, however, have been a matter of much doubt and controversy. Bourrienne, who was then still near Bonaparte's person, positively states that he did not entertain any serious views of landing in England; that he was fully aware of the difficulty and risk of such an undertaking; that, even had he succeeded in landing 100,000 men, which was no easy matter, he might have lost one-half or two-thirds in taking possession of London; and then, had the English nation persevered, *he*, not having the superiority at sea, could not *have* obtained reinforcements. Bonaparte, at St. *Helena*, spoke differently. He said that he had

taken all his measures: he had dispersed his ships all over the sea; and while the English were sailing after them to different parts of the world, his ships were to return suddenly and at the same time; he would have had seventy or eighty French and Spanish ships in the Channel, with which he could have remained master of the narrow seas for two months. Three or four thousand boats and 100,000 men were ready at a signal. The enterprise was popular with the French, and was supported, Napoleon said, by the wishes of a great number of English. One pitched battle after landing, the result of which could not be doubtful, and in four days he would have been in London, as the nature of the country did not admit of a war of manœuvres; his army should have preserved the strictest discipline; he would have presented himself to the English people with the magical words of liberty and equality, and as having come to restore to them their rights and liberties, &c. It must be observed, that all this declamation applies to his preparations towards the end of 1803, and the beginning of 1804, when he was still First Consul, and preserved a show of respect for the liberties of the people. To O'Meara he spoke in a rather different strain. He said he would have gone straight to London, and have seized the capital; that he would have had all the mob for him, all the low, dissipated, and loose characters, all the restless and discontented, who abound in great cities, and who are everywhere the same, fond of change, and riot, and revolution. He would have excited the democratic element against the aristocracy: he would *have revolutionized* England. Whether, with such *instruments let loose*, he would have preserved the

discipline of his army, and prevented the horrors that attended his invasion of Spain and other countries, he did not say. Luckily, perhaps, for all parties, the trial was not made. While his army was assembled near Boulogne, a new storm burst out on the side of Germany.

Austria had remonstrated against the never-ending encroachments of Napoleon in Italy. The Emperor of Russia, and Gustavus King of Sweden, protested against the violation of the German territory on the occasion of the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien; the *Moniteur* answered them by taunts and gibes against the two sovereigns. By the treaty of Luneville the Italian, Batavian, and Ligurian Republics were acknowledged as independent states, but Napoleon had now seized the crown of Italy, had annexed Liguria to France, and Holland and Hanover were occupied by his troops. Both Russia and Austria complained, but their complaints remained unheeded. A new coalition was formed in the summer of 1805 between England, Russia, Austria, and Sweden. Prussia was urged to join it; she hesitated, but she increased her armies, and remained neutral, looking forward to the events of the war. Austria, without waiting for the arrival of the Russians, who were assembling on the frontiers of Gallicia, marched an army into the electorate of Bavaria; and on the elector refusing to join the coalition, the Austrians entered Munich. General Mack, who had given sufficient proofs of incapacity in the field while commanding the Neapolitans in 1798, was by some strange influence placed at the head of the great Austrian army. The Archduke Charles commanded the Austrian forces on the side of Italy,

Napoleon directed his army of England to march quickly to the Rhine: other troops from Holland, Hanover, and the interior of France, were ordered to march to the same quarter. He appointed Masséna to command the army in Italy.

On the 23rd of September, 1805, Bonaparte went in state to the Senate, where he delivered a speech on the occasion of the war. "The wishes of the eternal enemies of the Continent," he said, "are at last fulfilled; war is begun in the middle of Germany. Austria and Russia have joined England, and our generation is plunged again into all the calamities of war. . . . . The Austrian army has crossed the Inn: the Elector of Bavaria has been driven away from his capital; all my hopes of the preservation of peace have vanished. In this instance the wickedness of the enemies of the Continent has fully revealed itself. They feared the manifestation of my deep love for peace; they feared that Austria, at the sight of the precipice they have dug under her feet, might return to sentiments of justice and moderation, and they have hurried her into war. I grieve in thinking of the blood that this will cost Europe, but the French name shall derive a fresh lustre from it. Senators, when, at your request, at the voice of the whole French people, I assumed the imperial crown, I received of you and of all citizens a solemn engagement to preserve it pure and without stain. My people will rush to the standard of their Emperor and of his army, which in a few days shall have crossed the frontiers. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all are determined to keep our country *free from the influence* of England, who, if she *should prevail,* would grant us none but an igno-

minious peace, the principal conditions of which would be the burning of our fleets, the filling up of our harbours, and the annihilation of our industry. I have fulfilled all the promises which I made to the French people, who, in their turn, have exceeded all their engagements towards me. In the present crisis, so important to their glory and mine, they will continue to deserve the name of the Great People, by which I have repeatedly saluted them on the fields of battle."

It was by constantly throwing all the blame of the war upon the English, by continually representing them as a sort of incarnation of the evil principle ever intent on the ruin of France, that Bonaparte succeeded, in a country where great ignorance prevailed on political subjects, and where the press was sure not to contradict him, to create that spirit of bitter and deep animosity against England which has continued to exist long after his death. It is curious to read the Moniteur of those times, and to see the barefaced assertions and charges against England with which its columns are filled. (*Recueil de Décrets, Ordonnances, Traités de Paix, Manifestes, Proclamations, Discours, &c., de Napoléon Bonaparte et des Membres du Gouvernement Français depuis le* 18 *Brumaire, An VIII.* [*Novembre*, 1799], *jusqu'à l'année* 1812 *inclusivement, extraits du Moniteur*, 4 vols. 8vo., 1813; a very useful book of reference.) In one instance the English were gravely accused of having thrown bales of infected cotton on the coast of France in 1804, in order to introduce the plague *into* that country; and the Moniteur (the official *journal*) added, "the English cannot conquer us *by the* sword—they assail us with the plague!"

strange to say, this absurd story has been re-
d in the 'Memoirs of Marshal Ney,' published
'aris in 1832.

Napoleon repaired to Mainz, where he took the
mand of the Grand Army, a name which was
rwards always applied to the army while he
manded in person. He also began in this cam-
gn to issue regular bulletins of the events of the
. Coloured as these documents generally are
urrienne, in his account of the Egyptian war,
ws the process by which Napoleon used to
ne them), they constitute, however, a series of
ortant historical papers.

We cannot enter into the details of the campaign
805, and we must refer our readers to the pro-
ional statements of military men of both sides
were in it, such as 'Stutterheim's Campaign
Austerlitz;' 'Rapp's Memoirs,' &c. Suffice it
ay, that General Mack allowed himself to be
ounded at Ulm, and then surrendered, on the
h of October, without fighting, with more than
000 men, and all his staff and artillery. The
er Austrian divisions being now scattered about,
ld make no effectual resistance, and the French
ered Vienna on the 13th of November. General
ck, the Prince of Auffenberg, and a number of
er superior officers, were afterwards brought to
l by order of the Aulic Council, as being re-
nsible for these disasters. The Russian army
by this time assembled in Moravia, under the
peror Alexander in person. Being joined by
e Austrian divisions, it amounted to about
000 men. Napoleon told his soldiers that they
e *now going to* meet a new enemy, "who had
brought from the ends of the world by the

gold of England." Alluding to the high character borne by the Russian infantry, he added:—"This contest is of much importance to the honour of the French infantry. The question must be now finally settled whether the French infantry be the first or the second in Europe." The great battle of Austerlitz was fought on the 2nd of December, 1805. The two armies were nearly equal in number. The Russians, confident of success, extended their line too much. Bonaparte broke through it, and separated their divisions, which, after a stout resistance, especially on the part of the Russian Guards, were routed in detail. The loss of the allies was tremendous; thousands were drowned in the frozen lakes in the rear of their position. The battle of Austerlitz was one of skilful manœuvring on the part of Napoleon; it was his most brilliant victory during the period of the Empire. General Petiet has given a good narrative of it in the 'Spectateur Militaire,' May, 1834. The Emperor of Austria had an interview with Napoleon the day after the battle, and an armistice was concluded, by which the remaining Russian troops were allowed to retire to their own country. Peace between Austria and France was signed at Presburg on the 26th of December. Austria gave up the Venetian provinces and Dalmatia to the kingdom of Italy, Tyrol to the Elector of Bavaria, and other districts, besides a contribution of one hundred millions of francs. This war, which was to have checked the preponderance of Napoleon in Italy, left that country entirely at his disposal, and established his influence over a great part of Germany, where, having raised the Electors of Bavaria and Wurtemberg to the rank of kings, he placed himself at the

head of all the smaller states, which he formed into the Confederation of the Rhine under his protection. The old German Empire was thus dissolved. Soon after, the Emperor Francis formally renounced his title of Emperor of Germany. He had already assumed the title of Francis I., Emperor of Austria and of his other hereditary states.

It must be observed that the position of Napoleon after the battle of Austerlitz, in the heart of Moravia, the winter having set in, and he far from the frontiers of France and from his reinforcements and supplies, the Russians, who were expecting fresh troops, in his front, Prussia wavering on his flank, Bohemia untouched, the Archduke Charles and the Hungarian insurrection in his rear, was extremely critical, if he protracted the war. All these circumstances induced him to grant Austria better terms than what she appeared to have a right to on a mere superficial view of the condition of the two powers. The Austrian Empire was not overthrown because Vienna had fallen into the hands of the invader. But Napoleon calculated on the habits and the fears of the Emperor Francis, and on his affection for the good citizens of Vienna; and he was not mistaken on this occasion.

The King of Naples, breaking his recent treaty with France, had allowed a Russian and English army to land in his dominions, where they remained useless during the great struggle that was going forward in Germany. Napoleon sent an army to Naples in February, 1806; and King Ferdinand took refuge in Sicily. A decree of Napoleon, March, 1806, appointed his brother Joseph King of *Naples and of Sicily*. On the 6th of June following, by another decree, he appointed his brother

Louis King of Holland, thus transforming by a stroke of the pen the Batavian Republic into a kingdom dependent on France. His brother-in-law, Murat, was made Grand Duke of Berg.

During his victorious progress in Germany, Napoleon received the news of the total destruction of the French and Spanish fleets by Nelson at the battle of Trafalgar, on the 21st of October, 1805. His peevish remark on the occasion is said to have been—"I cannot be everywhere;" and he threw all the blame on his unfortunate admiral, Villeneuve, who soon after killed himself; the Moniteur merely mentioned that an encounter at sea had taken place, in which several French vessels had been lost. Such was the veracious account published by Napoleon's government, of the most decisive naval battle of the whole war. From this time Napoleon renounced his plans of invading England, and he employed himself in destroying all English trade and correspondence with the Continent. Charles Fox, who had succeeded Pitt as minister, was known to be favourable to peace. Negotiations accordingly were entered into by Napoleon, on the basis of the *uti possidetis*. Lord Yarmouth, and afterwards Lord Lauderdale, were the English negotiators. Napoleon however required that Sicily should be given up to Joseph Bonaparte. But Sicily had never been conquered by the French; it had been throughout the war the ally of England, and, owing to that alliance, its sovereign had lost his continental dominions of Naples. To have bartered away Sicily to France would have been, on the part of England, an act of bad faith equal to if not worse than the former barter of Venice by the French. The English

ministry refused to comply with this requisition, and Fox dying soon after, the negotiations were broken off.

Whilst Napoleon was advancing against Austria in the autumn of 1805, Captain Wright of the English navy, who had been taken prisoner on the coast of France the year before, and confined in the Temple, was found one morning in his prison with his throat cut. Captain Wright had been privately interrogated concerning the conspiracy of Georges and Pichegru, whom he had landed on the coast; but he refused to give any explanation, as he was a British officer and a prisoner of war. It is stated that thumbscrews were used to force him to speak. His death was ascribed to suicide by the French police, but others ascribed it to the police itself. There is an account of Wright in the French 'Biogr. Universelle.'

The conduct of Prussia had been one of tergiversation. Napoleon knew that she had felt the wish, without having the resolution, to strike a blow while he was engaged in Moravia against the Russians. To keep her in good humour he had given Hanover up to her, which Prussia, though at peace with the King of England, scrupled not to accept. She moreover shut her ports against British vessels. Bonaparte, after having settled his affairs with Austria, altered his tone towards Prussia. The 'Moniteur' began to talk of Prussia as a secondary power, which assumed a tone that its extent and position did not warrant. In his negotiations with Lord Lauderdale, Napoleon had offered to restore Hanover to the King of England. The *Confederation of* the Rhine extended round a *great part of the* Prussian frontiers. The Prussian *minister at Paris,* Von Knobelsdorf, in a note

which he delivered to Talleyrand on the 1st of October, 1806, said truly, "that the king his master saw around his territories none but French soldiers or vassals of France, ready to march at her beck." The note required that the French troops should evacuate the territory of Germany. Napoleon answered in a tone of sneer and defiance saying, that "to provoke the enmity of France was as senseless a course as to pretend to withstand the waves of the ocean." The King of Prussia issued a long manifesto from his head-quarters at Erfurt, on the 9th of October, 1806, in which he recapitulated the long series of Napoleon's encroachments, which all the world was acquainted with, but which the King of Prussia seemed now to discover for the first time. Napoleon was speedily in the field; he attacked the Prussians first, and this time he had on his side a large superiority of numbers, added to his superiority of tactics. The double battle of Auerstädt and Jena (16th of October) decided the campaign. The Prussian troops fought bravely, but their generals committed the same error as the Austrian generals had committed before, of extending their line of operations too much. The consequences of the Prussian defeat were most disastrous. Most of their divisions were surrounded and obliged to lay down their arms. Almost all their strong fortresses, Magdeburg, Spandau, Küstrin, Stettin, Hameln, surrendered without firing a shot. The work of the great Frederick's whole life crumbled to pieces in a few weeks. Blücher and Lestocq were the only officers who kept some regiments together, with which they made a gallant stand in the northern provinces.

Bonaparte entered Berlin on the 21st of October.

He despatched Mortier to occupy Hamburg, and seize all English property there. On the 21st of November, 1806, Napoleon issued his well-known Berlin Decree against British commerce. "The British islands were to be considered as in a state of blockade by all the Continent. All correspondence or trade with England was forbidden under most severe penalties. All articles of English manufacture or produce of the British colonies were considered as contraband. Property of every kind belonging to British subjects, wherever found, was declared lawful prize. All letters to and from England were to be detained and opened at the post-offices." The English government retaliated by its Orders in Council of the 11th of November, 1807.

In August, 1806, just before the opening of the Prussian campaign, whilst the press in Germany was rousing the national spirit against the French, Napoleon gave orders to Berthier, his Lieutenant-General of the army, to arrest six of the principal booksellers of Augsburg, Ulm, Donawerth, and Nürnberg, and try them by Court Martial, "for having published seditious writings which tended to lead astray the populations of Southern Germany, and to excite them to insurrection against the French armies; and also to excite the French troops themselves to disobedience and to the forgetfulness of their duties towards their legitimate sovereign." Berthier assembled a Court Martial at Braunau, which condemned six individuals to death. The sentence was forwarded to Napoleon, who reprieved five of them, and singled out *the bookseller Palm* of Nürnberg for execution. *His chief offence* was the having published a work

of Gentz, "on the present humiliation of Germany." Palm was shot on the 25th of August, and his death left a deep impression on the public mind over all Europe.

Meantime the King of Prussia had fled to Königsberg, and the Russian armies advanced to the Vistula: the French occupied Warsaw. French agents had previously penetrated into Russian Poland, and had spread a report that Kosciusko was at Napoleon's head-quarters. Napoleon had indeed invited Kosciusko, who was then living in Switzerland, to come; but that single-minded patriot, mistrusting the views of the conqueror, declined the invitation. (*Mémoires de Michel Oginski sur la Pologne et les Polonais depuis* 1788 *jusqu'en* 1815.)

At his head-quarters at Posen, Napoleon received numerous addresses from various parts of Poland, entreating him to restore that country to its independence. His answers were cold and cautious. He began his winter-campaign against the Russians by the battle of Pultusk (28th of December), in which the French experienced a severe check and retired towards the Vistula. The month of January, 1807, passed without any engagements, but on the 8th of February the great battle of Eylau was fought between the two grand armies. General Beningsen commanded the Russians. The French made repeated and furious attacks on the Russian infantry, which stood like walls of brass, and the assailants were at last obliged to desist. The battle lasted till near ten *o'clock* at night. The loss on both sides was *dreadful*; it has never been correctly ascertained, *but has* been roughly estimated at 50,000 men.

er the battle Napoleon withdrew again to the line
he Vistula, and Beningsen retired towards Kö-
berg. There was no more fighting between the
armies for more than three months after. The
nch now besieged Danzig, which was defended
he Prussian General Kalkreut, and surrendered
ne end of May, 1807. Napoleon having rein-
ed his army to 200,000 men, again advanced
rds the Russians. On the 13th of June the
le of Friedland took place, in which, after an
inate struggle, the Russians were at last
ted, and driven beyond the river Aller. They
not lose, however, either cannon or baggage,
they effected their retreat upon Tilsit, near the
ian frontiers.

s Bonaparte and Alexander both wished for
e, an armistice was made, and a personal in-
iew took place between the two emperors on a
in the middle of the river Niemen on the
of June. The two sovereigns after this took
heir residence in the town of Tilsit, where the
y of peace was finally signed. The King of
ssia was restored to about one-half of his
er territories, as far as the Elbe. The duchy
Varsaw was given to the Elector of Saxony, who
made a king, and became the faithful ally of
oleon. The principal Prussian fortresses and
ort towns were to remain in the hands of the
nch till the general peace. Russia made no
fices; on the contrary, she obtained a part of
ssian Poland. But there were secret articles
ne treaty, by which France allowed Russia to
Finland from Sweden, and Russia, on her
promised to close her ports against British
ls. *On the 9th* of July Napoleon left Tilsit

to return to Paris, where he received the usual tribute of servile addresses and fulsome flattery.

On the 19th of August a Senatus Consultum suppressed the Tribunate, the only remains of a national deliberative body in France. It had been previously reduced to one-half of its original number. "The Tribunate," said Napoleon at St. Helena, "was absolutely useless, while it cost nearly half a million; I therefore suppressed it. I was well aware that an outcry would be raised against this violation of the law; but I was strong; I possessed the full confidence of the people, and I considered myself a reformer. I did everything for the best. Had I been hypocritical, I should have maintained the Tribunate; for who can doubt that it would have adopted and sanctioned, when required, my views and intentions?" And speaking of the alleged servility of the Senate, he informs us that "in almost every important measure many of the Senators, before they gave their vote, came to communicate with him privately, and stated, sometimes very decidedly, their objections; but that they went away convinced either by his arguments, or by the necessity and urgency of affairs." Necessity and the urgency of circumstances were mighty words with Napoleon; they generally concluded all his arguments on matters of morality and politics. Whether these urgent circumstances were not often of his own creating or seeking is a point which he seems not to have stopped to examine. Three committees of administration, of legislation, and of finance, taken from the Legislative Body, discussed the projects of law in place of the Tribunate.

Having stripped the Elector of Hesse Cassel of

his dominions, on the ground that he had not joined him in the war against Prussia, as well as the Duke of Brunswick of his, on the ground that the duke had joined Prussia against him, Napoleon created out of these and other districts the kingdom of Westphalia, and gave it to his brother Jerome, on the 18th of August, who took up his residence at Cassel. Soon after, the Prince Regent of Portugal having refused to enforce the Berlin decree against England, Napoleon sent Junot with 30,000 men across Spain to take possession of Portugal. At the same time he published in the *Moniteur* that "the House of Braganza had ceased to reign in Europe." Junot entered Lisbon without opposition on the 30th of November, 1807, the Prince Regent and his court having just before embarked for Brazil. In December of the same year, Napoleon, having gone to Milan, sent for the Queen of Etruria and her son, and signified to her that she must resign Tuscany, which was immediately occupied by French troops; and in the following June (1808) Tuscany was formally annexed, not to the kingdom of Italy, but to the French empire, of which it formed three new departments. The queen was promised a compensation in Portugal, which she never obtained. On the 17th of December, 1807, Napoleon issued from Milan a decree by which all merchant vessels that submitted to the British Orders in Council were declared to be lawful prizes by the French. In the following year (1808) a number of American vessels were seized and confiscated in the French and Italian ports. The Pope next felt Napoleon's displeasure. The French troops had for some time occupied Ancona and Civita Vecchia, in order to keep away

the English and the Russians; but Napoleon now insisted on the Pope declaring war against England. The Pope answered that he was a sovereign of peace, and could not declare war against any Christian power. Napoleon said that, as the successor of Charlemagne, he was Emperor of the West, King of Italy, and Suzerain of the Pope; that the English were heretics, and therefore enemies of the Holy See, and that the donation of Charlemagne had been made for the defence of the Holy Church against its enemies; that if the Pope did not comply with his wishes, he, Napoleon, would resume Charlemagne's grant. We cannot go further into the long and vexatious correspondence and controversy between Napoleon and the court of Rome, which were carried on for several years, and which forms an interesting episode in the general history of those times. A French writer, Artaud, in his interesting life of Pius VII., has given a full account of these negotiations. By a decree of the 2nd of April, 1808, Napoleon annexed the Marches or Adriatic provinces of the Roman State to his kingdom of Italy. There were other points of dispute between the Pope and Napoleon on matters concerning the Concordat with the kingdom of Italy. About the same time (February, 1808) a French force under General Miollis entered Rome, occupied the Castle of St. Angelo, and began to do military duty in the city. The General took the Papal troops under his own command. The Pope remained in his palace with the mere shadow of a civil power, which he had no means of enforcing.

CHAPTER XIII.

Napoleon's visions of a Western Empire—His disregard of national feelings—His harsh treatment of Prussia—Second English expedition to Copenhagen—French invasion of Spain—Insurrection of the Spaniards, and Peninsular war—Conferences at Erfurt between Napoleon and Alexander—Napoleon goes to Spain—His quick return—New Austrian war—Battles of Aspern and Wagram—Peace of Schönbrunn—Napoleon's divorce and second marriage—Extent of Napoleon's Empire—Annexation of Holland, of the Hanseatic Towns, and of Rome—Napoleon's demeanour towards his brothers—Birth of the King of Rome—Rupture with Russia—Russian campaign—Retreat from Moscow—German campaign of 1813—Battle of Leipzig—The Allies invade France—Campaign of 1814—Capitulation of Paris—Napoleon's abdication.

THE peace of Tilsit begins a new period in Napoleon's career, a period of surprising outward greatness, yet bearing at the same time the germ of inward decay. He now openly aspired to the rank of Emperor of the West. He had conquered Austria and Prussia; he had forced Russia into his alliance; the other minor States he thought he could easily dispose of. This was true with regard to the governments; but he overlooked one great though apparently dormant element—the people. He hurt *the feelings of nationality* of the great European *countries, of the* Germans, Spaniards, Russians &

their pride of race; their traditions of language and habits; and there he failed. Napoleon as the ruler of France and North Italy bore a very different relation to his subjects from that which Napoleon the conqueror, the invader, bore to the people of Germany, Holland, Spain, and South Italy. To these, his was an unmitigated system of oppression.

"Napoleon," says Capefigue, "did not fall through the governments opposed to him, but through the people; it was when he attacked national feelings that he met with a stubborn resistance; he had strangely abused his dictatorial power over Europe; he crushed down nations by his treaties, and he gave up the populations to kings of his own creation; he broke territories into fractions, separating that which was before united, and joining together those parts which were separated; he transformed a republic into a kingdom; of a free town he made a district of one of his prefectships; he united the high lands to the plain, simple, primitive populations to old and corrupt ones, without regard to diversities of language, or manners, or to the religious antipathies. In Germany, above all, his policy appears most tyrannical; he takes away a province from one monarchy and gives it to another; he plays with the masses as if they were chess-men; he creates a kingdom of Westphalia out of more than twenty states or fragments of states; he detaches the Tyrol from Austria, heedless of traditional customs, institutions, and manners; Holland, a mercantile republic, he changes into a kingdom; to Naples, at the extremity of Italy, he sends one of his brothers. His is an unparalleled despotism, without reason or excuse. The people are for him like a mute herd of cattle;

he pens them up, or drives them before him with his terrible sword. Add to this the French spirit, the French character, which, in his pride of a founder of a great empire, he wished to force upon all Europe, together with his own code of laws. God has imparted to each of the various nations a character which is its own; for good or for evil, it is unwise to run counter to it. Germany has its own morals and manners; Spain has its inveterate habits —perhaps they dispose to indolence; but what is that to strangers? Uniformity may be a plausible idea in mathematics; but in the moral organization of the human kind, harmony is the result of diversities."

Prussia was the first great country doomed to feel all the weight of the iron hand of the conqueror. No situation could be more humiliating and more depressed than that of Prussia after Tilsit; the country was ground down by military occupation and by war-contributions. The stipulated contributions amounted already to more than one hundred millions of francs, but that was little in comparison to the requisitions for the army; ten millions a month were required for the military chest, besides requisitions in kind of cloth, accoutrements, bedding, horses, waggons, &c. The wealthier towns were taxed at will, and the payment was made obligatory within four-and-twenty hours; Frankfort, Hamburg, Lubeck, Berlin, were oppressed without mercy; the state of peace was for North Germany nearly as bad as that of war. The instructions of Napoleon were to treat Prussia with rigour, and he was punctually obeyed. Submission was unavoidable, at least for a time, but under the appearance of submission there lurked in

the German breast a rancour, an indignation, which bided its time for exploding. It was about this period that the secret societies began to stir themselves in Germany.

The British Cabinet was informed by positive though hidden channels of the secret conditions of the treaty of Tilsit, one of which was that the Danish fleet was to be placed at the disposal of the Emperor Napoleon, and, being joined by the Russian and Dutch fleets, they were to assist the French in an attack upon England. The English ministers determined to be beforehand. An expedition of naval and land forces appeared on the 1st of October, 1807, before Copenhagen, and demanded the Danish fleet to be delivered in deposit to England till the peace. This being refused, the English troops were landed, the town was bombarded, and then the Danish council submitted; twenty ships of the line and sixteen frigates, besides smaller vessels, were delivered over to Admiral Gambier, and taken to England. The war between Napoleon and England assumed a character of bitterness which carried both parties beyond the usual limits of modern warfare. England was, at this period, literally fighting for her existence. She had lost all her allies in the North, when Napoleon, through his headlong intemperance, furnished her with a most important one in the South.

Spain was the humble and submissive ally of Napoleon; her navy, her army, her treasures were at his disposal. She was at war with Great Britain; she had allowed a free passage to the French troops through her territory to Portugal. Other French troops had entered Spain as friends in the beginning of 1808, and seized by stratagem the for-

tresses of St. Sebastian, Pamplona, and Barcelona. At the same time the internal administration of Spain was carried on in the most corrupt and profligate manner. Charles IV., his queen, and the favourite Godoy, had completely disgusted the Spaniards. An insurrectionary movement took place at Aranjuez on the 20th of March, when Ferdinand, the heir to the crown, who was a favourite with the people, was proclaimed king, and Charles was induced to abdicate. Upon this Napoleon founded a pretence for interfering. He invited father, mother, son, and favourite to Bayonne, where he himself repaired in April. Charles and his queen went readily; Ferdinand hesitated; but Napoleon sent Savary, who, with many asseverations of his master's honourable and friendly intentions towards him, gradually decoyed the weak prince from stage to stage until he was fairly out of the Spanish territory. A scene of duplicity and dishonesty, of indecent and unnatural recriminations, now took place between Napoleon, the old king, the queen, and her son, which for moral turpitude has no parallel in history. Charles resumed his character of king, stigmatized Ferdinand as a rebellious son; the queen joined in reviling him and disgracing him at the expense of her own and her husband's honour; and Ferdinand, overwhelmed by insults and threats, renounced his claim to the crown of Spain on the 6th of May. (Concerning the real sentiments of Ferdinand expressed in his intercepted letters, see Bausset, *Mémoires Anecdotiques sur l'Intérieur du Palais.*) Charles likewise resigned all his rights "in favour of his friend and *ally the Emperor of the* French;" and Napoleon *issued a decree,* appointing his "dearly-beloved

brother Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples and Sicily, to the crowns of Spain and the Indies." By a subsequent decree (15th July) he appointed "his dearly-beloved cousin, Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, to the throne of Naples and Sicily, which remained vacant by the accession of Joseph Napoleon to the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies." Both these curious documents are signed Napoleon, and countersigned by the Minister Secretary of State, Maret.

The memorable events which resulted from these nefarious transactions—the occupation of Madrid by Murat—the revolt and subsequent massacre of the people of that city on the 2nd of May—the insurrection which broke out simultaneously in all parts of the Peninsula against the invaders—the heroic though often unfortunate resistance of the Spaniards—the atrocities committed by the French troops, and the cruel retaliation by the Spanish guerrillas—the long murderous war, from 1808 till 1814, in which the British army acted a conspicuous part,—all these may be read in the numerous works written expressly on the subject of the Peninsular war. For the military transactions see Colonel Napier, General Foy, and Major Vacani, and the 'Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns,' by Captain Hamilton. For the Spanish view of the subject, see Count Toreno, 'Historia del Levantamiento, Guerra, y Revolucion de España,' Madrid, 1835; and Canga Arguelles, 'Observaciones sobre las Historias de Southey, Londonderry, Clarke y Napier.' For a general, historical, and political view of *Spain* during that period, see Southey's 'History of *the* Peninsular War;' and the 'Histoire de la Révolution d'Espagne,' by Colonel Schepeler, a Prus-

sian officer, who was himself in the Spanish service during the whole time. But better, perhaps, than all, the Duke of Wellington's Dispatches afford the safest guide throughout the history of that memorable struggle.

The first year of the war in Spain was marked by two disastrous events for Napoleon—the capitulation of 22,000 French under Dupont, who surrendered as prisoners of war to the Spaniards at Baylen in Southern Spain, and that of Junot at Lisbon, by which another French army surrendered Portugal. Both these events occurred in the month of August, 1808; and they visibly altered the opinion of Europe respecting the invincibility of Napoleon's power.

During the six years of the Peninsular war, 600,000 French soldiers entered Spain at different times by the two great roads of Bayonne and Perpignan. There returned into France at various times about 250,000. The other 350,000 did not return. Making full deduction for those who remained prisoners in the hands of the Spaniards and English, and were afterwards set free at the peace of 1814, the number who perished during that war cannot be estimated at less than 250,000, if it does not rather approach to 300,000. The loss of the Spaniards, soldiers and peasants, who were destroyed in detail in almost every part in the Peninsula, cannot be calculated, but it must have been much greater than that of the French.

In the year 1808 Napoleon re-established titles of nobility in France. Lefèbvre, who had taken Danzig the year before, was the first duke that he created. Many others, both military men and civilians, received titles from towns in Italy and

Germany, with an income charged upon the revenues or national domains of the conquered countries. Both the titles and the incomes attached to them were made hereditary. The Marshals created dukes besides Lefèbvre, were Moncey, Duke of Conegliano; Masséna, Duke of Rivoli, and afterwards Prince of Essling; Augereau, Duke of Castiglione; Soult, Duke of Dalmatia; Mortier, Duke of Treviso; Ney, Duke of Elchingen, and afterwards Prince of La Moskwa; Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt, and afterwards Prince of Eckmühl; Bessières, Duke of Istria; Victor, Duke of Belluno; Kellermann, Duke of Valmy; Marmont, Duke of Ragusa; Lannes, Duke of Montebello; and Macdonald, Duke of Taranto; Bernadotte was made Prince of Pontecorvo, and Berthier Prince of Neuchatel. There were, besides, the Generals Caulincourt, Duke of Vicenza; Junot, Duke of Abrantes; Duroc, Duke of Frioul; Savary, Duke of Rovigo; Arrighi, Duke of Padua; and Clarke, Duke of Feltre; and afterwards, Suchet, Duke of Albufera. The civilians were, Regnier, Duke of Massa; Champagny, Duke of Cadore; Maret, Duke of Bassano; Gaudin, Duke of Gaeta; Cambacérès, Duke of Parma; and Lebrun, Duke of Piacenza. Talleyrand was made Prince of Benevento.

In September, 1808, Napoleon repaired to Erfurt, to hold conferences with the Emperor Alexander. The subject of these conferences remained a secret; but it would seem that the question of Turkey was agitated. Napoleon says that the principal obstacle to a partition of that country was Constantinople. It seems, however, that he consented to Russia encroaching on the [illegible]

provinces of Turkey, as the Russian troops invaded Moldavia and Wallachia soon after the conference. On returning from Erfurt, Napoleon told his senate that he and the Emperor of Russia were irrevocably united in a bond of alliance.

The English in the meantime having reconquered Portugal, were advancing to the assistance of the Spaniards. King Joseph had been obliged to leave Madrid, and the French armies had withdrawn behind the Ebro. Napoleon resolved to set out for Spain himself. On the 25th October he opened in person the session of the legislative body with one of his characteristic speeches:—"The hideous presence of the English leopards contaminates the continent of Spain and Portugal. I go to place myself at the head of my armies, to crown my brother at Madrid, and to plant the French eagles on the ramparts of Lisbon." Two days afterwards he set out for Spain.

On the 23rd of November, 1808, Napoleon defeated the Spanish troops at Tudela, and on the 4th of December Madrid capitulated. He told the Spanish deputation that their grandchildren would bless his memory. He then advanced towards Astorga, expecting to intercept Sir John Moore in his retreat. In this, however, he did not succeed; and leaving the task of pursuing the English to Soult and Ney, he suddenly quitted Astorga, and returned in haste to France, in January, 1809.

A new Austrian war was on the point of breaking out. This time Austria came single into the field. She had made astonishing exertions to recruit *her armies* to the number of nearly half a *million of men.* Austria had apparently no new

subject of complaint, except the alarm which she naturally felt at the rapid strides of Napoleon towards universal dominion. The Archduke Charles commanded the Austrian army of Germany, and the Archduke John that of Italy. The Austrians crossed the Inn on the 9th of April, and occupied Bavaria and the Tyrol. Napoleon quickly assembled his army beyond the Rhine, repaired to Augsburg, and by one of his skilful manœuvres, broke the line of the Austrians, gained the battle of Eckmühl, and obliged the Archduke Charles to retire into Bohemia, leaving the road to Vienna open to the French. (For the details of this campaign, see General Pelet, *Mémoires sur la Guerre de* 1809, 4 vols. 8vo. Paris, 1824-26.) On the 12th of May the French entered Vienna. The archduke now collected his army on the left bank of the Danube; Bonaparte crossed the river to attack him, and the great battle of Aspern took place on the 21st of May. The battle remained undecided; but on the following day it was renewed with fury on both sides, when, in the midst of the action, Bonaparte was informed that the bridge in his rear, which communicated with the right bank of the Danube, had been carried off by a flood. Upon this he ordered a retreat, and withdrew his army into the island of Lobau, in the middle of the Danube. The loss of the French was very great: Marshal Lannes was among the generals killed. Napoleon remained for six weeks on the island. Having re-established the bridge, and received reinforcements, he once more crossed to the left bank, and fought the battle of Wagram (6th July), in which he defeated the Austrians: the loss on both sides was tremendous. Still the

Austrian army was not destroyed or dispersed, and the Archduke Charles was for continuing the struggle. Other counsels, however, prevailed, and an armistice was concluded at Znaym, and this led to the peace of Schönbrunn, which was not signed however till the 14th of October. Napoleon had entertained some idea of dismembering the Austrian empire; he had even addressed an invitation to the Hungarians to form an independent kingdom under a native ruler; but this address produced no effect. Germany began to be agitated by a spirit of popular resistance against him; bands of partisans under Schill, the Duke of Brunswick, and others, had appeared; the Tyrol was still in arms, and he was not quite sure of Russia. The war in Spain continued with dubious success, and the English had landed a considerable force at Flushing. He thought best, therefore, to grant peace to Austria on moderate conditions. The Archduke Charles disapproved of the peace, and gave up his command. Austria ceded Trieste, Carniola, and part of Croatia, Salzburg, Cracow, and Western Gallicia, and several other districts, to the amount of about two millions and a half of inhabitants. The brave Tyrolese were abandoned to their fate. Hofer and others of their chiefs were seized by the French, taken to Mantua, and there shot.

Whether the subsequent marriage of Napoleon with a daughter of the Emperor Francis was in course of negotiation at the time of the peace of Schönbrunn has been doubted; but soon after his return to Paris he made known to his wife Josephine his determination to divorce her. A painful scene took place on this occasion, which is well

described by De Bausset, prefect of the imperial household, in his 'Mémoires Anecdotiques sur l'Intérieur du Palais.' Napoleon himself seems to have been affected at Josephine's grief, but his notion of the necessity of having an heir to the empire subdued his feelings. It is known that from the time of the conferences of Erfurt, and perhaps of Tilsit, he had contemplated a marriage with one of Alexander's sisters, and the project had been communicated to the Russian court, but the empress-mother had always objected to it, ostensibly on the plea of difference of religion. The divorce being consented to by Josephine in presence of commissioners from the Senate, the act was solemnly passed and registered on the 16th of December, 1809. On the 11th of March, 1810, Napoleon married by proxy the Archduchess Maria Louisa, who soon after set out for Paris. The marriage ceremony was performed at Paris by Cardinal Fesch.

The years 1810 and 1811 were the period of Napoleon's greatest power. There is an interesting report made by Count Montalivet of the situation of the French empire in 1810, which displays the gigantic extent of its dominions. One passage which refers to Holland is curious. That country was under the government of Louis Bonaparte, who felt really anxious for the welfare of his Dutch subjects, and did not enforce very strictly the continental system, as it was styled, against English trade. This led to frequent reproofs from his imperious brother, who at last resolved to enforce *his* own decrees himself by uniting Holland to the French empire. (Louis Bonaparte's *Historical Documents and Reflections on the Government of*

Holland.) Count Montalivet in his report made use of a curious argument to prepare the people's minds for this measure:—"Holland," he said, "is in reality a continuation of France; it may be defined as being formed out of the alluvia of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, which are the great arteries of the empire." And Champagny, minister for foreign affairs, in a report to the emperor said:—"Holland is an emanation of the French empire. In order to possess the Rhine, your Majesty must extend your territory to the Zuyderzee." But even the Zuyderzee was not far enough. By a Senatus Consultum of the 13th of December, 1810, Holland, Friesland, Oldenburg, Bremen, and all the line of coast to Hamburg, and the country between that town and Lübeck, were annexed to the French empire, of which this new territory formed ten additional departments. The French empire now extended from the frontiers of Denmark to those of Naples, for Napoleon had finally annexed Rome and the southern Papal provinces to France. The Pope launched a bull of excommunication against Napoleon, upon which he was arrested in his palace on the Quirinal in the middle of the night of the 5th of July, 1809, by a party of gendarmes who escaladed the walls, and was carried off to Savona, where he was kept prisoner until he was removed to Fontainebleau. (For an account of these proceedings, see *Memorie del Cardinal Pacca*, with the *Relation de l'Enlevement du Pape Pie VII. et de son Voyage jusqu'à Florence*, par le Baron Radet, in the Appendix.) Radet was the colonel of gendarmes who seized *the person* of the Pope. The papal territory was divided into two departments of the

French empire, called the departments of R
and of the Thrasymene, of which latter Per
was the head town. Napoleon gave his "
city of Rome" the rank of second town in
French empire.

Besides the French empire, which, thus
tended, consisted of 130 departments, and
tained 42 millions of people, Napoleon held u
his sway the kingdom of Italy, which incl
Lombardy and Venice, Modena, Bologna, and
other Legations and the Marches, with above
millions of inhabitants; and the Illyrian provi
including Dalmatia, Carniola, and part of Cro
which formed a separate government. The k
dom of Naples, with about five millions more,
also dependent on his will, as well as the king
of Westphalia, and the Grand Duchy of Berg.
policy of Napoleon towards the countries w
he bestowed on his brothers and other rela
was plainly stated by himself to his brother Lu
in an interview at Mantua in December, 1
"In the interior, as well as the exterior, all
relatives must follow my orders: everything
be subservient to the interest of France; cons
tion, laws, taxes, all must be in your respe
states for the advantage and support of my cr
I should otherwise act against my duty and
interest. No doubt you would like to act the
of a Medici at Florence" (there had been some
about placing Lucien over Tuscany), "but w
to allow you to do so, it is clear that Tusc
happy and tranquil, would become an objec
envy to the French." He would not allow
brothers to identify themselves with their sub
or to strengthen themselves on their t

because he foresaw that it might suit him some day to remove them on the occasion of a general peace, or upon some new scheme of his own. He sacrificed the people of those countries and their interests, as well as the happiness and the greatness of his brothers, to what he conceived to be the interest and the glory of France. But even his brothers were restive under this discipline. Louis ran away from his kingdom of Holland; Murat was in continual disputes with his brother-in-law; Jerome was in a condition of tutorship in his kingdom of Westphalia; and Lucien would not accept any crown on such conditions.

As Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, Napoleon had under his orders the Kings of Saxony, Bavaria, and Würtemberg, the Grand Duke of Baden, and the other German princes. He had also under his protection the Helvetic Confederation, which was bound to furnish him with troops, and to follow his policy. Prussia, humbled and dismembered, lay entirely at his mercy. He could thus dispose of more than eighty millions of people. Never, since the fall of the Roman empire, had so great a part of Europe been subject to the will of one man. Austria was his ally through fear as well as by family connexion; Russia through prudence and self-interest. In Sweden, General Bernadotte had been chosen Crown Prince, and, after obtaining Napoleon's consent, had repaired to Stockholm. Spain, bleeding at every pore, struggled hard, and apparently with little hope of ultimate success. Britain alone continued to defy his power, and held Sicily and Portugal under her protection. Such was the political condition of Europe at the beginning of 1811. In the month

of March of that year, Maria Louisa was delivered of a son, who was saluted by Napoleon as "King of Rome," an ominous title to those Italians who still fancied that the crown of Italy was to be, according to Napoleon's promise, separated from that of France.

In 1811 the first symptoms of coolness between Alexander and Napoleon manifested themselves. The complaints of the Russian landholders against the continental system, which prevented their exporting by sea the produce of their vast estates, had induced Alexander to issue a ukase of the 31st of December, 1810, by which colonial and other goods were allowed to be introduced into the ports of Russia, unless they appeared to belong to subjects of Great Britain. This last restriction was of course easily evaded, and the trade with England might be said to be in reality opened again. This was soon made a ground of complaint on the part of Napoleon. The Russian emperor, on his side, complained that his relative, the Duke of Oldenburg, had been dispossessed of his territory contrary to the treaty of Tilsit. A third subject of difference was concerning Poland. Napoleon having, by the peace of Schönbrunn, united Western Gallicia and Cracow to the duchy of Warsaw, seemed to encourage the prospect of re-establishing the whole of Poland as an independent state. But there was another and a deeper feeling of mistrust and insecurity on the part of the emperor, and the nobility of Russia in general, at the evident assumption of universal dictatorship by Napoleon, especially since his marriage with an Austrian archduchess. At Tilsit he had been willing to share the empire of the world with Russia, but

now he would "have no brother near his throne." He summoned Sweden, in an imperious manner, to enforce his decrees against the British trade, while his armed vessels and privateers in the Baltic seized upon fifty Swedish merchantmen, which were confiscated, upon the charge of contraband trade with England. Lastly, in January, 1812, General Davoust was sent to take possession of Swedish Pomerania and the island of Rügen. This act of aggression induced the Crown Prince, Bernadotte, to sign a treaty of alliance with the Emperor Alexander in March, 1812. In the interview between these two princes at Abo in Finland, the plan of resistance to Napoleon was settled. Russia had not yet declared war, but she reinforced her armies, waiting to be attacked. Napoleon was pouring troops into Prussia, Pomerania, and the duchy of Warsaw.

Some of the older and wiser counsellors of Napoleon had the courage to remonstrate with him, not on the injustice, but on the impolicy of this new act of aggression. Fouché presented to him an eloquent memorial on the occasion. "I regulate my conduct," answered Napoleon, "chiefly by the opinion of my army. With 800,000 men I can oblige all Europe to do my bidding. I will destroy all English influence in Russia, and then Spain will easily fall. My destiny is not yet accomplished; my present situation is but the outline of a picture, which I must fill up. I must make one nation out of all the European states, and Paris must be the capital of the world. There must be all over Europe but one code, one court of appeal, one *currency*, one system of weights and measures. *Am I to blame if* the great power which I have

already attained forces me to assume the dictatorship of the world?" To De Pradt at Dresden he said, "I will destroy Russian influence in Europe. Two battles will do the business: the Emperor Alexander will come on his knees, and Russia shall be disarmed. Spain costs me very dear: without that I should be master of the world; but when I become such, my son will have nothing to do but to retain my place." In calmer times, and after the full experience of disappointment, we find him confirming the sentiments which he had expressed on the former memorable occasions. After his return from Elba, he said to Benjamin Constant, "I desired the empire of the world, and who in my situation would not? The world invited me to govern it; sovereigns and subjects vied with each other in bending before my sceptre. I have rarely found any opposition in France." And later at St. Helena, "If I have been on the point of accomplishing the universal monarchy, it was without any original design, and because I was led to it step after step. The last effort wanting to arrive at it seemed so trifling, was it unreasonable to attempt it? . . . But I had no ambition distinct from that of France, her glory, her ascendancy, her majesty, with which my own were identified. Had I lived in America, I should willingly have been a Washington; but had Washington been in France, exposed to discord within and attack from without, I would have defied him to be what he was in America. . . . I have been spoiled by success. I have always been in supreme command; *from* my first entrance into life I have enjoyed high *power*; and circumstances, and my own energy of *character*, have been such, that from the instant I

d military superiority, I acknowledged neither
ers nor laws."

ıe events of the memorable Russian campaign
812 are known to the world. We can only
our readers to the works of Ségur, and of
nel Boutourlin, aide-de-camp to the Emperor
ander; to the Memoirs of Oginski; and to the
ın account of Captain Laugier, 'Gl' Italiani
ussia.' By consulting these various authorities,
ı of very correct information concerning that
ndous catastrophe may be obtained.

fore Napoleon left Paris for the Russian ex-
ion, he directed Maret, Duke of Bassano, to
a letter to Lord Castlereagh proposing nego-
ns for peace, on the basis of the *uti possidetis*.
was now willing to let Sicily remain under
inand, and Portugal under the House of Bra-
ı, but he insisted on Spain being secured to
rother Joseph. It must be observed that
Wellington had just taken possession of
joz and Ciudad Rodrigo, and was advancing
Spain towards Madrid, which he shortly after
ed upon gaining the battle of Salamanca.
English minister immediately replied, that
and's engagements with the Spanish Cortes,
g in the name of King Ferdinand VII., ren-
l the acknowledgment of Joseph impossible.

ıe Russian minister, Prince Kourakin, still re-
ed at Paris. Early in May he presented an
al note to the Duke of Bassano, stating that
matters in dispute between the two empires
t easily be made the subject of amicable nego-
ns, provided the French troops should eva-
Pomerania and the Duchy of Warsaw, where
ould be for no other purpose than that of

threatening the frontiers of Russi
pretended to be exceedingly angry a
which he said was insolent, adding t
used to be addressed in such a styl
his movements dictated by a forei
and he sent Prince Kourakin his
the 9th of May he himself set off wi
for Dresden, where he had invited
his own creation, Bavaria, Würtem
Westphalia, and his other tributaries
The Emperor of Austria also repai
with his empress. The King of Pr
as he had just signed a treaty with
which he placed 20,000 men at his
approaching campaign. Austria ag
30,000 men to act against Russian
poleon sent the Count de Narbo
where the Emperor Alexander then
him to come to Dresden, but Alex
the invitation. After brilliant festi
quitted Dresden for Thorn, where
the 2nd of June. His immense ar
bled chiefly between the Vistula an
which latter river formed the bo
Russian empire. There were 27
80,000 Germans of the Confederatio
30,000 Poles under Prince Poniat

without meeting with any opposition. The Russian army, under General Barclay de Tolli, 120,000 strong, evacuated Wilna, and retired to the banks of the Dwina. Another Russian army, 80,000 strong, under Prince Bagration, was stationed near the Dnieper. On the 28th of June Napoleon entered Wilna, where he remained till the 16th of July. He there received a deputation from the Diet of the Duchy of Warsaw, entreating him to proclaim the union and independence of Poland. Napoleon's answer was still cold and cautious: he told them that he had guaranteed to the Emperor of Austria the part of Poland which he still retained; that for the rest they must depend chiefly on their own efforts.

In the mean time, the French soldiers treated Lithuania as an enemy's country. The provisions ordered by Napoleon to follow his army not having arrived, and the Russians having removed all the stores, the French and German soldiers went about marauding, plundering alike the mansions of the nobility and the huts of the peasants, feeding their horses on the green corn, violating the women, and killing those who resented such treatment. Lithuania, a poor and thinly-inhabited country, which had suffered from the bad harvest of the preceding year (1811), was utterly devastated. At the same time, disorganization and demoralization spread fearfully throughout the enormous masses of the invaders; disease thinned their ranks; 25,000 patients were crowded within Wilna in a few weeks, where there was not accommodation for one-third of the number; *heavy rains* rendered the roads impassable, *and 10,000 horses* were lost.

After partial engagements at Mohilow and


would be the signal of dissolution.
of attack, not of defence; an arm
not of position. We must advance
and strike a blow in order to obtain
ing quarters and supplies." (Ségur
the Dnieper, and entered Russia Pr
180,000 men, leaving a body of re
and the corps of Macdonald on the
Riga. In his march through Lith
than 100,000 men had dropped off
and were either dead or sick, or h
prisoners by the Cossacks, or were
marauding about the country.

On the 16th of August the two
met under the walls of Smolensk.
sians, after carrying off or destroying
and allowing time to the inhabita
themselves, evacuated Smolensk, wh
guard set on fire. They continue
upon Moscow, and Napoleon follow
battle of Borodino, near the bank

traversed the city of Moscow, which most of the inhabitants had already evacuated. On that same day the French entered Moscow, and found it deserted, except by the convicts and some of the lowest class, who lingered behind for the sake of plunder. On the evening of this day a fire broke out in the coachmakers' street, but it was put down in the night. On the next day, the 15th, Napoleon took up his residence in the Kremlin, the ancient palace of the Tzars. On the following night the fire burst out again in different quarters of the city, and no exertions of the French could stop it: the wind spread the flames all over the city, and on the third day Napoleon was obliged to leave the Kremlin, where he was in imminent danger. The fire raged till the 19th, when it abated, after destroying 7682 houses, about four-fifths of the town. This burning of Moscow has been attributed to a premeditated plan of the Russians; but Count Rostopchin, the governor, has denied this positively. "Several individuals," he says, "set fire to their own houses, rather than leave them in possession of the invaders, and the French soldiers seeking for plunder, or for wine or spirits in the cellars, where they got intoxicated, did the rest." ('La Vérité sur l'Incendie de Moscou,' par le Comte Rostopchin, Paris, 1823.)

The markets of Moscow used to be supplied, not from the immediate neighbourhood, but from a considerable distance in the interior, and especially from the southern districts towards Kaluga, where the Russian army was now posted. The French therefore could get no provisions, and they were obliged to live chiefly on the flesh of their horses, which was salted down.

19th of October, seeing no chanc
peace, Napoleon began his retreat.
was fine and moderately cold. He
to retire by Kaluga, where he ex
provisions; but the stout resistance
perienced at Malo Yaroslavetz ind
luctantly to turn again to the road
Viazma to Smolensk, by which he
He was closely followed by the Rus
was more especially harassed by swar
under the Hetman Platoff. His rea
sharp engagements at Viazma and
of the Wop. His army rapidly d
through fatigue, privations, and th
tacks of the Cossacks. It had
120,000 strong, but was now reduc
that number of fighting men: the
confused and disorderly mass in th
immense train of baggage and arti
condition they were overtaken on t

ıer. The wretchedness and sufferings of the ıt from Moscow must be read in the works ly referred to. The French at last reached ensk, where they found their stores. Many ıe soldiers had not tasted a piece of bread or it since they had passed through that town months before. On the 14th of November)leon left Smolensk with about 40,000 men to carry arms. His rear divisions had now to in repeated attacks from the Russians, and he arrived at Orsca, in Lithuania, he had 12,000 men with arms in their hands. Of)0 horses there were hardly 3000 left. In this ıt he reached the banks of the Berezina, where as joined by a corps of reserve of nearly)0 men, under Victor and Oudinot. The ge of the Berezina, on the 26th and 27th of ember, cost him about one-half of his army reinforced. On the 3rd of December Na- ın arrived at Malodeczno, whence he issued amous 29th bulletin, which came like a clap ıunder to awaken Europe. This time he told whole truth in all its sternness: except the ds, he had no longer an army. At Smorgoni, e he arrived on the 5th of December, he took of his generals, left the command of the , such as it was, to Murat, and set off in a e with Caulaincourt to return to Paris. He ed at Warsaw on the 10th, where he had that ıus conversation with De Pradt which the r has so humorously related. Continuing his , he passed through Dresden on the 14th, and ed at Paris on the 18th of December at night. *remains of his* unfortunate army were col- *by Murat on* the line of the Vistula. The

152,000 dead of fatigue, hunger, disea
and 193,000 prisoners, including 3000
48 generals. The 'St. Petersburg Ga
that the bodies burnt in the spring af
in Russia Proper and Lithuania, a
308,000, of which of course a consider
tion were Russians. In the Berezin
the adjoining marshes, 36,000 dead bod
to have been found. The French left
900 pieces of cannon and 25,000 w
soons, &c.

Napoleon, after his return to Paris,
self to recruit his army by fresh conse
drafting the national guards into his
talions, by recalling all the men wh
spare from Spain, and by sending the
fleet to serve on land. He thus collec
Germany, in the spring of 1813, an arm
men. The Kings of Prussia and of
now allied themselves to Alexander, a
had advanced as far as the Elbe. Aust

these victories led to no decisive results; the allies retired in good order, and lost few prisoners and no guns. Bonaparte bitterly complained of this, and his generals observed to each other, that these were no longer the days of Marengo, Austerlitz, or Jena, when one battle decided the fate of the war. On the 22nd of May, in another engagement with the retreating allies, Duroc, his old and most faithful companion, who was one of the few personally attached to him, was struck by a cannon-ball and dreadfully mangled. The dying man was taken to the house of a clergyman near the spot. Napoleon went to see him, and was deeply affected. It was the only instance in which he refused to attend to the military reports which were brought to him. "Everything to-morrow," was his answer to his aides-de-camp. He had a few days before lost another of his old brother-officers, Bessières.

An armistice was now agreed to on the 4th of June, and Bonaparte returned to Dresden, where Metternich came with fresh offers of mediation on the part of Austria. Austria proposed, as a principal condition, that Germany should be evacuated by the French, and the boundaries of the French empire should be fixed at the Rhine, as Napoleon himself had repeatedly declared. But Napoleon would not hear of giving up the new departments which he had annexed as far as Hamburg and Lübeck, nor would he resign the Protectorate of Germany. This led to a warm discussion, in which Napoleon said he only wished Austria to remain neutral while he fought the Russians and Prussians, and he offered to restore to her the Illyrian provinces as the price of her neutrality. Metternich replied that things had come to that pass that Aus-

tria could no longer remain neutral; she must be either with France or against France; that Germany had been long enough tormented by these wars, and it was time she should be left to rest and to national independence. The conferences, however, were carried on at Prague, without any agreement being come to; in the midst of this the armistice expired on the 10th of August, and Austria joined the allies.

A series of battles were fought about Dresden on the 24th, 25th, and 27th of August between the Austrians and Prussians on one side, and the French on the other, in which the latter had the advantage. But in pursuing the allies into Bohemia, Vandamme, with a corps of 30,000 men, was surrounded, and made prisoner with 8000 men at Culm. Oudinot was likewise worsted at Gross Beeren by the Swedes and Prussians under Bernadotte. Ney, who was sent by Napoleon to replace Oudinot, lost the battle of Dennewitz on the 6th of September, near Berlin. On the Katzbach, in Silesia, Blücher routed the French opposed to him. The month of September passed in this desultory warfare, Napoleon's armies losing ground and strength on every side. Bavaria made a separate peace with Austria. The Saxons and other German troops began to forsake the French cause. At last, after a painful struggle between pride and necessity, Napoleon was obliged to begin his retreat upon Leipzig, followed by the allies. At Leipzig he determined to make a final stand. "One victory alone," he said, "and Germany might still be *his*." On the 16th of October the first battle of Leipzig took place. It was fought gallantly on both sides, but the allies had now a great supe-

riority in numbers, and the French were driven close upon the ramparts of the town. The 17th passed without fighting; on the 18th the battle was renewed, the French divisions lost ground, and a body of 10,000 Saxons left them and went over to the enemy. Napoleon now made his dispositions to effect his retreat towards the Rhine. But while his army was filing out of Leipzig by a long bridge, or rather a succession of bridges, in the morning of the 19th, the allies forced their way into the town after a desperate resistance, and the bridge being blown up, 25,000 Frenchmen were obliged to surrender prisoners of war. The retreat from Leipzig was nearly as disastrous to Napoleon as that from Moscow. His army was completely disorganized. He was however able to fight his way at Hanau, on the 30th of October, through the Bavarians, his late allies, who now wanted to oppose his passage. At last he reached the Rhine, and passing over the 70,000 or 80,000 men, all that remained out of an army of 350,000, with which he had begun the campaign, he placed them on the left bank while he set out for Paris, where he arrived on the 9th of November. (For the particulars of this hard-contested campaign of 1813, see Odeleben's Narrative.) About 80,000 men left in the garrisons of Magdeburg, Danzig, Stettin, &c., surrendered to the allies.

The enormous losses and reverses of the French armies, and the approach of the allies to the frontiers of France, produced a strong feeling of dissatisfaction in that country. The Legislative Body showed for the first time a spirit of opposition to the *headlong system* of Napoleon. A committee *was appointed* to draw up a report on the state of

the nation; Raynouard, Lainé, Gallois, and other members who had a character for independence, were of the committee. The report, which they laid before the Legislative Body on the 28th of December, 1813, expressed a desire for peace consistent with the honour and welfare of France, and a wish to know what steps the Emperor had taken to attain so desirable an object; and it ended by saying, that "while the government will take the most effective measures for the safety of the country, his Majesty should be entreated to maintain and enforce the entire and constant execution of the laws which ensure to the French citizens the rights of liberty, property, and security, and to the nation the free exercise of its political rights." The Legislative Body by a large majority ordered the report to be printed. This was a language which Napoleon had not been used to. He immediately ordered the doors of the hall of the Legislative Body to be closed and guarded by soldiers, and the copies of the report to be seized at the printer's. On the 31st an imperial decree adjourned the Legislative Body. On the 1st of January, 1814, several members of the Legislative Body having appeared at his levee, he gave vent to his ill humour in a violent and coarse address, told them that they were not the representatives of the nation, but only the representatives of the individual departments; that he was the only representative of the people; that their report and the address founded upon it were seditious; that they ought not thus publicly to have commented on his conduct; and he ended by saying—"France stands more in need of me than I *stand* in need of France." The Senate, more subservient, had already passed a decree for a new con-

scription of 300,000 men, including all those who had escaped the conscriptions of former years. The taxes were at the same time ordered to be doubled; but the people were weary of these never-ending sacrifices, and in many departments it was found difficult to collect either men or money. Napoleon's disposable army on the Rhine amounted to no more than 70,000 or 80,000 men, and he had to contend with twice that number, besides numerous reinforcements which were hastening through Germany. Meantime conferences were held at Châtillon, in which the allies proposed to fix the limits of France as they were in 1792, that is to say, with the exclusion of Belgium; but Napoleon would not listen to this. It was his last chance of peace. At the end of January, 1814, Napoleon began the campaign which has been considered by tacticians as that in which he most strikingly displayed his astonishing genius for military combinations, fertility of resources, and quickness of movements. For more than two months he held at bay the various armies of the allies, now beating one corps and then flying to attack another; at times severely checked himself, and yet recovering his strength the next day. (*Memoirs of the Operations of the Allied Armies in* 1813–14, London, 1822; and Koch, *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Campagne de* 1814.) But the odds were too many against him. By a bold movement he placed himself in the rear of the allies; but the allies marched upon Paris, and after a hard-fought battle, on the 30th of March, took possession of the whole line of defence which protected that city on the north-eastern side. The empress had left it for Blois, and Joseph Bonaparte, after the battle of the 30th, quitted Paris

also. Marshal Marmont asked for an armistice, and this led to the capitulation of Paris, which the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia entered on the 31st, amidst the loud acclamations of the Parisians. Napoleon, hearing of the attack upon Paris, had fallen back to the relief of the capital, but it was too late. He met near Fontainebleau the columns of the garrison, which were evacuating the city. His own generals told him that he ought now to abdicate, as the allied sovereigns had declared that they would no longer treat with him. A decree of the Senate also declared that Napoleon Bonaparte, in consequence of sundry arbitrary acts and violations of the constitution (which were specified and classed under various heads in the preamble to the decree), and by his refusing to treat with the allies upon honourable conditions, had forfeited the throne and the right of inheritance established in his family, and that the people and the army of France were freed from their oath of allegiance to him. A provisional government was formed, consisting of Talleyrand, Bournonville, Dalberg, and others. Upon this, Bonaparte, after much reluctance, and upon his generals refusing to join him in a last desperate attempt upon Paris, which he meditated, signed the act of abdication at Fontainebleau on the 4th of April, 1814. In this first act there was a reservation in favour of the rights of the Empress and of his son. By a second act, however, he "renounced unconditionally" for himself and his heirs the throne of France and Italy. The Emperor Alexander proposed that he should retain the title of Emperor, with the sovereignty of the island of Elba, and a revenue of six millions of francs to be paid by France. This was agreed to

by Prussia and Austria; and England, though no party to the treaty, afterwards acceded to it. On the 20th of April, Napoleon, after taking an affectionate leave of his generals and his guards, left Fontainebleau for Elba. He ran some danger from the populace in passing through Provence, but arrived safe at Fréjus, where he embarked on board the British frigate, the Undaunted, and on the 4th of May landed at Porto Ferrajo, in the island of Elba. (See, for the history of all these transactions in France, Baron Fain, *Manuscrit de* 1814. See also the *Narrative of Napoleon Bonaparte's Journey from Fontainebleau to Fréjus in April*, 1814, by Count Truchses Waldburg, attendant Prussian commissary.) Napoleon's interview on the road with Augereau, who had issued an abusive proclamation against him, and other curious particulars concerning Napoleon on his journey, are found in the latter work.

CHAPTER XIV.

Condition of France after the Treaty of Paris, May, 1814—Partial discontent—Intrigues at Elba—Napoleon lands at Cannes—He arrives at Paris unopposed—His new Constitution or Charter—He marches towards Belgium—He attacks Blücher, and defeats him; he attacks the English under Wellington, and is defeated—Signs a second abdication—Embarks on board the Bellerophon—Arrives at Torbay—Is removed on board the Northumberland, which takes him to St. Helena—His altercations with the Governor of the island—Falls ill and dies, 5th of May, 1821—Account of his son, young Napoleon—The body of Napoleon Bonaparte is removed from St. Helena, and solemnly interred at Paris—Conclusion.

EUROPE had risen in arms and marched to Paris, not to insult or dismember France, not to prescribe to her the adoption of any particular dynasty, but to demand the termination of Bonaparte's intolerable military dictatorship over the world, of that tremendous power which weighed upon every nation and every individual from the Tagus to the Niemen, and from the shores of the Baltic to the Straits of Messina. The restoration of the Bourbon dynasty was afterwards effected by a French party, with no very marked encouragement from the Allied sovereigns, at least at the commencement. But it was in a great measure in consequence of that restoration, which then seemed to afford the best guarantee for the future peace of the world,

that France was treated with unexpected leniency, more like a friend than a vanquished enemy. A broad distinction was drawn between France and Napoleon. The Allied troops evacuated France. Louis XVIII. gave a constitutional charter to the kingdom. The frontiers of France remained as they had been before the Revolution, with some additions on the side of Savoy, Avignon, Montbeliard, and some other districts. The state was larger than Louis XIV. had left it. All the French colonies were restored with the exception of the Mauritius, Tobago, and St. Lucie, which were ceded to England. Two-thirds of the ships of war, ammunition, and naval stores in the foreign ports formerly annexed to France were given up to her. France was left in possession of all the works of art which she had taken from Italy, Germany, and Spain. Such was the treaty of Paris of May, 1814, and certainly its stipulations could not be styled as harsh towards France. But the party of Napoleon, the party of war, were not, could not be, pleased. This is not surprising, but what is surprising is that writers, long after the event, should accuse the Allies of having been too hard upon France. By a singular obliquity of judgment they talk as if France had a right to dictate her own conditions, even when her capital and one-half of the country were in possession of the Allied armies. They seem persuaded that France, whether conquering or conquered, had a prescriptive right to be the first, the only great nation in Europe. Napoleon had told them this so often, that they became convinced of the truth and reasonableness of the principle.

Napoleon remained in the Island of Elba about *ten months.* At first he seemed reconciled to his

lot: he set about making roads, and improving the fortifications; but after some months he was observed to become more reserved, gloomy, and frequently absent and lost in thought. He was, in fact, at the time, engaged in secret correspondence with his friends in France and Italy. During so many years of supreme power, attended by most splendid success, he had formed, of course, many adherents; men whose fortune was dependent on his, and most of whom had lost their emoluments and prospects by his fall. The bold and aspiring, the reckless and restless, saw no further prospect of conquest and new organization of foreign states, which had formerly placed at Napoleon's disposal thousands of offices and situations with which to reward his partisans. The old soldiers, to whom the camp had become a home, regretted him who used to lead them from victory to victory, affording them free quarters, a continual change of scenery, and pleasant cantonments in the finest cities of Europe. His brothers, sisters, and other relatives, all rich, and some still powerful, as Murat at Naples, felt that by his fall they had lost the main prop of their family. On the other side, the restored Bourbons had committed faults, and had listened perhaps too much to the old emigrants by whom they were surrounded; and lastly, France in general had been too long in a state of violent excitement to subside at once into a quiet and contented repose. Many of the subordinate agents of the police, post-office, and other departments were in Napoleon's interest. A wide conspiracy was formed, the old Republicans joined the Bonapartists, and Napoleon was invited to return to France. Fleury de Chaboulon's 'History of the Hundred Days' gives an

account of the intrigues carried on with Napoleon at Elba.

On the 26th of February, 1815, Napoleon embarked with about 1000 men of his old guards, who had followed him to Elba, and landed on the 1st of March, at Cannes, not far from Fréjus. At Grenoble the first defection in the army took place: Colonel Labedoyère, commanding the 7th regiment of the line, joined Napoleon; the rest of the march to Paris was a triumphant one. The Bourbons were abandoned by the whole army. Marshal Ney, who was sent by Louis XVIII. to stop Napoleon's progress, went over to him; but Macdonald and Marmont, and several other Marshals, remained faithful to the oath they had taken to the king. Augereau also kept aloof from Napoleon; but the Bourbons had no troops on which they could depend. Napoleon arrived at the Tuileries on the 20th of March, Louis XVIII. having left the capital early in the morning by the road to Flanders. Napoleon's return to Paris was accompanied with the acclamations of the military, and the lower classes in the suburbs; but the great body of the citizens looked on astounded and silent: he was recalled by a party, but evidently not by the body of the nation.

The Congress of Vienna was still sitting, when Talleyrand laid before them the news of Bonaparte's landing at Cannes. They immediately agreed again to unite their forces, in order to frustrate his attempt, and to maintain entire the execution of the Treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814, made with France under the constitutional monarchy of the Bourbon dynasty. The Austrian, Russian, and Prussian armies, which had evacuated

France, resumed their march towards the frontiers of that country.

Napoleon found, on his return to Paris, that he could not resume the unlimited authority which he had before his abdication. The Republicans and Constitutionalists, who had assisted, or not opposed his return, with Carnot, Fouché, Benjamin Constant, and his own brother Lucien at their head, would support him only on condition of his reigning as a constitutional sovereign; he therefore proclaimed a constitution under the title of 'Acte additionnel aux Constitutions de l'Empire,' which greatly resembled the charter granted by Louis XVIII. the year before. There were to be an hereditary chamber of peers appointed by the Emperor, a chamber of representatives chosen by the electoral colleges, and to be renewed every five years, by which all taxes were to be voted; ministers were to be responsible; judges irremovable; the right of petition was acknowledged, and property was declared inviolable. Lastly, the French nation was made to declare that they would never recall the Bourbons; deputies from the departments came to Paris to swear to the additional act, at the Champ de Mai, as it was called, although held on the 1st of June. The Emperor and his brothers were present at the ceremony.

The chambers opened on the 4th of June, while Napoleon prepared to march towards the frontiers of Flanders, where the allied English and Prussian armies were gathering. He assembled an army of about 120,000 men, chiefly old troops, of whom 25,000 were cavalry, and 350 pieces of cannon, with which he advanced upon Charleroi, on the 15th of June. Ney, Soult, and Grouchy led

commands under Napoleon. On the 16th Napoleon attacked in person Marshal Blücher, who was posted with 80,000 men at Ligny, and drove him back with great loss. At the same time he sent Ney against part of the English army at Quatre Bras, which, after sustaining a severe attack, retained possession of the field. In the morning of the 17th, the Duke of Wellington, in consequence of Blücher's retreat, fell back with his army to the position of Waterloo. Napoleon followed him, after despatching, on the 17th, Grouchy, with a body of 30,000 men, to follow the retreat of the Prussians. (Grouchy's 'Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815, par le Général Gourgaud,' Philadelphia, 1818.) On the 18th the famous battle of Waterloo took place. According to Captain Siborne's statement from authentic documents, Napoleon's force at the commencement of the battle was 71,947 men and 246 guns, and the effective strength of the Allied army was 67,661 men and 156 guns. Of the Allied army about 24,000 were British, and about 6000 of the King's German Legion in the British service; the rest was composed of Hanoverian, Brunswick, Belgian, Dutch, and Nassau troops. The events of the battle are well known. The French made several furious attacks with infantry and cavalry upon the British line, gained some advantages, and took possession of La Haye Sainte, but all the efforts of their cavalry could not break the British squares. In these repeated attacks, the French cavalry was nearly destroyed. At six o'clock Bulow's Prussian corps appeared on the field of battle, about 10,000 strong with 40 guns. Napoleon now made a last desperate effort to break the

English line, before the Prussians could act: he directed his guard, which had not yet taken part in the action, to advance in two columns against the English. They were received with a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry; they attempted to deploy, but in so doing became confused, and at last gave way. Napoleon, who was following with his eye, through a spy-glass, the motions of his favourite guards, turned pale and exclaimed, "They are mixed together!" and galloped off the field. (See and compare the various accounts of the battle of Waterloo, by English, French, and Prussian military writers; among the rest, Captain Pringle of the Engineers; Captain Barry, Baron Muffling, under the assumed initials of C. de W., 'Histoire de la Campagne de l'Armée Anglaise et de l'Armée Prussienne en 1815,' Stuttgart, 1817; Gourgaud's 'Narrative of the War of 1815,' with Grouchy's important comments upon it; Foy, 'Campagne de 1815;' Napoleon's own account in Montholon and Las Cases, and in the 'Mémoires Historiques,' published by O'Meara; Ney's 'Letter to the Duke of Otranto,' Paris, 1815; Rogniat's account of the battle, and Captain Siborne's 'History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815.)

The French accounts vary as to several circumstances of the battle. One thing is certain, that Napoleon attacked the English repeatedly with all his force, and was repulsed, with the loss of the flower of his troops; that after the last attack by his guards, at seven in the evening, which also failed, he had no reserve left; and the arrival of Blücher with fresh troops on the field of battle changed the repulse into a total defeat. The astonishing firmness of the British infantry (to which

several French generals, and Foy among the rest, have paid an eloquent tribute of praise) gained the day; Bonaparte's army fled in dreadful confusion, pursued by the Prussians, and lost cannon, baggage, and all. The loss of the English was 12,000 men in killed and wounded, including about 600 officers. In the preceding battle of Quatre Bras on the 16th the English army had about 3000 men killed or wounded. Generals Picton and Ponsonby were among the killed at Waterloo. On the same day Grouchy was engaged at Wavre, thirteen miles distant, with one division of the Prussian army, which gave him full employment, while the other Prussian divisions were marching to Waterloo. His orders were to follow the Prussians, and attack them wherever he met them. Napoleon seems to have underrated the strength of the Prussians, when he thought Grouchy's corps sufficient to keep in check the whole of their army.

The battle of Waterloo finally closed a war, or rather a succession of wars, which had lasted with little interruption for twenty-three years, beginning with 1792. As to these wars, Napoleon is only strictly accountable for those which took place after he had attained supreme power in France: in some of them, such as those of Spain and of Russia, he was decidedly the aggressor. Whether he did not likewise give sufficient provocation to those which Austria, England, and Prussia waged against him, the reader must judge for himself. His determination to be the dictator, the umpire of all Europe, left no chance of national independence to any country; if he had subjected all Europe, he would have reverted to his old scheme of the conquest of the East. Even his peace establishment, supposing

him ever to have been at peace, was to consist of an army of 800,000 men, besides 400,000 of reserve. (Montholon's 'Memoirs of Napoleon,' vol. i.) During the ten years of the Empire, he raised by conscription two millions one hundred and seventy-three thousand men, of whom two-thirds, at the least, perished in foreign lands, or were maimed for life.

After the defeat of Waterloo, Napoleon, having given his brother Jerome directions to rally the remains of the army, hurried back to Paris. The House of Representatives declared itself permanent, and demanded his abdication. Lucien appeared before the house, and spoke eloquently of the former services of his brother, and of the claims which he had on the gratitude of France. "We have followed your brother (answered Lafayette) over the sands of Africa, and through the frozen deserts of Russia; the whitened bones of Frenchmen scattered over every part of the globe bear witness to our long fidelity to him." Lucien made no impression on the assembly. He advised his brother to dissolve the chamber; Napoleon refused: "It would be the signal," he said, "of civil war." The House of Peers had adopted the same views as the lower house. There was but one man, it was openly stated, between France and peace. Napoleon signed his second abdication on the 22nd of June; but this time it was of his own accord, and against the advice of his intimate friends, Carnot, Lucien, and others. The abdication was in favour of his son, Napoleon II. A provisional government was appointed by the chambers, and they required that Napoleon should leave France, and embark at Rochefort for the United States.

General Becker was appointed to escort him to Rochefort, where he arrived on the 3rd of July. All this did not take place, however, without many violent altercations in the chambers, and much reluctance on the part of Napoleon. The Allies, who entered Paris on the 7th of July, refused to acknowledge Napoleon's right to abdicate in favour of his son, and on the following day Louis XVIII. re-entered the capital, and resumed the government.

Napoleon at Rochefort, seeing that the whole country around him was submitting to the Bourbons, and finding that he had no chance of escaping by sea, through the vigilance of the English cruisers stationed along the coast, sent Count Las Cases and Savary to Captain Maitland, who commanded the English ship Bellerophon, to ask for leave to proceed to America, either in a French or a neutral vessel. Captain Maitland replied, "That his instructions forbade this, but that if Napoleon chose to proceed to England, he would take him there on board the Bellerophon, without, however, entering into any promise as to the reception he might meet with there, as he was in total ignorance of the intentions of the British government as to his future disposal." This offer was made by Captain Maitland, in his second interview with Las Cases, on the 14th of July; but Napoleon had already, the day before, written a letter addressed to the Prince Regent of England, saying, that "he came, like Themistocles, to claim the hospitality of the British people, and the protection of its laws." Captain Maitland offered to despatch General Gourgaud *to England* with this letter immediately, *repeating at the* same time to him "that he was

myself under the protection of you
your laws." On the 24th the ship en
On the 31st of July Admiral Lord
Henry Bunbury, under secretary of s
board the Bellerophon, to announce to
resolution of the British governme
Island of St. Helena should be his fut
Napoleon protested against this deter
he was not a prisoner of war, that he
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had been that of a man of honour."
Napoleon removed from the Beller
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which was appointed to carry him t

By a convention signed at Paris on the 20th of August, 1815, between Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the custody of Napoleon's person was intrusted to the British government, and commissioners were appointed by Russia, Austria, and France to reside at St. Helena to look after his safe detention. In July, 1816, General Sir Hudson Lowe arrived at St. Helena as governor of the island. From the very first interview Bonaparte behaved uncivilly, or rather insultingly, to that officer, and this treatment was repeated with aggravation at every subsequent opportunity. One of Napoleon's great grievances was being styled General Bonaparte; another, his not being allowed to stroll about the island unattended by a British officer. He was allowed a space measuring eight and afterwards twelve miles in circumference round Longwood, through which he might range at his pleasure; beyond these limits he was to be accompanied by an officer. But the real grievance was that of being detained as a prisoner at all. The governor, however, had no power to remedy these subjects of complaint. Various minor matters of dispute with the governor were laid hold of by Bonaparte and his attendants, as if with the view of keeping alive an interest in the public mind in favour of the exile of St. Helena. We cannot enter into the particulars of this petty system of warfare, in which, as it generally happens, both parties may have occasionally been in the wrong. But it is impossible to read even Napoleon's statements, made through Las Cases, Santini, Antommarchi, and others, without perceiving that there was a *determination* on his part not to be pleased *with anything* that the governor could do for him,

unless he had disobeyed his orders. Napoleon's mind was in a state of irritation whenever he recurred to the subject of his confinement, which made him querulous and peevish. He was no philosopher in adversity; but it must be said in justice to him that he never pretended to be a philosopher at any time. He used always to sneer at moral philosophy, which he called ideology. His mind was cast in a material mould; it could encompass the earth within its aspiring grasp, but it did not soar above the earth's surface. While at St. Helena he seemed to have had, almost to the last, some latent hope of making his escape. In other respects the particulars of his life and conversations at St. Helena are highly interesting. He could be very agreeable towards visitors who were admitted to pay their respects to him, as we may see from Mr. Ellis's and Captain Hall's accounts of their interviews with him. In September, 1818, Napoleon's health began to be visibly affected, but he would take no medicines. He also refused to ride out, as advised, because he would not submit to the attendance of a British officer. In September, 1819, Dr. Antommarchi, of the University of Pisa, came to St. Helena as physician to Napoleon. Two clergymen came also from Italy to act as his chaplains. Towards the end of 1820 he grew worse, and remained in a weak state until the following April, when the disease assumed an alarming character. It was then that Bonaparte said that he believed it was the same disorder which killed his father, namely, a schirrus in the *pylorus*; and he desired Dr. Antommarchi to examine his stomach after his death. He made his will, leaving large bequests to his friends

and attendants. This will is a remarkable document.

On the night of the 29th of April he desired Count Montholon to send for the chaplain Vignali, to whom he confessed, and from whom he received the sacrament and the extreme unction. The next morning he told Montholon that he was now happy. "I have fulfilled all my religious duties, and I wish you may have the same happiness at your death. I needed it; I am an Italian, a child of Corsica. The sound of bells affects me, the sight of a priest pleases me. I wanted to keep all this secret, but that would not be right; I must, I will give glory to God. I doubt whether he will be pleased to restore my health. But that is of no matter; give your orders, General, to raise an altar in the next apartment, and have the sacred host exposed upon it, and prayers said for forty hours." And then, recollecting himself, he said he would give directions himself. General Bertrand, hearing of these preparations, went to remonstrate with Napoleon, saying that such a display was more suited to a monk than to an old soldier. Napoleon then raising himself on his bed, cried out in a loud tone of voice: "General, I am here at home; you have no orders to give here, none to receive; why do you come here? I don't interfere in your household affairs." Bertrand went away somewhat nettled. On the 3rd of May Napoleon received the sacrament a second time, and after bidding farewell to his officers, he exclaimed: "I am at peace with all human kind;" and clasping his hands together, he said, "Oh, *my God!*" He then became delirious, and some unconnected words, of "head of column," "army,"

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escaped him, showing that his mind was wandering through visions of battle-fields. At six in the evening of the 5th of May he expired.

The following day the body was opened by English surgeons of the garrison, in presence of Dr. Antommarchi, Generals Bertrand and Montholon, and several British officers. The cause of his death was soon made apparent—a large ulcer spread over a great part of the stomach. The adhesion of the stomach to the liver had been the means of lengthening his existence for some time.

On the 8th of May his remains were interred with military honours in Slane's Valley, near a fountain overhung by weeping willows. This had been a favourite spot with Napoleon. The procession was followed to the grave by the Governor, the Admiral, Napoleon's attendants, and all the civil and military authorities. The grave was afterwards enclosed by a railing, and a sentry was kept on duty to guard the spot.

For the acts of Napoleon's internal administration, see 'Bulletin des Lois de l'Empire' and the 'Exposés' of his ministers; for the state of the finances, see the various 'Comptes-rendus,' or reports of the Duke of Gaeta (Gaudin), and also Bresson, 'Histoire Financière de France;' for the military institutions and organization of the army, see 'Tableau Politique et Militaire,' which precedes Foy's 'History of the Peninsular War.' Also 'Mémoires sur l'Empire,' by Thibaudeau, which is a continuation of his 'Memoirs on the Consulate,' the Duchess of Abrantes' 'Mémoires,' the numerous Memoirs of Napoleon's generals and ministers, and Capefigue's work, 'L'Europe pendant le Consulat et l'Empire de Napoléon,' the most impar-

tially written of all French contemporary histories. The article 'Napoleon,' in the supplement to the 'Biographie Universelle,' contains many interesting particulars of his life.

NAPOLEON-FRANÇOIS, the only son of Napoleon, after his father's first abdication in 1814, went with his mother to Vienna, where he was brought up at the court of his grandfather, the Emperor Francis, who made him Duke of Reichstadt. His education was carefully attended to, and he was early trained up to the military profession. After passing through the various subordinate grades he was made a lieutenant-colonel in June, 1831, and he took the command of a battalion of Hungarian infantry then in garrison at Vienna. He was extremely assiduous in his military duties, but his constitution was weak; he had grown very tall and slender, and symptoms of a consumptive habit had early shown themselves. His physician advised a removal to Schönbrunn, which had at first a beneficial effect, but a relapse soon followed; and after lingering for several months young Napoleon died on the 22nd of July, 1832, in the palace of Schönbrunn, attended by his mother, who had come from Parma to visit him. He seems to have been generally regretted at the Austrian court, especially by his grandfather, the Emperor, who had always behaved to him with paternal kindness. There is an interesting account of this young man's short career by M. de Montbel, 'Le Duc de Reichstadt,' Paris, 1832.

In the *first sentence* of Napoleon's will, written *only a few days before* his death, he says:—"It is

my wish that my ashes may repose on the banks of the Seine, and in the midst of the French people, whom I have loved so well." During the Restoration no steps were taken towards fulfilling the Emperor's last request, but after the Revolution of July (1830), when the statue of Napoleon was once more placed on the column in the Place Vendôme and the emblems of the Empire were no longer proscribed, the Chamber of Deputies came to a resolution urging upon the Executive the propriety of applying to the English government to give up his remains. It was not until M. Thiers became prime minister that steps were taken to carry the resolution of the Chamber into effect. In reply to the application of M. Thiers, Lord Palmerston said:—"The government of her Britannic Majesty hopes that the promptness of its answer may be considered in France as a proof of its desire to blot out the last trace of those national animosities which, during the life of the Emperor, armed England and France against each other. The British government hopes that if such sentiments survive anywhere, they may be buried in the tomb about to receive the remains of Napoleon."

On the 13th of May, 1840, the French Chamber was officially acquainted with the result of these negotiations, by the Minister of the Interior, who announced that Louis Philippe had ordered his son, the Prince de Joinville, to proceed to St. Helena. A grant of a million francs (40,000*l.*) was proposed to the Chamber by the government to defray the cost of the expedition and other expenses connected with the removal of the Emperor's remains. A proposition to increase the grant to two million francs and one to extend it to five millions

were rejected in favour of the original sum. On the 7th of July, La Belle Poule and La Favorite frigates sailed from Toulon, and on the 8th of October they reached St. Helena. The exhumation was commenced at midnight on the 15th of the same month, and after nine hours of hard labour the coffin was reached, and on being opened, the body of the Emperor was found in a singular state of preservation. It had not been embalmed, but the dryness of the spot and the care with which the grave had been closed, had prevented all decay. The lineaments of the pallid countenance were still preserved, and the small hands retained their whiteness. A procession of the civil and military authorities of the island accompanied the body to the shore, where it was given into the hands of the Prince de Joinville. On the 18th the frigates weighed anchor, and on the 30th of November arrived in Cherbourg roads.

On the 8th of December the sarcophagus containing the remains was transferred from the frigate to the Normandie steamboat, which proceeded up the Seine. Before arriving at Rouen, the coffin was placed on board a funeral barge constructed for the purpose, and was towed up the Seine by a small steam-boat. As the procession moved slowly up the river, all the population of Rouen and the civil and military authorities of the city were assembled on the quays to witness the spectacle; and the remainder of the voyage was marked by popular demonstrations of a similar nature, the smallest villages exhibiting some proof or other of the general feeling which hailed the return of Napoleon to the soil of France. On the night of the 14th of December the flotilla (which consisted of

several vessels, and was accompanied by the Prince de Joinville and the seamen of La Belle Poule) reached Courbevoie, a short distance from Paris.

The morning of the 15th opened gloomily, but the sun afterwards broke forth, gleaming on the arms and banners of the military and the national guard of Paris and the vicinity, who were collected in great force. The whole population of Paris and the surrounding places flocked towards the barrier of Neuilly and Courbevoie, to participate in a scene so full of striking recollections. At eleven o'clock the body was removed from a steamboat to a Grecian temple erected for its reception, and soon after the train was in motion. It proceeded slowly, the immense funeral car being drawn by sixteen horses. The remains of the Emperor were placed on the top of this catafalque, which was ornamented with white plumes and various devices and gorgeous emblazonments; the drapery consisted of a splendid mantle of violet velvet. Before the car were carried eighty-six eagles, emblematic of the eighty-six departments of France. Marshals and Generals, attended by brilliant staffs, and the principal functionaries in the various departments of the government, joined the procession, which included the Prince de Joinville and the crew of La Belle Poule.

Among the assemblage were many of Napoleon's old soldiers. Here were the men who had fought on the great battle-fields of the Revolutionary war, on the Rhine, in Italy, under the Pyramids, and from Vienna to Madrid and Moscow. They had entered all the great capitals of Continental Europe. It was a striking and impressive spectacle to behold these relics of the Imperial Guard, the

Mamelukes of the Guard, the Polish Lancers of the Guard, and the most of the other "arms" so celebrated in the campaigns of the Republic, the Consulate, and the Empire.

The procession halted for a time beneath the Triumphal Arch at the barrier of Neuilly; then passing along the Champs Elysées it entered the Place de la Concorde, turning to the right towards the Hôtel des Invalides. The coffin, which was borne as on landing at Courbevoie by the seamen of La Belle Poule, was carried to the entrance of the church, into which it was carried by thirty-two non-commissioned officers: the coffin was covered with a funeral pall, and the imperial crown was placed upon it. The remains were received by a large body of the clergy, headed by the Archbishop of Paris. The king and royal family, with the most distinguished persons in France, were seated in the places provided for them. As the procession advanced, the roll of drums and the thunder of artillery were heard, and the military bands performed solemn dirges for the dead. The archbishop and the clergy recited the prayers for the occasion. Louis Philippe, surrounded by the great officers of the state, formally received the body, and commanded General Bertrand to place the sword and hat of the Emperor on the coffin. The ceremony concluded by the performance of a grand mass.

Napoleon's last place of rest is not inappropriately in the soldiers' asylum—the Chelsea Hospital of France.

not obliterate from our mind the fearful recollection of that galling yoke, of that universal system of military despotism which weighed equally upon every country and every nation. Europe has made an immense progress during the last thirty years of peace. A great portion of the French people themselves hailed the first downfal of Napoleon, which to the rest of Europe was a real deliverance.

"Napoleon, when Emperor," says Capefigue, "strained to the utmost the springs of his power; in striving to crush down all opposition to his will, he hurt those sensitive chords which vibrate in the hearts of the multitudes. It was at the time of the greatest apparent splendour of his Empire, after the conferences of Tilsit and Erfurt, that he began to lose his moral power, because he wounded too many interests, and too many consciences. In a struggle of this kind, resistance multiplies itself; for every obstacle which is crushed down, another is sure to rise. An opposition which has its origin in the feelings of the masses is indestructible like the masses themselves. See how the great Emperor dealt with them! He respected no nationality, he annulled them. Hence the resistance of the Spaniards; hence the secret societies which formed themselves in Germany and Italy, and which conspired against the huge dictatorship of Napoleon. It was by invoking the holy laws of nationality that Major Schill took the field at the head of his band; the students of the universities gathered together under the magic symbols of Fatherland and liberty; Teutonia and Germania were the two great images inscribed on their banners. In Spain the feeling of religion allied itself with the spirit of independence—the monks were sprung from the

people, and they rallied with the people; and by a curious anomaly numbers of students at Salamanca and Oviedo assumed the denominations of Cassius and Scævola. Napoleon put on the tone and bearing of a classical conqueror, and the people invoked against him the avenging recollections of classical republicanism . . . . . At this period of his dictatorial power, Napoleon became reckless, he respected nothing; he employed artifice as well as force, all means were alike to him. . . . . In the affairs of Spain, in the transactions of Bayonne with Ferdinand VII. and Charles IV., there is nothing but disloyalty and treachery. Napoleon disdained to carry his object by bold open force; he employed legal chicanery, subterfuge, casuistry unworthy of his station. He not only deceived a degenerate family of princes, but he betrayed a whole brave and proud nation; but the game was hazardous for him. It was in the 'revolting iniquities of Bayonne,' as Foy calls them, that the Spanish war originated. And yet at St. Helena Napoleon is made to say that the affair of Bayonne was not an iniquity, but an immense 'coup d'état.' That 'coup d'état,' however, produced a sinister influence on the public mind of all Europe. In the same manner and about the same time, he ran himself against the Pope, a helpless but venerable old man, to whom he owed some gratitude, whom he had courted and caressed during the Consulship, and at the time of his coronation. He thus roused against himself the religious feelings of a great portion of mankind; and in this new contest, all his armies and all his cannon were unavailing; they could batter down fortresses, crush whole battalions,—but they could not subdue *opinions and convictions*, whether religious or political.

"And lastly, Napoleon attacked likewise the material and social interests of men. His mind conceived the Continental System, a gigantic but impracticable undertaking. How could he alter and recast the commercial intercourse of nations? God has awarded to each country its staple products, and the means of its wealth; and it is by their exchange, that nations attain a high degree of civilization. These principles of the order of nature Napoleon disdained; his hatred against England made him blind, he thought of breaking the springs of commerce by accumulating restrictions and custom-houses. He was seized with a sort of puerile joy when he was told that sugar could be made out of raisins, beet-root, and other substances; he organized a custom-house office in his own saloons, from whence he proscribed the cotton of England and the muslins of India even on the shoulders of weak females. He made wars, gained battles, shed torrents of blood for his pet Continental System; he followed it up every where; he imposed it upon other states as a condition of treaties; and then, after so many exertions, he himself, by one of those contradictions which a dictator alone can resort to, violated his own system by the grant of licences: he made himself the only trader in his dominions, a monopolist after the fashion of the East. The liberty of commerce became an object of traffic, of imperial speculation; every where English goods were burnt, the finest stuffs were reduced to ashes; and yet this odious system was turned into ridicule: so much so that the first thing that Maria Louisa did in her journey to Holland, was to provide herself with dresses and gauzes of English manufacture.

The cord was strained so much that it snapped: the task of annihilating liberty of thought and liberty of commerce was too great even for a giant."

It was, then, about 1809 that the war in Europe assumed a new character. It was no longer a war of governments and of regular armies; the people came armed into the field, fighting for their dearest interests. What right had one man to torment, to unsettle, to recast into a mould of his own, the whole human race? Who had given him this fearful mission? Even those nations who remained docile under his sway felt a lively sympathy for the heroes and martyrs of national independence. The long desperate struggle of the Spaniards, which at times appeared hopeless, was watched with intense anxiety by the rest of Europe. Spain and Germany gave their thousands of victims to the common cause, ere that cause had attained its maturity and its triumph; for the progress of resistance was slow, though sure in the end.

And what was the character of those national wars? It was cruel and merciless on both sides, as all such wars are; and Napoleon's system of warfare added to its horrors. His military economy, especially in countries where he was opposed by the mass of the people, such as in Spain and in Russia, was wasteful and reckless; it was more Asiatic than European; it was calculated to bring Europe back to a state of barbarism. To throw enormous masses into an enemy's country, without magazines, without tents, without adequate means of transport, without moveable hospitals; to depend entirely upon {forced requisitions and marauding, *shooting those* who resisted or obstructed such *violent proceedings*; regardless of communications

with the rear, reckoning upon one-half of the army attaining its object at the cost of the other half: this is certainly a system of warfare not worthy of a civilized nation and age, nor creditable to the head or heart of him who enforced it. We must now let more competent authorities speak on this subject. The French General Foy, a witness and an actor in the Peninsular war, thus writes in his history of that war:—"Similar to the avalanche rushing down from the summit of the Alps upon the valley beneath, our countless armies by their mere passage destroyed in a few hours the resources of a whole country. They generally bivouacked, and where they happened to halt, our soldiers demolished houses which had stood for a century, in order to construct with their materials those long uniform villages which were frequently destined to last but for a day or two. Where forest-timber was not at hand, fruit-trees of the most valuable kind, such as the olive, mulberry, and orange trees, were felled for fuel: had our soldiers waited for supplies till the administration of the army served them with rations, they might have starved. The young conscripts, transported by a magic power from their quiet homes to the extremities of Europe, intermingled all at once with men of all countries, and being irritated by want and danger, contracted a moral intoxication of which we cared not to cure them, because it prevented their sinking under unparalleled fatigues. . . . . This disorder being considered as unavoidable, it became impossible to fix its limits; it attached itself to our wars of invasion like a consuming cancer. The scourge became still more fearful when exasperated passions put arms into the hands of the country-people, men

who were not called upon by their condition to bear them. Then the war between army and people partook of the nature of civil war, in which crimes are perpetrated on both sides without exciting either horror or disgust. Our soldiers, generous in their relations with other warriors, were inexorable towards the patriot who had taken arms to defend the fruit of his garden or the honour of his daughters; the tool concealed beneath the garb of labour seemed to them the poniard of a disguised assassin. The military reports presented nothing else but a series of villages plundered, and towns taken by storm; and if it happened that the ministers of a God of peace transformed themselves into leaders of insurrection, one is not surprised that young soldiers, though they had been used to religious practices, threw aside their former habits, and violated churches and convents and even the asylums of the dead."

But even in countries where the people took no part in the contest, such as Austria and Prussia, during the campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809, the system of marauding was regularly organized. There is a graphic sketch of it by a French subaltern officer, Lieutenant Bleaze, in his 'Recollections of Military Life under Napoleon's Empire.'

"Here we are, then, in a charming plain, cut up by the artillery, trampled down by the cavalry. It is here that we are to sleep. The order is given; twenty men of each company are sent to the neighbouring villages to fetch wood, straw, and provisions. A curious sight soon presents itself to our view. 'The fair will be a good one,' say the soldiers, 'the dealers are coming.' On all sides we see, in fact, our intrepid freebooters arriving, laden with sacks of poultry, baskets of eggs, and

piles of loaves, stuck upon the ramrods of their pieces. Some are driving before them sheep and cows, oxen and pigs: others are making peasants, whom they have put in requisition, carry straw and wood for them. From the sour looks of the latter, and from the interjections that escape them, you plainly perceive that they are far from pleased; but their words are drowned by the cries of the animals, and by the loud laughter of the soldiers. . . . Those who have never been engaged in war cannot form any idea of the calamities that it brings in its train.

"Sometimes the general took it into his head to forbid marauding, and this was done by fits and starts; for a fortnight or three weeks the soldiers were allowed to rob as they pleased, because there were no provisions to distribute. If a few waggon-loads of bread or biscuit arrived, an order of the day immediately forbade every kind of pillage, and the first wretched wight taken in the fact suffered for all. I have seen many of these petty robbers shot for stealing a shirt or a pair of boots from a peasant; but never was a robber on a large financial scale visited with the slightest punishment. Sometimes the Emperor made them disgorge, but they were never shot. Military executions were only for the small fry! . . . . How many saints of gold and silver, how many pyxes and cups were transformed into ingots to be afterwards exchanged for hotels in Paris! How many diamonds and rubies, after adorning for ages the pompous and poetic ceremonies of the Roman Catholic Church, must have been utterly astonished to find themselves on the bare bosom of an opera-dancer! The magnificent pictures which decorated the churches of Spain almost all found their way to France; they now adorn the galleries of the wealthy of our capital.

Had some of our amateurs of the fine arts, who protected them so efficiently in their baggage waggons by a strong escort, been picked out and shot, the war would not have become national. These dilapidations were the causes of the war to the death which the Spaniards waged against us; thousands of soldiers were massacred because certain persons had plundered the churches and the convents. . . . . But what I have ever disapproved, what was always a great affliction to me, was the severity with which pillage was punished one day, after it had been tacitly authorized for a month."

Such then was the character of Napoleon's wars during the Empire; and who can, after this, listen with patience to the grand plans attributed to him by his admirers for the benefit of the human race? In the countries which were quietly annexed directly or indirectly to his dominions, such as Italy, Holland, a great part of Germany, and the Duchy of Warsaw, what was the tenour of his administration? The laws were equally administered, but there was one individual above them, who could alter or suspend them at his pleasure, and he never failed to do so whenever his policy was concerned; the higher education was tolerably liberal, except in matters connected with politics; mendicity was abolished, but external or maritime commerce was annihilated; the harbours were deserted, whilst new roads were opened; canals were cut and public buildings were raised; the police was efficient in extirpating robbers, as well as in enforcing the harsh law of the conscription. As soon as he annexed a new province to his dominions, he procured minute information of the state of mind and the character of the people, and

of the resources and wants of the country; he was made acquainted with the men who were his partizans—and who were to be encouraged and rewarded, and with those who were dissatisfied and intriguing—and these were either silenced by fear or won over by giving them employment. The rich and noble were called to the court at Paris, the ambitious were flattered with titles and decorations, the needy men of talent received pensions, the learned and the artists were patronized. In this manner Napoleon, in spite of his oppressive regulations, contributions, and conscriptions, continued to have in every newly-acquired department a number of useful persons on his side, who watched over the internal peace and submission of the country.

The choice of his civil administrators was generally good, especially where he wished to conciliate. But it was otherwise in countries placed under military occupation, such as Prussia, Spain, Hanover, the Hanse Towns, which were left to the mercy of generals, commissaries, and military intendants. Napoleon would brook no opposition, no independence of spirit; and where he met with any, he was determined to crush it without mercy. Such was this extraordinary man, who will be recorded as one of the greatest and most successful captains of modern ages, and at the same time, we fervently hope, as

THE LAST OF EUROPEAN CONQUERORS.

THE END.

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